핵심요약

• 이란은 미국 해상 봉쇄와 제재를 해제하기 위해 '공세적 자세'로 전환하고 있습니다.
• 이란은 페르시아만 인터넷 케이블에 대한 선제공격, 쿠웨이트 및 바레인 내 국내 불안정 조장, 쿠웨이트에서의 지상 작전 가능성을 포함하는 새로운 계획을 구상하고 있습니다.
• 이란 당국은 미국과 지역 파트너들이 이란의 최대 요구 사항에 양보하지 않을 경우 공격의 범위와 심각성을 확대할 수 있음을 시사했습니다.
• 이란 군 지도부는 '공세적 자세'로 전환하고 있으며, 이는 지역적 지정학적 위험을 극대화하고 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란이 미국 및 지역 파트너들에 대한 군사적 확전을 고려하고 있음을 보여줍니다. 이는 단순한 지역 분쟁을 넘어 글로벌 공급망과 에너지 시장에 심각한 영향을 미칠 수 있는 지정학적 위험을 내포하고 있습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 군사적 움직임이 국제 제재의 실효성과 에너지 시장의 변동성에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 분석해야 합니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 리스크의 구체화

이란 당국이 언급한 확장된 군사 계획은 지역 안보의 구조적 변화를 예고합니다. 특히 페르시아만 인터넷 케이블에 대한 선제공격이나 쿠웨이트에서의 지상 작전 가능성은 해상 운송로의 안정성과 에너지 수송 경로에 직접적인 위협을 가합니다. 이러한 시나리오는 국제 해운 물류와 에너지 거래에 즉각적인 변동성을 야기하며, 이는 글로벌 원자재 가격에 상승 압력을 가할 수 있습니다. 또한, 쿠웨이트와 바레인 등 시아 공동체 국가 내에서 국내 불안정을 조장하려는 시도는 지역 내 정치적 안정성을 훼손하고, 이는 이란의 영향력 확대와 연계되어 지역 패권 경쟁을 격화시킬 위험이 있습니다. 이는 단순히 이란과 미국의 양자 관계를 넘어 중동 전체의 지정학적 균형에 영향을 미치는 핵심 요소로 작용합니다.

본문 2: 제재의 실효성과 경제적 파급 효과

이란이 요구하는 제재 해제 및 협력 중단 요구는 미국의 대이란 정책의 실효성에 대한 근본적인 질문을 제기합니다. 만약 이란이 군사적 확전을 통해 제재를 무력화하려 한다면, 이는 국제 사회의 제재 체계에 대한 신뢰도를 약화시킬 수 있습니다. 이는 국제 금융 시장에서 위험 프리미엄을 증가시키고, 특히 이란 관련 자산에 대한 투자 심리를 위축시킬 수 있습니다. 또한, 이란이 지역 협력을 중단하려 한다는 것은 역내 협력체제 자체가 와해될 가능성을 의미하며, 이는 지역 경제 통합 노력에 부정적인 영향을 미칩니다. 따라서 투자자들은 군사적 충돌이 장기적으로 제재 체제의 지속 가능성에 미치는 영향을 고려하여, 단기적인 시장 반응뿐만 아니라 장기적인 경제적 위험을 평가해야 합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망 및 시장 대응

이란의 '공세적 자세' 전환은 중동 지역의 장기적인 지정학적 불안정성을 심화시킬 전망입니다. 군사적 긴장이 고조될수록 에너지 시장은 공급 불안정 위험에 민감하게 반응하며, 이는 국제 유가 및 천연가스 가격의 지속적인 상승 요인으로 작용할 가능성이 높습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 군사적 리스크가 에너지 섹터와 해운 물류 섹터에 미치는 영향을 중점적으로 모니터링해야 합니다. 또한, 지역 내 불안정 조장 시도에 대한 대응으로 각국의 외교 정책 변화를 주시하며, 이는 장기적인 투자 전략 수립에 중요한 참고 자료가 될 것입니다. 시장은 이러한 군사적 위협이 경제적 비용으로 전환되는 경로를 예측하며, 이에 따른 위험 회피 심리가 반영될 것입니다.

결론

이란의 군사적 확전 가능성은 중동 지역의 지정학적 불안정성을 가속화시키며, 이는 글로벌 에너지 시장과 금융 시장에 직접적인 변동성을 초래할 것입니다. 투자자들은 이란의 군사적 행동이 제재 체제의 지속 가능성과 지역 경제 안정성에 미치는 영향을 중심으로 위험을 평가해야 합니다. 향후 이란의 군사적 움직임과 국제 사회의 제재 대응 노력을 지속적으로 관찰하는 것이 중요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilwFBVV95cUxOVVdJbkRYZE1DUFhOUzBFaDc3ek90b0k2TVBXdnBBdzFnUWFhOVlVRzZVRG9DclY0dkMzdU5PNXNKM013MExVbk1EaWF1c0NtVTJQNVJ5V2pvOEJDSkRYT1ZKQTJOZnUteW5NTDRxYmdDeW5WTlg2MGlsZkRKTF9UYTVaYjIzWU00MlgxRFZiUldZVjlkcHp3?oc=5

Iran Update Special Report, August 17, 2026 - Institute for the Study of War

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

Note : ISW-CTP will pause publishing weekend updates starting on August 15, 2026. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.

The Iranian regime is signaling that it would prefer to continue or even escalate fighting with the United States and its regional partners rather than make any serious concessions regarding its maximalist demands if the regime cannot force them to accede to Iran’s demands. The regime is signaling that it could expand the scope and severity of its attacks against the United States and its allies if they do not acquiesce to Iran’s maximalist demands, which include lifting the US naval blockade and US sanctions, securing recognition of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz, and stopping regional cooperation on policies the regime deems hostile to its interests, among others. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has reportedly devised new plans for further escalation, including preemptive strikes on internet cables in the Persian Gulf, fomenting domestic unrest in countries with Shia communities like Kuwait and Bahrain, and “potentially” ground operations in Kuwait, according to Iranian officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and public statements.[1] Iranian officials’ decision to publicize these plans to WSJ was likely meant to have an informational effect, even if the regime is seriously considering these options. Senior Iranian military commanders, including IRGC Political Deputy Yadollah Javani, have warned in recent days that Iran is shifting to an “offensive posture.”[2] A senior Iranian official similarly told Reuters on August 17 that Iran will adopt a “fully offensive” posture and conduct an attack to break the US naval blockade if diplomatic efforts to lift the blockade fail.[3] These threats are likely intended to coerce the United States to surrender to Iranian demands as well as to restore deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and its regional partners by signaling the regime’s willingness to expand the scope of its attacks and conduct preemptive attacks.

The regime is likely simultaneously preparing to try to make fighting more costly for the United States should there be a renewal of hostilities. The WSJ report added that the IRGC “used the calm created by the [memorandum of understanding (MOU)]” to coordinate attack plans with its partners and proxies in the region.[4] Officials familiar with Arab intelligence findings said that the Iranian regime sent advisers to Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to discuss plans, including a plan for confrontation with Saudi Arabia in coordination with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis.[5] The IRGC reportedly supervised the deployment of “missiles, naval weapons, and drone launchers” to positions around the Red Sea, provided the Houthis with intelligence and target lists, including Saudi ports and energy facilities, and advised the Houthis on how to defend against Saudi retaliation.[6] ISW-CTP has repeatedly assessed that the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia as well as its blockade on Saudi ports advance Iranian efforts to impose economic costs on the United States and its regional partners to erode their willingness to continue the war and force them to give in to Iranian demands. Arab intelligence officials similarly told WSJ on August 17 that Iran’s hardline leadership, which ISW-CTP has assessed since March 2026 is dominated by IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, is preparing the Iranian armed forces to “widen the war” and “raise costs” for the United States and its allies.[7] This report is consistent with a New York Times (NYT) report on August 1 that senior IRGC Quds Force officers held calls with Hezbollah, Houthi, and Iraqi militia commanders during the ceasefire to coordinate efforts to expand the conflict with the United States.[8]

Vahidi and his inner circle would likely accept a deal with the United States if the United States surrendered to the regime’s demands. Axios reported on August 17 that the United States tried to establish a diplomatic backchannel with Vahidi in May 2026 to determine whether the Iranian negotiating team’s position accurately reflected Vahidi and his faction’s demands, according to three sources with direct knowledge of the matter.[9] Vahidi reportedly communicated to the United States that he “fully” supported Iran’s negotiating delegation and would “prefer to solve this crisis through negotiations.”[10] Vahidi previously presumably approved the US-Iran MoU in April 2026, given his outsized role in decision-making in recent months and reports that Iranian negotiators did not have the independent authority to approve the MoU.[11] Iranian leaders have interpreted the MoU differently from the United States, particularly its fifth clause regarding the Strait of Hormuz. The regime has interpreted the clause to mean that Iran would maintain control over the Strait of Hormuz, which diverges from the US interpretation.[12] Iran has since attacked ships that have attempted to bypass Iranian control in the strait to enforce its interpretation of the MoU. These actions suggest that Vahidi and his faction would likely accept a deal that meets their demands but are unlikely to accept one that falls short, even if failing to reach an agreement would risk renewed conflict.[13]

Vahidi’s faction may be willing to accept some economic costs and potential unrest if doing so enables them to achieve their core objectives. Some Iranian officials and media have expressed concerns in recent weeks about Iran’s worsening economic conditions and the potential for domestic unrest. Regime media outlet Mehr News Agency argued on August 17 that anti-regime media is trying to “create a perception of a nationwide crisis” by highlighting Iran’s economic problems.[14] Mehr argued that this reporting is a “psychological operation” intended to amplify grievances among dissatisfied groups and encourage the belief among these groups that protests are the only way to solve the economic crisis.[15] Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref separately stated on August 16 that the regime needs to confront US economic pressure through proper planning and policies and called for the regime to prepare for “worst-case scenarios,” possibly referring to domestic unrest.”[16] The recent Winter 2025-2026 protest wave was the largest wave of protests in Iran in recent years and stemmed from discontent about Iran’s economic situation.[17] It is unclear whether the risk of internal unrest would be sufficient to drive Vahidi to make concessions to receive economic relief, however. Vahidi may prefer to take other actions, such as securitizing society and seeking alternative export routes, to mitigate the risks of domestic unrest and economic collapse.

Reports of growing regime concerns about Iran’s economic conditions and the possibility of domestic unrest come amid Hossein Taeb’s appointment as Basij commander on August 10.[18] Taeb has decades of experience in repressing anti-regime activities as a former Basij commander and the head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization.[19] Taeb led the Basij’s brutal suppression of the 2009 Green Movement, for which the United States sanctioned him in 2010, for example.[20] Taeb’s appointment may, in part, reflect the regime’s anticipation of potential unrest amid mounting economic pressure.

Nothing significant to report.

Iran reportedly launched two drones targeting Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s office and the KRG’s intelligence chief’s residence in Erbil on August 17, according to the KRG . [21] The KRG security agency announced on August 17 that an unknown actor had launched two drones from Iranian territory at Barzani’s home but did not clarify whether the drones hit their intended target.[22] The agency reported that the attack did not cause any casualties.[23] Neither Iran nor any Iranian-backed group has claimed responsibility for the attacks at the time of this writing. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, speaking to his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein, and a senior Iranian official, speaking to Hezbollah-affiliated media, both denied Iran’s involvement in the attacks.[24] The senior Iranian official claimed that Iran’s adversaries conducted the attacks as a “false flag” operation.[25] Neither Iran nor Iranian-backed Iraqi militias claimed responsibility for a similar attack on KRG President Nechirvan Barzani’s house on March 28.[26] Several militias condemned the attack at the time.[27] Iraqi militias have conducted several drone attacks on targets in Erbil since the beginning of the war on February 28, but these attacks have largely been concentrated on US positions.[28]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah commanders following a Hezbollah drone attack that injured three IDF soldiers operating in Ali al Taher, Nabatieh Governorate, on August 14.[29] The IDF reported that it killed Hezbollah Radwan Force battalion commander Ali Samir al Haj Hassan in an airstrike targeting a Hezbollah command facility in Ansar, Nabatieh Governorate, on August 14 in response to a Hezbollah first-person view (FPV) drone attack in Ali al Taher.[30] The Radwan Force is Hezbollah’s elite special operations unit that conducts cross-border infiltrations and attacks on Israeli positions.[31] The IDF reported that it also killed senior Hezbollah Badr Unit commander Ali Muhammad Fakhr al Din in a separate airstrike in Deir el Zahrani, Nabatieh Governorate, on August 15.[32] The Badr Unit is one of Hezbollah’s geographic units and is responsible for the area north of the Litani River, particularly around Nabatieh District and the southern Bekaa Valley. The Badr Unit is one of the main Hezbollah units that has engaged Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.[33] Hezbollah claimed that the IDF strikes killed 11 people, including civilians, but did not acknowledge that its fighters were killed.[34] Hezbollah also has not claimed responsibility for the drone attack on August 14 at the time of this writing. The recent escalation in southern Lebanon has centered around control over Ali al Taher, which serves as a key reconnaissance position and launch site for Hezbollah. The area is also advantageous for the IDF to observe Hezbollah ground force movements given its high elevation.[35] An unspecified political source close to Hezbollah’s leadership told UK-based, Saudi-owned media on August 17 that Hezbollah is prepared to fight “in full force” if the IDF attempts to seize Hezbollah’s positions in Ali al Taher.[36] The IDF took “complete control” of the territory surrounding Ali al Taher in late June 2026, but the area still contains one of Hezbollah’s largest underground command-and-control (C2) facilities and approximately 15 trapped Hezbollah fighters.[37] Israeli media reported on August 16 that the IDF seeks to kill the remaining Hezbollah fighters and destroy infrastructure in the area. The IDF has also blocked recent Hezbollah efforts to resupply its trapped fighters.[38]

The recent escalation in southern Lebanon may stall ongoing diplomatic efforts between Lebanon and Israel. Unspecified Lebanese military and diplomatic sources told Lebanese media on August 15 and 16 that Lebanon will not participate in direct negotiations with the United States and Israel in Rome in September 2026.[39] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun separately claimed on August 15 that the IDF strikes violated the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[40]

There appear to be fissures within the Iranian-backed Badr Organization over its support for Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s efforts to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Badr Organization Political Bureau head Mohammad Naji Mohammad issued a statement on August 14 that criticized Zaydi’s disarmament efforts.[41] Mohammad added that no one, including the Iraqi prime minister, should be allowed to disarm the militias because doing so would cause “internal strife.” Mohammad’s comment completely disregards the militias’ role in causing such strife by conducting attacks on US interests in Iraq and neighboring countries.[42] The militias’ attacks in Iraq undermine Iraqi sovereignty and the Iraqi federal government’s efforts to stay out of Iran’s conflicts with the United States and Israel. Mohammad, also known as Abu Jassim al Askari, led Badr’s Inspection and Investigations Directorate in the early 2000s, according to a Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi intelligence report on the Badr Organization.[43] Some Iraq analysts have also noted that Abu Jassim led several Badr units that facilitated attacks on the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in March and April 2026.[44] Mohammad’s August 14 statement on disarmament notably appears to contradict Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri’s position on the issue. Ameri has played a key role in the Iraqi federal government’s disarmament efforts in recent months, including by serving on the Shia Coordination Framework’s disarmament committee.[45] The Badr Organization’s media office denied the existence of that committee in early June, however, which could have been a response to internal Badr opposition to Ameri’s involvement in the committee.[46]

The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) arrested Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba reconnaissance unit leader Abbas Hussein Yaqubi in Dhi Qar Province on August 17.[47] A security source told Iraqi media on August 17 that CTS forces raided the Harakat Hezbollah reconnaissance unit leader’s home in Dhi Qar Province.[48] The Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee chairman confirmed to Kurdish media on August 17 that CTS Special Forces arrested Yaqubi, who is also the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Baghdad Belt Operations Command intelligence director.[49] The PMF is an Iraqi security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[50] This operation follows several recent Iraqi government attempts to crack down on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including an attempted raid on a Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba base in Jurf al Naddaf in late July 2026.[51] The arrest also comes amid indicators that the Iraqi federal government is preparing to use force to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[52] Yaqubi’s arrest could be part of a broader effort to set conditions for such an operation.

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are portraying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as defenders of Iraq’s sovereignty to justify their continued existence, likely in an effort to build public support amid the Iraqi government’s efforts to disarm the militias.[53] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Political Bureau head Mohammad Naji Mohammad stated on August 14 that Iraqi “resistance” was established to defend the “state.”[54] A member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing similarly stated on August 14 that the militias fought for Iraq’s sovereignty and retain strong popular support.[55] These claims come as the Iraqi federal government has taken steps to crack down on the militias amid continued US pressure to curb Iranian influence in Iraq.[56] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militia officials likely calculate that framing the militias as defenders of Iraqi sovereignty could generate public support for their continued armament and justify their continued existence.

Unspecified sources speaking to Saudi media on August 17 claimed that unspecified Iraqi armed factions are planning to assassinate Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan in response to the Iraqi government’s disarmament efforts.[57] The sources indicated that the threats are directly related to the Iraqi government’s militia disarmament and anti-corruption campaigns.[58] Zaidan has previously supported efforts to restrict weapons to the state.[59]

The Houthis are framing their attack on a Yemeni civilian vessel near the Bab al Mandeb Strait as a strike on Saudi-coalition naval vessels, likely to try to deter the Saudi-led multinational maritime defense coalition from operationalizing its mission to protect Red Sea maritime trade by signaling that the Houthis could target the coalition’s vessels.[60] The Houthis claimed that they struck five Saudi-coalition naval vessels with ballistic missiles in the Red Sea near Mocha Port, Taiz Governorate, on August 17.[61] The Houthis added that they sank one Saudi-coalition landing craft and four nearby patrol boats.[62] Multiple Yemeni sources reported on August 17 that the Houthi strikes only targeted the AMIR KHAN , a Yemeni-owned civilian vessel docked in Al Ardi Port, near the Bab el Mandeb Strait, however.[63] The strike reportedly caused severe damage to the vessel and the harbor’s berth but did not cause casualties.[64] The Houthi claim follows Saudi Arabia’s July 2026 formation of a multinational maritime defense coalition tasked with protecting Red Sea shipping from Houthi and Iranian threats to the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[65] The Houthis’ attempt to frame their recent attack on a Yemeni civilian vessel as an attack on the coalition’s vessels likely served as an implicit threat and intended to signal the group’s willingness to target Saudi-coalition naval vessels to deter the coalition from operationalizing its mission. ISW-CTP previously assessed that the Houthis likely view the coalition as a threat to their blockade of Saudi ports and vessels and the broader Houthi campaign to coerce Saudi Arabia into lifting its blockade of Houthi-controlled ports and airports.[66]

[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6

[2] https://t.me/defapress_ir/65633/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-threatens-go-offensive-strait-hormuz-if-diplomacy-with-us-fails-2026-08-17/

[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6

[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6

[6] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6

[7] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-10-2026/

[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/01/world/middleeast/iran-proxies-war-oil.html

[9] https://www.axios.com/2026/08/16/iran-backchannel-trump-gabbard-barzani-war

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilwFBVV95cUxOVVdJbkRYZE1DUFhOUzBFaDc3ek90b0k2TVBXdnBBdzFnUWFhOVlVRzZVRG9DclY0dkMzdU5PNXNKM013MExVbk1EaWF1c0NtVTJQNVJ5V2pvOEJDSkRYT1ZKQTJOZnUteW5NTDRxYmdDeW5WTlg2MGlsZkRKTF9UYTVaYjIzWU00MlgxRFZiUldZVjlkcHp3?oc=5