이란의 대미전쟁, 내부 위기 심화로 인한 갈등의 복합성
Iran’s war with the US is not its only conflict as internal crises mount - The Guardian
내부 위기와 지정학적 갈등이 복잡한 시장 불확실성을 야기하여 명확한 방향성을 제시하지 못합니다.
핵심 요약
이란의 대외 분쟁과 내부 경제 위기가 결합하여 외교적 교착 상태가 심화되고 있으며, 경제적 압박이 주요 갈등 요인으로 작용하고 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 이란은 미국과의 5개월 전쟁을 진행 중이며, 내부 위기가 동시에 발생하고 있습니다.
- 이란의 가장 중요한 전장은 군사적 충돌이 아닌 국민의 경제와 생계입니다.
- 내부 갈등과 외부 갈등의 수렴은 외교적 교착 상태를 심화시킬 가능성이 높습니다.
- 이란 정부 붕괴에 대한 불신이 내부 갈등을 더욱 증폭시키고 있습니다.
도입
본 기사는 이란의 대외 군사 갈등이 내부 사회경제적 위기와 어떻게 얽혀 있는지를 분석하며, 이러한 복합적인 상황이 향후 이란의 지정학적 및 경제적 안정성에 미치는 영향을 투자 관점에서 조명합니다. 외부의 군사적 압박과 내부의 사회적 불만이 결합될 때, 국가의 정책 결정과 국제 관계는 예측 불가능한 변동성을 보일 수 있습니다.
본문 1: 사회경제적 압박이 주요 전장이 되는 이유
이란의 현재 상황에서 가장 중요한 전장은 군사적 충돌이 아닌 국민의 경제와 생계라는 점이 핵심입니다. Masoud Pezeshkian 대통령이 언급했듯이, 군사적 공격만으로는 국민을 굴복시킬 수 없으며, 경제적 압박이 사회적 불만을 형성하고 확산시킬 때 국민이 가진 사회적 자본이 동원되어 갈등이 심화된다는 논리입니다. 이는 외부의 군사적 전쟁이 내부의 경제적 취약성을 자극하여 사회적 불만을 증폭시키는 기제로 작용함을 의미합니다. 따라서 투자자는 외부 군사 상황뿐만 아니라 이란 내부의 경제적 스트레스 지표와 사회적 불안정 지표를 함께 고려해야 합니다.
본문 2: 외교적 교착 상태와 내부 불신의 연쇄 작용
외부 전쟁이 예멘, 이라크, 이집트로 확산되면서 국제적인 긴장이 고조되고 있으며, 이 과정에서 상호 불신이 외교적 교착 상태를 초래하고 있습니다. 이처럼 외부 갈등이 내부 갈등과 결합하면, 이란 내에서 정부에 대한 불신이 더욱 깊어지고, 이는 정부가 어떤 합의도 지속할 수 없다는 인식으로 이어집니다. 이러한 내부 불신은 외교적 협상에서 이란 측의 입장을 경직시키고, 장기적인 평화적 해결책 모색을 더욱 어렵게 만드는 악순환을 초래합니다. 즉, 외부의 압박이 내부의 취약성을 이용하는 방식으로 작용하여 정치적 불안정성을 심화시키는 것입니다.
본문 3: 장기적 전망과 위험 요소
이러한 내부-외부 갈등의 수렴은 단기적인 군사적 결과뿐만 아니라 장기적인 정치경제적 안정성에 중대한 위험을 안고 있습니다. 내부의 사회적 불만이 지속적으로 표출될 경우, 이는 정부의 통치력 약화로 이어져 경제 정책의 일관성이 저해될 수 있습니다. 또한, 국제 사회가 이란의 내부 불안정성을 주요 위험 요소로 인식하게 될 경우, 제재와 외교적 압박이 더욱 강화되어 이란 경제에 불확실성을 더할 수 있습니다. 따라서 향후 이란 시장의 움직임은 외부의 지정학적 변화와 내부의 사회경제적 안정화 노력이라는 두 축에 의해 결정될 가능성이 높습니다.
결론
결론적으로, 이란의 상황은 단순한 군사적 충돌을 넘어선 복합적인 사회경제적 위기 상황으로 읽힙니다. 외부 전쟁과 내부 갈등이 상호작용하며 외교적 교착 상태를 만들고 있으며, 경제적 압박이 사회적 불만을 증폭시키는 핵심 동인으로 작용하고 있습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 내부적 취약성과 지정학적 위험이 결합된 상황을 면밀히 모니터링하며, 장기적인 관점에서 이란 경제의 구조적 안정화 노력을 주목해야 할 것입니다. 향후 이란의 안정성은 내부 사회 갈등의 해소와 국제 사회의 외교적 접근 방식에 달려있을 것으로 전망됩니다.
Original Article
Iran’s war with the US is not its only conflict as internal crises mount - The Guardian
Government fears social discontent on ‘most important battlefield’ of economy and livelihoods as war takes its toll amid anti-state dissent
Iran, in the midst of an escalating five-month war with the US, continues to stumble from one internal crisis to another – whether it is over public executions, the rising cost of living, the alleged bias of the state broadcaster or even the post-midnight destruction of pavements outside liberal-leaning Tehran cafes. Very little that happens in Iran , cultural or political, momentous or trivial, does so uncontested.
But there is now a growing threat of a long diplomatic deadlock, forged by mutual distrust in which neither side believes the other will stick to any agreement. That impasse has occurred as the war broadens, drawing in Yemen, Iraq and now Egypt. In Iran, at least, the advocates of escalation are winning. As a result, a convergence of Iran’s conflicts, internal and external, becomes more likely.
Parts of the Trump administration and the Iranian opposition – including Reza Pahlavi , the son of the former deposed Shah – have never abandoned the belief that the Iranian government is on the brink of collapse.
What is true is that the picture of cohesive if brittle society presented by the millions attending the funeral of the supreme leader Ali Khamenei earlier this month revealed only one side of the public mood.
Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s president, rarely tires of warning that the conditions that led to the bloody protests in January remain.
At a recent meeting of the supreme judicial council he argued: “Iran is engaged in a full-scale war. Today’s war is not just a war of missiles; the enemy has come to the conclusion that it cannot force the Iranian nation to surrender through military attacks. The most important battlefield today is the economy and livelihood of the people. If economic pressures cause social discontent to form and this discontent spreads, the enormous social capital that the people have created in support of the system will be lost.”
Undoubtedly dissent, in the form of despair, exists.
Golshan Fathi, a Tehran human rights activist, recently wrote on her social media page: “The same sick cycle repeats … morning … the call to prayer, news of an execution … noon with power cuts, afternoon the water stops … dusk, the anxiety of war and renewed attacks on cities, and at midnight, the earth trembles.
“And tomorrow, the same story again. Caught between natural disasters, management failures, and man-made crises … every day we don’t live, we just practice enduring. Repetition, repetition, repetition … until a weary land no longer asks, ‘What will tomorrow bring?’ It just waits to see, ‘When will the next crisis arrive?’”
Dissent in the form of political protest also exists, whether it is those inside jails or citizens in the squares of Isfahan protesting against the current wave of intimidatory public executions . Many critics ask why the punishment of the accused takes place in public gallows, yet their trials are held in secret courts.
On Monday the political bureau of the Nation’s Union party warned that ignoring the protests over the wave of executions could have “devastating consequences”, and urged academics and religious scholars to intervene to end this state violence.
Azar Mansouri, once a close reformist ally of Pezeshkian, warned last week at the annual meeting of the Iranian reformist front about a small but vocal group that seemed determined to portray negotiated agreements with the US as retreats or defeat. War, she warned, “is not just a confrontation between military forces and armies. It is the destruction of the economy, the erosion of social capital, the spread of despair, the emigration of elites, the increase in poverty and the loss of opportunities for development. Ultimately, it threatens the future of the nation.”
Similarly a “we do not want war” statement signed by 268 political activists this month said they believed the overwhelming majority opposed war, and this should be tested in a public vote. Another letter from 1,000 activists linked with the former president Mohammad Khatami warned “the contemporary experience of Iran is that war has no winners. Those who advocate negotiations should not be slandered.”
What unites these initiatives is a fear that diplomats are losing, and Iran is being edged into a forever war that can be portrayed as an Iranian-Arab war, a war that would be to Israel’s advantage.
Yet opposition to the whole principle of negotiation with America – fuelled by Donald Trump’s own erratic behaviour – is being voiced by hardliners, in street rallies and more recently on unofficial billboards.
The sway of the hardliners lies less in their strength in parliament – many were elected on low turnouts and anyway have been deposed from key committees in parliament – but in the belief a network of deep-state support exists in the military and in the office of the supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. The absence of Khamenei from public view makes it harder to resolve the controversy about whether the family see any purpose in negotiations with America.
The closure of cafes, or the destruction of the sidewalks around them, is also seen as a crude attempt to shape debate. Last year the prominent hardliner Saeed Jalili described the cafes as an anti-Islamic “third space” beyond the dormitory or the office where people go to escape loneliness. “In this concept the family loses any meaning. This stands in opposition to Islam’s philosophy of marriage.”
Despite being a conservative newspaper, Jomhouri-e Eslami complained “an addiction to violating the dignity of one’s political opponents is increasing every day”. That in turn is, in part, a reference to the criticism of negotiators meted out by the publicly funded national broadcaster IRIB, long seen as a preserve of those opposed to talks with the west. Many see IRIB as an exclusive platform for the hardliners rather than a mirror of a diverse society.
The crisis between the government and the broadcaster is now out in the open after interventions by Pezeshkian and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the chief negotiator , were censored.
The government in a statement complained: “Censorship of the president’s speech, unilateral destruction of the government’s performance, and efforts to destroy the memorandum of understanding that was formed to get the country through the crisis and protect national interests are no longer media criticism; they are a stand against national cohesion, empathy, and unity.
“The question is clear: is the Iranian broadcasting system with the people, government, and interests of Iran or with those who benefit from division, tension, and polarisation? The national media should be the voice of Iranian unity, not a platform for destroying the government and disrupting national understanding.”
There are calls for a complete overhaul of the organisation’s accountability when a new head is appointed this September. At one level the politics of the national broadcaster should not matter, since surveys suggest less than 12% of the country watch it. The difficulty for the government is that this leaves audiences watching hostile foreign satellite channels instead.
This tension over the national broadcaster coincides with a period of unprecedented economic pressure. In the next six months food rationing might become necessary, Majid-Reza Hariri, the head of the Iran-China chamber of commerce, warned this week. Gholamhossein Mohammadi, the deputy minister of labour, said more than a million jobs had been lost as a result of the war.
In a way rationing – through food price inflation – has already started as Iranians are being forced to change their diets due to the cost of fruit, eggs and chicken. Year-on-year food inflation reached 134% in July, meaning the average household’s monthly food budget has more than doubled in a year. Overall inflation is at 84%. In a further sign of the long-term pressure on living standards, figures released this week showed the real value of the mimimum wage had plummeted.