미국의 군사적 실패와 이란 외교적 해결의 가능성
The limits of military power and the promise of diplomacy with Iran - Center for International Policy
지역적 긴장감이 지속되지만, 시장 방향성을 결정할 명확한 계기가 없어 중립적 입장을 유지하시는 것이 타당합니다.
핵심 요약
이란은 10개의 핵무기를 제작할 수 있는 고농축 우라늄을 보유하고 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 이란은 10개의 핵무기를 제작할 수 있는 고농축 우라늄을 보유하고 있습니다.
- 이란은 지하에 위치한 고급 원심분리기를 수만 대 보유하고 있습니다.
- 최근의 휴전 협정은 이란에만 혜택을 제공하고 미국 정부의 전전 목표는 달성하지 못했습니다.
도입
이번 분석은 미국과 이란 간의 군사적 갈등이 외교적 해결로 이어질 수 있는 가능성을 탐구합니다. 이란의 핵 프로그램과 미사일 능력에 대한 군사적 접근의 한계를 이해하는 것은 투자자에게 중요한 정보를 제공합니다.
본문 1: 군사적 접근의 한계
이란은 10개의 핵무기를 제작할 수 있는 고농축 우라늄을 보유하고 있으며, 이는 군사적 공격이 이란의 핵 프로그램을 완전히 파괴하지 못했음을 보여줍니다. 또한, 이란은 지하에 위치한 고급 원심분리기를 수만 대 보유하고 있어, 군사적 공격이 이란의 핵 능력을 완전히 제거하는 데 실패했습니다. 이는 군사적 접근이 이란의 핵 프로그램을 완전히 제거하는 데 효과적이지 않음을 시사합니다.
본문 2: 외교적 해결의 가능성
최근의 휴전 협정은 이란에만 혜택을 제공하고 미국 정부의 전전 목표는 달성하지 못했습니다. 이는 외교적 해결이 군사적 접근보다 더 효과적일 수 있음을 시사합니다. 외교적 해결을 통해 이란의 핵 프로그램을 완화하고 안정적인 지역 정세를 유지할 수 있을 가능성이 있습니다.
결론
이번 분석은 군사적 접근의 한계와 외교적 해결의 가능성을 강조합니다. 미래에는 외교적 해결을 통해 이란의 핵 프로그램을 완화하고 안정적인 지역 정세를 유지할 수 있을 가능성이 있습니다. 투자자는 이란과 관련된 정책 변화와 국제적 동향을 지속적으로 모니터링하는 것이 중요합니다.
Original Article
The limits of military power and the promise of diplomacy with Iran - Center for International Policy
The humiliating strategic failure of the United States in Iran is the predictable consequence of the decision to use force and the failure to realize the limits of military power. When Trump abandoned diplomacy in favor of war, the White House traded a policy with a track record of success for a militarized approach that was likely to fail. By acting in defiance of US and international law and without the consent of Congress or the support of allies, the administration forfeited any pretense to legitimacy. The resulting ceasefire agreement is a one-sided memorandum of understanding that provides benefits for Iran while securing none of the administration’s prewar goals.
The widespread public outcry against this ignominious outcome provides an opportunity for much needed public debate on what has gone wrong with American foreign policy and how it can be corrected. This requires an understanding of the reasons for failure and the consideration of alternative policies to avoid such calamities in the future.
The negative results of the war are no surprise to those familiar with the history of failed US military interventions in the Middle East over the decades. As Phil Gordan, Andy Bacevich and others document, the US losses in Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond, are tragedies that can be traced to the hubris and folly of decision makers in Washington choosing war rather than diplomacy and containment.
The recent conflict makes clear the limits of force. US and Israeli bombing caused significant damage and loss of life , but the attacks did not destroy Iran’s nuclear program or its substantial missile force. Tehran’s large stockpile of higher enriched uranium, enough for building ten bombs, remains in a buried site near Isfahan. Iran retains large quantities of lower enriched uranium and tens of thousands of advanced centrifuges in deep underground sites. Iran’s nuclear capability is larger and more dangerous now than it was previously.
Military force is incapable of preventing the development of nuclear weapons capacity. As former nuclear security officials Matthew Sharp and Nate Swanson observe , Iran has developed technical knowledge in centrifuge production and operation “that cannot be bombed away.” Harvard nuclear expert Matthew Bunn argues similarly that Iran’s vast array of material, equipment, and expertise cannot be eliminated by military means.
The history of nuclear nonproliferation shows that when states have signed away the bomb they have done so in exchange for security guarantees and economic inducements achieved through negotiated agreements. There is no case where the use of force alone has been able to eliminate nuclear capability.
US and Israeli attacks also failed to eliminate Iran’s substantial missile capabilities. Secretary of State Marco Rubio identified this as one of the primary goals of the military operation, but thousands of bombing strikes were unable to achieve it. A recent analysis in the New York Times revealed that Iran still has about 70 per cent of its prewar mobile missile launchers and weapons stockpiles, which contain both ballistic and short-range missiles. Iran has also retained access to 30 of its 33 missiles sites along the Strait of Hormuz.
The tragedy of the failed war in Iran is compounded by the administration’s rejection of available diplomatic options. Trump made clear his disdain for diplomacy in his first term when he reneged on the original nuclear deal in 2018. That agreement was effectively blocking Iran’s path to the development of nuclear weapons when the White House pulled the plug.
The administration’s disregard for diplomacy was also evident in the weeks preceding the start of attacks on February 28. Discussions were underway, with significant Iranian concessions on the table. Mediators and close observers of the talks believed progress was being made , but the US and Israel ignored Iran’s conciliatory offers and proceeded with military action. The strikes were targeted at sites in Iran, but they exploded at the bargaining table in Geneva.
The unprovoked US and Israel attacks have hardened political opinion and anti-Americanism within Iran’s new political leadership and may have stirred an impulse to move toward the weaponization of its nuclear capacity. As Bunn writes , the US/Israeli attack has created an embittered, hardline regime that is now determined to have weapons capability. The tragic irony is that a war supposedly to prevent Iran from building a bomb may increase the propensity to do just that.
The one-side agreement Trump and his team have negotiated has been denounced widely. The President has responded to the criticisms of the memorandum by misrepresenting its content and threatening Iranian leaders. At the G7 meeting, he said “we’ll go back to shooting at them.” If they “misbehave,” he ranted, “we’ll go back to dropping bombs right smack in the middle of their heads.” It was a grotesque remark, a threat simultaneously impossible and unrealistic.
The recurrence of US military attacks against Iran would be self-defeating politically and militarily, prompting retaliatory Iranian strikes across the region and a renewed shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz. All of this would send markets spinning downward again and would further diminish the sagging political prospects of Republican candidates in the midterm elections.
The Iranians have Trump over a barrel, literally. They can control outcomes through their power to threaten the flow of oil from the Gulf. The White House cannot prevent this and, having tried and failed to change it with military force, has no other options available. Multilateral diplomacy is the only way out of the hole Trump has dug for himself.
It may be possible to salvage at least some benefit from the current disaster by negotiating an agreement that re-establishes limits on Iran’s nuclear program. Negotiating such an agreement will be difficult, and the terms of a new deal, if there is one, may be less favorable than the original 2015 program. Achieving a new agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities is nonetheless important and worth the continued effort.
The major problem for negotiating a new agreement is the administration’s demonstrated incompetence in diplomacy. Iranian leaders have seen their previous negotiating proposals spurned and their leaders assassinated and have been reluctant to engage with administration representatives. They refused to meet directly with Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner and have relied instead on intermediaries from Pakistan and Qatar.
A different approach will be needed and could be possible if the US would consider working with states in Europe and the Gulf to create a new international authority, perhaps under UN auspices, to negotiate a new nuclear deal and establish International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring and verification.
The model for such an authority could be the multinational coalition that negotiated the nuclear deal in 2015, which included the US, Iran, the UK, France, Germany, Russia and China cooperating under the authority of the European Union and the UN Security Council. A new arrangement would include Gulf state participation and could be tied to parallel negotiations to maintain open passage through the Strait.
The proposed authority could be connected to the new UK-France multinational naval protection force. In April the United Kingdom and France announced the creation of an independent security mission to safeguard commercial shipping through the Strait. In May defense ministers from 38 states expressed their support for the task force. The mission is intended to be “strictly peaceful and defensive” and will become operational as the fighting ends. French and British naval ships are now deployed to the region for that purpose.
The role of the Gulf coalition is solely protective now, but it could serve as the springboard for a broader multilateral diplomatic effort to negotiate a sustainable end to the conflict. The UK, France and other states could request UN Security Council action to create such an authority.
This approach could only work if the US agrees to participate, which is highly unlikely at present. The idea of multilateralism is anathema to this administration. If current approaches continue to fail, however, White House officials may begin to recognize the potential benefits of a new international authority for preventing war and nuclear proliferation in the region.
As political leaders in Washington question what went wrong in Iran, they need to take responsibility for creating needed changes in US policy. It is time for members of Congress to step up. For too long they have granted war making authority to presidents who then abused that power. The current crisis has revealed levels of arrogance and incompetence that demand attention.
Recent congressional efforts to invoke the War Powers Act are a step in the right direction, but much more is needed to rein in presidential war making. Congress can use its power of the purse to withhold funding for further use of force in the Gulf region and can withhold military assistance for Israel until it upholds human rights principles and respects the rights of the Palestinian people.
Congress must also address the need for a fundamental change of direction in US policy—to put a definitive end to the era of forever wars, to reject the false promise of military predominance, and to establish a new security paradigm based on military restraint and a greater commitment to diplomacy and international cooperation.
David Cortright is a visiting scholar at Cornell University’s Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies and professor emeritus at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.