EU, 중국 전기차 17~35.3% 관세 부과…중국-EU 관계 복잡화
The Structural Limits of the EU’s China Policy - The Diplomat – Asia-Pacific
중국 전기차 및 도자기 수출에 대한 EU의 반보조금 조치가 부과되었으나, 협상을 통한 해결을 모색하고 있어 향후 전망이 불확실합니다.
핵심 요약
EU는 2024년 10월 중국산 전기차에 17~35.3% 관세를 부과하며, 도자기에는 79% 관세를 유지하고 있습니다.
핵심요약
- EU는 2024년 10월 중국산 BEVs에 17~35.3% 보조금 반제 관세 부과
- 중국산 도자기에는 79% 관세 유지 중
- EU 지도자들은 중국과의 대화 유지와 동시에 무역 방어 도구 평가 요청
- 중국-EU 관계는 불확실한 상태 유지
도입
이번 분석은 EU와 중국 간의 무역 분쟁이 글로벌 공급망과 투자 환경에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 데 중요합니다. 특히 전기차와 도자기 분야에서의 관세 부과는 관련 기업들의 수익성과 시장 전략에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.
본문 1: 전기차 산업의 관세 영향
EU가 중국산 BEVs에 17~35.3%의 관세를 부과한 것은 중국 기업들의 유럽 시장 진출을 크게 억제할 수 있습니다. 이는 중국 기업들이 유럽 시장에서의 가격 경쟁력을 잃게 만들며, 결국 EU 내 전기차 시장의 구조적 변화를 초래할 수 있습니다. 특히 중국 기업들은 기존의 공급망과 유통망을 재구축해야 하는 부담이 생길 가능성이 높습니다.
본문 2: 도자기 산업의 관세 지속 효과
중국산 도자기에 79%의 관세를 유지하는 것은 EU 내 도자기 산업에 대한 보호 장벽을 강화하는 조치입니다. 이는 EU 내 도자기 제조업체들의 경쟁력을 일시적으로 높일 수 있지만, 장기적으로는 중국과의 무역 관계 악화를 초래할 수 있습니다. 특히 EU와 중국 간의 무역 분쟁이 지속될 경우, 양측의 경제적 이익이 모두 손상될 수 있습니다.
본문 3: 글로벌 공급망의 리스크
EU와 중국 간의 무역 분쟁은 글로벌 공급망에 대한 리스크를 높이고 있습니다. 특히 전기차와 도자기 같은 분야에서는 공급망의 분산화와 지역화 전략이 더욱 중요해질 전망입니다. 이는 기업들이 새로운 시장과 공급망을 탐색하는 과정에서 추가적인 비용과 시간을 투자해야 한다는 것을 의미합니다.
결론
EU와 중국 간의 무역 분쟁은 여전히 불확실한 상태이며, 이는 글로벌 공급망과 투자 환경에 지속적인 영향을 미칠 것입니다. 투자자들은 EU와 중국 간의 무역 정책 변화에 주의해야 하며, 특히 전기차와 도자기 산업에서의 관세 부과의 영향을 면밀히 분석해야 합니다.
Original Article
The Structural Limits of the EU’s China Policy - The Diplomat – Asia-Pacific
When EU leaders gathered in Brussels on June 18-19, their agenda was packed with the bloc’s long-term budget, regional conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and global trade frictions. Although China was not explicitly named in the final European Council conclusions, the leaders’ discussions on “global macroeconomic imbalances” probably referred to the bloc’s fraught economic ties with Beijing. The summit yielded an ambivalent mandate. EU leaders called on European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to maintain dialogue with key economic counterparts, while simultaneously urging an evaluation of the EU’s trade defense toolbox to design new regulatory instruments. This leaves China-EU relations suspended in a familiar state of friction. Brussels’ bifurcated policy toward Beijing, which simultaneously pursues diplomatic engagement while clamping down on specific aspects of the economic relationship, is set to continue. Crucially, the summit offered no indication of a broader, unifying strategic framework to make this dual-track policy predictable. This lack of a coherent EU approach, compounded by member state policy oscillations, structurally caps what Brussels can achieve with Beijing, as it erodes the strategic confidence needed to reach meaningful compromises. China-EU relations have been strained for years, weighed down by a matrix of evolving regulatory measures that restrict business activities on both sides. These frictions are complex and extend into multiple regulatory and business areas. For instance, both sides conducted trade probes and imposed tariffs on each other’s products. In October 2024, the EU imposed definitive countervailing duties ranging from 17 percent to 35.3 percent on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) manufactured in China to counter what Brussels sees as “unfair subsidization.” While BEVs dominate headlines, they represent just one facet of a wider regulatory campaign; the EU maintains a 79 percent tariff on Chinese ceramics and is investigating tire imports. On the other side of the equation, Beijing has launched targeted anti-dumping investigations and duties on European products. European pork, dairy, and brandy are all subject to import tariffs in China, ranging from 4.9 percent to 34.9 percent, depending on the specific goods. Furthermore, the two sides also have or plan to have regulatory restrictions in place that go beyond targeting a specific product group and apply to whole industries and supply chains. The EU’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act aims to shield strategic European sectors, while the upcoming revision of the Cybersecurity Act seeks to restrict “high-risk” vendors from EU telecommunications networks. While this move is country-agnostic on paper, it threatens Chinese tech giants like Huawei. Beijing has its own defensive legislation. The Provisions on Industrial and Supply Chain Security allow China to penalize foreign firms that discriminate against Chinese supply chains, while the Provisions on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction empower the Ministry of Justice to block domestic entities from complying with foreign probes. This latter tool was recently used to halt cooperation with the EU’s Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) investigation into the security technology firm Nuctech. Moreover, the two sides also have export control regulations in place in addition to trade probes and industry-wide acts. The EU continues to tighten export controls on dual-use goods to prevent European technology from potentially reaching Russia's military economy via Chinese intermediaries. Conversely, China’s export restrictions on rare earth elements and permanent magnets put pressure on Europe's industrial competitiveness and green transition. This list of frictions is not exhaustive, as the two sides also have disagreements in other areas, like public procurement of medical devices. Nevertheless, even amid these compounding pressures in China-EU ties, diplomatic channels have not shut down. A European Parliament delegation led by Engin Eroglu visited China in late May, and Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Ling Ji met with the European Commission's Ditte Juul Jorgensen on June 9 to discuss a new trade and investment consultation mechanism. The June European Council took place amid media headlines that Europe’s debate on China was at a “boiling point,” and that leaders were moving in the direction of a “harder line toward” Beijing. The actual outcome, however, was far more muted. Rather than choosing a definitive path, the Council chose to institutionalize its ambivalence. It handed the Commission a mandate to design new trade defense tools, reportedly focusing on diversification, while explicitly instructing it to continue dialogue with the EU’s key trade partners. Consequently, the commercial uncertainty defining the China-EU relationship is set to persist. The structural weakness of the EU’s approach is not just the Commission’s dual-track policy, but also the geopolitical inconsistency of its member states. Germany, whose economic weight naturally shapes the direction of EU policy, remains caught between preserving its close business ties with Beijing and maintaining unity with its European partners. As a result, Berlin continues to oscillate between a moderate approach and endorsing a stronger defensive posture. Similarly, Spain has demonstrated shifting priorities, recently pivoting from its initial support of a French-led policy paper demanding a tougher line on China to distancing itself from the initiative. These shifting national positions constrain the EU’s capacity for collective action. Long-term stability in the China-EU relationship cannot be built on defensive toolboxes, policy buzzwords, or reactive tariffs. It requires a policy that is coherent, consistent, and united. Brussels’ fragmented approach to China, shaped by its de-risking strategy, proclaimed commitment to dialogue and divergent member state action, makes it difficult for Beijing to distinguish signal from noise. As long as China receives contradictory messages from a fractured bloc, it has very little incentive to make concessions on critical issues like rare earth export clearances or market access barriers. A predictable, unified European policy is a viable foundation for the strategic confidence needed to move relations beyond this volatile inflection point. Only when Brussels establishes clear, consistent boundaries will Beijing be able to gauge Europe's long-term strategic trajectory, creating the stable environment necessary for both powers to negotiate a much-coveted economic compromise.