핵심요약

• 호르무즈 해협 봉쇄는 최고지도자 사망 시나리오에 따른 비상 계획으로, 제3차 걸프전으로 확대되었습니다.
• 이 결정은 지역 안보 구조를 변화시켰으며, 최고지도자의 운명이 해협 안보와 연관됨을 시사합니다.
• 석유 가격 급등은 국내 인플레이션과 운송 비용 증가를 야기하여 국내 가계에 경제적 압박을 가했습니다.
• 이 사건은 지정학적 리스크가 에너지 공급망과 국내 경제에 미치는 영향을 명확히 보여줍니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란의 지정학적 행동이 지역 안보 구조와 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향을 분석하며, 이는 투자자들이 지정학적 리스크가 실제 경제 지표와 자산 가격에 어떻게 반영되는지를 이해하는 데 필수적입니다. 호르무즈 해협 봉쇄와 같은 전략적 결정이 어떻게 지역 갈등을 심화시키고, 궁극적으로 국제 유가와 국내 인플레이션에 영향을 미치는지를 통해 지정학적 변동성이 금융 시장에 미치는 영향을 예측하는 데 중요한 통찰을 제공합니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 리스크와 전략적 레버리지

이란이 호르무즈 해협을 봉쇄한 결정은 단순한 군사적 조치를 넘어, 최고지도자의 운명을 지역 안보 구조와 연결하려는 전략적 레버리지의 발현입니다. 이는 기존의 지역 안보 균형을 재편하고, 잠재적 위협에 대응하기 위한 새로운 외교적/군사적 옵션을 확보하려는 시도로 해석됩니다. 과거 IRGC 지도부 인사들이 이러한 조치가 향후 분쟁에서 실행될 수 있는 조치임을 시사했듯이, 이는 충돌 발생 시 국가 안보가 핵심 전략 자산과 직결됨을 보여줍니다. 이러한 지정학적 행동은 국제 사회의 인식 속에서 이란의 행동에 대한 정당성을 확보하거나, 적대국에 대한 압박 수위를 높이는 결과를 가져오며, 이는 국제 에너지 시장의 변동성을 증가시키는 주요 원인이 됩니다.

본문 2: 경제적 파급 효과와 내부적 갈등

해협 봉쇄로 인해 발생한 국제 유가 상승은 이란 국내 경제에 심각한 인플레이션과 운송 비용 증가라는 직접적인 경제적 부담을 주었습니다. 이는 국내 가계의 실질 구매력에 큰 타격을 주었으며, 이는 국내 정치적 갈등을 심화시키는 요인으로 작용했습니다. 또한, 이러한 경제적 압박은 이란 내부에서 조치에 대한 비판이 제기되는 결과를 낳았습니다. 이는 외부의 지정학적 압력과 내부의 경제적 현실이 상충하며, 정책 결정이 지역 안보 목표와 국내 경제 안정이라는 두 가지 목표 사이에서 균형을 잡아야 하는 복잡한 딜레마에 직면해 있음을 의미합니다. 따라서 외부 충격에 대한 대응이 국내 경제 안정성에 미치는 장기적인 영향에 대한 면밀한 분석이 요구됩니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 시장 시사점

이러한 사건의 장기적인 전망은 지역 강대국 간의 상호 의존성과 지정학적 위험의 고착화에 달려 있습니다. 호르무즈 해협과 같은 주요 해상 통로의 통제권은 향후 수십 년간 에너지 공급망의 안정성과 글로벌 무역 흐름에 지속적인 영향을 미칠 것입니다. 따라서 이란의 전략적 선택은 단기적인 군사적 결과를 넘어, 글로벌 에너지 시장의 구조적 변동성과 지역 안보 프리미엄의 변화를 예측하는 데 중요한 지표가 됩니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변수가 에너지 가격과 지역 경제의 장기적인 안정성에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 모니터링해야 합니다.

결론

이란의 전략적 행동은 지역 안보 환경을 재편하고 에너지 시장에 직접적인 영향을 미치는 복합적인 지정학적 리스크를 내포하고 있습니다. 향후 이란이 취할 외교적 및 군사적 옵션들은 에너지 공급망의 안정성과 지역 경제의 지속 가능성에 대한 예측을 좌우할 것입니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변동성이 에너지 가격과 지역 경제 지표에 미치는 영향을 종합적으로 고려하여 장기적인 포트폴리오 전략을 수립해야 할 것입니다.

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After “Code 110”: What Are Iran’s Playing Cards in the Ongoing War? - IranWire

“Nobody in the meeting had the heart to say that the Supreme Leader might be martyred; hence, we used Code 110.”

With this revelation regarding the pre-war deliberations of the Supreme National Security Council, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi disclosed that the decision to close the Strait of Hormuz in the event of the Supreme Leader’s assassination had been planned well in advance. Following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, this contingency plan was activated, sparking a severe crisis between Tehran and Washington that ultimately escalated into the Third Gulf War. Araghchi maintains that this action, alongside retaliatory strikes against Persian Gulf states, permanently altered the regional security architecture, signalling that the Leader’s fate had been tied to the security of the Strait of Hormuz.

Now, as full-scale conflict resumes, the potential for targeted strikes against the newly appointed Supreme Leader remains high, and Tehran is attempting to demonstrate that it possesses additional strategic options. However, the decision to close the Strait of Hormuz, which brought waves of missile strikes against domestic targets, faces growing internal criticism as a dangerous gamble. Even Iran’s Minister of Agriculture noted that soaring global oil prices triggered by the blockade led to severe inflation and surging transport costs nationwide, placing significant economic pressure on domestic households. Should the new Supreme Leader also be targeted, does the Islamic Republic have any remaining cards to play?

The Strait of Hormuz: From Geographic Reality to Strategic Leverage

Before its closure, shutting the Strait of Hormuz had been discussed only within restricted policy circles. While the editor of Kayhan newspaper had long advocated blocking the waterway, senior IRGC figures, including Mohammad Ali Jafari, indicated following the 12-Day War that such a measure would be implemented during subsequent conflicts.

During the 39-Day War, the Strait of Hormuz emerged as a primary instrument of power for the Iranian government, a tool used to control maritime traffic, impose transit conditions, and compel adversaries to accept Tehran’s terms. From the doctrine of “blockade for blockade” to the assertion that “a full ceasefire is meaningless unless backed by an end to naval blockades and global economic hostage-taking,” Tehran has treated the waterway not merely as a maritime passage but as a mechanism to pressure the global economy and recalibrate the balance of power in the Persian Gulf.

The political establishment aimed to fundamentally alter the legal regime governing the strait, seeking to collect transit fees or tolls in exchange for ensuring security. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, claimed that the Islamic Republic was collecting “$2 million in transit fees” from passing vessels, describing it as the enforcement of a “new sovereign regime” - a figure that was subsequently scaled back in official statements.

Later, Kazem Gharibabadi, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, stated: “Safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz cannot be guaranteed through ambiguous arrangements, parallel routes, or decision-making outside the framework of Iran as a coastal state.” He emphasized that navigation routes would be dictated by Tehran, warning that “if Oman fails to cooperate, Iran will proceed with single-handed management of the strait.”

Foreign Minister Araghchi echoed this posture, asserting that “Iran, as a coastal state of the Strait of Hormuz, has implemented measures consistent with international law to safeguard its national security against U.S. and Israeli aggression.” Similarly, Mehdi Tabatabaei, Deputy Communications Director for the Presidential Office, remarked: “The Strait of Hormuz will only be reopened under a new legal framework in which a portion of transit toll revenues is allocated to compensate for war-related damages.” In Tehran’s strategic framework, the strait serves not merely as a military instrument but as an avenue for turning a geopolitical chokepoint into a source of revenue, sovereignty, and diplomatic leverage.

The Islamic Republic currently seeks to use the conflict to permanently assert sovereignty and impose new maritime regulations over the strait, seeking international recognition while using the chokepoint as leverage against Washington.

Oil Prices as Global Economic Pressure Points

The focus on the Strait of Hormuz extends beyond exercising sovereignty over a geographic chokepoint; it represents a mechanism for transforming oil flows from an economic commodity into a political weapon. Many conservative and hardline factions argue that the blockade policy should be sustained until oil prices reach unsustainable levels for the United States and its allies. Certain figures maintain that the Islamabad Agreement should not have been signed, contending that skyrocketing energy prices would eventually have forced American concessions.

Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf previously observed that “oil prices may remain in the triple digits for an extended period,” warning that “the crippling of global economies” was a probable consequence of an expanding war. Following a renewed surge in oil prices above $100 per barrel on July 23, Ghalibaf commented: “They sought to punish Iran, but punished themselves with triple-digit oil. A 10 out of 10 strategy!”

These official statements indicate that, within the governing establishment, oil is viewed not merely as an export product but as leverage to raise the financial cost of war, disrupt global markets, and influence U.S. domestic politics. Political analysts aligned with the state contend that the depletion of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve will expose Washington to structural vulnerabilities, a dynamic Tehran aims to exploit to extract diplomatic concessions.

Surging crude prices translate directly into elevated global fuel costs, which Tehran calculates will drive inflation across Western economies. Proponents of this strategy maintain that leveraging regional capabilities can further compound market pressures. As one figure close to the establishment wrote: “Beyond the Strait of Hormuz, over which we will establish Iranian authority, we hold options across the Bab al-Mandab, the Strait of Gibraltar, and even the Cape of Good Hope to apply pressure when necessary.” Within this framework, oil functions as a strategic card, converting market supply disruptions into calculated political pressure designed to destabilize markets and force concessions from adversaries.

Bab al-Mandab: Completing the Pressure Network Across Critical Waterways

The Islamic Republic calculates that protecting its posture in the Strait of Hormuz and safeguarding oil flows requires cultivating secondary flashpoints by turning to its regional ally, the Houthis, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Tehran seeks to replicate in the Red Sea the same strategy implemented in the Strait of Hormuz: controlling passage, raising commercial shipping costs, and increasing energy risks for regional and international rivals.

For figures close to the ruling establishment, this strategic waterway is viewed not merely as a shipping lane but as an integral node in Iran’s “pressure network.” Analysts close to the state argue that if the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab are squeezed simultaneously, nearly 30% of global oil supplies could be disrupted, enabling Tehran to exert influence over energy prices and political calculations in Washington, Riyadh, and European capitals from afar.

Within Tehran’s framework, Bab al-Mandab serves as a force multiplier for the Strait of Hormuz rather than as an isolated issue. Coordinating pressure across both chokepoints extends the crisis from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, compounding shocks across global energy and shipping markets. Consequently, strategic analysts classify Bab al-Mandab as Tehran’s newest leverage point.

The strategy extends beyond simple blockade tactics. The Islamic Republic aims to demonstrate that, without acceptance of its core demands, including a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region, no durable security architecture can be established across vital maritime energy corridors. In this context, Bab al-Mandab acts as a complementary asset to bolster Tehran’s bargaining position, link Red Sea security to Persian Gulf dynamics, and redirect external pressure onto its adversaries.

From Regional Conflict to Trans-Regional Warfare

The Iranian leadership treats regional conflict as a central card in its strategic deck, a doctrine emphasized before the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and reiterated in official commentary following the February 28 escalation. Hardline figures aligned with the state have openly discussed regime-change or annexation scenarios targeting Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Recently, a presenter on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) Channel 3 publicly declared: “It appears that it is time for the Arabs to evacuate. Echoing our commanders, I state loudly: evacuate immediately. It is time to return to the era of nomadism and camel riding… If we are left with no infrastructure, no one else will have infrastructure either.”

This posture represents an effort to deter and constrain attacks by adversaries. Tehran seeks to leverage threats of regional retaliation to halt or restrict U.S. strikes. A spokesperson for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters stated: “Should the invading military target Iran’s infrastructure, everything in the region that remains intact due to Iran’s restraint will be crushed under the iron strikes of our powerful armed forces.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed this principle, remarking: “Our defence doctrine is clear: an eye for an eye.”

An article published on May 21 in Sedaye Iran, an outlet associated with Khamenei’s official portal, noted: “The playing cards are not limited strictly to those held within Iran’s borders. The recent regional conflict involved various nodes of the Resistance Front striking enemy interests, forces, and assets across the region. Under Iran’s leadership, this dynamic can extend beyond regional borders.” The publication warned that any new military campaign would trigger trans-regional escalation.

This doctrine was formally articulated in an IRGC statement issued on May 20, warning that a renewed conflict would cause “the promised regional war to expand beyond the region, delivering crushing blows where least expected.” The threat remains central to Tehran’s posture. On June 11, Ali Abdollahi, Commander of the Khatam Central Headquarters, reiterated threats of all-out war against the United States. He emphasized that the goal is to fundamentally alter the adversary’s cost-benefit calculus by ensuring that any military action against Iran imperils broader global interests, ranging from overseas military bases to commercial shipping across open oceans.

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