호르무즈 해협 긴장 고조: MOU 불일치로 인한 대리전 심화 전망
Why the US-Iran escalation over Hormuz will not be the last - Middle East Eye
지정학적 긴장 고조는 글로벌 위험 프리미엄을 즉시 증가시키고 위험 자산에 대한 안전 추구 매도를 촉발시킵니다.
핵심 요약
호르무즈 해협 통항에 대한 MOU 불일치로 인해 미국과 이란 간의 충돌이 확대되었으며, 이는 해상 봉쇄와 공습으로 이어졌습니다.
Original Article
Why the US-Iran escalation over Hormuz will not be the last - Middle East Eye
There was optimism when the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 17 June, intended to end the US-Israel-Iran war that began on 28 February and to establish a 60-day negotiating period leading to a final agreement on Iran's nuclear programme .
But the 14-point document was hastily put together and includes nebulous articles open to interpretation.
Disagreements over Article 5 - which concerns shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz - have caused skirmishes and led ultimately to last week's major escalation .
Article 5 calls on Iran to "make arrangements ... for the safe passage of commercial vessels" in the Strait of Hormuz during the 60-day negotiating window.
Iran has interpreted the article as giving it the right to direct traffic, including instructing ships to take only those routes it has approved as safe. The US understands the article as meaning that Iran is obliged to reopen the strait fully and unconditionally.
When the US began directing ships to a southern corridor along Oman 's coast, Iran issued warnings and ultimately fired on vessels.
The US intervention appears to be a not-so-subtle attempt to wrest control over Hormuz away from the Iranians. Both sides have blamed the other for violating the terms of the MOU.
Although the latest escalation initially appeared to be contained - mediators were working to restore calm - the conflict has since widened. The US has struck Iran for a third consecutive night, killing at least three people, and Trump has reinstated a blockade of Iranian shipping in the Gulf.
Conflict is almost certain to persist.
The Iranians are very unlikely to back down on the Strait of Hormuz.
The Iranian government believes it has acquired a major strategic asset there, one that may be as effective as a nuclear weapon in deterring future aggression against Iran. In the aftermath of the June 2025 and February 2026 US-Israeli attacks, the importance of deterrence for the Islamic Republic cannot be overstated.
But deterrence is not the only benefit of control over the strait. Authority over Hormuz is also increasingly seen by the Islamic Republic as a source of national pride, a kind of spoil of war .
The Iranian government believes it has acquired a major strategic asset at Hormuz, one that may be as effective as a nuclear weapon in deterring future aggression
More importantly, control over the strait could also deliver Iran an economic windfall . The government has said repeatedly that it will begin charging service fees at the end of the negotiation window, which could generate billions in annual income for Tehran.
That revenue is now precisely what Washington is moving to capture for itself. On 13 July, Trump announced that the US would levy a 20 percent charge on cargo transiting the strait, declaring that the US would become "THE GUARDIAN OF THE HORMUZ STRAIT".
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi replied that whoever provides safe passage should indeed be compensated - and then claimed the role for Tehran. "Iran has always been the GUARDIAN of the Strait and will remain so FOREVER," he wrote. "20% is of course too much. We will be fair."
Given the advantages that control over Hormuz offers, it is exceedingly unlikely that the Iranian government will willingly agree to re-establish the pre-28 February status quo.
But Iranian control over the strait is untenable for the United States, its allies in Europe and the Gulf, and much of the international community.
The situation has produced a strategic impasse: Iran has no incentive to surrender something it gained from the war, while the United States cannot easily accept a new regional order in which Tehran exercises unprecedented control over an international waterway.
For both Washington and Tel Aviv, accepting that outcome would amount to an implicit admission of strategic failure.
The war was supposed to bring down the Iranian government, change the political system into one favourable to US and Israeli interests, and severely weaken Iran's military capabilities.
Instead, the Islamic Republic has survived, expanded its regional leverage and demonstrated its ability to impose substantial pain on the US, Israel and Gulf countries.
The war's outcomes may have shocked leaders in Washington and Tel Aviv, but they did not surprise international affairs experts.
Before the war, experts repeatedly warned that another major attack on Iran could produce significant retaliation across the Gulf . Yet the US and Israel appear to have entered into the war without understanding this likelihood.
In the middle of March, about two weeks into the war, Trump said : "No one expected Iran to attack the Gulf states... we were shocked."