핵심요약

• 북한은 최소 300발에서 500발의 핵탄두를 추구하며 '기하급수적인' 핵력 증강을 요구하고 있습니다.
• 북한 지도부의 주요 목표는 개인적 생존, 정권 유지, 그리고 북한에 대한 절대적인 통제입니다.
• 미국의 확장 억지력에 대한 의문이 제기되며 국제 안보 환경에 대한 질문이 발생하고 있습니다.
• 현재 북한의 핵무기 보유량은 60발 이상이지만, 이는 현재 억지력 목적에는 충분하다고 평가됩니다.

도입

본 기사는 북한의 핵무기 프로그램이 국제 안보 환경과 미국의 확장 억지 전략에 미치는 영향을 분석합니다. 투자자 관점에서 이 기사는 북한의 핵 증강 움직임이 단순한 군사적 변화를 넘어, 국제 동맹의 억지력에 대한 신뢰도를 시험하고 지정학적 변동성을 높이는 핵심 요인임을 시사한다는 점에서 중요합니다. 북한의 핵 개발 목표가 어떻게 국제 질서의 균형에 영향을 미치는지 이해하는 것은 현재의 지정학적 위험 평가에 필수적입니다.

본문 1: 핵 억지력의 재평가와 동맹의 도전

북한이 핵무기 증강을 추구하는 배경에는 미국의 핵 억지력에 대한 의문이 자리 잡고 있습니다. 기사는 미국이 이란과의 전쟁에서 상대적으로 좋은 정보에도 불구하고 이란 정권을 제거하지 못했다는 점을 언급하며, 이는 미국의 핵 억지력에 대한 신뢰를 약화시킬 수 있음을 시사합니다. 따라서 북한 지도부는 미국의 핵 위협이 충분한 억지력을 제공하지 않는다고 의심하며, 자신들의 핵력 강화에 집중하고 있습니다. 이는 북한이 미국의 확장 억지 약속을 무시하고 자체적인 생존 전략을 구축하려는 움직임으로 해석됩니다. 결과적으로, 한국을 포함한 동맹국들은 미국의 확장 억지 약속의 실효성에 대해 재검토할 필요가 있으며, 이는 동맹 관계의 구조적 안정성에 영향을 미칩니다.

본문 2: 북한의 전략적 목표와 내부 동력

북한의 핵 개발 전략은 단순한 군사력 증강을 넘어 지도부의 생존과 정권 통제라는 내부적 목표에 의해 주도됩니다. 전문가들은 김정은의 주요 목표가 개인적 생존, 정권의 생존, 그리고 북한에 대한 절대적인 통제에 있다고 분석합니다. 이러한 목표는 핵무기 증강을 단순한 군사적 수단이 아닌, 정권의 권위와 통제력을 강화하는 수단으로 활용하게 만듭니다. 핵력 증강은 내부적으로 정권의 결속을 다지고 외부 위협에 대한 심리적 우위를 확보하려는 전략적 동력으로 작용합니다. 이는 북한 내부에서 핵 프로그램에 대한 집중과 확대를 정당화하는 심리적 기반이 됩니다.

본문 3: 장기적 위험과 국제적 파급 효과

북한의 핵무기 증강 추세는 장기적으로 국제 안보 환경에 예측하기 어려운 위험을 초래할 수 있습니다. 300~500발의 핵탄두를 확보하려는 시도는 기존의 억지 균형을 무너뜨리고, 잠재적인 군사적 충돌의 문턱을 낮출 수 있습니다. 이러한 움직임은 미국과 동맹국들이 핵 억지 전략을 재정립하고 새로운 안보 협력을 모색하도록 강제할 것입니다. 장기적으로 볼 때, 북한의 핵 증강은 지역 내 불안정성을 심화시키고, 국제 사회가 핵 확산 방지 노력에 더욱 집중하도록 만들 것입니다. 따라서 국제 사회는 북한의 핵 개발 속도와 목표를 면밀히 모니터링하며 다자간 외교 노력을 강화해야 할 것입니다.

결론

북한의 핵 증강 움직임은 단순한 군사적 경쟁을 넘어, 미국의 억지력에 대한 의구심과 북한 내부의 권력 구조라는 복합적인 요인에서 비롯됩니다. 향후 북한의 핵력 증강 속도와 목표는 국제 안보 질서에 중대한 변동성을 야기할 가능성이 높습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 위험을 고려하여, 동맹국의 전략적 대응과 국제적 협력의 변화를 면밀히 주시할 필요가 있습니다. 장기적인 관점에서 핵 위협의 관리와 다자간 협력의 중요성이 더욱 강조될 전망입니다.

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Kim’s Arithmetic: Why North Korea Is Building Toward 300-500 Nuclear Warheads - 19FortyFive

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Requirements: North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un must be elated with the impact of his family’s nuclear weapons program. The North’s nuclear forces likely played a significant role in the U.S. choice to start a war against the lesser Iranian nuclear weapon threat rather than attack the greater North Korean nuclear weapon threat. And President Trump even offered Kim a concession by recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power. To deter North Korean nuclear weapon use, the United States and South Korea have threatened that Kim’s regime would not survive if Kim carries out a nuclear weapon attack. However, the United States failed to eliminate the Iranian regime in the ongoing war against Iran despite the relatively good intelligence the United States had. Consequently, Kim may be doubting the strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrent threat, and many in South Korea may be questioning the viability of the U.S. extended deterrence commitments. These successes confirm Kim’s focus on his nuclear forces. Kim’s current 60 or more nuclear weapons appear sufficient for his current deterrence purposes. Still, Kim has repeatedly called for an “‘exponential’ increase in his nuclear forces.” He has showcased missile launchers which in total could carry many hundred missiles with nuclear weapons. He appears to be seeking a force of at least 300 to 500 nuclear weapons, which would pose an unacceptable threat to the United States and its allies. What Are Kim’s Objectives and Strategies? For many countries, leaders’ objectives establish national security strategies, which in turn determine national military force requirements. North Korea appears to follow this pattern. There is broad consensus in the North Korean expert community that Kim Jong-un’s primary objectives are his personal survival, the survival of his regime, and his absolute control over North Korea. Kim and his regime regularly threaten the United States with nuclear and other attacks to deter any U.S. attacks against North Korea, demonstrating his serious concerns about such possibilities. To deter U.S. nuclear attacks, Kim needs to be able to impose unacceptable costs on the United States, which he has interpreted as threatening U.S. territory, and especially U.S. cities, with nuclear attacks sufficient to overcome U.S. defenses and survive U.S. efforts to destroy North Korean nuclear forces. Kim must also manage internal opposition that could imperil his survival. He uses a fear-based approach for controlling his people. North Korean culture also demands that the leader be powerful, and Kim has used his nuclear weapons to demonstrate that power. He has also demonstrated his power by gaining strong support from both Russia and China. I believe that Kim’s secondary/supporting objectives are dominance of the Korean Peninsula and establishing the North as a powerful world power, a peer of the United States. In particular, he wants to demonstrate this power to both deter and coerce the United States. Successfully achieving these objectives would increase his ability to secure the inputs he needs to accomplish his primary objectives: Getting the international position, internal political support, economic resources, and military forces he needs to survive. Kim’s nuclear weapons assist in achieving success in these areas. Until the end of 2023, the Kim Family planned to invade South Korea to unify with South Korea and dominate the peninsula. Kim’s grandfather first attempted this in the Korean War that started in 1950. But at the end of 2023, Kim renounced unification as an objective and began speaking of South Korea as the North’s “principal enemy.” Ambassador Julie Turner explained Kim’s abandonment of unification “as a desperate attempt to get control of the internal information environment.” Kim cannot afford to have his people recognize and seek for the superior lifestyle available outside the North, especially as experienced in South Korea. North Korea applies extreme measures to prevent outside information from penetrating the North. An invasion into the South would ideologically contaminate many North Korean personnel with the wonders of South Korea compared to the living conditions in the North. If an invasion succeeded, Kim could control the South in the short-term in exchange for, over time, likely losing the support and control of his people and eventually his country. North Korea’s New Hypersonic Missile. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korean State Media. Kim apparently realized that he did not need nor want military control of the South. Instead, he seeks to create an Iron Curtain around North Korea through which little outside information and influence can penetrate. All he needs from South Korea is enough “tribute” to sustain his lifestyle, his regime, and his military programs—probably less than 5 percent of South Korean GDP. He does not want more than that because it would give some North Koreans the resources needed to avoid his control through bribery and corruption, imperiling his regime. Kim would also want the ability to force the South to cease specific activities that jeopardize North Korean internal control (like K-Pop?). To dominate the South without an invasion, Kim needs to create the image of North Korean military superiority and to decouple the U.S./South Korea alliance. It is therefore not surprising that North Korea carries out regular missile and other military technology tests in addition to parades to showcase its relatively advanced military weapons (which in some cases have been mockups or very limited examples of advanced weaponry). To decouple the alliance, Kim also needs to raise questions about the appropriateness of South Korean dependence on U.S. military power and the reliability of U.S. extended deterrence. And he has certainly been working to do both. North Korean Nuclear Force Requirements Based on these perspectives of Kim’s objectives and strategy, we can estimate Kim’s nuclear force requirements. Clearly, we do not know for sure. But there are two factors that should be considered. First, Kim uses his nuclear forces to deter threats against the North by threatening damage to key adversary targets in the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China. But Kim knows that not all of his nuclear weapons will be delivered to targets. He therefore needs many more nuclear weapons than the number of targets he would like to affect. Some weapons will fail, while others will be destroyed before they can be launched, and yet others will be destroyed by missile defenses and other defensive systems. To address these potential losses, he likely wants at least two to three times as many weapons as the targets he wants to threaten in South Korea, Japan, and China. He probably wants three to four times as many as U.S. targets because of the U.S. defenses against ICBMs. Kim presumably wants to be able to damage enough adversary targets to deter an attack intended to destroy his regime. He has threatened to “thoroughly annihilate” the United States. But given his evolving capabilities, he is probably seeking an ability to threaten at least 25 or so military, political, and civilian targets in each of his adversaries. In the United States, these targets could include bomber bases, political capitals, and cities. Image: KCNA/North Korean State Media. For example, one North Korean 20 kiloton weapon targeted on each of ten major U.S. cities could cause nearly 1.5 million fatalities and 2.5 million serious casualties, a level of damage that could well deter many U.S. presidents from going after the Kim regime. If Kim carries out limited nuclear attacks, his ability to damage 25 U.S. targets would allow him to carry out repeated limited attacks in response to any U.S. limited retaliations prompted by U.S. extended deterrence commitments. His ability to impose such pain and suffering on Americans would force the U.S. president to determine if he really is prepared to “trade San Francisco for Seoul,” or whether he would abandon U.S. allies. These North Korean requirements are large when combined with sufficient weapons to replace various possible lost nuclear weapons. For the United States, these 25 targets times three to four weapons per target would mean 75 to 100 total nuclear tipped ICBMs and other very long-range systems. And against Japan and China, Kim would likely want at least 25 nuclear weapons each times two to three, totaling 100 to 150 nuclear weapons for targeting Japan and China combined. With short-range delivery means, Kim appears to be seeking the ability to threaten at least 75 to 100 targets in South Korea with nuclear weapons. North Korea has explicitly identified airfields, ports, and military command and control facilities as targets for North Korean nuclear weapons, which could potentially allow Kim to be able to neutralize many South Korean asymmetric military advantages. Kim would also want to coerce the South Korean government by targeting the civilian population. And he would want the ability to destroy South Korean facilities for producing nuclear weapons should South Korea ever pursue such weapons, Kim seeking to sustain nuclear superiority over the South. To replace potential losses, Kim would want 150 to 300 nuclear warheads for targeting South Korea. The combined North Korean nuclear weapon requirements for targeting purposes would thus be roughly 325 to 550. Second, Kim seeks to be treated as a nuclear superpower by the world governments. Yet many articles on states possessing nuclear weapons cast North Korea as a minor player. Kim likely perceives that he must at least equal if not exceed the nuclear inventories of France and the United Kingdom. The UK reportedly possesses about 225 nuclear weapons whereas France possesses about 290 operational warheads plus 80 warheads awaiting dismantlement. Thus, Kim likely seeks at least 300 to 400 nuclear weapons—consistent with his targeting requirements—to establish the perception that he is a major nuclear power, at least on par with the UK and France. The Growing North Korean Nuclear Weapon Inventory Of course, it is hard to tell the actual magnitude of North Korean nuclear weapon capabilities today because the North has often practiced deception as one component of its means for deterring outside intervention. Many experts on North Korean nuclear weapons put the current North Korean nuclear inventory at roughly 60 weapons plus enough fissile material to make a total of about 90 or 100. But other experts credit the North with as many as 150 nuclear weapons today. Kim’s order for an exponential increase in his nuclear weapons is consistent with him being well short of his perceived requirements. Estimates of North Korea’s future nuclear weapon inventory depend upon an accurate understanding of his inventory today plus an educated projection of how many nuclear weapons North Korea can produce per year. One expert estimates that North Korea can now produce 10 nuclear weapons annually based upon the capacity of the uranium enrichment facilities that Kim unveiled in 2024, 2025, and 2026. Another expert reported in 2017 that North Korea may have already been able to produce 12 nuclear weapons per year. The North’s recent increase in production capacity has likely now increased this estimate to around 20 nuclear weapons per year. Such rates will likely increase with Kim’s plans for exponential increase. At the current rates, Kim may be able to cross the 300 nuclear weapon threshold as soon as 2033 or as late as 2050. He may be presenting an exaggerated view of his nuclear force size to enhance his ability to deter and coerce other countries, or he may be concealing some of his nuclear capabilities to avoid more serious intervention by the United States and its allies. Conclusion North Korea should not be allowed to possess 300 nuclear weapons. According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “North Korea’s use options and target selection will evolve as its nuclear force grows, potentially lowering its nuclear use threshold in the coming years.” While Kim may not consider using nuclear weapons if the situation in North Korea is stable, he may consider limited nuclear weapon use to divert the attention of his people during North Korean instability. Or he may use nuclear weapons to destroy a South Korean nuclear weapon production program. And he may threaten to launch follow-on attacks if his personnel even see the launch of a potential U.S. nuclear weapon retaliation against North Korea. Even one nuclear detonation on the United States or its allies would be an unacceptable disaster. Subsequent potential retaliation exchanges would risk uncontrolled nuclear escalation. Preventing the continued growth of the North Korean nuclear weapon force is thus very important. The U.S. leadership needs to become serious about reining in Kim’s nuclear force expansion. The United States has given Kim ample opportunities to negotiate some restraint, and he continues to refuse to employ such restraint. It is now time to begin employing “carrot and stick” measures to make some progress. About the Author: Bruce W. Bennett Bruce W. Bennett is a senior defense analyst. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation, specializing in Korean security. He also teaches graduate school classes on “Understanding Nuclear Forces” and “Wargaming Limited Nuclear Weapon Employment.”

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMisgFBVV95cUxPd2FZTUxMVVktaS1GbkdRd1lXZ1lWVzJiU0dWZWZRZVV5SlZaa2xGYlRydjZReW1OWC1ya0xVa3NBQk1jbjNkTTZMZWo2RlRHMGpqV1o4bkxJR3ZFdXZ2QTNaZDZsZ2xBNDJybU9YZm1YVHNNemtTbm41QktKQlF5cy1hM1RQSWstWHZScWM3VU9wZ3Bra2lHWXhDNWFHa3JkLWRHSzVodFJCYTZITXl4OE1R?oc=5