핵심요약

• 수천 명의 이란인과 dozens of US service members가 사망했지만, 전쟁은 미국에게 실질적인 이익을 가져오지 못했다.
• 이란의 핵 능력과 미사일력은 크게 약화되지 않았다.
• 전쟁으로 인해 호르무즈 해협이 폐쇄되었고, 휴전 협정은 이를 재개하는 것을 요구하고 있다.
• 트럼프의 전쟁 목표인 이란의 미사일 파괴와 핵 보유 방지는 달성되지 않았다.

도입

이 기사는 트럼프의 이란 전쟁이 미국에게 어떤 전략적, 경제적, 정치적 비용을 안겼는지 분석하고 있다. 이 전쟁은 미국에게 실질적인 이익을 가져오지 못했고, 오히려 이란의 강경파를 강화시키고 호르무즈 해협에 대한 이란의 영향력을 키웠다. 이 분석은 투자자에게 트럼프의 외교 정책이 글로벌 경제와 시장 안정성에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 데 도움이 된다.

본문 1: 전략적 실패

기사는 트럼프가 전쟁의 비용을 과소평가하고, 이란의 반격을 예상하지 못했다고 지적한다. 이란은 호르무즈 해협을 폐쇄함으로써 미국에게 큰 타격을 입혔고, 트럼프는 빠른 승리를 기대했지만, 오히려 휴전 협정을 맺어야 하는 상황에 처했다. 이는 미국이 중동 지역에서의 전략적 우위를 잃게 될 가능성을 시사한다. 또한, 이란의 핵 능력과 미사일력은 크게 약화되지 않았기 때문에, 미국이 중동 지역에서 안정성을 유지하는 데 어려움을 겪을 수 있다.

본문 2: 경제적 영향

호르무즈 해협의 폐쇄는 글로벌 경제에 큰 영향을 미쳤다. 이 해협은 세계 석유 수출의 30%가 통과하는 중요한 통로이기 때문에, 그 폐쇄는 세계 경제에 큰 타격을 입힐 수 있다. 또한, 전쟁으로 인한 불안정성은 원유 가격 상승으로 이어질 수 있으며, 이는 인플레이션 압력을 높일 수 있다. 이는 글로벌 시장 안정성에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있다.

결론

트럼프의 이란 전쟁은 미국에게 실질적인 이익을 가져오지 못했고, 오히려 전략적, 경제적, 정치적 비용을 안겼다. 이 전쟁은 이란의 강경파를 강화시키고, 호르무즈 해협에 대한 이란의 영향력을 키웠다. 향후, 미국이 중동 지역에서 안정성을 유지하는 데 어려움을 겪을 수 있으며, 글로벌 경제에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 투자자는 트럼프의 외교 정책이 글로벌 시장 안정성에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 모니터링해야 한다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMifkFVX3lxTE5obWRudnBsOEUwSkFIai05Y1hvTkllQ0w4Vi14S3RUdENYdHlMRTJ2SjJSODY1UzNqUS12czhwY0hCckZtVnFyc080cy1hNVE5N29kZ1Q4dGZTSjdTWlR0YUdtdW9sT3R5eXFFWEN1U0NTS1h4YW1oQ2JMS1RUUQ?oc=5

Trump’s Disastrous War on Iran Was Not Worth It - Inkstick Media

Trump’s war delivered few tangible gains and imposed steep strategic and economic costs.

The United States war with Iran has, at least for now, ended. But even with the ink not yet dry on the ceasefire agreement, it’s not too soon to offer an assessment of US President Donald Trump’s decision to attack Iran. It’s a strategic calamity that has brought no tangible benefits for the United States and produced significant strategic, economic, political, and diplomatic costs.

It’s not just that thousands of Iranians and dozens of US service members have been killed or wounded, but the war has left Iran’s nuclear capacity broadly unchanged, its missile force largely intact, its hardliners empowered, and its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz — and consequently the global economy — enhanced.

Why did the war go so badly? Because Trump made the same mistake that US leaders repeatedly make when going to war: He overestimated the benefits of using military force and badly underestimated the costs.

Trump failed to take into account the old military adage that the enemy gets a vote. Yes, the US possesses the world’s most powerful and sophisticated military, but administration officials severely underestimated the possibility that Iran would respond to force by closing the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic. Once that happened, Trump, who seemingly expected a quick and painless victory, sought an exit ramp. Hence, the ceasefire extension signed last week only demands one major concession from Iran: to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which is only necessary because of the war itself.

Indeed, the US has made little progress toward the objectives that Trump laid out when he announced his decision to launch military strikes against Iran in late February. Those objectives were to destroy Iran’s missiles and missile production capabilities, annihilate its navy, weaken its support for regional militants, and prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Trump also hinted the war could lead to regime change and promised the Iranian people that the government “ will be yours to take .”

Nearly four months later, the results are bleak. Classified intelligence assessments indicate that Iran retains roughly 70% of its prewar missile stockpile and mobile launchers, has regained access to approximately 90% of its underground launch facilities, and its missile and drone production infrastructure remains largely intact. Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon is broadly unchanged since last summer. And while US strikes have done significant damage to Iran’s naval capabilities, it didn’t stop Tehran from closing the Strait of Hormuz.

As for regime change, the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei did not topple the mullahs. Instead, it elevated his son Mojtaba — widely regarded as more hardline — while passing effective decision-making authority to a cohort of similarly hard-line commanders. Iran is battered but still dangerous, now led by harder-line actors, with a better, credible understanding of how to impose pain on the United States and its partners in future crises.

Still, as bad as it is for the US to fail so miserably, the far bigger problem was that none of these objectives were crucial to US national security interests.

Does annihilating Iran’s navy or wiping out its missile production make the US demonstrably safer? Not really. Per US intelligence , Iran is more than a decade away from even developing a missile capable of hitting the US homeland. Likewise, Israel and Tehran-backed militants still threaten one another, but Iranian proxies have not posed a serious, direct threat to core US interests in years. In fact, they were already significantly weakened well before the US attacked in February. Preventing nuclear proliferation has long been a key US national security interest. But Trump declared Iran’s nuclear infrastructure “obliterated” last June. If that was true, how was another round of fighting worth the cost, especially when it’s left Iran’s nuclear capacity largely unchanged?

What is even more remarkable about Trump’s decision to go to war is that it directly contradicts his own National Security Strategy (NSS), published in November.

That document described the Iranian regime as “weakened,” argued that the Middle East should play a less dominant role in US foreign policy, spoke of “a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention,” and deemphasized nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

In going to war with Iran, the Trump administration ignored its own stated priorities, but even if the US had achieved its stated goals, the juice would never have been worth the squeeze.

The costs, meanwhile, are staggering. As of mid-May, the Pentagon estimated the cost of the war at almost $30 billion, and closer to $50 billion when including the reconstruction of bases damaged by Iranian attacks. That number is almost certainly higher today.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has led to a global spike in gas prices, which now average around $4.00 per gallon. The extra cost to consumers tops $60 billion — or an average of $300 per American household.

Increased fuel prices have pushed up shipping costs and airfares for consumers. Inflation is now cresting above 4%, which has tied the hands of the Federal Reserve and made it far more difficult for the central bank to cut interest rates. Keeping rates at their current level alone could lead to slower growth and cost the US hundreds of billions in lost output.

Hundreds of businesses have cited the conflict as a trigger for everything from production cuts and price increases to suspended dividends and reduced earnings guidance.

And there are the other indirect costs. For example, a third of the world’s helium passes through the Strait of Hormuz, affecting semiconductor manufacturing, medical imaging, and other industries. The Persian Gulf is also a major artery for fertilizer inputs. The price of urea , the most popular synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, has risen by 80% since February, threatening to reduce global food production and lower crop yields.

The war has also strained US relations with partners in the Gulf and beyond, reinforcing perceptions of Washington as a reckless actor on the world stage. Worse yet, the US is now in a worse position to defend key allies or deter military adventurism elsewhere in the world — particularly in Asia.

Since February, the United States has fired roughly half its stockpile of long-range stealth cruise missiles, a third of its Tomahawks, half of its THAAD interceptors , and up to 60% of its Patriot interceptors. It could take years to replenish these stocks. For an administration that in the aforementioned NSS identified deterring possible Chinese aggression over Taiwan as a top priority, the decision to burn through scarce, hard-to-replace munitions against Iran is difficult to square.

In short, the Trump administration chose war to address problems that were either peripheral to US national security interests or could not be solved by military force alone. In the process, it created a bigger problem — the closure of the Strait of Hormuz — and weakened its ability to respond to future global crises.

If there is any positive outcome from the Iran war, it would be in forcing US leaders to think more broadly about the efficacy of using military force. That the United States can project power and achieve narrow tactical successes is unquestionable. But that does not equal strategic success. Strategy requires matching means to ends, distinguishing core interests from peripheral ones, and understanding the potential costs that adversaries can impose in response.

The Iran war is yet another reminder that the benefits of force are often oversold, and the costs are always underestimated.

If you made it this far, you’re exactly why Inkstick exists.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMifkFVX3lxTE5obWRudnBsOEUwSkFIai05Y1hvTkllQ0w4Vi14S3RUdENYdHlMRTJ2SjJSODY1UzNqUS12czhwY0hCckZtVnFyc080cy1hNVE5N29kZ1Q4dGZTSjdTWlR0YUdtdW9sT3R5eXFFWEN1U0NTS1h4YW1oQ2JMS1RUUQ?oc=5