핵심요약

• 인도의 45% 원유, 60% 천연가스, 90% LNG 수입이 호르무즈 해협을 통해 운송됩니다.
• 2026년 2월 28일 Conflict 이후 누적 원유 공급 손실은 10억 배럴을 넘어섰습니다.
• 2026년부터 2030년까지 1200억 입방미터의 천연가스 공급 손실이 예상됩니다.
• 연간 연료비는 1180억 달러에 달해 인도의 경제에 심대한 영향을 미치고 있습니다.

도입

이 기사는 인도의 에너지 공급망에 미치는 호르무즈 위기의 영향을 분석하며, 투자자에게 중동 지역의 지정학적 리스크가 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미치는 파급효과를 이해하는 데 중요한 통찰을 제공합니다. 특히 인도의 에너지 의존도가 높은 국가들 중 하나인 만큼, 이 위기가 인도의 경제 전반에 미치는 영향을 예측하는 데 필수적입니다.

본문 1: 인도의 에너지 수입 의존도와 호르무즈 해협의 전략적 중요성

인도의 45%의 원유, 60%의 천연가스, 90%의 LNG 수입이 호르무즈 해협을 통해 운송된다는 점은 이 지역이 인도의 에너지 공급망에 있어 전략적 중요성을 가지는 것을 보여줍니다. 호르무즈 해협이 차단되거나 disruption이 발생할 경우, 인도의 에너지 공급에 심각한 타격을 줄 수 있습니다. 이는 인도의 경제 전반에 걸쳐 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 특히 제조업과 운송 분야에서 큰 영향을 받을 것입니다. 따라서 투자자는 인도의 에너지 수입 의존도가 높은 국가들이 호르무즈 해협의 안정성에 대한 리스크를 고려해야 합니다.

본문 2: 호르무즈 위기가 인도의 경제에 미치는 파급효과

호르무즈 위기는 인도의 경제에 다양한 파급효과를 미치고 있습니다. 예를 들어, 원유 공급 손실은 인플레이션을 가속화시키고, 천연가스 공급 손실은 산업 생산에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 또한, 연료비 증가로 인해 인도의 현재 계정 적자(CAD)가 확대될 가능성이 있습니다. 이러한 파급효과는 인도의 경제 성장에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 투자자는 이러한 리스크를 고려하여 포트폴리오를 조정해야 합니다. 특히 에너지 관련 주식이나 인도의 경제와 밀접한 관련이 있는 주식에 대한 투자 결정이 중요할 것입니다.

본문 3: 장기적인 전망과 대응 전략

호르무즈 위기는 단기적인 disruption이 아닌 장기적인 리스크로 자리잡을 가능성이 있습니다. 따라서 인도는 다양한 대응 전략을 마련해야 합니다. 예를 들어, 다른 공급원으로의 전환, 에너지 효율성 향상, 재생 에너지 개발 등이 고려될 수 있습니다. 또한, 국제 사회와의 협력을 통해 호르무즈 해협의 안정성을 확보하는 것이 중요할 것입니다. 이러한 대응 전략은 인도의 경제 안정성과 성장을 위한 필수적 조치입니다. 투자자는 이러한 장기적인 전망을 고려하여 포트폴리오를 조정해야 합니다.

결론

호르무즈 위기는 인도의 에너지 공급망과 경제 전반에 미치는 영향이 크다는 점이 핵심입니다. 단기적인 disruption뿐만 아니라 장기적인 리스크도 고려해야 하며, 인도는 다양한 대응 전략을 마련해야 합니다. 투자자는 이러한 리스크를 고려하여 포트폴리오를 조정해야 하며, 호르무즈 해협의 안정성과 인도의 에너지 정책 변화에 주목해야 합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiigFBVV95cUxQdEhTV09BUW5wYms4Y3J6bUVKTklJWkpyZGM3WldUejV4TFlpSk9mNnpKdENYd1Zxc3M5UEg4akUzY3pDbmhsVEp3d2ZtNGhnbFJmZ1p3US0xSEpLSkF0VWhVbXZYQjVYOWRqODR1QVplTEpoOXM2SHZ1OXc3UVFlaUttM3c0cUdCS1E?oc=5

Hydrocarbons at the Epicentre of the Hormuz Crisis - ORF Middle East

The following excerpt is from “ From Hormuz to Households: The Impacts of the Middle East Crisis on the Indian Economy ,” ORF Special Report No. 310 , Observer Research Foundation, June 2026.

The conflict may be unfolding in West Asia, but India sits uncomfortably close to its economic epicentre. Until the recent conflict, substantial shares of Indian imports—45 percent of crude oil [1] , , 60 percent of natural gas [2] , and 90 percent of liquefied natural gas (such as liquified petroleum gas [LPG] [3] —have historically travelled through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint. , Disruptions in the narrow waterway have already triggered global supply shortages. Cumulative, global crude oil supply losses have touched more than a billion barrels since the conflict began on 28 February [4] , and a potential 120 billion cubic metre loss in natural gas supplies is anticipated between 2026 and 2030. [5] Given India’s dependence on Middle East energy, the exposure is profound and vulnerabilities are multi-sectoral.

Hydrocarbons are foundational to all modern economies. Rising prices of oil and gas imports are easily transmitted and felt by consumers, but the real danger lies beyond the first-order effects. When supply chains are fractured, the consequences cascade across sectors—powering transport; fuelling industries such as aluminium, petrochemicals, and steel; fertilising agriculture; and supporting essential domains from household energy consumption to tourism, banking and logistics. What may begin as an energy shock can quickly turn systemic.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent appeals—urging citizens to work from home or use public transport, avoid gold purchases for a year, and defer unnecessary foreign travel [6] —may seem unrelated, but they reflect an attempt to contain mounting external vulnerabilities and a widening current account deficit (CAD).

Fuel costs, amounting to US$118 billion last year, [7] constitute the largest share of India’s import bill. Estimates suggest that for every US$10 per barrel increase in crude oil prices, India’s annual import bill will rise by approximately US$13–15 billion and widen CAD by 0.4–0.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). [8] With Brent crude prices rising from US$65 to US$120 per barrel, CAD has already widened by 2 percent of the GDP in a matter of few weeks. [9]

At the same time, India imports more than 90 percent of the gold consumed in the country. [10] This, taken along with outbound foreign spending, contributes to capital outflows, further straining the balance of payments. Moreover, rising energy prices will weigh on the Indian currency from a foreign exchange (forex) perspective as well, creating a double bind: a weaker currency makes imports more expensive, which in turn will worsen CAD, further fuelling depreciation pressures.

While the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) does hold significant forex reserves and has intervened through dollar sales, the monetary policy, however, will only offer limited and short-term respite. This is largely a supply driven shock, rather than a demand-led inflation. Policymakers, therefore, face a delicate balancing act of managing demand and prices, without triggering ‘stagflationary’ pressures.

Figure 1: India energy imports from Middle East as % share of total energy imports (2024)

Table 1: Total Energy Supply by Fuel in India (%) (2024)

Source: Author’s own, using data from Energy Institute [12]

Crude Oil : India imports nearly 90 percent of its crude-oil needs [13] , (roughly 5.64 million barrels per day [bpd] in 2024 [14] ), with almost half of it transiting through the Strait of Hormuz [15] . While the country has diversified its supplies from 27 countries in 2006–07 to over 40 today, [16] yet countries in the Middle East—Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), respectively—remain its key suppliers after Russia. While oil remains negligible in India’s power generation due to high costs, it is critical for transport (50 percent), industry (12 percent), residential use (13 percent) and agriculture (5.5 percent).

India hosts one of the largest refineries in the world, and the crude shortages have already triggered a 15 percent drop in inventory and forced declines in processing rates. [17] India’s efforts to source crude from Russia, West Africa, and the Americas have already reduced reliance on the Hormuz chokepoint; 70 percent of crude imports are now routed outside the Strait of Hormuz, compared to 55 percent previously. [18] Strategic stockpiles and a diversified base for crude imports offers some flexibility to the oil markets, unlike in the case of natural gas and LPG.

Figure 2: Oil products final consumption by sector, India, 2023

Natural Gas: India’s exposure to natural gas supply chains presents a more complex challenge. Unlike oil, gas is difficult to store and transport, making prolonged disruptions particularly damaging. India imports roughly 50 percent of its natural gas needs [20] , of which approximately two-thirds comes from the Middle East [21] , primarily Qatar. [22] Although the share of natural gas in India’s overall energy mix is only 7 percent, its importance in fertilisers (around 30 percent usage), [23] transport (compressed natural gas [CNG]) and household consumption (piped natural gas [PNG]) makes it economically sensitive. Industries such as refineries, steel, and petrochemicals are also heavily reliant on natural gas.

Piped Natural Gas: In FY 2023–24, PNG accounted for almost 20 percent of India’s total gas demand. [24] While the government has since been prioritising PNG and CNG infrastructure, progress remains slow. About 16 million PNG connections exist today, of which 10 million are active, despite a target of 120 million; 8,600 CNG stations are operational, compared to a target of 17,500. Infrastructure constraints thus limit the short-term impact of PNG. [25]

Figure 3: Final consumption of gas by sector, India, 2023

Liquefied Petroleum Gas: serves as the primary cooking fuel for 330 million households and over 3 million businesses. [27] It, therefore, sits at the intersection of energy policy and welfare, and represents the most immediate and socially sensitive risk. Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY), a scheme that provides to over 100 million low-income households access to subsidised LPG, [28] limits the government’s ability to transfer price increases. Beyond cooking, LPG is also widely used across small and medium (SME) manufacturing sectors.

Recent measures, including the LPG Control Order (March 2026), have raised domestic production targets, while a one year agreement to import 2.2 million tonnes annually from the United States (US), aims to stabilise immediate supply. [29] However, these interventions are unlikely to offset short-term shocks.

The government’s response so far reflects a tight balancing act between securing supply, ensuring affordability, protecting consumers and maintaining macroeconomic stability. The Essential Commodities Act (1955), [30] invoked by the government, allows the reallocation of natural gas across priority sectors while curtailing supply to non-essential industrial consumers, and manages price spikes amidst tendencies toward hoarding. Oil marketing companies have been asked to prioritise the utilisation of propane and butane streams for LPG production. Subsidies have been used to shield consumers from price hikes, particularly in LPG. At the same time, fuel prices in pumps have remained steady with state entities absorbing some of the shock.

However, these measures come at a cost, adding fiscal pressure and straining state-owned refineries and enterprises. Moreover, import substitution strategies— such as ramping up coal-based power generation, or fuel switching to kerosene—may ease pressure on LPG demand initially, but will exacerbate environmental and logistical challenges that could range from higher emissions to strained transport networks.

The Hormuz crises represents a moment of reckoning, forcing countries to rethink and recalibrate their energy security architecture.

Energy security is a matter of national security. In a world with growing geopolitical tension, energy infrastructure should be protected physically and digitally against both kinetic and cyber-attacks. Furthermore, strengthening strategic reserves and stockpiling will become central to energy security frameworks. Existing arrangements have already demonstrated their value. For instance, the UAE’s storage of approximately 5.86 million barrels of crude in the Mangalore Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) facility in Karnataka, [31] turned out to be a significant buffer for India during the ongoing crises. Building on this, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the UAE on 15 May 2026, marked an important step forward, with both sides committing to expand storage capacity by as much as 70 percent, to 30 million barrels. [32] These developments offer a strong template for deeper collaboration and expanded storage capacity with trusted allies and partners.

Countries are increasingly willing to pay a ‘sovereignty premium’ to reduce external dependencies. This will drive: (a) diversification across suppliers, routes, fuels, and technologies; and, (b) domestic development and international co-development. Both factors (a) and (b), will increase reliance on local energy resources alongside expanding investments in oil, gas, renewables and critical minerals—in exploration as well as in sustainable extraction. This shift will likely expand to projects and even geographies that may have previously been considered financially or politically unviable. The third factor, (c) is transition.

(c) Transition to clean energy is no longer a climate imperative, but an economic necessity. Renewables, gas, nuclear, and hydrogen—though requiring high upfront capex investments—can eventually reduce long-term vulnerability to global price volatility and supply disruptions. However, transition risks remain. Without adequate domestic capacity in manufacturing clean energy and processing critical minerals, India only risks replacing one dependency with another. Building resilient supply chains, investing in storage and grid infrastructure, and strengthening distributed energy systems will be essential.

Mannat Jaspal is Director and Fellow, Climate and Energy, ORF Middle East.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiigFBVV95cUxQdEhTV09BUW5wYms4Y3J6bUVKTklJWkpyZGM3WldUejV4TFlpSk9mNnpKdENYd1Zxc3M5UEg4akUzY3pDbmhsVEp3d2ZtNGhnbFJmZ1p3US0xSEpLSkF0VWhVbXZYQjVYOWRqODR1QVplTEpoOXM2SHZ1OXc3UVFlaUttM3c0cUdCS1E?oc=5