미국-이란 협정이 가져올 중장기적 위협
The next Iran war is on the horizon - The Jerusalem Post
지역 분쟁의 가능성은 있지만, 구체적인 시한이 명시되지 않아 시장에 즉시 반영될 가능성은 낮습니다.
핵심 요약
이란은 미사일과 드론 등 군사력을 재건할 전망이며, 협정이 체결되더라도 위협은 지속될 가능성이 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 이란은 미사일과 드론을 생존을 위한 필수적 도구로 보고 있습니다.
- 협정이 체결되더라도 위협은 지속될 가능성이 높습니다.
- 이란은 평온한 기간을 재무장하는 기회로 활용할 전망입니다.
도입
이 기사는 미국-이란 협정이 체결될 경우, 중장기적으로 어떤 위협이 발생할 수 있는지 분석합니다. 투자자들에게는 이란의 군사력 재건과 그로 인한 지역 불안정성이 시장 변동성에 미칠 영향을 고려해야 합니다.
본문 1: 이란의 군사력 재건 전략
이란은 미사일과 드론을 포함한 군사력을 재건할 것으로 보입니다. 이는 이란의 안보 전략에서 핵심적인 요소로, 이란은 이러한 도구를 생존을 위한 필수적 도구로 보고 있습니다. 미사일과 드론은 이란이 지역 내 영향력을 확대하는 데 중요한 역할을 할 것입니다. 따라서 이란의 군사력 재건은 지역 안정성에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 가능성이 높습니다.
본문 2: 협정의 한계와 위협 지속 가능성
협정이 체결되더라도 이란의 위협은 지속될 가능성이 높습니다. 이는 이란이 평온한 기간을 재무장하는 기회로 활용할 것이기 때문입니다. 또한, 이란은 압력과 피로감을 극복하고 군사력을 재건할 가능성이 높습니다. 이는 지역 내 긴장 감소를 기대하기 어렵다는 점을 의미합니다.
결론
이 기사는 미국-이란 협정이 체결되더라도 이란의 군사력 재건과 그로 인한 위협이 지속될 가능성이 높다는 점을 강조합니다. 투자자들에게는 이란의 군사력 재건과 그로 인한 지역 불안정성이 시장 변동성에 미칠 영향을 고려해야 합니다. 향후 이란의 군사력 재건 동향과 그로 인한 지역 불안정성 증가 가능성을 주시해야 합니다.
Original Article
The next Iran war is on the horizon - The Jerusalem Post
An Israeli colleague who visited me in Dubai recently asked for reassurance about the US-Iran agreement that may or may not materialize. I gave an unexpected answer: despite the headlines, the agreement holds little interest for me, and not because of disdain. My concern is what follows the headlines, the burdensome question that many avoid: How are we preparing for the next war once Iran restores its missile capability, regains financial solvency, and resumes support for terrorism in the region? When will it happen, what will it look like, how will it unfold, and how will the region face it again?The question about the agreement is valid, but it remains on the surface. Agreements are tactics. The structural reality is different. Iranian history shows a recurring cycle: periods of calm have preserved the expansionist project. They have given Tehran time to recover, reorganize, and rearm for the next round.The regime is aggressive by nature, treats de-escalation as a chance to circumvent, and responds only to a painful cost that threatens its survival. So the agreement – if it materializes – will prolong the threat rather than end it.That is why I see it as only part of the picture. The real issue is the consequences years later, not the day an agreement is signed. Understanding the situation starts with asking why Iran will rebuild its military capabilities. Iran's security doctrine relies on three pillars instead of a conventional air force: strategic depth, the proxy network, and missiles and drones. These tools are more than hardware. The regime sees them as the guarantee of its survival. Losing them in war strikes the core of its doctrine, not only its stockpiles.Rebuilding is therefore inevitable. A regime that views missiles and proxies as vital to its existence will cling to them, regardless of how long calm lasts or how severe sanctions become. Pressure and exhaustion do not deter it. They harden its resolve. Tehran may emerge exhausted, but its exhaustion fuels vengeance, not prudence. The comeback is not speculation. It reflects the regime's nature.The timing of renewed danger is complex, governed by three separate tracks.The first is financial: when will Iran regain solvency and spending power? This depends on sanctions relief, unfrozen funds, and oil revenues. Here the agreement matters. It could fund rearmament or delay it through inspections. So what I dismissed may actually determine the timing of my concern.The second is industrial: when will Tehran rebuild missile and drone production? The answer is faster than optimists estimate. Technical knowledge survives bombing, factories can be rebuilt, and expertise remains with its owners. Many military experts estimate restoration will take several months to two years, not a full decade.The third is regional – the slowest and hardest. Rebuilding the proxy network depends on people, loyalties, and war-worn geography, not factories. This is likely the longest phase. The danger peaks when the three tracks converge: available funds, restored production, and rebuilt proxies. Any lag in one delays them all. Several observers place that convergence somewhere in the middle to late part of the decade, if the tracks advance together.The next war will look differentTiming is debatable. The character of the next war matters equally for serious preparation. Iran's lessons from this war will define its next arsenal. It will likely adapt the model rather than repeat it. It may decentralize further, dispersing production and launch sites underground and in civilian areas, complicating preventive strikes. It may favor cheap quantity over quality, overwhelming costly defenses with drone swarms costing under a few thousand dollars each.The undeniable point: the next war will be about cost as much as firepower.This raises the practical question of readiness. Serious preparation rests on three axes. First, defense must be sustainable as well as effective. The current round proved interception is possible but expensive. Future readiness requires a low-cost interception layer, so the shield is not financially exhausted before it is breached.Second is the preventive strike. Infrastructure must be struck while fragile, not after Iran rebuilds. This approach troubles concerned capitals, torn between “mowing the grass,” periodic strikes to prevent buildup, and waiting for the threat to mature. The right course, with Israel in the lead, is periodic mowing, not waiting.Third is the most critical front: blocking the flow of money, technology, and spare parts that restart factories. Here, the agreement must be treated as a weapon rather than an afterthought. Its inspection and sanctions provisions will set the pace of Iran's comeback more than any airstrike. They must be tightened fully.Open talk of readiness revives an old political debate. Iran follows it. It knows its adversaries are preparing and is planning its own next war. Some argue that adversary readiness drives its arming. That view reverses cause and effect. The regime is rebuilding for its own expansionist motives rather than in response to a threat. Halting preparation will not halt Iran. It will read it as weakness, and push further. Laxity will not curb its aggression. It will give it a free hand.The writer is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.