북한의 미사일 프로그램: 제재의 한계와 기술 발전

핵심요약

• 2006년 유엔안보리 제재 이후에도 북한은 대량살상무기 프로그램 개발을 지속 중
• 지난달 성공한 ICBM 시험발사 후 구암 해안에서 20마일 떨어진 곳 4개의 시험 미사일을 표적으로 삼을 계획
• 유엔의 '보편적' 제재가 모든 국가에 적용되지만, 북한의 불법적 기술 조달을 완전히 차단하지 못하고 있음

도입

북한의 미사일 프로그램은 국제사회의 제재에도 불구하고 지속적으로 발전하고 있습니다. 이는 동아시아 지역 안보 환경에 미치는 영향을 고려할 때, 투자자들에게 중요한 지표가 될 수 있습니다. 특히, 미국을 타격할 수 있는 ICBM의 성공적인 시험발사와 구암 해안에서의 추가 시험 계획은 지역 안정성에 대한 우려를 높이고 있습니다.

본문 1: 유엔 제재의 한계와 북한의 불법적 기술 조달

2006년 유엔안보리는 북한에 대한 제재를 강화하여 '대량살상무기 프로그램에 기여할 수 있는 모든 물자와 기술의 공급, 판매, 이전'을 금지했습니다. 그러나 북한은 이러한 제재를 우회하여 불법적으로 기술을 조달해 왔습니다. 이는 유엔의 제재가 모든 국가에 적용되지만, 각국이 제재를 어떻게 시행하는지에 따라 차이점이 발생하기 때문입니다. 예를 들어, 미국은 1990년대부터 북한의 미사일 기술 조달을 차단하기 위해 노력해 왔지만, 유엔의 보편적 제재가 시행된 후에도 북한은 다양한 방법을 통해 기술을 입수해 왔습니다. 이는 제재의 한계를 보여주며, 북한의 미사일 프로그램 개발이 지속될 가능성이 높습니다.

본문 2: 북한의 기술 발전과 지역 안보 환경의 변화

북한의 미사일 프로그램은 단순한 군사적 위협을 넘어, 지역 안보 환경에 미치는 영향을 고려할 때 투자자들에게 중요한 변수가 될 수 있습니다. 특히, 미국을 타격할 수 있는 ICBM의 성공적인 시험발사는 동아시아 지역에서의 군사적 긴장감을 높이고 있습니다. 이는 지역 안보 환경의 변화에 따라 투자 전략을 조정해야 할 필요가 있음을 시사합니다. 또한, 북한의 추가적인 시험 계획은 지역 안정성에 대한 우려를 높이고 있으며, 이는 투자자들에게 장기적인 관점에서 고려해야 할 중요한 요소입니다.

본문 3: 장기적인 관점과 투자 전략

북한의 미사일 프로그램은 장기적으로 동아시아 지역의 안보 환경에 미치는 영향을 고려할 때, 투자자들에게 중요한 변수가 될 수 있습니다. 특히, 미국을 타격할 수 있는 ICBM의 성공적인 시험발사는 지역 군사적 긴장감을 높이고 있으며, 이는 투자 전략을 조정해야 할 필요가 있음을 시사합니다. 또한, 북한의 추가적인 시험 계획은 지역 안정성에 대한 우려를 높이고 있으며, 이는 투자자들에게 장기적인 관점에서 고려해야 할 중요한 요소입니다. 따라서, 투자자는 북한의 미사일 프로그램 발전과 관련한 최신 정보를 지속적으로 모니터링해야 할 필요가 있습니다.

결론

북한의 미사일 프로그램은 유엔의 제재에도 불구하고 지속적으로 발전하고 있으며, 이는 동아시아 지역의 안보 환경에 미치는 영향을 고려할 때 투자자들에게 중요한 변수가 될 수 있습니다. 특히, 미국을 타격할 수 있는 ICBM의 성공적인 시험발사와 구암 해안에서의 추가 시험 계획은 지역 안정성에 대한 우려를 높이고 있습니다. 따라서, 투자자는 북한의 미사일 프로그램 발전과 관련한 최신 정보를 지속적으로 모니터링해야 할 필요가 있으며, 이는 장기적인 관점에서 고려해야 할 중요한 요소입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikAFBVV95cUxQYW8tZVF0a1NPSkRCOVNITHhvOW9GMDJiaVBSRnFoR0N0Y2JmNWFkWGVzRndVYnkzNW1UaXlfS20wNGNBWlZuSmNoMFAybW9rdmRQNUdyZnpkT1RadS1lMUh1YlFaLUs0UE9NUXVPODJKQkFNSm5vUXpZUHpibUJiaUJaS0xCUnRsQkN0SU9kOVE?oc=5

Why didn’t sanctions stop North Korea’s missile program? - The Conversation

North Korea’s long-range missile program has made significant technological advances in the past few months.

For most of the past 20 years, the international community has struggled to stop this kind of progress.

Kim Jong Un’s plan to target four test missiles approximately 20 miles off the coast of the U.S. territory of Guam shows just how destabilizing this rapidly advancing ballistic missile program can be. North Korea’s plan – which Kim claims will be finalized later this month – follows last month’s two successful tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile with the capability to hit the U.S.

My research on how states illegally obtain missile technologies and my experience conducting outreach related to U.N. sanctions give me some insight into the methods North Korea used to make illicit procurements and the limitations in using technology-based sanctions to prevent them.

In 2006 – following North Korea’s first nuclear test – the U.N. Security Council prohibited the “supply, sale or transfer” of “items, materials, equipment, goods and technology” that could contribute to the country’s missile program.

Efforts to prevent North Korea’s acquisition of missile technology by certain nations – notably the United States – had been underway since the 1990s . However, the U.N. sanctions went further by placing standardized legal requirements on all states to prevent the development of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs.

These sanctions are “universal” – obligatory for all states around the world. Each nation is responsible for implementation within its borders. Missile, nuclear and military technologies are regulated through national export control systems. Exports of certain goods and technologies need to be granted an export license by the government. This allows governments to do a risk assessment on transactions and minimize the diversions to undesirable uses, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction programs or human rights abuses.

In theory, all countries should have the capacity to implement technology-based sanctions. Having an export control system has been mandatory for states since the passage of U.N. Security Council resolution 1540 in 2004. However, more than a decade after this resolution was passed, many nations – particularly developing ones – are still struggling with implemention .

This has led to uneven execution of missile-related sanctions on North Korea. A recent report has described the U.N. sanctions regime as a “ house without foundations ,” noting that not a single element of the sanctions regime “enjoys robust international implementation.”

As North Korea’s missile program has advanced, its sources of missile technology have evolved.

North Korea began by importing full missile systems and seeking to reverse-engineer or replicate them. For example, after procuring short-range Scud missiles from Egypt in the late 1970s, North Korea “reverse-engineered” them by the mid-1980s. The 1990s saw North Korea develop the Nodong , a scaled-up Scud design. It also experimented with longer-range missiles in the late 1990s and mid-2000s. These Taepodong missiles drew together elements of the shorter-range systems such as their engines. The Taepodong-2 allegedly had an intercontinental range, although it was never successfully tested.

Since taking power in 2011, Kim Jong Un has accelerated North Korea’s missile program. In the past year alone, the country has tested four seemingly new missiles for the first time – including a submarine-launched ballistic missile and an intermediate range ballistic missile , as well as the ICBMs tested last month.

The country has also sought to learn how to produce required parts and components at home. North Korea’s program is opaque, and the balance between reliance on external sources and homemade parts is unclear, but some episodes provide insights.

Rocket debris salvaged from the sea following a satellite launch in December 2012 suggested an ongoing reliance on the international market place for parts. A 2013 U.N. report suggested the rocket had used modern components sourced from China, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S., as well as “cannibalized” Scud components and other 1980s vintage Soviet parts.

Since then, North Korea has continued to pursue more advanced manufacturing technologies. Footage from the leadership’s frequent factory visits has shown that North Korea has acquired advanced computer numerically controlled machine tools which are of use in missile and nuclear programs. Photographs from a parade in April 2017 suggest that North Korea’s new submarine-launched ballistic missile was constructed with wound filament. This material is lighter and stronger than aluminum, and a significant step forward in capability.

To make these advances in their missile program, North Korea has had to evade sanctions and the broader scrutiny of the international community. Their illicit procurement techniques include using front companies, obscuring the end user, falsifying documentation and mislabeling cargo. A 2017 U.N. report notes that North Korea’s evasion techniques are “increasing in scale, scope and sophistication.”

North Korea’s military and WMD procurement networks are global in nature. According to one study , they have touched more than 60 countries.

Due to geographical proximity, historic relationship and broader trading links, China has played an unparalleled role in these networks. Many middlemen and procurement agents have operated in China , and increasingly – as the country’s private sector develops – its manufacturers have been a source of technology. A series of revelations in early 2017 demonstrated that Chinese manufacturers and Chinese-North Korean joint ventures are benefiting North Korea’s missile program – including with machine tools , components and materials .

Observers might rightfully ask: Have sanctions failed?

This question is complicated. It might be more useful to consider what the effects of sanctions have been.

The primary objectives of technology-based sanctions have been to slow and prevent North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. The recent ICBM tests clearly prove these measures have not prevented North Korea’s missile development. Whether they slowed progress is debatable.

What is undeniable is that sanctions have had unforeseen consequences. Research suggests that sanctions could have made North Korea’s procurement efforts more sophisticated as Chinese middlemen monetize the risk.

Americans tend to view North Korea as an inward-looking, economically isolated state cut off from the international community. However, the country’s illicit networks – including those supplying its missile program – are global and responsive. Ultimately, they will be difficult to counter.

This is an updated version of an article originally published on July 7, 2017.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikAFBVV95cUxQYW8tZVF0a1NPSkRCOVNITHhvOW9GMDJiaVBSRnFoR0N0Y2JmNWFkWGVzRndVYnkzNW1UaXlfS20wNGNBWlZuSmNoMFAybW9rdmRQNUdyZnpkT1RadS1lMUh1YlFaLUs0UE9NUXVPODJKQkFNSm5vUXpZUHpibUJiaUJaS0xCUnRsQkN0SU9kOVE?oc=5