핵심요약

• 이스라엘과 사우디 간의 관계는 1948년 아랍-이스라엘 분쟁 이후 적대적 관계에서 신중한 교류로 변화했으나, 가자 전쟁 이후 다시 외교적 긴장 상태로 퇴행했습니다.
• 사우디는 1967년 6일 전쟁과 1973년 욤 키푸르 전쟁에서 아랍 연합에 지지를 표명했으며, 하르툼 합의의 '세 가지 거부'를 통해 중동 외교를 주도해왔습니다.
• 사우디는 2002년 아랍 평화 이니셔티브를 제안했으나, 이는 이스라엘의 철수에 대한 조건을 걸어 중동 평화의 기준을 설정하려 했으나 실현에는 어려움을 겪었습니다.
• 현재의 움직임은 이스라엘의 홍해 및 아프리카뿔 지역 전략적 확장에 따른 지역 영향력 경쟁이라는 더 넓은 지정학적 긴장 속에서 이루어지고 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 최근 사우디와 이스라엘 간의 외교적 교류가 단순한 양자 관계 개선을 넘어 중동 지역의 복잡한 지정학적 역학 관계 속에서 어떻게 해석되어야 하는지에 대한 투자적 시사점을 제공합니다. 이는 중동 지역의 불안정성이 에너지 시장 및 지정학적 리스크에 미치는 영향을 분석하는 데 중요한 맥락을 제공하며, 지역 내 세력 균형 변화가 향후 중동 경제 환경에 미칠 잠재적 영향을 파악하는 데 필수적입니다.

본문 1: 외교적 움직임과 전략적 목표

이스라엘 대통령과 사우디 왕세자의 공개적인 교류는 최근의 지정학적 변화 속에서 지역 강대국들의 외교적 전략이 얼마나 유동적으로 변화하고 있는지를 보여줍니다. 이러한 움직임은 단순히 양자 관계 개선을 의미하기보다는, 사우디가 지역 내 영향력을 유지하고 다각화하며, 모든 협정을 팔레스타인 문제 해결과 연계하려는 광범위한 전략을 반영합니다. 이는 사우디가 중동 내에서 단순한 지역 강국을 넘어, 특정 지정학적 이슈를 관통하는 다층적인 외교적 역할을 수행하고 있음을 의미합니다. 이러한 전략적 접근은 지역 내 경쟁국들, 특히 이스라엘의 전략적 확장에 대한 대응책으로 읽힙니다. 즉, 외교적 접근은 군사적 또는 지역적 영향력 경쟁의 결과로 해석되어야 합니다.

본문 2: 역사적 배경과 구조적 제약

사우디와 이스라엘의 관계는 1948년 분쟁부터 시작하여 1967년 6일 전쟁, 1973년 욤 키푸르 전쟁에 이르기까지 직접적인 적대감으로 점철되어 있었습니다. 사우디는 이 시기에 아랍 연합에 지지를 표명하고 하르툼 합의를 통해 중동 외교의 주도권을 확보하려 했으나, 이는 이스라엘의 전략적 목표와 사우디의 종교적/역사적 역할이라는 구조적 제약 속에서 제한적인 성과를 보였습니다. 특히 사우디가 제안한 2002년 아랍 평화 이니셔티브는 아랍 국가들의 통합된 프레임워크를 제시했으나, 이스라엘의 철수라는 조건이 충족되지 않아 실제적인 평화 정착에는 실패했습니다. 이러한 역사적 맥락은 현재의 외교적 움직임이 단기적인 감정적 교류가 아니라, 수십 년간 축적된 역사적, 종교적, 지정학적 이해관계를 바탕으로 이루어지고 있음을 시사합니다. 이는 현재의 협상이 과거의 틀을 완전히 벗어나기 어렵다는 점을 의미합니다.

본문 3: 지역 경쟁과 장기적 전망

현재의 외교적 움직임은 이스라엘이 홍해, 아프리카뿔, 더 넓은 중동 지역으로 전략적 입지를 확장하는 것과 맞물려 있습니다. 이는 사우디가 지역 내 영향력을 확보하려는 노력과 충돌하는 경쟁 구도를 형성합니다. 사우디의 목표는 지역 내 다각적인 파트너십을 통해 영향력을 확대하는 반면, 이스라엘의 확장은 전략적 자원의 통제권을 확보하려는 움직임으로 해석됩니다. 이러한 경쟁은 중동 지역의 안보 환경을 더욱 불안정하게 만들며, 지역 내 국가들이 상호 이익을 극대화하는 방식으로 외교적 선택을 강요받는 상황을 초래합니다. 장기적으로 볼 때, 이러한 경쟁 구도는 지역 내 협력보다는 상호 견제와 잠재적 갈등의 위험을 높이는 방향으로 발전할 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 향후 사우디-이스라엘 관계는 지정학적 환경 변화에 따라 유동적으로 변동할 것이며, 지역 안정에 대한 상호 의존성이 외교적 협상보다 우선될 가능성이 높습니다.

결론

결론적으로, 사우디와 이스라엘 간의 최근 외교적 움직임은 지역 내 영향력 경쟁이라는 지정학적 현실 속에서 이루어지고 있으며, 이는 역사적 배경과 상호 전략적 이해관계에 의해 제약받고 있습니다. 향후 관계의 발전은 단순한 양자 관계를 넘어, 중동 지역의 광범위한 안보 환경과 팔레스타인 문제 해결에 대한 각국의 복잡한 계산에 의해 좌우될 것입니다. 투자 관점에서 볼 때, 이러한 지정학적 변동성은 에너지 및 지역 무역 흐름에 예측 불가능한 변동성을 가져올 수 있으므로, 장기적인 관점에서 지정학적 리스크를 면밀히 평가할 필요가 있습니다. 향후 중동 지역의 외교적 동향에 대한 지속적인 모니터링이 중요합니다.

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The Changing Calculus of Saudi-Israeli Normalization - horn review

Recently, unusual public exchanges revived speculation about Saudi-Israeli ties. Israeli President Isaac Herzog told Al Arabiya that rapprochement remained his ‘dream’ and praised Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, while a former senior Saudi air force officer appeared on Israeli television . These moves occurred in the context of renewed Houthi attacks on Saudi territory and fragile post-Iran-war dynamics. Far from signaling imminent normalization, these developments reflect Riyadh’s broader strategy of maintaining regional influence, diversifying diplomatic partnerships, and linking any agreement with Israel to progress on the Palestinian issue. They also indicate growing tensions over competing visions for regional influence, particularly as Israel expands its strategic presence in the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the wider Middle East.

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel have evolved from direct hostility rooted in the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict to cautious, interest-driven engagement, only to regress into renewed diplomatic strain and open hostility in the wake of the Gaza war and its regional fallout. Saudi Arabia backed Arab coalitions in the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It also endorsed the Khartoum Resolution’s “three no’s”—no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with Israel. This reflected both solidarity with Palestinians and its role as custodian of Islam’s holiest places, defining Saudi’s diplomacy for decades.

The then Crown Prince Abdullah proposed The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and it was later adopted by the Arab League offering a comprehensive framework. It conditioned full Arab normalization on Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. This initiative established Saudi leadership in Arab diplomacy but also created a rigid benchmark that subsequent Israeli governments have found difficult to meet. These historical positions continue to influence Saudi public discourse and official statements linking any normalization to tangible progress on Palestinian statehood, in addition to regional factors created recently.

One of the drivers toward cooperation has been the shared perception of Iran as a regional threat. Saudi Arabia has faced Houthi attacks including the 2019 strikes on Aramco facilities and continued attacks in July 2026. In parallel, Israel has also confronted Iranian nuclear ambitions, missile programs and proxy forces including the Houthis. These common challenges fostered quiet intelligence and security coordination even before public discussions intensified. At times, Saudi Arabia permitted Israeli overflights and engaged in back channel talks signaling tacit approval.

During 2019 and 2020, Saudi Arabia and Israel held unofficial discussions on normalizing relations. The signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain in September 2020 altered the regional diplomatic landscape and created a framework that Saudi Arabia was expected to eventually join. The Accords, brokered during President Donald Trump’s first term, normalized relations between Israel and several Arab nations including Morocco and Sudan, and established a precedent for Arab states to engage with Israel without requiring a full resolution of the Palestinian issue. In the wake of the Accords, Saudi-Israeli contacts accelerated with direct American involvement and began receiving public attention. One of the strategic logic for Saudi Arabia is that normalization with Israel would accelerate Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 by pairing Saudi capital and ambition with Israeli innovation and security expertise, all underwritten by American strategic backing. Previously, a U.S.-brokered civilian nuclear deal was seen as one of the main benefits Saudi Arabia stood to gain from normalizing with Israel. However, a recent WSJ report indicates that the Trump administration has approved the nuclear agreement without requiring normalization.

From the planned normalization, Israel would gain legitimacy and integration into the broader region while both nations envision integrated air and missile defense systems. Nevertheless, the 2023 Chinese brokered Saudi-Iranian rapprochement introduced nuance. By reducing immediate tensions with Tehran, Riyadh gained diplomatic space but also in part affected the optics of aligning closely with Israel with the U.S. backing.

Until the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Saudi Arabia pursued a measured and gradual rapprochement with Israel. By September 2023, Israel and Saudi Arabia appeared poised to normalize relations, a strategic breakthrough that could have reshaped the Middle East. Saudi officials were clear at the time that Riyadh would not merely follow the United Arab Emirates into the Abraham Accords but would chart its own course as the region’s most consequential Arab power. During this period, the Crown Prince affirmed Saudi Arabia’s unwavering commitment to the Palestinian cause and the two-state solution as the first criteria for normalization. He also reaffirmed this again during his visit to the White House and his meeting with President Trump at the Oval Office, where he made clear that any normalization agreement would require meaningful progress on the Palestinian front.

However, the Gaza war fundamentally altered the regional calculus putting the normalization on the edge, causing Riyadh to put US-brokered Israeli normalization talks on hold. Because of the public anger caused by the war, Saudi Arabia was compelled to cool its approach and establish more stringent requirements for any future agreement.

The 12 day Israel Iran confrontation in 2025 and the broader Iran war that escalated in early 2026 laid further effects on the regional balance of power and the normalization prospects. Saudi Arabia criticized the move claiming it was not consulted on the campaign and opposed the use of its territory for operations. While the conflicts arguably weakened Iranian capabilities, they exposed Riyadh to spillover risks and raised questions about whether closer ties with Israel amplify rather than mitigate threats. In contrast, the war has shown Iran’s capacity to absorb sustained military pressure while retaining the ability to retaliate, demonstrating its continued relevance in shaping the Persian Gulf security order. It also made the regional countries question the reliability of U.S. security guarantees after facing huge attacks from Iran. This experience affected earlier assumptions that United States and Israeli alignment automatically enhances Saudi security.

U.S. brokerage has remained central yet challenging. During former President Joe Biden’s administration, Washington and Riyadh explored a broader agreement that would have combined security guarantees for Saudi Arabia with normalization of ties with Israel and a pathway toward Palestinian statehood. Saudi Arabia has been seeking security guarantees and other benefits with the United States in return for normalizing with Israel. President Donald Trump’s return to office has reinvigorated the push for normalization, though with distinctive characteristics. Trump has linked the Iran conflict to a broader push for Arab and Muslim countries to join the Abraham Accords. He has called on Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to sign the Abraham Accords as part of a peace agreement with Iran. Trump has boldly tied negotiations to end his war with Iran to Arab nations formally establishing diplomatic ties with Israel. He suggested that joining the Abraham Accords should be mandatory for a number of Arab and Muslim countries as part of his proposed deal to end the war in Iran. Trump also said he had spoken with leaders from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, asking them to normalize relations with Israel after a possible agreement to end the Iran war. However, the resumption of the war after the Memorandum of Understanding reflects the many issues that remained unresolved, further complicating the normalization process.

The late Senator Lindsey Graham believed that Israel-Saudi normalization could be the ‘big prize’ product of the war with Iran . Graham had been working on a new initiative to broker a historic normalization agreement, believing that the Iran war had created an opening for President Trump to broker such an agreement. He sought to begin an intensive diplomatic push after Israel’s October election and the US midterm elections, with the aim of reaching an agreement before the new US Congress was sworn in, in January.

In addition, developments preceding the war further intensified intra-Gulf and regional rivalries. Saudi Arabia increasingly views the close alignment between Israel and the UAE as a destabilizing factor that challenges Riyadh’s traditional leadership role in the region.This competition manifests strongly in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland drew sharp opposition from Saudi Arabia and a broad coalition of Arab countries. Riyadh condemned the move as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and worked through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to reject it as a dangerous precedent. Saudi Arabia has responded with enhanced defense cooperation with Somalia, closer coordination with Egypt and Qatar, and overtures to Pakistan while improving ties with its former rival Turkey which maintains major investments in Somalia. These steps aim to counter perceived Israeli and UAE influence in strategic maritime zones and to preserve a Red Sea order aligned with Saudi preferences.

Israel’s moves in the wider region are seen by Riyadh as part of a broader strategy that challenges Saudi influence and regional stability. This, in turn, intensified a form of regional alliance-building, placing Saudi Arabia and Israel on opposing sides. Israel’s Red Sea strategy may also become a source of tension, particularly as it overlaps with Saudi Arabia’s broader efforts to define the regional order. Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve a Red Sea status quo aligned with the regional order it aims to shape and influence.

The cumulative effect of these developments has significantly increased the complexity of Saudi-Israeli normalization. Historical Palestinian commitments now intersect with post-war security doubts, US brokerage ambitions, and intensifying rivalries in critical regions like the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia’s strategies, leadership assertions, and insistence on substantive Palestinian progress create a high threshold for any agreement. While incentives such as Vision 2030 and lingering concerns over Iran persist, major obstacles remain. Unresolved Iran-related issues, intra-Arab competition, and declining confidence in U.S. reliability make normalization an unpredictable prospect. Any future breakthrough would need to navigate not only bilateral ties but also the broader regional order both countries seek to shape, making the process more intricate than at any point in recent years. This complexity would be further compounded if the Iran war remains prolonged, delaying the prospects for normalization.

By Yonas Yizezew, Researcher, Horn Review

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikAFBVV95cUxOX0FXTGRZWmFSNlpPOFRtZGg4el9lYU40T3JDWkxKTmx2aUZNTUlRTHpxMUdUM0JjdGpKQnNuMDNaLWhYNkZudGVkNjRhNFJjaGRWNnVCNnMyY09INTRHQkd2U3lJeHl5Z09BSWRkR05kM3VMeEVBX1BYZV9YRW9wbEdKRXNmVW5tUWpuZnhBYkk?oc=5