핵심요약

• 트럼프 대통령이 미국-이란 MoU 초안에 대한 60일 간의 논의 기간을 포함하는 수정 요청을 했습니다.
• 현재 MoU 초안에는 이란의 HEU 인도 또는 우라늄 농축 중단 의무가 명시되지 않았습니다.
• 호르무즈 해협 개방에 대한 트럼프 대통령의 요구와 이란의 주장이 충돌하고 있습니다.
• 이란은 호르무즈 해협이 개방되어 있다고 주장하지만, 미국은 IRGC 해군이 불법적인 교통 분리 체계를 강요하고 있다고 비판합니다.

도입

이번 기사는 미국과 이란 간의 긴장 관계와 관련된 최신 동향을 분석한 것으로, 투자자들에게 중요한 지정학적 리스크를 이해하는 데 도움을 줄 수 있습니다. 특히, 트럼프 대통령의 MoU 수정 요청과 호르무즈 해협 문제 해결을 위한 접근 방식이 향후 에너지 시장에 미칠 영향을 예측하는 데 중요한 정보를 제공합니다.

본문 1: HEU 확보 문제의 핵심이 되는 60일 논의 기간

트럼프 대통령이 미국-이란 MoU 초안에 대한 수정 요청에서 가장 강조한 부분은 HEU 확보 방법과 시기에 대한 조항입니다. 현재 초안에는 이란이 핵무기를 추구하지 않을 것을 약속하지만, HEU를 인도하거나 우라늄 농축을 중단할 의무를 명시하지 않았습니다. 이는 향후 미국과 이란 간의 협상 과정에서 HEU 확보를 둘러싼 갈등이 지속될 가능성이 높다는 것을 시사합니다. 특히, 이란이 HEU를 인도하거나 우라늄 농축을 중단할 의무가 없기 때문에, 미국이 이란의 핵 프로그램에 대한 감시를 강화해야 할 필요성이 있습니다. 이는 에너지 시장에 불안정을 초래할 수 있으며, 특히 중동 지역을 중심으로 한 원유 수출에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.

본문 2: 호르무즈 해협 개방 문제의 지정학적 영향

트럼프 대통령은 이란에 대해 호르무즈 해협을 즉시 개방하고 지뢰를 제거할 것을 요구했습니다. 그러나 이란은 호르무즈 해협이 이미 개방되어 있다고 주장하며, IRGC 해군이 불법적인 교통 분리 체계를 강요하고 있습니다. 이는 호르무즈 해협을 통과하는 선박에 대한 불안정을 초래할 수 있으며, 특히 원유 수출에 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 호르무즈 해협은 세계 원유 수출의 약 30%가 통과하는 중요한 해상 통로이기 때문에, 이 지역의 불안정이 지속될 경우 에너지 시장에 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 이는 투자자들에게 중동 지역을 중심으로 한 에너지 관련 주식에 대한 리스크를 고려해야 함을 의미합니다.

결론

이번 기사는 미국과 이란 간의 긴장 관계와 관련된 최신 동향을 분석한 것으로, 투자자들에게 중요한 지정학적 리스크를 이해하는 데 도움을 줄 수 있습니다. 특히, 트럼프 대통령의 MoU 수정 요청과 호르무즈 해협 문제 해결을 위한 접근 방식이 향후 에너지 시장에 미칠 영향을 예측하는 데 중요한 정보를 제공합니다. 향후 미국과 이란 간의 협상 과정에서 HEU 확보를 둘러싼 갈등이 지속될 가능성이 높으며, 호르무즈 해협의 불안정이 에너지 시장에 영향을 미칠 가능성도 있습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 리스크를 고려하여 중동 지역을 중심으로 한 에너지 관련 주식에 대한 포트폴리오를 조정해야 할 것입니다.

---

원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikwFBVV95cUxPaUNMRmF2dGdJeEJLZXEtaU1mdW8tUE1QS0lsX1p1U1lvM01fM1hHOW5wNUxJaGwySFd1LWVaa0F1U3UxMGZvNXdTZElmQ0ZoQ1hoMFdjZWltbGc1bGNsMERoakMwMGVudXNBZENlN0hhOG9SWlZKZVlfb29UeXN1aVhMMW9MMjROaGJBY2VHVEwzWFU?oc=5

Iran Update Special Report, May 31, 2026 - Institute for the Study of War

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

US President Donald Trump has requested several amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) as the United States and Iran remain at odds over key issues. A senior Trump administration official and a second unspecified source told Axios on May 30 that Trump requested several amendments to the draft MoU.[1] The officials said that Trump specifically requested amendments to the draft’s text about how and when the United States would secure Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU).[2] The current draft MoU states that Iran would commit to not pursue a nuclear weapon but does not contain any Iranian commitments to hand over Iran’s HEU or halt enrichment.[3] The current draft states that the United States and Iran would discuss nuclear issues during a 60-day period after the parties sign the MoU.[4] Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that Iran will not suspend uranium enrichment or transfer its HEU from Iran.[5]

A second informed source told Axios that Trump also requested changes to the draft MoU’s text on the Strait of Hormuz.[6] The source did not specify what specific changes Trump requested, however.[7] Trump previously called on Iran on May 29 to “immediately open” the Strait of Hormuz without tolls and to remove mines from the strait.[8] The United States and Iran have different definitions of “opening” the strait, however.[9] Iranian officials and media continue to claim that the strait is “open” despite the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy forcing vessels to transit through Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme.[10] Two unspecified US officials told Axios on May 28 that, under the current draft MoU, Iran would allow “unrestricted” shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, stop imposing tolls and harassing vessels in the strait, and remove naval mines within 30 days, while the United States would lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.[11] Iranian officials have also claimed that Iran is charging vessels “protection fees” and “environmental fees” instead of “tolls.”[12] Iran remains the only power that has threatened civilian shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during this war, meaning that its “protection fee” is a protection racket that ships must pay to avoid Iranian attack.

Three US officials separately told the New York Times on May 30 that Trump is concerned about parts of the draft MoU that would involve the United States unfreezing Iranian funds.[13] Trump previously appeared to reject unfreezing Iranian funds on May 29, stating that “no money will be exchanged until further notice.”[14] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that the United States must unfreeze frozen Iranian assets in order for Iran to accept any potential agreement.[15] An Iranian official affiliated with Iran’s negotiating delegation stated on May 30 that Iran could withdraw from a US-Iran agreement if the United States “does not meet its commitments,” including unfreezing Iranian funds.[16]

Unspecified informed sources told Israeli media that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not responded to either the current draft MoU or Trump’s proposed amendments.[17] IRGC-affiliated media argued that it would be better to not reach an agreement than for Iran to accept a “bad deal” that fails to secure Iranian interests.[18]

Anti-regime media, citing an unspecified informed source, claimed on May 31 that President Masoud Pezeshkian has submitted a resignation letter to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[19] Pezeshkian reportedly warned in an “unprecedented and critical tone” that the IRGC is wielding an outsized role in the regime.[20] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify this report. Iranian state media denied this report and no Iranian officials have confirmed this claim at the time of this writing.[21]

Iran continues to use the Caspian Sea and overland transit routes to try to offset reduced maritime trade caused by the US blockade on Iranian ports, but these alternative routes offer less capacity and efficiency than commercial shipping through the strait. Deputy Parliament Speaker Haji Babaei stated on May 31 that Iran is avoiding the US blockade on Iranian ports by using alternative routes and land corridors.[22] He claimed that Iran now imports at least 50 percent of basic goods through the Caspian Sea and argued that Iran must continue to develop alternative trade routes to ensure Iran’s economic security under the blockade.[23] Iranian state media separately claimed on May 31 that Iran has imported over 20.5 million tons of goods this year, which marks an increase compared to the past two years.[24] Iranian state media added that Indian goods are transported by rail and road to Iran via Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.[25] An economics expert told Radio Free Europe (RFE) on May 6 that alternative routes can supply Iran with goods but cannot fully replace a maritime container-based economy.[26] A former US economic adviser separately told RFE on May 6 that trucking is more expensive than shipping and that Caspian Sea import throughput is constrained by limited port and fleet capacity, which the former adviser stated may raise costs and inflation in Iran.[27]

Nothing significant to report.

Iran fired a ballistic missile at a Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) base in Iraqi Kurdistan on May 31, likely in response to an attack by Kurdish opposition groups in Iran on May 29.[28] The IRGC and IRGC-affiliated media stated on May 31 that the IRGC fired a ballistic missile targeting a PAK base in Iraqi Kurdistan.[29] A PAK spokesperson told Kurdish media on May 31 that an Iranian ballistic missile struck a PAK headquarters in Darashakran, Erbil Province, without causing casualties.[30] The spokesperson added that Iran struck the same base on May 25 with at least four missiles and several drones, which wounded nine people, and claimed that Iranian forces and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have attacked PAK forces over 50 times since the war began on February 28.[31] Iran’s ballistic missile attack on the PAK base comes after likely Kurdish opposition fighters attacked a border guard unit in Chaldran County, West Azerbaijan Province, near Iran’s northwestern border on May 29.[32] It also comes after the IRGC reportedly killed two PAK members in Kermanshah Province on May 28.[33] The Iranian regime has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups of fomenting unrest in Iran and facilitating Israeli operations in Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan.[34]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to conduct ground offensives beyond its “Yellow Line” and has advanced further north of the Litani River in southern Lebanon. The IDF announced on May 30 that 36th Armored Division units have launched new ground offensives on both sides of the Litani River to expand the IDF’s “Yellow Line,” destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, and strengthen the IDF’s operational control in southern Lebanon.[35] Israeli military and political sources, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, announced that the IDF seized Beaufort Castle in Nabatieh District on May 31 as part of the IDF’s new ground offensives.[36] Beaufort Castle is operationally significant to the IDF because the castle is located on high ground, which is favorable for observing ground force movements. The site is also symbolic because the IDF previously seized the site after a significant battle during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.[37] Hezbollah claimed that it used direct fire to defend against Israeli advances into two towns near Beaufort Castle during protracted ground engagements between May 26 and 30.[38] Hezbollah has increasingly used direct fire in protracted ground engagements with advancing Israeli forces in southern Lebanon since May 19.[39]

Hezbollah has expanded the scope of its attacks on northern Israel by targeting larger urban areas deeper inside Israeli territory, likely in response to recent IDF advances in southern Lebanon.[40] Hezbollah claimed for the first time since the ceasefire began on April 16 that it fired rockets targeting Israeli cities more than 10 miles south of the Israel-Lebanon border, including the city of Karmiel and the Krayot suburbs of Haifa, on May 30 and 31.[41] An Israeli military correspondent also reported that Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Acre in northern Israel on May 31, although Hezbollah did not claim this attack.[42]

The United States recently warned Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al Zaydi that the United States opposes the participation of any Iranian-backed Iraqi militia in the next Iraqi government, even if a militia states that it intends to disarm, according to an informed political source speaking to Iraqi media on May 31.[43] The US message reportedly stated that the United States may break off “political or administrative relations” with any ministry affiliated with an Iraqi militia.[44] The US warning comes after a Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on May 25 that some militias have expressed willingness to disarm and engage in Iraqi politics in exchange for securing “senior positions” within the Iraqi government.[45] An Iraqi committee comprised of Zaydi, Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani was reportedly close to finalizing a plan to disarm Iraqi militias, according to a regional media report on May 8.[46] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq, including via militia disarmament, since early 2025, but has intensified its efforts in recent months due to militia attacks against US and allied targets in Iraq and the region during the recent war.[47]

[1] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear [2] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear [3] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear [4] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear [5] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2061085369047626085 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2060248796848644099?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-25-2026/; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2026/05/25/irans-new-sponsor-qatar-seeks-to-fund-revolutionary-guards/; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-talks-bog-down-over-nuclear-program-sanctions-relief-31702b6f?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-talks-bog-down-over-nuclear-program-sanctions-relief-31702b6f?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 [6] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear [7] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear [8] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116658423998920803 [9] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-29-2026/ [10] https://t.me/presstv/191896 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2060248796848644099?s=20 ; https://t.me/farsna/438636; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2026/05/27/769383/lessons-war-strait-hormuz-nuclear-sovereignty-define-iran-redlines-today; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-29-2026/ [11] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/28/iran-peace-deal-trump-approval [12] https://t.me/mehrnews/381432 [13] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/30/us/politics/trump-iran-peace-framework.html [14] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116658423998920803 [15] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/418098 ; https://www.iranintl.com/202605246647 ; https://x.com/IranIntlbrk/status/2055925293504672002?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2060688665181851778?s=20 [16] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2060820198689473011 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/419115 [17] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-897909 [18] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/419115 [19] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202605312204 [20] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202605312204 [21] https://t.me/iribnews/342337 ; https://t.me/defapress_ir/60015 ; https://t.me/farsna/439072 [22] https://t.me/defapress_ir/60002 [23] https://t.me/defapress_ir/60002 [24] https://t.me/iribnews/342310 [25] https://t.me/iribnews/342310 [26] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-pakistan-turkey-russia-caspian-china/33751260.html [27] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-pakistan-turkey-russia-caspian-china/33751260.html [28] https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/198919 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/419138 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/ ; https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/kurdistan/958742 [29] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/419138 ; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/198919 [30] https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/kurdistan/958742

[31] https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/kurdistan/958742

[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/ ; https://t.me/defapress_ir/59905 [33] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/ ; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/198859 [34] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-protests-mahsa-amini-crackdown-kurdistan-government-forces-shoot-rcna58496 ; https://nournews dot ir/Fa/News/127294/ [35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2060927439346307299?s=20 [36] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2060927439346307299?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2060939449345720769?s=20 ; https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2061039608746361120?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2060028255109832818?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-28-2026/ ; https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2061013048983253015?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2060939449345720769?s=20 ; https://x.com/Stinky915846091/status/2061072355711951049?s=20 [37] https://t.me/moriahdoron/31184 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2060939449345720769?s=20 ; https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2061039608746361120?s=20 [38] https://t.me/mmirleb/16873 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16691 [39] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-28-2026/ ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16691 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-4-2026/ ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16390 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-20-2026/ [40] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/ [41] https://t.me/mmirleb/16885 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16875 [42] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2061025482636750893?s=20 [43] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/انقسام-داخل-ال-طار-التنسيقي-بش-ن-حل-الحشد-وفصا-ل-تهدد-بالمغادرة [44] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/انقسام-داخل-ال-طار-التنسيقي-بش-ن-حل-الحشد-وفصا-ل-تهدد-بالمغادرة [45] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/انقسام-داخل-ال-طار-التنسيقي-بش-ن-حل-الحشد-وفصا-ل-تهدد-بالمغادرة [46] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5271010-three-member-committee-negotiates-washington-disarming-iraqi-factions [47] https://almadapaper dot net/410670/ ; https://www.newarab dot com/analysis/iraqs-elections-high-stakes-vote-amid-us-iran-tug-war ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/10/secretary-rubios-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-mohammed-shiaa-al-sudani-2

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikwFBVV95cUxPaUNMRmF2dGdJeEJLZXEtaU1mdW8tUE1QS0lsX1p1U1lvM01fM1hHOW5wNUxJaGwySFd1LWVaa0F1U3UxMGZvNXdTZElmQ0ZoQ1hoMFdjZWltbGc1bGNsMERoakMwMGVudXNBZENlN0hhOG9SWlZKZVlfb29UeXN1aVhMMW9MMjROaGJBY2VHVEwzWFU?oc=5