미국, 이란에 대한 공중 폭격 전술 실패
America’s Big Mistake in Iran - The Atlantic
미국과 이스라엘의 이란 공습이 예상한 결과 없이, 이란이 호르무즈 해협을 폐쇄하면서 국제 유류 시장이 혼乱에 빠질 전망입니다. 이는 에너지 부문에 대한 부정적 영향으로 이어질 수 있습니다.
핵심 요약
미국과 이스라엘은 2월 이란에 대한 전쟁을 시작하며 공중 폭격으로 정부를 항복시키거나 국민의 반란을 유발할 계획이었습니다.
핵심요약
- 2월 미국과 이스라엘이 이란에 대한 전쟁을 시작
- 공중 폭격으로 정부 항복 또는 국민 반란을 유발할 계획이었으나 실패
- 이란 정부는 호르무즈 해협을 폐쇄하고 미국이 침공하지 않을 것을 도박
- 미국 전략가들은 공중 폭격만으로 전쟁을 이길 수 있다는 잘못된 가정을 했음
도입
이 기사는 전략적 폭격 이론의 실패를 보여주며, 군사 전략에 대한 재평가를 요구합니다. 투자자들에게는 지정학적 리스크와 군사 기술 개발의 경제적 영향에 대한 이해를 깊이 있게 요구합니다.
본문 1: 전략적 폭격 이론의 실패
기사에서는 20세기 초부터 미국, 이탈리아, 영국 등에서 공중 폭격만으로 전쟁을 이길 수 있다는 이론이 존재했음을 지적합니다. 이탈리아의 줄리오 도헤트 장군은 "공중 우세"를 점유한 국가가 적국의 도시를 폭격해 항복을 강요할 수 있다고 주장했습니다. 그러나 실제로는 독일의 런던 폭격이나 연합국의 독일 폭격도 적국의 항복으로 이어지지 않았습니다. 이는 공중 폭격만으로 전쟁을 이길 수 없다는 점을 명확히 보여줍니다.
본문 2: 지정학적 리스크의 증대
이란 전쟁의 실패는 미국과 이스라엘의 군사 전략에 대한 신뢰도를 떨어뜨립니다. 호르무즈 해협의 폐쇄는 국제 석유 시장에 대한 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 이는 에너지 가격의 급등을 초래할 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 지정학적 리스크가 높은 지역에서의 투자에 더욱 신중해야 합니다. 특히 중동 지역의 에너지 기업들은 정치적 불안정성으로 인해 변동성이 클 수 있습니다.
본문 3: 군사 기술 개발의 경제적 영향
전쟁의 실패는 군사 기술 개발에 대한 재투자 필요성을 강조합니다. 공중 폭격만으로는 전쟁을 이길 수 없으므로, 지상군과 해군과의 협력을 강화해야 합니다. 이는 군사 산업의 다양한 분야에 대한 수요를 증가시킬 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 군사 기술 개발에 집중하는 기업들에게 주목해야 합니다.
결론
이 기사는 공중 폭격만으로 전쟁을 이길 수 없다는 점을 명확히 보여주며, 군사 전략의 다각화 필요성을 강조합니다. 앞으로는 지정학적 리스크가 높은 지역에 대한 투자에 더욱 신중해야 하며, 군사 기술 개발에 집중하는 기업들의 성과를 주목해야 합니다. 이란 전쟁의 결과는 국제 관계와 군사 전략에 대한 이해를 깊이 있게 요구합니다.
Original Article
America’s Big Mistake in Iran - The Atlantic
When the United States and Israel launched the war on Iran in February, their plan was simple: bomb Iran until either the Iranian public rose up and overthrew the government, or the existing government capitulated to American demands. It rapidly became apparent that neither was going to happen. The Iranian people didn’t revolt against their oppressors. The Iranian government hunkered down, closed the strait, and gambled that the U.S. would be unwilling to invade or strike at crucial infrastructure.
So it seems U.S. planners made an obvious, if common, mistake: They assumed that a war could be won via aerial bombing alone.
Starting right after World War I, military theorists in the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom rallied around the idea that airpower lessened or eliminated the need for armies and navies. Their central thesis was that wars could be won almost exclusively with bombers and bombing campaigns.
In his 1921 book, Il dominio dell’aria ( “The Command of the Air” ), Italian General Giulio Douhet argued that whichever nation claimed air superiority first would be able to bomb their enemies’ cities to ash, forcing capitulation. Marshal Hugh Trenchard , the so-called father of the Royal Air Force who pioneered strategic-bombing theory during World War I, thought that airpower could break an enemy’s will to fight rather than merely provide tactical support for ground troops. And General Curtis LeMay, an American champion of strategic bombing, believed that overwhelming, concentrated force was the best way to win a war. He favored the use of incendiary weapons against urban centers and of immediate, devastating strikes instead of gradual escalation .
When these theories of total war through bombing were put to the test in World War II and beyond, however, they failed miserably. The German Blitz on London did not induce the British public to give in. Allied bombing of Germany did not break the Nazis’ will to fight; the German collapse at the end had much more to do with the ( justified ) fear of being captured by the Red Army, and the opportunity to surrender to the Americans .
In the case of Japan, the combination of the naval blockade and firebombing of cities left millions of Japanese people likely to die if the war went on into 1946. However, it was not until the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, plus the Soviet invasion of Manchuria , that Japan sought a nearly unconditional surrender.
Strategic bombing failed in Vietnam as well. In that war, the U.S. dropped approximately 7.6 million tons of bombs, compared with the roughly 2.7 million tons dropped by the U.S. military across the European and Pacific theaters in World War II. The “Christmas bombings” of 1972 were not enough to persuade North Vietnam to offer favorable terms; rather, the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 were a result of U.S. exhaustion with the war. They paved the way for North Vietnam to conquer the south in 1974–75.
The advent of “true” mass precision bombing in the 1990s led some analysts to conclude that the rules of war had changed, and that airpower alone was at last sufficient. But the supposed examples of victory through aerial bombing aren’t what they seem. The first Gulf War ended only after U.S. troops went into Kuwait in a 100-hour-long charge. In Serbia in 1999, Slobodan Milošević’s capitulation to a united NATO’s demands was based on fears of regime survival and the credible threat of ground invasion. The air campaign in Afghanistan succeeded because the U.S. had allies on the ground willing to fight for, take, and hold territory in the form of the Northern Alliance. In each case, there were troops on the ground, or a credible threat thereof. A study by the RAND Corporation in 1996 on the capabilities and limitations of the psychological effects of U.S. air operations cautioned leaders that airpower alone was unlikely to coerce an enemy to offer favorable terms, unless there were other factors at play. Those external influences include the enemy’s belief that they would be defeated on the battlefield, that continued fighting would not improve their position, that damage from air attacks would likely be worse than concessions, and that there would be no hope of mounting a defense or effective counterattack.
The U.S. plan for attacking Iran was doomed from the start because it relied on airpower without the benefit of external factors that would have made an air campaign successful. There was no credible threat of mass ground invasion to overthrow the Iranian regime. It was either internal revolution or nothing.
The U.S. was also unwilling to inflict the sort of mass casualties and suffering that might have caused Iran to decide that capitulation was less damaging than continued resistance. The administration generally avoided targeting crucial infrastructure such as water and electrical plants and ground lines of communication (bridges and rail). And it was unwilling to resort to something drastic, such as setting off a nuclear electromagnetic-pulse weapon to permanently disable the majority of Iranian infrastructure.
Unlike Serbia or Afghanistan, Iran had the ability to fight back and inflict significant pain on the United States. Iran fully grasped, from the beginning, that the outcome of the war would be determined by who could withstand the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The regime always had a plausible theory of victory and pursued it logically and consistently throughout the conflict.
Senior U.S. military leaders have spent decades studying warfare from every angle and must have understood the possibility of a prolonged regional conflict . In fact, General Dan Caine reportedly cautioned the Trump administration against attacking Iran.
But President Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth did not appreciate the need for caution. Hegseth gained his experience at the tactical level, as a junior officer in the field. He seems to believe that technological might and physical strength, rather than carefully thought-out strategy, win wars. An Army captain in the field might see dropping a 2,000-pound munition on a house as a self-contained solution to his troops taking fire; a flag officer understands the risk of it creating 100 more enemies next week.
The consequences of the botched war effort are nothing short of catastrophic. The U.S.’s munitions stockpiles are depleted, its military reputation is in tatters, its foreign relations are strained to the breaking, and Iranian leadership is in the best strategic position it has ever been in. It’s a hard way to relearn the old lesson that airpower alone doesn’t win wars.