핵심요약

• 이스라엘은 시리아의 아부 알-두후르 공군 기지를 공격하여 터키의 군사적 배치를 저지하려는 목적을 가졌습니다.
• 분쟁의 핵심은 바샤르 알-아사드 축출 이후 시리아의 군사 및 정치적 질서를 누가 형성할 것인지에 대한 전략적 경쟁입니다.
• 터키는 이스라엘 총리에게 인터폴 적색 수배 요청을 요구하며 긴장감을 고조시키는 등 갈등을 확대하고 있습니다.
• 양국이 동일한 전장에서 군사 활동을 펼칠 가능성이 커지면서 직접적인 충돌 위험이 증가하고 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이스라엘과 터키 간의 시리아를 둘러싼 지정학적 경쟁이 어떻게 군사적 충돌 위험을 내포하고 있는지 분석합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지역 분쟁이 에너지 시장, 방위 산업, 그리고 중동 지역의 거시 경제 안정성에 미치는 파급 효과를 면밀히 살펴볼 필요가 있습니다. 이는 단순히 양국 간의 대립을 넘어, 지역 내 세력 균형 변화가 글로벌 자원 흐름과 안보 프리미엄에 어떻게 반영될지를 예측하는 데 중요합니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 경쟁과 군사적 행동의 연관성

이스라엘의 아부 알-두후르 공군 기지 공격은 터키의 시리아 내 군사적 역할에 대한 이스라엘의 전략적 우려를 반영합니다. 이스라엘은 이 공격을 터키의 군사적 배치를 막기 위한 조치로 정당화했으며, 이는 시리아 내의 세력 균형에 대한 이스라엘의 직접적인 개입 의지를 보여줍니다. 이러한 군사적 행위는 양국이 시리아라는 지정학적 공간에서 상호 이해관계가 충돌하는 지점을 명확히 드러냅니다. 터키가 시리아 내에서 군사적 영향력을 확대하려는 시도와 이스라엘의 전략적 목표가 겹치면서, 비록 직접적인 전쟁을 피하려 해도 간접적인 군사적 긴장 상태가 지속될 위험이 커집니다. 이는 양국의 군사적 역량과 외교적 압박이 상호작용하며 불안정성을 증폭시키는 구조로 읽힙니다.

본문 2: 외교적 압박과 지역 불안정성의 확산

갈등의 양상은 군사적 행동뿐만 아니라 외교적 압박을 통해 더욱 복잡해지고 있습니다. 터키가 이스라엘 총리에게 인터폴 적색 수배 요청을 요구한 것은 단순한 국경 분쟁을 넘어선 외교적 레버리지 사용의 사례입니다. 이는 양국 간의 대립이 국제적인 법적, 외교적 틀 안에서 표출되고 있음을 의미하며, 지역 내 다른 행위자들에게도 영향을 미쳐 전반적인 지정학적 변동성을 높입니다. 이러한 외교적 긴장감은 에너지 공급망의 불안정성이나 국제 무역 흐름에 간접적인 영향을 미치며, 이는 투자 심리에 즉각적인 위험 프리미엄으로 작용할 수 있습니다. 즉, 국지적 분쟁이 거시 경제적 리스크로 전환되는 메커니즘을 이해해야 합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 투자 시사점

장기적으로 볼 때, 시리아 지역의 군사적 변화는 터키와 이스라엘의 전략적 이해관계에 따라 예측 불가능한 변동성을 야기할 것입니다. 양국이 시리아 내에서 각자의 목표를 달성하기 위해 군사적, 외교적 노력을 지속할 경우, 지역 안정성은 매우 취약해질 수 있습니다. 투자 관점에서 볼 때, 이러한 지정학적 위험은 방위 산업 섹터의 장기적인 수요 증가와 함께, 지역 내 안보에 직접적으로 연관된 에너지 및 원자재 시장의 변동성을 키우는 요인으로 작용할 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 시장은 이러한 지정학적 위험을 반영하는 위험 회피 성향을 높일 것으로 전망됩니다.

결론

결론적으로, 이스라엘과 터키 간의 시리아를 둘러싼 갈등은 표면적으로는 군사적 충돌을 회피하려는 노력이 주를 이루지만, 그 이면에는 심각한 전략적 경쟁과 외교적 긴장이 내재되어 있습니다. 향후 지역의 안정성은 양국의 외교적 조정 능력과 국제 사회의 개입 여부에 따라 결정될 것입니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변동성이 에너지 가격 및 방위 기술 시장에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 모니터링하며, 잠재적인 위험 프리미엄을 고려하여 포트폴리오를 관리해야 할 것입니다. 향후 중동 지역의 정책 변화와 국제적 외교 노력을 면밀히 주시할 필요가 있습니다。

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The next war nobody wants: Can Israel and Turkey avoid a conflict? - The Economic Times

Israel's bombing of Syria's Abu al-Duhur airbase a few days ago has opened a new and unusually dangerous front in the Middle East. The immediate dispute is over whether Turkey was preparing to establish a military presence at the Syrian base, but the underlying contest is much larger. It is about who will shape the military and political order of Syria after the ouster of Bashar al-Assad?Israel sees a Turkish-backed Syrian military as a potential strategic threat while Turkey sees Israeli attacks as an attempt to constrain Turkey's desire for a role in a neighboring country. Neither side appears to want a war, yet the possibility of a direct clash has become harder to dismiss because the two countries could now find their forces operating in the same battlespace.Turkey appears to be escalating the Israeli air strikes issue. Turkish media outlet Daily Sabah reported today that Turkish justice ministry has requested that Interpol red notices be issued for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over alleged genocide charges linked to an attack on activists aboard the Global Sumud Flotilla a few months ago.Abu al-Duhur changes the equationOn August 18, Israel carried out airstrikes against Abu al-Duhur, a former Syrian military airbase in northwestern Syria. The strikes hit the runway and other facilities though no casualties were reported. Israel subsequently confirmed that it had carried out the attack and said the objective was to prevent Turkey from establishing a military presence at the base.Also read | Iran vows 'devastating' response as US threatens toughest ever economic hitThe Israeli justification is important. This was not presented as another strike in the long-running Israeli campaign against Iranian weapons transfers or Hezbollah infrastructure in Syria. Israel said it was acting against a prospective Turkish military deployment.Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel had warned Syria against allowing a Turkish military presence to move southward in Syria. He described the Turkish entrenchment as a threat to Israel and said the strike was a message to Turkey. Defense Minister Israel Katz was even more explicit. He warned President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against what he called dangerous adventures in Syria and said Turkey should not test Israel's resolve.Israel has frequently warned Syria, Iran and Hezbollah. But it is now issuing a comparable military warning directly to Turkey, a NATO member with one of the region's largest armed forces.The dispute over what happened at Abu al-Duhur has made the episode more complicated. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani said Turkish officials had visited the facility and that Syria had explained to Israel that there was no plan to establish a permanent Turkish base there. Turkey's Defense Ministry, however, said no Turkish military delegation had been at Abu al-Duhur before or during the Israeli attack.Also read | Pakistan Assembly passes military bills to formalise Asim Munir's expanded roleEven if the Turkish delegation account is ultimately proved wrong, the episode illustrates the danger. Israel is now monitoring Turkish military activity in Syria closely enough that even a routine Turkish visit to a Syrian military facility can become part of a much larger security crisis.The real dispute is over post-Assad SyriaThe airbase strikes are less important than what they represent. The government of Bashar al-Assad, who was supported by Iran and Russia, fell in late 2024, with Assad taking refuge in Russia. New government of Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda commander who is now allied with the US, subsequently emerged with Turkey as one of its most important external supporters. Turkey has provided political backing and has been involved in reconstruction and military assistance.Turkey says its military cooperation with Syria involves training, expertise and support for the development of a unified Syrian military.Israel sees the same process differently. Under Assad, Syria was an adversary, but its conventional military had been devastated by years of civil war. Israel had also developed a relatively established method of dealing with Iranian and Hezbollah activity on Syrian territory. Israeli aircraft could attack weapons transfers, missile facilities and Iranian-linked infrastructure while trying to keep the Syrian government itself from becoming the main target.A Turkish-supported Syrian military could eventually create a different strategic environment. Turkey has a substantial conventional military, a large drone industry, sophisticated air capabilities and extensive experience operating inside Syria. It can provide training and military technology that could help turn Syria's fragmented armed groups and depleted armed forces into a more coherent state military.That is the long-term Israeli concern. The problem is not simply Turkish soldiers at Syrian airbases but the possibility that Turkey helps create a Syrian military capable of defending itself against Israeli airpower and eventually challenging Israel's freedom of action.An Israeli strategic assessment published by the Institute for Counter-Terrorism has described the possibility of Syria becoming effectively dependent on Turkey as a significant emerging concern. It has also warned that a Turkish role in Syria could increase the possibility of a direct Israeli-Turkish confrontation.Why Turkey is different from RussiaThere is an important historical comparison here. When Russia intervened militarily in Syria in 2015 against ISIS and other such groups in support of the Assad regime, Israel and Russia had fundamentally different interests. Russia wanted to preserve the Assad government and its own military position in Syria. Israel wanted to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from using Syrian territory to build military capabilities against Israel.Yet the two governments managed to construct a practical relationship that allowed them to operate in the same airspace. Netanyahu and Vladimir Putin established mechanisms for military deconfliction. Israel retained considerable freedom to attack Iranian and Hezbollah targets while trying to avoid direct confrontation with Russian forces.The relationship with Turkey is much harder. Russia was a powerful external actor in Syria, but it was not building a regional strategy around confronting Israel. But Erdogan's government has become one of Israel's most vocal regional opponents, particularly since the Gaza war. Turkey has backed Hamas politically, condemned Israeli military operations in exceptionally strong terms and increasingly treats Israel as a major obstacle to its preferred regional order.A recent Brookings analysis argues that Turkey's rivalry with Israel has become a structural constraint on Ankara's regional strategy, with Syria emerging as the central test of Turkey's regional influence. But the analysis cautions against interpreting Erdoğan's nationalist, neo-Ottoman-tinged rhetoric as evidence that Turkey is pursuing a project of regional domination. Based on interviews with senior Turkish officials and diplomats, it portrays Ankara's leadership as considerably more pragmatic and restrained than its public messaging suggests, with Turkey primarily seeking to manage instability around its borders and protect its core interests rather than build a new regional empire.Turkey may not want a war with Israel but Israel increasingly doubts that Turkey's long-term regional ambitions are compatible with Israeli security interests.The Erdogan factorThe deterioration in relations did not begin with Israeli strikes on Abu al-Duhur airbase. Turkey and Israel experienced periods of cooperation and even restored full diplomatic relations in 2022 after years of hostility. Erdogan and Israeli leaders were again engaging diplomatically. But the relationship deteriorated sharply after October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the Gaza war that followed.Erdogan has repeatedly described Israel in exceptionally hostile terms and has accused it of terrorism and genocide. Turkey has also supported Hamas diplomatically and allowed senior Hamas figures to operate from Turkish territory. The Israeli government now regards Erdogan's policy as part of a broader campaign against Israel rather than merely criticism of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians.The confrontation has continued to intensify in 2026. Netanyahu reportedly raised concerns about Erdogan with President Donald Trump before the NATO summit in Turkey, specifically warning about what Israel sees as Turkey's increasingly hostile posture.The rhetoric has also extended into questions surrounding Jerusalem. In June, a Turkish minister publicly spoke of his desire one day to serve as governor of Jerusalem and suggested that Jerusalem and other former Ottoman territories could eventually return to Turkish sovereignty. The remarks were widely interpreted in Israel as provocative.There is also a growing ideological problem inside the new Syrian order. Reports have described Islamist and nationalist elements within Syria's emerging security structures using intensely hostile rhetoric toward Israel. That does not mean al-Sharaa has decided to make Syria an anti-Israel military state. In fact, the evidence points in the opposite direction for now. Al-Sharaa has pursued contact with Israel and has said Syria wants a security agreement rather than a new war. His foreign minister has also continued discussing de-escalation with Israeli officials.But Israel has to consider what Syria could become several years from now, not only what al-Sharaa says today.A potentially stronger Syria worries IsraelThis is where the comparison with Hezbollah becomes useful. Hezbollah in Syria was an enormous threat to Israel during the Assad era. It had large missile stocks, experienced fighters and extensive infrastructure in Lebanon and Syria. But Hezbollah remained a non-state organization. Israel could attack its infrastructure without automatically declaring war on a major state military.A Turkish-backed Syrian army would be different. Turkey could help Syria rebuild conventional military capabilities. That could include drones, air defenses, command systems, intelligence capabilities and training. The strategic problem for Israel would then become a state-level military problem rather than simply a campaign against a militia.There is another geographical point. Turkey does not necessarily need to put troops near the Golan Heights to influence Israel's security environment. A network of Turkish-supported facilities in northern and central Syria could give Turkey substantial influence over the development of the Syrian military without a large Turkish force ever reaching southern Syria.Israel therefore appears to be trying to establish its red lines before such a military infrastructure becomes entrenched. That helps explain why Abu al-Duhur was targeted even though the facility had been inactive for years. The airbase had not been operational for more than a decade and was being rehabilitated.From Israel's perspective, destroying a runway and hangars now may be easier than trying to remove Turkish-supported air-defense systems and Syrian military infrastructure later.The risk is an accidental Israel-Turkey warAn open Israeli-Turkish war remains highly unlikely. Both governments have much to lose. Turkey does not want to fight Israel while dealing with Syria's reconstruction and a complicated regional environment. Israel does not want to fight Turkey, a NATO member with a large conventional military. The US has strong relationships with both countries and has every reason to prevent such a conflict. It is already trying to make Israel and Turkey reach an understanding and build a mechanism to avoid future problems.The more realistic danger is an unintended escalation. Consider the possible sequence. Turkey establishes a military presence at a Syrian facility and Israel decides the facility threatens its security and strikes it. Turkish personnel are killed even though Israel was not targeting them specifically. Turkey retaliates against Israeli aircraft or another Israeli target and Israel responds.US special envoy Tom Barrack has said the US is working on a formal deconfliction mechanism involving Israel, Turkey and Syria. Reuters reported that Washington was concerned about misunderstandings and accidental confrontations after the Abu al-Duhur strike.The fact that Washington is pushing for such a mechanism is itself significant. It indicates that American officials see the possibility of Israeli and Turkish forces operating close enough to one another in Syria to require dedicated military communications.NATO makes the calculation more complicatedTurkey's NATO membership adds another layer to the problem. Article 5 does not mean that every Israeli attack on Turkish personnel anywhere in the world automatically triggers a NATO military response. The legal and political circumstances too matter. Turkish forces operating inside Syria are not the same thing as an attack on Turkish territory.This question has suddenly become a subject of public discussion in Israel. An opinion article in Israel Hayom argued that NATO's collective-defense arrangements do not automatically extend to Turkish forces deployed in Syria. Another report on the article said Israeli strategists have been examining where Article 5 applies.That should not be confused with an official Israeli declaration that Israel intends to attack Turkish troops because NATO would stay out. There is a major difference between an Israeli strategic discussion about the limits of Article 5 and an official decision to exploit those limits.Still, the fact that the question is being discussed at all shows how dramatically the strategic environment has changed.There is an additional complication. Turkey recently joined Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in a new defense agreement whose collective-defense language resembles NATO's Article 5. The agreement was signed in Mecca on August 7, just days before the Abu al-Duhur strike.At this stage an Israel-Turkey war appears highly unlikely. The military, economic and diplomatic costs would be enormous and neither government appears to be seeking one. But a dangerous cycle of conflict triggered by some misunderstanding can't be totally ruled out. For now, diplomacy still has room to prevent that.

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