미국-이란 전쟁의 경제적 영향: 2700억 달러 피해와 6% GDP 감소의 의미

핵심요약

• 이란의 전쟁 피해액은 2700억 달러에 달하며, GDP는 6% 감소 전망
• 이란의 군사력은 크게 약화되어 미국에 직접적인 피해를 입히지 못할 수준
• 이란의 경제는 하이퍼인플레이션과 리더십 불안정으로 극도로 취약해짐
• 전쟁은 즉시 정권 교체를 가져오지 않았지만, 이란의 지정학적 영향력은 크게 약화됨

도입

이 기사는 미국-이란 전쟁의 경제적 결과를 분석하며, 이란에 대한 미국의 승리의 의미를 설명합니다. 투자자들에게는 이란의 경제적 약화와 미국의 지정학적 영향력 증가가 향후 중동 지역과 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미칠 영향을 이해하는 데 중요한 통찰을 제공합니다.

본문 1: 이란 경제의 하이퍼인플레이션과 6% GDP 감소의 의미

이란의 GDP가 6% 감소할 전망이라는 점은 이란 경제가 극도로 취약해졌음을 보여줍니다. 하이퍼인플레이션은 통화 가치를 급격히 떨어뜨려 이란의 수출 경쟁력과 내수 시장 모두에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 것입니다. 이는 이란의 석유 수출 수입이 감소하고, 국내 기업들의 운영 비용이 급증할 것으로 예상됩니다. 또한, GDP 감소는 이란의 재정 상태가 악화되어 정부가 인프라 투자와 사회 복지 프로그램에 대한 지출을 줄여야 할 가능성을 시사합니다. 이는 이란 국민의 불만 증가로 이어질 수 있으며, 이는 정치적 불안정으로 이어질 수 있습니다.

본문 2: 미국과 이란의 군사적 힘의 변화와 그 영향

이란의 군사력이 크게 약화되었습니다. 이는 미국이 이란의 군사적 위협을 크게 줄였음을 의미합니다. 그러나 이란의 군사적 약화는 중동 지역에서의 미국의 영향력 증가를 의미하기도 합니다. 이는 미국이 중동 지역의 안정화를 주도할 수 있는 기회를 제공할 수 있습니다. 그러나, 이란의 군사적 약화는 이란의 지역 내 동맹국들과의 관계를 악화시킬 수 있으며, 이는 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정을 초래할 수 있습니다. 또한, 이란의 군사적 약화는 이란의 핵 프로그램에 대한 미국의 압력을 강화할 수 있습니다.

본문 3: 전쟁의 장기적 영향과 투자 시사점

이 기사는 전쟁의 장기적 영향에 대해 논의합니다. 전쟁은 이란의 경제적 약화와 정치적 불안정을 초래할 수 있으며, 이는 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정을 초래할 수 있습니다. 또한, 전쟁은 미국과 이란의 관계에 미칠 영향을 고려해야 합니다. 이는 중동 지역의 에너지 시장에 미칠 영향을 고려해야 합니다. 또한, 전쟁은 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미칠 영향을 고려해야 합니다. 이는 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정을 초래할 수 있으며, 이는 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미칠 영향을 고려해야 합니다.

결론

이 기사는 미국이 이란과의 전쟁에서 승전보를 올렸으며, 이는 이란의 경제적 약화와 정치적 불안정을 초래할 수 있음을 보여줍니다. 투자자들은 이란의 경제적 약화와 정치적 불안정이 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정을 초래할 수 있음을 고려해야 합니다. 또한, 전쟁의 장기적 영향에 대해 고려해야 합니다. 이는 중동 지역의 에너지 시장에 미칠 영향을 고려해야 합니다. 향후 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정과 글로벌 에너지 시장의 변동성을 주의 깊게 관찰해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilwFBVV95cUxNVVhnNFkzWWhEV19CU3VlZHpmdk1BcDlCWlk3MTdmV1J2dHZiTFoxZjVmWm9pUlJBWGV2RExyYTMwUlNaTUxMQkN4enFROFFCVng4T2JsVGtnU3pLMmlzTFZHUjhITzNHNU9oU3ktOG5kYXB0SU11NWpmcllEQWpqV21HbTBhcXlDVkVSZG5LeGlTdlEzUklj?oc=5

The U.S. Won the War With Iran - Foreign Policy

It wasn’t a knockout blow, but Washington prevailed on points.

According to an emerging conventional wisdom, the United States suffered a catastrophic loss in the war and memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Iran that were worse than Vietnam and comparable to the United Kingdom’s embarrassing defeat in the Suez Crisis in 1956.

To be sure, the United States did not register a knockout punch against the Islamic Republic, but to continue the boxing metaphor, it did win on points.

For several weeks, beginning on Feb. 28, the United States landed blow after heavy blow against its opponent. Operation Epic Fury achieved most of U.S. President Donald Trump’s stated goals by seriously degrading Iran’s nuclear program, conventional military, defense industrial base, and leadership.

For decades prior to the war, Iran posed one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security. Now, it is at its weakest point since the 1979 revolution. Its prewar leadership is gone. Its new leaders are hiding for their lives. Iran’s economy is in crisis, with hyperinflation, a predicted 6 percent decline in GDP, and, by Tehran’s own estimates, $270 billion in wartime damage . Its military is badly degraded and unable to inflict significant damage directly against U.S. forces. Finally, the Islamic Republic has lost legitimacy with its own people and alienated neighboring states across the region.

Trump also followed through on his promise to the Iranian people that “help is on the way.” In response to Tehran’s large-scale killing of its own people in December and January, the United States and Israel launched a massive bombing campaign that resulted in the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as much of the Iranian leadership who oversaw the massacre. Any future Iranian leader will need to think twice before choosing the same course of action—and potential fate.

The war did not result in regime change— at least not yet. But this was never a core and consistent objective of the U.S. strategy and never one that was fully in Washington’s control. The large-scale military campaign provided an opportunity, as Trump promised, for the Iranian people to rise up, and they (perhaps understandably after the regime’s previous massacres) decided not to take it.

Critics maintain that the rapid and large-scale expenditure of munitions has “wrung out” U.S. power and that Washington’s inability to subdue Iran sends a message of American weakness around the world. On the contrary, the war showed that the United States is still willing and able to engage in large-scale military action. Russian President Vladimir Putin or Chinese President Xi Jinping cannot safely assume the Pentagon will stay on the sidelines if they attack NATO or Taiwan.

The war also gave the U.S. military the opportunity to practice. China’s People’s Liberation Army has not fought a war in decades. The Pentagon just conducted a months-long exercise in Iran of new tactics and technology that will be useful in a future conflict in Europe or Asia.

Critics argue that this war and subsequent deal somehow leave Iran in a stronger position because it demonstrated that Iranian forces can close the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, the past weeks may have revealed new details about the economic impact of this move, the limits of the United States’ ability to reverse it with force, and the susceptibility of the administration to pressure on gas prices. But as other critics also correctly point out, military planners have known for years that Iran could threaten the Strait of Hormuz in a way that would be damaging to the U.S. and global economy. This is a simple fact of geography and military technology. It is impossible to prevent Tehran from threatening to fly a drone into a passing cargo ship. The war simply confirmed this long-standing assumption.

Moreover, Iran was not the only country that demonstrated capability during the war. The war also demonstrated that Iran’s leadership, nuclear program, and conventional military only ever existed due to the good graces of Washington and Tel Aviv. These powers always retain the option of decapitating and defanging the Islamic Republic again and again at a time of their choosing.

Critics argue that the war has strained the United States’ relations with its allies, and it is true that Washington should have done a better job of enlisting its European allies in this effort. But the Europeans understand that Iran poses a serious threat that needs to be addressed. And, on balance, Washington’s relationships with its allies and partners in the Middle East have improved. Some of these countries, such as Qatar, were hedging between Washington and Tehran before the war. But Tehran bared its teeth in this conflict, attacking civilian targets in neighboring countries, demonstrating to all that the Islamic Republic is an untrustworthy menace.

The greatest downside cost to the war has been Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the U.S. retaliatory blockade, which choked off Middle Eastern energy flows, resulting in inflation and disruptions to the global economy. The MOU promises to repair this damage by reopening the strait, allowing energy markets and the global economy to recover.

In this way, Epic Fury traded the destruction of the military of the world’s leading terrorist state for an increase in energy prices that will ultimately subside. That is a good trade.

Critics argue that the terms of the MOU are one-sided in Iran’s favor. To be sure, some of the terms of the deal, such as the notion that Washington will facilitate a $300 billion reconstruction effort in Iran are abhorrent.

I am not worried, however, because the full terms of this deal are unlikely to ever be implemented. The MOU should really be read as two separate agreements. Some of the terms of the deal, namely those related to reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for limited sanctions relief, are set to start “immediately.” Other terms, like those related to Iran’s nuclear program and the large-scale reconstruction effort, are set to be negotiated over the next 60 days.

In short, this deal is an agreement to get Middle Eastern energy flowing to global markets and an effort to work out the rest later.

But the rest is unlikely to ever be worked out. It is hard to imagine that Iran’s leaders will ever abandon their nuclear program. And I hope that America’s leaders would never actually follow through with a Marshall Plan for a terrorist state.

Many critics agree that Iran will not limit its nuclear program, and aver, therefore, that this is another wartime aim that Trump failed to achieve. But Washington does not actually need a nuclear deal. Iran’s nuclear program has been devastated, and if it is rebuilt, the Pentagon can simply destroy it again.

The same is true of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium buried under the rubble of its destroyed nuclear facilities. This issue has received undeserved, outsized attention in the public policy debate. But Iran probably lacks the capability to extract the material. And if Iranian personnel try to enter the area, they would put themselves in the crosshairs of potential U.S. military strikes. The material is of no use unless it is enriched to higher levels, and Iran lacks enrichment facilities thanks to U.S. military action.

Some hawks are disappointed that Trump is not pressing his advantages against Iran to “ finish the job .” He could have resumed large-scale airstrikes against Iranian military and dual-use targets, while encouraging Israel to continue its campaign to assassinate Iranian leaders and provide support—such as internet access—to the Iranian opposition movement.

Their disappointment is understandable. The Islamic Republic is at is most vulnerable since the 1979 revolution, and it would be wonderful to have a government in Tehran that is more cooperative internationally and that respects the human rights of its own people.

But an extended regime-change war was always an unlikely course of action for Trump. His “peace through strength” doctrine allows a space for short, sharp, decisive uses of force, but he is uncomfortable with long, drawn-out military campaigns with no clear end in sight. The instincts that led him to unleash Operation Epic Fury are the same that contributed to the MOU.

Much rides on what happens in the next 60 days. There are three scenarios. First, it is conceivable that Washington and Tehran negotiate a comprehensive accord in the coming weeks. But this outcome is highly unlikely.

Second, it is possible that, frustrated with the lack of progress in final negotiations, the two sides return to open warfare. In this scenario, today’s hotly debated MOU will be looked back on as a truce. If warfare resumes, it is likely that Iran will once again suffer disproportionately.

Third, and most likely, the two sides will be unable to strike a final accord, but the cease-fire and interim provisions remain in place. Neither side is eager to return to open warfare, and both have a strong economic incentive to keep the strait open.

Critics argue that, if this third outcome is realized, Trump will simply have restored the prewar status quo. But this misses an important point. Before the war, Iran’s leadership and military were strong. Now, they are weak.

The perception of the leaders involved is relevant, and Trump has repeatedly claimed that the United States won a “total and complete victory.” When asked if Iran won the war, in contrast, Ali Khamenei was unavailable for comment.

This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration . Follow along here .

Matthew Kroenig is a columnist at Foreign Policy and vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His latest book, with Dan Negrea, is We Win, They Lose: Republican Foreign Policy and the New Cold War . X: @matthewkroenig

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilwFBVV95cUxNVVhnNFkzWWhEV19CU3VlZHpmdk1BcDlCWlk3MTdmV1J2dHZiTFoxZjVmWm9pUlJBWGV2RExyYTMwUlNaTUxMQkN4enFROFFCVng4T2JsVGtnU3pLMmlzTFZHUjhITzNHNU9oU3ktOG5kYXB0SU11NWpmcllEQWpqV21HbTBhcXlDVkVSZG5LeGlTdlEzUklj?oc=5