핵심요약

• 미국 대통령은 시작한 교착 상태의 전쟁을 종결하는 경우가 거의 없습니다.
• 트럼프 대통령의 이란 협상은 중단되었고, 제재가 재부과되었습니다.
• 대통령들은 승리보다 '매몰 비용 사고'와 '신뢰도'에 초점을 맞추는 경향이 있습니다.
• 이러한 패턴은 제2차 세계대전 이후 모든 교착 상태의 미국 전쟁에서 관찰됩니다.

도입

본 기사는 미국 대통령들이 전쟁을 종결하는 데 어려움을 겪는 역사적 패턴을 분석하며, 이는 외교적 목표 달성이 얼마나 어려운지를 보여줍니다. 투자자 관점에서 이 분석은 지정학적 리스크가 정책 결정에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 데 중요합니다. 외교적 목표 달성보다는 내부적인 심리적 요인과 역사적 관성이 어떻게 정책 결과를 좌우하는지 이해해야 합니다.

본문 1: 매몰 비용 사고와 신뢰도 (Sunk-Cost Thinking and Credibility)

미국 대통령들이 전쟁을 종결하지 못하는 주된 이유는 승리보다 심리적, 평판적 요인에 얽매이는 '매몰 비용 사고'와 '신뢰도'에 대한 우려 때문입니다. 대통령들은 이미 투입된 자원 때문에 어떤 종류의 이익을 보여야 한다는 압박을 느끼며, 이는 합리적인 비용-편익 사고를 방해합니다. 특히 이란과 같이 고도로 확정된 적을 상대할 때 이러한 심리는 교착 상태를 더욱 심화시킵니다. 이는 외교적 목표를 달성하기보다 현상 유지를 선호하게 만드는 근본적인 원인입니다.

본문 2: 역사적 관성과 후계자 문제 (Historical Inertia and Succession)

역사적으로 볼 때, 대통령들은 전쟁을 시작할 때 정치적, 심리적, 평판적 이유로 인해 해당 분쟁에 대한 독점적인 이해관계를 갖게 됩니다. 이러한 관성은 전쟁이 끝날 때까지 교착 상태를 지속시키는 요인으로 작용합니다. 따라서 트럼프 대통령이 평화를 약속했음에도 불구하고, 최종적인 평화는 트럼프 대통령이 아닌 그의 후임자가 도출할 가능성이 높습니다. 후임자는 전쟁이 실패했음을 인정하고 합의를 위한 양보를 할 수 있는 더 나은 위치에 있을 것입니다. 이는 현재의 정책 결정이 단기적인 외교적 성과보다는 장기적인 역사적 흐름을 고려해야 함을 의미합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 위험 및 전망 (Long-term Risks and Outlook)

이러한 역사적 패턴은 현재의 외교적 노력이 단기적인 성과에만 집중될 위험이 있음을 시사합니다. 만약 현재의 외교적 압박이 역사적 관성을 극복하지 못한다면, 미국의 외교 정책은 장기적인 목표 달성보다는 현상 유지에 초점을 맞출 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 단기적인 외교적 진전보다는, 정책 변화의 장기적인 지속 가능성과 국제 관계의 변동성(volatility)을 면밀히 관찰해야 합니다. 특히 중동 지역의 지정학적 환경 변화는 이러한 내재적 역학 관계에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.

결론

결론적으로, 미국의 외교적 목표 달성은 단순한 협상 기술을 넘어선 역사적, 심리적 요인에 의해 제약됩니다. 향후 외교적 결과는 트럼프 행정부의 의지뿐만 아니라 후계자의 접근 방식에 크게 좌우될 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 외교적 불확실성이 장기적인 자산 가격에 미치는 영향을 분석하며, 지정학적 변동성에 대비해야 할 것입니다. 향후 정책 변화의 동향에 대한 면밀한 관찰이 필요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMickFVX3lxTE81eVhSeUtEZjEwZTBPZ3BZT0haVVBwa2RTbnF1RVh4NEpwaHNWQVNqdlZORXEyYTFNS3c5a0J4dEFjLUhWRVVZX3pwQjFVYnNJNXNPMjdIN3V5SVd1QWh0SHRORzc3Wlg3YnBZcS1Va0xhUQ?oc=5

To End the Iran War, Trump Needs to Defy History - Foreign Policy

U.S. presidents are virtually never able to end the stalemated wars they start.

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When U.S. President Donald Trump agreed to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Iran in mid-June, he promised to broker a final deal that will “bring peace and security to the whole region.” Since then, however, negotiations have stalled , fighting has resumed , U.S. sanctions have been reimposed, and U.S. warships have once again blockaded Iran. In short, we’re back to the same stalemated war we thought we were done with a month ago.

This all raises an important question: Can Trump bring the peace he’s promised?

If history is any guide, it’s unlikely. U.S. presidents are virtually never able to end the stalemated wars they start. Trump could overcome these precedents if he taps into his more pragmatic side or Congress presses him to do so. Both are long shots, however—meaning that a final peace is more likely to come from Trump’s successor, who will be better positioned to admit this war was a failure and make the kinds of concessions to get a deal that Trump should, but likely won’t, do.

What history shows us is that when presidents take the nation to war, they feel they have a unique stake in the conflict, whether politically, psychologically, or reputationally. Things like sunk-cost thinking (“we’ve invested so much, we need to show some kind of gains”) and worries about credibility (“backing down will hurt our image abroad”) push out good cost-benefit thinking and lead them to try to salvage something that approximates a win before making peace.

Especially when facing a highly resolved foe like Iran , this usually means the stalemate drags on as the clock runs out on the president’s term.

This pattern has played out in every stalemated U.S. war since World War II. After the Korean War deadlocked in the summer of 1951, President Harry Truman’s concerns about looking tough on communism at home, U.S. credibility, and sunk costs pushed him to pursue rigid terms in armistice negotiations. He left office with no peace treaty.

After the 1968 Tet offensive, President Lyndon Johnson’s concerns about his standing at home, sunk costs, and U.S. credibility pushed him to likewise take a rigid position in peace talks. “I can’t get out, I can’t finish it with what I have got,” he bemoaned . “So what the hell do I do?”

After President Barack Obama’s promised escalation to end the war in Afghanistan failed, he halted a withdrawal of all troops in 2015. Obama worried , in part, about being the president to “lose” Afghanistan, as well as a repeat of the political damage that followed the Iraq withdrawal in 2011 and which contributed to the rise of the Islamic State.

Trump faces similar challenges in ending the Iran war, which stalemated when Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in early March. As with prior U.S. stalemates, the costs of this war are significantly higher than the benefits to U.S. security, which remain few given reduced U.S. interests in the Middle East and the rise of more important challenges elsewhere, especially in Asia.

Like his predecessors, Trump is piling pressure on himself to get the right kind of deal.

Above all, he wants a better nuclear deal than Obama achieved with Iran, having repeatedly denounced that “ horrible one-sided ” deal that “ should never ever have been made .” Trump is now feeling sunk-cost pressures to prove he was right to abandon Obama’s nuclear deal in 2018 and start his policy of maximum pressure.

More broadly, Trump wants to transform the Middle East in ways former presidents tried and failed to do. “Look, for 47 years, no president was willing to do what I’m doing” on Iran, Trump said recently.

Since the Iran war stalemated, these reputational concerns have had a big impact on negotiations. The MOU talks dragged on for weeks, in part because Trump—who lost considerable leverage with the closing of the Strait of Hormuz—couldn’t come to terms with a deal that made him look bad.

Trump repeatedly told aides he needs something that looks like a “ victory ,” such as an expansion of the Abraham Accords or an Iranian pledge to give up its highly enriched uranium. Two weeks before the MOU was signed, he turned down a final draft hammered out by negotiators and agreed to by the Iranians because he said it resembled the “ pallets of cash ” in Obama’s nuclear deal.

Trump’s reputational concerns carry even greater weight at this stage.

For starters, unlike the MOU—which was a cease-fire and mostly agenda-setting in nature—the two sides are now trying to hammer out terms on concrete issues that are especially near and dear to Trump’s reputational concerns. With his legacy on the line, Trump is showing less willingness to bend in these talks; he can’t as easily spin the terms of a final deal the way he could the less concrete MOU. That compels him to the same maximalist demands as before the war—something we’ve seen hints of since talks began.

The easing of economic pressure in the United States—which could be reversed if renewed fighting persists—with the signing of the MOU hasn’t helped in getting a deal, either. With fuel prices ,dropping after the MOU went into effect, Trump has been less under the gun to get a final agreement than he was to negotiate the MOU. That means reputational factors have had more room to roam, so to speak, in his decision-making.

In fact, this has already directly scuttled negotiations on at least one occasion.

When the terms of the MOU were released on June 17, Trump took a lot of heat from critics who claimed it—and, by extension, Trump—was weak, conceding too much to Iran. He’s been especially enraged at comparisons to Obama. To counter that impression, Trump wrecked the first round of high-profile talks by issuing a tough statement about how he would “blow the shit out of” Iran and take it over. The Iranians walked out , talks have gone nowhere since, and Trump’s recent return to war appears to be yet another classic case of a war-initiating president desperately trying to save face amid an embarrassing failure.

Stalemated wars don’t last forever, of course. But it’s generally the successor to the war-initiating president who brings about a resolution.

Why? Because successors tend to be freer from the constraints of their predecessors. They didn’t start the war, so they feel less obligation to continue it, find more space to admit failure, and can more easily adjust negotiating terms to get a deal. Trump and former President Joe Biden both campaigned on ending the unpopular Afghanistan war, then followed through on their pledges when they came to office.

Given that Trump is arguably the most unconventional president in U.S. history, he could break the mold of his predecessors. Last year, for instance, he set aside concerns about credibility and looking weak when he ended the futile air war with the Houthis , and he has refused to insert U.S. ground troops into the Iran conflict. In both instances, Trump rightly focused on costs and benefits to U.S. national security.

History is still more likely to prevail than not on Iran, however. Trump seems far more invested personally in a victory here than against the Houthis. Furthermore, his weak national security-making process means checks on his decision-making are few . Trump seems uninterested in fresh perspectives, even if available from his team.

Though also fraught, the best hope for near-term de-escalation and peace probably lies with outside pressure from Congress, which should start by challenging Trump’s new claim to another 60 days of unfettered warmaking authority under the War Powers Resolution .

Congress likely won’t stop the war entirely—that has never happened under the resolution. But it could exercise more oversight through hearings, limit funding, and set conditions on future funding that helps break the fever of war inside the administration, push Trump back to peace talks, and limit escalatory military action. Even as Congress continued to authorize war funding, this kind of legislative intervention helped eventually force peace in Vietnam and limited the 2007 surge of troops into Iraq. It also prevented escalation in El Salvador in the 1980s by making policy “ like walking through a swamp ,” according to former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

There should be no illusions here, though. Trump won’t give up the fight easily, and historically, the tug and haul between the executive and legislative branches on warmaking has allowed space for conflict to drag on. Congress increased oversight and pressure to end Vietnam in 1966. Still, a peace deal didn’t come until 1973.

Chances are, then, Trump leaves office with no peace agreement, and his successor will need to fix the mess of Iran.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMickFVX3lxTE81eVhSeUtEZjEwZTBPZ3BZT0haVVBwa2RTbnF1RVh4NEpwaHNWQVNqdlZORXEyYTFNS3c5a0J4dEFjLUhWRVVZX3pwQjFVYnNJNXNPMjdIN3V5SVd1QWh0SHRORzc3Wlg3YnBZcS1Va0xhUQ?oc=5