핵심요약

• 골프만에서 추가 연료 공급이 일시적으로 증가하며, 정체된 선박들이 호르무즈 해협을 탈출하고 있습니다.
• 골프 국제 포럼의 전문가 8명이 협정의 골프만 보안, 지역 안정성, 그리고 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향을 분석했습니다.
• 전 세계 경제는 갈등으로 인한 혼란에서 회복하는 데 시간이 필요할 것으로 전망됩니다.

도입

이번 분석은 투자자에게 왜 중요한가요? 미-이란 MOU는 에너지 시장과 지역 안보에 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있는 중요한 전환점이 될 수 있습니다. 특히, 골프만 지역을 중심으로 한 에너지 공급망의 안정성과 글로벌 경제 회복의 속도에 영향을 줄 수 있기 때문입니다.

본문 1: 에너지 시장 변화의 영향

미-이란 MOU 체결로 골프만에서 추가 연료 공급이 일시적으로 증가하며, 정체된 선박들이 호르무즈 해협을 탈출하고 있습니다. 이 변화는 단기적으로 에너지 시장의 변동성을 줄일 수 있지만, 장기적으로는 공급망의 안정성에 대한 우려를 높일 수 있습니다. 특히, 호르무즈 해협을 중심으로 한 에너지 수송 경로의 안정성은 글로벌 에너지 시장의 핵심 요소 중 하나이기 때문입니다.

본문 2: 지역 안정성의 전망

골프 국제 포럼의 전문가 8명이 협정의 골프만 보안, 지역 안정성, 그리고 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향을 분석했습니다. 이 분석은 지역 안정성의 향방을 예측하는 데 중요한 자료가 될 수 있습니다. 특히, 이란의 핵 야망과 지역 내 갈등의 지속 가능성에 대한 분석은 투자자에게 중요한 정보를 제공할 수 있습니다.

본문 3: 글로벌 경제 회복의 속도

전 세계 경제는 갈등으로 인한 혼란에서 회복하는 데 시간이 필요할 것으로 전망됩니다. 특히, 에너지 시장의 변동성과 지역 안정성의 불확실성이 글로벌 경제 회복의 속도를 늦출 수 있습니다. 따라서, 투자자는 이러한 요인을 고려하여 장기적인 투자 전략을 수립해야 합니다.

결론

미-이란 MOU는 에너지 시장과 지역 안보에 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있는 중요한 전환점이 될 수 있습니다. 그러나, 단기적인 에너지 공급 증가에도 불구하고, 지역 안정성과 글로벌 경제 회복의 속도에 대한 우려는 여전히 남아 있습니다. 따라서, 투자자는 이러한 요인을 고려하여 신중한 투자 결정이 필요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMieEFVX3lxTE9sMGlKWl9NZ3o3N1dqVjZlT2QyYm5ja0RhRjdpWjRGUERldTVvMzdjWUNNb012aTVMcHFwQ1NkUTNlQ0pTb053dEkzM3JaNEV6Wlo5YWNGbWJWNU56N1V5ODhHUG1TWXVkX3JTSnVMaXZHM2ZZZzNuLQ?oc=5

U.S.-Iran MOU and Negotiations: Expert Perspectives - Gulf International Forum

Following the signing of the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the launch of follow-on negotiations in Switzerland, Gulf International Forum experts assess the agreement’s implications for Gulf security, regional stability, and global energy markets. Their analyses examine how GCC states are responding to the emerging diplomatic framework, the extent to which the agreement addresses the underlying drivers of conflict, and what the cessation of hostilities could mean for the future of the regional order, energy security, and long-term stability in the Gulf.

The Global Economy Might Take Some Time to Recover – Rachel Ziemba, Senior Non-Resident Fellow with Gulf International Forum

Kuwait Is Relieved at the War’s End—but Fears Resumption – Dr. Courtney Freer, Senior Non-Resident Fellow with Gulf International Forum

After the War, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions Are Unlikely to Fade – Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, Senior Non-Resident Fellow with Gulf International Forum

The MOU Over Baghdad's Head – Dr. Muhanad Seloom, Senior Non-Resident Fellow with Gulf Internaional Forum

The Iran War Was a Blunder for Benjamin Netanyahu – Dr. Robert Geist Pinfold, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at Gulf International Forum

Turkey Wants a Long-Term End to the War – Sinem Cengiz, Non-Resident Fellow with Gulf International Forum

To Preserve Peace, the GCC Must Defend Its Sovereignty – Dr. Abdulla Banndar Al-Etaibi, Assistant Professor at Qatar University

The MOU Is a Win for Qatari Diplomacy – Dr. Ali Bakir, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affair

Bahrain Wants More than a Ceasefire – Mahdi Ghuloom, Fellow for Geopolitics at ORF Middle East

The Global Economy Might Take Some Time to Recover

Rachel Ziemba, Senior Non-Resident Fellow with Gulf International Forum

The signing of the MOU has led to a short-term burst in additional fuel supplies exiting the Gulf from both Iranian and other producers as pent-up vessels escape the Strait. Envisioned plans to return to pre-war export and production levels look optimistic. It will take time to scale up production, reposition vessels and other policies. OFAC waivers have only just been introduced and are time-limited and Iran persists in claiming oversight over strait traffic even if it is waiving tolls. There is plenty of friction that can allow one of the signatories to say that the other is not complying sufficiently with the ceasefire to have a long-term deal.

For now, more vessels are likely to exit rather than enter the Strait and government-backed fleets and insurance are likely to dominate trade and try to derisk the trade. This will likely imply higher-than-average volumes compared to the war period, and some scope for producers to begin draining their storage and considering reversing shut-ins. Additional new supplies from Saudi Arabia and the UAE are likely to dominate in the near term, while Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar take longer to ramp back up. The latter will also look to risk-tolerant shippers to pick up their volumes.

Kuwait Is Relieved at the War’s End—but Fears Resumption

Dr. Courtney Freer, Senior Non-Resident Fellow with Gulf International Forum

Kuwait, with the memory of the Iraqi invasion and occupation from 1990 to 1991 and with recent attacks on civilian targets like Kuwait International Airport, is eager to end hostilities that started between the U.S.-Israel alliance and Iran at the end of February. For decades, Kuwait has crafted a foreign policy that has sustained both its independence and its security.

That said, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz remaining open without tariffs or conditions may constrain Kuwait’s ability to accept a deal in the long term. Kuwait is one of the most reliant among its neighbors on hydrocarbon revenues, with oil accounting for 88 percent of the Kuwaiti government’s budget, and oil revenues were forecasted to drop from $3.3 billion to $0.9 billion in March alone due to the Strait’s closure.

Securing free passage of oil, particularly for Kuwait which lacks an alternative pipeline at present, is set to be an important issue for Kuwait and its neighbors who have also vocally opposed any potential Iranian-imposed tariffs. Notably, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaykh Jarrah Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah received a phone call from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Arangchi three days ago – the first direct contact between the two since the start of the war—to discuss the MOU. In the conversation, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister emphasized the need to adhere to “ the principles of international law and the objectives enshrined in the United Nations Charter .” Kuwait is likely to continue to press these demands both with Iran and when American Secretary of State Marco Rubio visits Kuwait next week.

After the War, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions Are Unlikely to Fade

Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, Senior Non-Resident Fellow with Gulf International Forum

After several weeks of intense fighting, the United States and Iran signed an agreement to manage their key differences, most notably Tehran’s nuclear program. For decades, both Republican and Democratic administrations have accused Iran of seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders have categorically denied these accusations.

Several conclusions can be drawn from both the war and the MOU. First, the joint U.S.-Israeli attacks in June last year, and again in February this year, might prompt Iran to cross the line and acquire the bomb. North Korea has not been attacked because it has the bomb, while Ukraine has been invaded because it gave up the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the former Soviet Union. But Iranian officials have consistently referred to the late Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa banning nuclear weapons.

Second, paragraph 8 of the MOU states that Washington and Tehran will address the nuclear program in negotiations following the agreement’s signing. The text does not specify commitment by either side.

Third, Iran has already paid a very high price for its nuclear program. Many nuclear scientists and political and military leaders died defending the nation’s “right” to develop its nuclear program, which became a key source of national pride. Thus, it is unlikely that Iran will agree to completely dismantle the program.

Fourth, Tehran might agree to freeze enrichment for 15 or 20 years. But the know-how it has gained in the last few decades cannot be taken away.

Finally, Gulf states are more concerned about Iran’s missile and drone capabilities than its nuclear program. These assets are not mentioned in the MOU; their absence is likely to be consequential.

Dr. Muhanad Seloom, Senior Non-Resident Fellow with Gulf Internaional Forum

The most revealing thing about the Islamabad Memorandum, from Baghdad’s vantage, is what it does not say. The text names Lebanon explicitly, committing both sides to terminate operations there and guaranteeing its sovereignty. However, it does not name Iraq, the theater where American and Iranian power are most densely entangled. That silence is not a reprieve; it defers Iraq’s status to the 60-day negotiation, recasting Baghdad as an object of bargaining rather than an author of the settlement.

The load-bearing clause for Iraq is the second point, in which both sides agree to “ refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs. ” Nowhere is that pledge less credible than in Iraq, where both powers project influence through presence and proxy, and where a principals’ agreement does not obviously bind the agents operating in the gap. The “all fronts” language, having named Lebanon and skipped Iraq, leaves the status of Iran-aligned factions undefined, and Israel’s refusal to be bound even in Lebanon shows how little such wording constrains.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMieEFVX3lxTE9sMGlKWl9NZ3o3N1dqVjZlT2QyYm5ja0RhRjdpWjRGUERldTVvMzdjWUNNb012aTVMcHFwQ1NkUTNlQ0pTb053dEkzM3JaNEV6Wlo5YWNGbWJWNU56N1V5ODhHUG1TWXVkX3JTSnVMaXZHM2ZZZzNuLQ?oc=5