핵심요약

• 트럼프 대통령은 호르무즈 해협 통행료로 20%를 부과할 것을 제안했습니다.
• 미국은 이란 관련 군사 목표물 80곳과 추가 90곳을 공격했습니다.
• 6월 17일에 서명된 휴전협정은 3주 만에 7월 6일에 붕괴되었습니다.
• 트럼프 행정부의 주요 결정은 종종 그 함의에 대한 논의 없이 이루어진다는 점이 강조됩니다.

도입

본 기사는 트럼프 대통령이 이란 전쟁을 재개하고 해협 통제권을 주장하는 과정에서 나타난 의사결정의 비합리성과 예측 불가능성을 조명합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 외교적 불안정성이 글로벌 에너지 시장과 지정학적 위험 프리미엄에 미치는 영향을 분석해야 합니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 불확실성과 정책 일관성의 부재

트럼프 대통령이 호르무즈 해협에 20% 통행료 부과를 언급했으나 이후 이를 철회한 행위는 정책의 일관성이 결여되었음을 보여줍니다. 이는 외교적 목표 달성을 위한 현실적인 전략적 고려가 부족했으며, 오히려 불확실성을 증폭시키는 결과를 낳았습니다. 군사적 행동의 맥락에서, 미국이 이란의 해상 공격 능력을 약화시키려는 목적이 '약화(degrade)'라는 모호한 용어로 표현된 점은 정책 목표와 실행 간의 괴리를 시사합니다. 이는 외교적 수사(rhetoric)와 실제 군사적 행동 사이의 간극을 보여주며, 국제 관계에서 신뢰 구축의 중요성을 역설합니다.

본문 2: 군사적 충돌의 역동성과 경제적 파급 효과

이란과의 군사적 충돌 과정에서 미국이 80곳의 군사 목표물과 추가 90곳을 공격한 것은 지역 안보의 급격한 변화를 의미합니다. 이러한 군사적 긴장은 에너지 공급망에 직접적인 영향을 미치며, 특히 중동 지역의 유가 변동성과 해상 운송 비용의 급등을 야기합니다. 해협 통제권에 대한 논의는 글로벌 무역 흐름과 에너지 운송 비용에 대한 새로운 위험 프리미엄을 추가합니다. 이러한 지정학적 위험은 원유 및 천연가스 가격의 변동성을 높이고, 이는 전 세계 인플레이션 압력으로 작용하여 금융 시장의 변동성을 심화시킵니다.

본문 3: 정책 결정의 비합리성과 시장 반응

트럼프 행정부의 주요 결정이 논의 없이 이루어진다는 비판은 정책 결정 과정의 투명성과 예측 가능성에 대한 시장의 우려를 반영합니다. 이러한 예측 불가능성은 투자자들이 장기적인 전략을 수립하는 데 어려움을 주며, 단기적인 시장 변동성을 증가시킵니다. 외교 정책의 급작스러운 변화는 각국의 안보 전략과 경제적 이해관계에 복잡하게 얽혀 있어, 단기적인 시장 반응을 넘어 장기적인 거시 경제 환경에 영향을 미칠 가능성이 있습니다. 따라서 이러한 정치적 변동성은 투자 포트폴리오에 내재된 위험 요소로 반드시 고려되어야 합니다.

결론

트럼프 행정부의 이란 정책 움직임은 외교적 목표와 실제 실행 사이의 괴리가 얼마나 큰지를 보여줍니다. 이러한 지정학적 불안정성은 에너지 시장과 글로벌 공급망에 직접적인 압력을 가하며, 투자자들은 이러한 정책적 변동성이 거시 경제 지표에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 모니터링해야 합니다. 향후 국제 정세의 변화에 따라 에너지 가격과 무역 흐름의 변동성이 더욱 커질 가능성이 있습니다. 따라서 지정학적 위험을 반영한 리스크 관리 전략이 필수적입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMijgFBVV95cUxPQkdpbEVVZm14anNIblkzeHExM1JJeEotb2x6blN5RVhaLV84eFp4aklUWEdFNFBJUnI5Qjh0em91OVFzV3UzSTVvSTFiUGM3VHRCaUVFNU56dmRZVldpbUYxbE51MUtKUm5EbWdGMWNucGpQVlYxYjJPNnFXb0tnUFNzc09mRTBBclNwX2Rn?oc=5

Trump’s Iran Bluster This Week Revealed the Only Thing That Really Matters to Him - Slate Magazine

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President Trump’s decision to resume and escalate the war in Iran makes even less sense than his decision four and a half months ago to start the war in the first place. More jarring still, Trump announced on Monday that he would also take control of the Strait of Hormuz and charge a 20 percent toll to all ships passing through—which, besides defying credulity, blows to bits the tiny shred of moral claim that he had held against Iran’s government.

On Tuesday, just hours later, Trump walked back his demand for a toll —perhaps he was advised that it could double global shipping costs (if it could be enforced)—but supplied no details on how the U.S. would take control of the waterway. Nonetheless, both declarations, as well as the backpedaling, amplify what has been loud and clear for some time—that Trump makes major decisions off the cuff, often with no discussion of their implications, and that nothing he says should be taken seriously.

The war with Iran has been back on for a while now. The ceasefire, signed on June 17, was always shaky and collapsed entirely three weeks later , on July 6, when, in response to Iranian attacks on merchant ships, U.S. forces attacked 80 Iranian military targets, including more than 60 small boats manned by the Revolutionary Guard, and, the next day, struck 90 more targets, including air defense systems, missile and drone storage sites, and supply lines along Iran’s coast.

Then, on Tuesday, Trump restored the naval blockade on Iran, which he had lifted as part of last month’s ceasefire.

A statement issued by Central Command claimed the purpose of all this was to “degrade” Iran’s ability to attack commercial ships in the strait and various installations inside allied countries in the region.

But “degrade” is one of those slippery words in military jargon, signifying that an attack would do a lot of damage but acknowledging, sotto voce, that nobody knows how much damage—or, more to the point, what effect the damage might have on the course of the war, much less the likelihood of victory.

To put it another way: If striking more than 13,000 targets in the 38 days from Feb. 28 to April 7 wasn’t enough to accomplish any of Trump’s stated war aims (re-obliterating Iran’s nuclear materials, destroying its military, or changing its regime), it’s hard to imagine how hitting a few hundred more would tip the scales.

In some ways, the war to date has been counterproductive. The killing of the entire top echelon of Iran’s leadership on the first day opened the way for the Revolutionary Guard—much more militant, oppressive, and anti-Western—to take full control of the country . The bombing of many civilian structures—including a girls’ school (an accident, but no American has yet taken responsibility or apologized)—has only hardened many Iranians’ loyalty to the regime or at least deadened some dissidents’ hopes that Washington would be on their side.

Trump’s main goal now is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the transit for a quarter of the world’s petroleum. It’s worth recalling that, before Trump started the war, the strait was free and open—not even an issue of discussion. Now it is the fulcrum of Iran’s leverage in a strategy of “ asymmetric warfare .” Iran will never blunt the massive edge in firepower held by the United States and Israel, but it can exert tremendous counterforce as long as it controls the Strait of Hormuz—and it doesn’t take much for it to keep control. Just a few drones or missiles or dynamite-packed small boats can dissuade shipping companies from entering the narrow waterway.

A month ago, in announcing the pending ceasefire, Trump wrote on social media , “I hereby fully authorize the toll-free opening of the Strait of Hormuz. Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” Trump’s claim was pretense—the Iranians still controlled the transit—and it appeared even more out of whack with reality when the U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding , the 14-point document that set the ceasefire’s terms, were published a few days later. On the opening of the strait, the MOU obligated Iran only to “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial ships with no charge for 60 days only.” This suggested that Iran would remain in charge of the strait—a privilege it did not enjoy before the war but that Trump and his underqualified negotiators were now enshrining.

The Iranians cite this aspect of the MOU to justify their attacks on certain commercial vessels. Their rationale is dubious and their behavior reprehensible, but they are right in criticizing the U.S. and Israel for failing to live up to other articles in the document (e.g., the U.S. lifting frozen Iranian assets and Israel observing a ceasefire in Lebanon).

Here is where Trump’s recent statements only worsen our standing in the war—and the world. On Monday morning, in an interview on Fox & Friends , he said, “We will become guardians of the strait. We’re going to hit [Iran] very hard and keep the strait, and probably run it.” As part of this guardianship, the U.S. will charge a toll of “20 percent on all cargo shipped.”

First, he did not explain how the U.S. would take control of the strait, mainly because there is no way it can, short of stationing ground troops along its shores on Iranian soil, which Trump isn’t likely to do, in part because his “base” would go nuts.

But the assertion of tolls, however briefly advocated, is more telling. The ironies are multiple. First, in late March, when Iran talked about charging a toll for ships entering the strait, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the idea of anyone—not just Iran—turning the strait into a “tolling system” would be “illegal” and “dangerous to the world.”

More devastating, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi , mocked Trump’s plan to charge tolls. “POTUS is absolutely right,” he wrote on social media. “Whoever provides secure and safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz should be compensated for this service. Iran has always been the GUARDIAN of the Strait and will remain so FOREVER.” But, he added, Iran will charge less than Trump would, noting, “20% is of course too much. We will be fair.”

Trump backpedaled on the toll plan one day after posting it, but, like many of his offhand remarks, it revealed his true state of mind. Rubio and others might tout the fine principle of free passage on open seas and even claim that this is why the U.S. needs to renew its military pressure on Iran. But to Trump, everything is all about money and almost nothing but money. The war with Iran, as he now sees it, is over who controls the strait and who collects the money from that control. He may have been dissuaded from imposing a toll, but this is the way he thinks, and this is how he defines U.S. interests. The old notion that the U.S. acts to preserve certain ideals—which, yes, serve its own interests but also preserve a system that benefits others—is no longer believed by the rest of the world. Trump has told them, after all, that he—the man twice elected to be president of the United States—doesn’t believe it either.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMijgFBVV95cUxPQkdpbEVVZm14anNIblkzeHExM1JJeEotb2x6blN5RVhaLV84eFp4aklUWEdFNFBJUnI5Qjh0em91OVFzV3UzSTVvSTFiUGM3VHRCaUVFNU56dmRZVldpbUYxbE51MUtKUm5EbWdGMWNucGpQVlYxYjJPNnFXb0tnUFNzc09mRTBBclNwX2Rn?oc=5