핵심요약

• MOU에서 레바논이 3회 언급되었지만 이스라엘은 언급되지 않음
• 이스라엘은 MOU를 이란의 승리이자 미국 정부의 양보로 보고 있음
• MOU에서 이란의 미사일 프로그램이나 헤즈볼라 지원에 대한 언급이 없음
• 미국이 이란에 대한 제재를 해제한 점이 이스라엘의 주요 불만 사항 중 하나임

도입

이번 미-이란 MOU는 이스라엘을 배제한 채 진행되었습니다. 이는 이스라엘의 지정학적 리스크를 높일 수 있으며, 투자자에게는 중동 지역 안정성에 대한 우려를 불러일으킬 수 있습니다. 특히 이스라엘의 정치적 상황과 결합해 추가적인 불확실성을 초래할 수 있습니다.

본문 1: MOU의 내용과 이스라엘의 반응

MOU의 2번째 단락에서 레바논이 3회 언급되었지만 이스라엘은 언급되지 않았습니다. 이는 이스라엘이 MOU 협상 과정에서 배제되었음을 보여주며, 이스라엘은 이를 이란의 승리이자 미국 정부의 양보로 보고 있습니다. 이스라엘은 MOU에서 이란의 미사일 프로그램이나 헤즈볼라 지원에 대한 언급이 없음을 강하게 비판하고 있습니다. 이는 이스라엘의 국가 안보에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 수 있는 사항입니다. 따라서 투자자는 이스라엘의 정치적 상황과 MOU의 내용이 중동 지역 안정성에 미치는 영향을 주의 깊게 지켜볼 필요가 있습니다.

본문 2: MOU의 경제적 영향과 제재 해제

미국이 이란에 대한 제재를 해제한 점은 이스라엘의 주요 불만 사항 중 하나입니다. 이란은 제재 해제로 즉각적인 재정적 지원과 경제적 혜택을 얻을 수 있게 되었습니다. 이는 이란의 경제적 안정화와 성장 가능성을 높일 수 있지만, 동시에 이스라엘과의 갈등을 심화시킬 수 있습니다. 투자자는 이란의 경제적 변화가 중동 지역 안보와 경제 상황에 미치는 영향을 고려해야 합니다. 특히 에너지 시장과 관련된 투자에는 추가적인 리스크가 있을 수 있습니다.

본문 3: 이스라엘의 정치적 상황과 MOU의 영향

이스라엘은 선거 시즌에 접어들며, MOU의 내용은 정치적 논란을 더욱 부추길 수 있습니다. 이스라엘 국민들은 MOU를 강하게 비판하고 있으며, 이는 선거 결과에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 특히 이스라엘의 안보 정책과 관련된 논의가 활발해질 전망입니다. 투자자는 이스라엘의 정치적 변화가 MOU의 실행과 중동 지역 안정성에 미치는 영향을 주의 깊게 지켜볼 필요가 있습니다.

결론

이번 미-이란 MOU는 이스라엘을 배제한 채 진행되었으며, 이는 이스라엘의 지정학적 리스크를 높일 수 있습니다. 투자자는 MOU의 내용과 이스라엘의 정치적 상황, 이란의 경제적 변화가 중동 지역 안정성에 미치는 영향을 주의 깊게 지켜볼 필요가 있습니다. 특히 에너지 시장과 관련된 투자에는 추가적인 리스크가 있을 수 있으므로, 신중한 접근이 필요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiqgFBVV95cUxQTUpEOTNBZlJGc25hYzBYZGpFUjRHemNPd1VXdERaUkNpS2JncmRzRXdlaUNralVlQ05iNnBiQ2V0Yk9zQU5HRlR5T1hXNEtmWTk3SzhLT1c2QWliVG1nNEhBVVJNQ2lmRWRoRk02cGJONXI0R0VmUnkxSTlnUHN2TTJJSWJ5bExSTTRhTzgxQWY1Rk1GLTZ2cGZ4Q1hXOWNWTWFXWFVZVWNDUQ?oc=5

The Iran Deal Comes at a Cost to Israel. The White House Hasn’t Acknowledged It. - Council on Foreign Relations

Elliott Abrams served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor in the George W. Bush administration, where he supervised U.S. policy in the Middle East, and as Special Representative for Iran and Venezuela in the Donald Trump administration.

The memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran has left Israel on the sidelines. Israel, the close U.S. ally that has been at war with Iran’s proxy group, Hezbollah, in Lebanon, had no role in the negotiation of it—and it shows. The MOU’s second paragraph, for example, mentions Lebanon three times and declares “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon” without making mention of Israel. What’s more, a new “ deconfliction mechanism ” for Lebanon that includes the United States, Iran, Pakistan, and Qatar has been announced—again, excluding Israel.

Israel views the linking of Lebanon’s internal affairs and national sovereignty to Iran as a great Iranian victory and an incomprehensible U.S. concession. In fact, Israelis have a sour opinion of the whole MOU. This view reflects several core grievances: Lebanon, where Israel anticipates U.S. efforts will constrain it from attacking Hezbollah; the lifting of all U.S. sanctions on Iran, which gives Tehran immediate and important financial relief; the absence of any mention of the Iranian missile program or support for proxies like Hezbollah in the MOU; and the way the MOU postpones serious discussion of Iran’s nuclear weapons program to later negotiations.

Israel is now entering an election season, which makes the political stakes of that discontent significant. In September or October (the date has not yet been fixed) Israelis will decide whether their prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, should continue in office or be replaced by an opposition leader. The election is certain to be contentious, but Israelis are now united on a critical issue—the conflict with Iran and the way it ended. A recent poll indicates that 92.1 percent of Israelis, including Jews and Arabs, agree that Iran gained the most from the MOU, and 86 percent of Israelis have a negative view of the agreement.

Keeping Israel out of the negotiations could be a critical factor in those negative views. And the roles that Pakistan and Qatar, both fierce critics of Israel, have played in this deal only deepen Israeli suspicions. If there were any consultations between the U.S. negotiating team and the government of Israel, they have not been revealed.

U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth called Israel a “steadfast partner” on March 4. He added that “Our ally Israel is demonstrating tremendous capabilities. Extraordinary cooperation with such an ally is amazing and necessary. We salute you [Israel] and appreciate you.” That is not the tone being taken now by the United States’ chief negotiator, Vice President JD Vance , who suggested that Israeli critics of President Donald Trump and the MOU need to “wake up and smell the reality of the situation that country is in.” The abrupt change in rhetoric points to a deeper question: Why is the United States distancing itself, in peacemaking, from the ally with which it has just worked in extraordinary cooperation during the conflict with Iran?

At some level, this isn’t necessarily surprising. During World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom were the closest of allies and military partners, but as the war neared an end, they differed greatly on military strategy in Europe and the terms of the peace. Each pursued its national interests, and those overlapped far more during the conflict than after it. The same may be true of the United States and Israel today. While fighting Iran, postwar issues like how exactly to handle Iran’s stocks of highly enriched uranium, the scope of Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah, or when to begin lifting U.S. sanctions, were simply deferred. Now they have become pressing.

Yet, the analogy has limits. It can also be argued that the gap between the U.S. and Israeli positions is not as wide as it may appear. Both countries oppose and will act to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program; both want a sovereign Lebanon out from under Hezbollah control; both want to prevent Hamas from regaining strength and seek to end its control of half of the Gaza Strip. So, despite the policy differences, both countries’ underlying goals remain aligned.

It’s clear that the United States gains some tactical flexibility by keeping Israel out of the negotiations, just as it has kept other interested parties like the Saudis and Emiratis out. And Israelis should at least consider whether they really want to be more directly involved, because such involvement would likely mean they were more closely bound by the outcome. Their non-involvement, for example over Lebanon, leaves them freer to act. The United States and Israel could be adopting an “ask forgiveness, not permission” approach to actions that affect each other’s interests.

But such an approach requires, at the very least, full explanations in private and careful language in public. This does not seem to be happening. While the vice president was in Switzerland discussing Lebanon with Iran, Qatari, and Pakistani, Israeli, and Lebanese diplomats were meeting in Washington under U.S. auspices, ostensibly to solve their bilateral problems and work toward restraining Hezbollah. How do these two tracks affect each other? Israel doesn’t seem to know. Its ambassador in Washington said that he needed “clarity” about U.S. policy and the new deconfliction mechanism. “The basic premise [of the talks in Washington] was that Iran was not involved, and the main discussion is about Lebanon and Hezbollah—not about the extent to which Iran can restrain Hezbollah,” he said. “That is not Iran’s role. Its role is to get out of Lebanon.”

The United States has not been giving the private explanations that this moment requires—if, in fact, the two separate Lebanon tracks can be logically explained and are coordinated. The careful language in public is also lacking. On the Israeli side, the prime minister has indeed been careful, but some other ministers (unsurprisingly, the two ministers on the far right of Netanyahu’s coalition, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir ) have not. And on the U.S. side, the vice president has engaged in browbeating rather than what is needed: restraint and a realization that Israel’s direct national security interests are at stake far more than those of the United States.

Sidelining an ally in negotiations affecting its vital interests can, at times, be useful or even necessary for the United States. It may greatly disadvantage that ally, or it can provide it—and the United States—distance that can allow for greater freedom of action. But in all cases, U.S. policy should carefully ensure that it consults with that ally, takes its interests into consideration, explains U.S. thinking and actions thoroughly, and speaks publicly about disagreements with language meant to maintain confidence rather than deepen differences. The United States has some catching up to do in this case.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiqgFBVV95cUxQTUpEOTNBZlJGc25hYzBYZGpFUjRHemNPd1VXdERaUkNpS2JncmRzRXdlaUNralVlQ05iNnBiQ2V0Yk9zQU5HRlR5T1hXNEtmWTk3SzhLT1c2QWliVG1nNEhBVVJNQ2lmRWRoRk02cGJONXI0R0VmUnkxSTlnUHN2TTJJSWJ5bExSTTRhTzgxQWY1Rk1GLTZ2cGZ4Q1hXOWNWTWFXWFVZVWNDUQ?oc=5