핵심요약

• 2020년, 트럼프 대통령은 이란의 쿠드스 조직 지도자 카셈 솔라이마니를 처단하는 결정을 내렸으며, 이는 이란의 능력을 실질적으로 약화시켰습니다.
• 트럼프 행정부는 작년에 이란의 핵 프로그램에 대한 이전 결정을 번복했습니다.
• 2019년, 트럼프 대통령은 이란 대리 세력의 공격에 대한 대응에 실패했습니다.
• 아브라함 협정(Abraham Accords)은 이스라엘과 걸프 지역 간의 군사 협력을 개선하는 데 기여했습니다.

도입

본 기사는 트럼프 행정부의 이란 정책 결정들이 지정학적 위험과 외교적 결과에 미친 영향을 분석하며, 이것이 투자 환경에 미치는 장기적인 영향을 조명한다는 점에서 투자자에게 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다. 미국의 대이란 정책 변화는 중동 지역의 안보 역학 관계를 재편하고 에너지 및 무역 경로의 안정성에 직접적인 영향을 미치므로, 정책의 일관성과 실행력이 향후 글로벌 시장의 변동성에 결정적인 요소가 됩니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 리스크와 군사 정책의 상충

트럼프 행정부는 이란의 핵 프로그램과 대리 세력 활동에 대응하기 위해 제재를 확대하고 더 강력한 핵 협상을 모색했습니다. 이러한 정책은 이스라엘과의 군사 협력을 강화하는 아브라함 협정으로 이어졌습니다. 그러나 군사 개입에 있어서는 상반된 판단이 나타났습니다. 2019년에는 드론 격추 사건에 대한 펜타곤의 권고를 거부하여 과도한 대응을 피하려는 신중함을 보였으나, 2020년에는 솔라이마니 처단과 같은 단호한 조치를 취했습니다. 이러한 상반된 접근 방식은 미국 외교 정책의 일관성이 부족했음을 보여줍니다. 즉, 전략적 목표 달성을 위해 때로는 계산된 위험을 감수하고 때로는 신중함을 택하는 모순된 전략이 혼재되어 있습니다. 이는 정책의 목표 달성 여부와 관계없이 지역 내 긴장도를 관리하는 데 있어 복잡성을 더합니다.

본문 2: 정책 일관성과 외교적 결과의 분석

정책의 일관성은 외교적 결과에 직접적인 영향을 미칩니다. 트럼프 행정부가 핵 협상에서 이전 행정부의 약속을 활용하지 못하고 제재를 활용하는 데 소극적이었던 점은 정책의 실효성에 의문을 제기합니다. 또한, 2019년 이란 대리 세력의 공격에 대한 대응 실패는 미국이 중동 내에서 영향력을 행사하는 데 있어 한계를 드러냈습니다. 이러한 정책적 불일치는 단기적인 군사적 성과를 달성했을지라도 장기적인 지역 안정화라는 목표에는 도달하지 못했을 가능성을 시사합니다. 외교적 목표와 군사적 행동 사이의 간극은 향후 이란 및 중동 지역의 불안정성이 지속될 수 있는 잠재적 위험을 내포하고 있습니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 위험 요소

향후 이란 관련 정책의 성공 여부는 단기적인 군사 행동보다는 장기적인 외교적 틀을 구축하는 데 달려 있습니다. 핵 프로그램과 같은 핵심 이슈에 대한 접근 방식의 일관성이 장기적인 안정성을 확보하는 데 필수적입니다. 향후에는 미국의 대이란 정책이 이스라엘과의 협력이라는 틀 안에서 어떻게 통합되어야 하는지에 대한 전략적 재정립이 필요합니다. 만약 정책적 모순이 해소되지 않는다면, 지역 내에서 불확실성이 지속되어 에너지 시장과 국제 무역 흐름에 예측 불가능한 변동성을 야기할 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 정책의 성공은 단기적인 성과보다 지속 가능한 외교적 합의를 구축하는 데 달려 있다고 판단됩니다.

결론

트럼프 행정부의 이란 정책은 여러 상반된 결정들로 인해 복잡한 결과를 낳았습니다. 정책의 일관성 부족은 지정학적 목표 달성에 있어 한계를 보였으며, 이는 중동 지역의 불안정성을 장기적으로 심화시킬 위험이 있습니다. 투자자들은 향후 미국의 대이란 정책이 어떻게 외교적 목표와 군사적 실행 사이에서 조화를 이루는지에 주목해야 하며, 정책의 일관성이 지역 안정성에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 관찰해야 할 것입니다. 향후 정책의 일관성과 외교적 틀의 구축이 글로벌 시장의 예측 가능성을 결정하는 핵심 변수가 될 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMi3AFBVV95cUxQUUNLOXVxQWpUM1RHa0FUWnBadE9BTWxwTjJYSC1HRms4Y2l3anR3NnlKQXNOU1Jnai04UmZLeHhwWUo1dURYVTcyMnAwcWc5cENSdk1UWV90SkEtc25yc29NamR1Y1NESnloT21lZnplYTNxZW5kX2h1d28tQ3lTWTZGMlR5NG5fYU5jbWtObThlY3F4QmJ6RThjN2VhQ1doeGJFZmpjMkw4S3JheXVweTVzVzlCZzJBbjVTQVlFTm1rRHEzY0JzUHNGRVk3VHNHYUNtbTFvRER3dDN2?oc=5

A misguided war, a flawed deal, and a dangerous future. Here’s what to do next on Iran. - Atlantic Council

Since first taking office, US President Donald Trump has been right on Iran more often than his critics care to admit.

From the outset, he recognized the threat posed by the regime and its nuclear program, necessarily expanded US sanctions to disrupt Iran’s malign activities, and sought a stronger nuclear deal than the imperfect one negotiated by his predecessor. The Abraham Accords that Trump announced near the end of his first term allowed for significantly improved military coordination between Israel and the Gulf, including critical efforts to improve defenses that proved invaluable when Iran twice attacked Israel directly during the Biden administration.

Trump also has made a number of correct calls on the most difficult questions involving the use of US military force against Iran, often overruling his advisors. Sometimes he has properly been more cautious; other times he has appropriately been willing to take calculated risks. In 2019, for instance, he wisely rejected a Pentagon recommendation to strike Iran directly in response to the shootdown of a US drone, which would have been a disproportionate and thus potentially dangerous response. Then, in 2020, he shocked the Pentagon by ordering the killing of Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani, which materially diminished Iranian capabilities and did not immediately provoke the wider war that many had feared at the time. That risk was mitigated when Trump refused calls to escalate further after Iran retaliated against US forces. Most significantly, Trump made the right decision last year to bomb Iran’s nuclear program, reversing his administration’s prior decision to distance itself from Israel’s earlier strikes.

Trump hasn’t gotten everything right on Iran, of course. In 2018, he unwisely withdrew altogether from former US President Barack Obama’s nuclear agreement instead of leveraging its strengths, such as its provisions to “ snap back ” sanctions. In 2019, he failed to respond when Iranian proxies attacked Saudi energy facilities Since his first term he has repeatedly questioned whether the United States should protect the flow of energy from the Gulf, arguing that “we don’t need oil” and therefore “don’t have to be patrolling the straits.” And he even began his second term by eliminating security details for those who served him previously and were targets of Iranian assassination plots .

Still, as this year began, it was reasonable to believe that Trump was well-positioned to develop a new set of policies toward Iran to advance US interests. Indeed, circumstances might have never been more advantageous for a shrewd combination of US power and diplomacy. Tehran’s geostrategic position had been sharply diminished in the wake of Israeli military successes against Iranian partners Hamas and Hezbollah, the fall of Iran’s ally Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Israel’s destruction of Iranian strategic air defenses, and the damage done in 2025 to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Perhaps most importantly, there were signs that the Iranian people were poised to once again rise up against their oppressors. It was a moment to leverage US strengths in coordination with regional partners to diminish the Iranian regime’s ability to threaten both the Middle East and its own citizens.

Unfortunately, Trump did not learn from his own experiences with Iran and take advantage of this generational opportunity. Instead, he repeated many of his predecessors’ mistakes by launching a misguided war and compounding the error by agreeing to a deeply flawed ceasefire agreement.

Nevertheless, there remains a way to salvage the situation. To avoid dangerous, predictable outcomes in the months and years ahead, Trump should embrace a new negotiating approach, a new emphasis on regional security and deterrence, and a new commitment to preparing for the future—all of which could attract bipartisan support in Congress.

Novel miscalculations in the conduct of foreign policy are understandable; repeated errors are not. US policies toward Iran this year have included a series of decisions that failed to apply lessons that should have been learned from previous mistakes by Trump’s predecessors.

Like Obama—who publicly declared a US red line regarding chemical-weapons use in Syria , erroneously imagining that the threat alone would compel compliance—Trump on January 2 demanded that the Iranian government not attack its peaceful protesters, threatening that “we are locked and loaded and ready to go.” Then, like George H.W. Bush and Dwight Eisenhower, who called on Iraqis and Hungarians respectively to rise up against their oppressors and then stood by when they were massacred, Trump on January 13 called on the Iranian people to “keep protesting” as “help is on its way” before they were left helpless and butchered by the regime, likely by the tens of thousands.

Like George W. Bush, who launched a misguided war of choice to achieve regime change in Iraq with rosy assumptions of low costs and unrealistic outcomes, Trump on February 28 began his war against Iran by promising to “destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground,” “ensure that the region’s terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region,” and “ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon.” None of these specific objectives has yet been accomplished. Moreover, in contrast to Bush, who overthrew Saddam Hussein and installed a new system of government, Trump has not achieved his stated goal of regime change, managing instead to only decapitate its leadership. The Iranian security forces did not comply with Trump’s demand to “lay down your arms,” so the Iranian people were unable to “take over your government,” as he had urged.

Like Lyndon Johnson, who failed to anticipate enemy action before the Tet Offensive in Vietnam , Trump didn’t plan for the predictable Iranian response of targeting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In contrast to Johnson, however, Trump and his advisors had easily available to them the results of countless war games over the decades that foresaw this Iranian reaction.

The recent memorandum of understanding with Iran also has unwelcome historical parallels. Trump has repeated Woodrow Wilson’s central mistake with Germany by signing an agreement at Versailles that increases the likelihood of another future war. And Trump’s fourteen points (the number itself providing another ironic Wilson echo ) includes provisions that provide for Iran to be paid through sanctions relief, reconstruction funds, and almost certainly some form of transit fees. In this respect, Trump has repeated Thomas Jefferson’s critical error when he went to war against the Barbary Pirates to end mandatory US tributes, but in the end agreed to “ ransom ” payments that set the stage for the Second Barbary War.

Trump’s approach to his fourteen-point agreement with Iran mirrors his previous twenty-point agreement on Gaza. There are some positive commonalities. Each usefully halted fighting, allowed for a renewed transit of critically needed goods, and began wider negotiations between warring parties. They also share challenges. From the beginning, for example, most observers didn’t believe either would proceed far beyond the first of the many points listed.

But that’s where the similarities end. The twenty-point agreement required Hamas to immediately release its hostages—the living and dead Israelis kidnapped by the group when it launched its war against Israel. But the fourteen-point agreement instead strengthens Iran’s control over its hostage, the Strait of Hormuz, which was taken only after the US launched its war. Iranian leaders certainly appreciate this fact, which explains their decision to move rapidly to enforce their control over Hormuz—an action that triggered the latest military exchanges between Iran and the United States.

Furthermore, while the twenty-point agreement came after Hamas was militarily defeated, the fourteen-point agreement leaves Iran victorious. Despite the damage done by the US and Israeli air forces, the Iranian regime remains in power and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps appears to have further consolidated its internal position both within the government and over a cowed population.

More significantly, the regime, following its longstanding approach, has successfully created a “new normal” in which Iranian actions that would have previously been considered casus belli now have been redefined below the threshold of war. Every US president since Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan determined that the United States would use military force to ensure freedom of navigation from the Gulf through international waters, but now Trump has, in effect and in writing, accepted de facto Iranian control over a vital maritime chokepoint. This is a stark contrast from when Obama directly but privately threatened Iran about any attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz—and a complete reversal even from Trump’s April 1 address to the nation in which he promised that “when this conflict is over, the strait will open up naturally.”

In recent decades, the United States had built so much trust with its Gulf security partners that leaders in the United Arab Emirates felt they were abandoned by Joe Biden after a comparatively modest Houthi attack in 2022, requiring the US to work hard to mend diplomatic relations . That experience is quite a distance from where we are today, when Trump openly dismisses Iranian direct hits on Emirati vital infrastructure as “ not heavy firing ” and defends the existence of Iran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles—a message that was undoubtedly heard loud and clear in both Tehran and Abu Dhabi. A new normal that allows Iran to supplement its ability to project power indirectly through proxies with an accepted ability to strike its neighbors directly as it desires cannot possibly be in US interests.

This new normal formalized in the memorandum also has enabled Iran to officially link its interests in two theaters—the Gulf and Lebanon—and to divide the United States and Israel diplomatically, both longstanding Iranian strategic objectives that previous American presidents had denied. Trump’s memorandum of understanding empowers Iran to pressure the US to halt Israeli military operations targeting Hezbollah. We should expect Iran’s most recent use of this leverage to not be close to its last.

There’s another core difference between Trump’s Gaza and Iran ceasefire deals. While we should hope that all twenty points in the Gaza deal are fully implemented, we should hope that all fourteen points with Iran are never implemented.

It is reasonable to be deeply skeptical about whether the twenty points and Trump’s Board of Peace will ever be successful, but Palestinians, Israelis, and the entire region would be much safer and more prosperous if they are. The plan’s aspirations include demilitarizing Hamas and blocking it from governance, preventing the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, blocking Israeli occupation or annexation of Gaza, providing security with an international force, mobilizing a global effort to ensure reconstruction and economic development, prioritizing deradicalization to encourage tolerance and coexistence, and establishing a Palestinian state that poses no threat to Israel. Only the most extreme Palestinians and Israelis could possibly object to this vision.

In contrast, the vision underlying the fourteen-point Iran plan is a nightmare for vital US national security interests—something many still haven’t fully appreciated. Should the agreement’s provisions ever become realities, it would fundamentally reshape the balance of power in the region to Iran’s benefit and the United States’ detriment.

Just a few clauses buried in the fourteen points tell the whole story. On the military front, Trump has committed to a Middle East in which the US will “remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran” and “will not deploy additional forces in the region.” On the face of it, this will lead to a US military withdrawal—a policy that I have been repeatedly warning against despite its appeal to many on both sides of the political spectrum. Most importantly, this is a Middle East in which the Iranian regime is clearly allowed to domestically enrich nuclear materials. The memorandum refuses to signal otherwise, instead affirming that “the Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program.” As every US administration—both Democratic and Republican—has concluded for decades, that nuclear program is a weapons program. That’s what “maintaining the status quo” really means.

On the financial front, this is also a Middle East in which the United States unfreezes Iranian funds and explicitly agrees that they can be “fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” That would include rebuilding Iran’s threatening arsenals and expanding its financial support to Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and proxies in Iraq. In addition, the US would be committed to ensuring that Iran receives the mind-boggling sum of “at least” $300 billion, granting “all required licenses, waivers, and permissions needed for the relevant financial transactions” without any qualification for abiding by US laws in the process. That’s the same amount as Iran’s entire current gross domestic product. But it’s not enough money for the regime, so furthermore “the United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran,” apparently including those imposed for any purpose whatsoever, and, explicitly, “the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions.” This goes light years beyond the Obama nuclear deal, which lifted US sanctions imposed on the nuclear file but permitted sanctions related to other malign Iranian activities, such as support for global terrorism, to continue.

On the diplomatic front, this is a Middle East in which the US is publicly committed to preventing Israel from retaliating against Hezbollah’s direct attacks and terrorism. It is important to recall that Hezbollah voluntarily initiated its war with Israel in 2023 in order to support Hamas in the wake of Hamas’s terrorist attack on civilians within Israel. At the same time, the US has agreed to allow Iran to “conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz.” There won’t be “tolls,” but instead there will be security fees, administrative charges, environmental levies, supplemental insurance programs, and every other synonym one can imagine. If current trend lines hold, it’s only a matter of time before Trump flips longstanding US policy on its head completely and commits to being a party to Hormuz tolling. Indeed, one of the president’s latest statements on the subject seemed designed to lay the foundation for that final capitulation.

The fourteen points begin (point two) with a pact that the US and Iran will cease “interfering in each other’s internal affairs”—a complete American abandonment of the Iranian people that must have the victims of January’s massacres or the previous Woman, Life, Freedom movement rolling in their graves. And to wrap this all up in a bow, Trump would commit the US to include all of this in “a binding [United Nations Security Council] resolution,” thus enshrining these provisions into international law and tying the hands of his successors.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMi3AFBVV95cUxQUUNLOXVxQWpUM1RHa0FUWnBadE9BTWxwTjJYSC1HRms4Y2l3anR3NnlKQXNOU1Jnai04UmZLeHhwWUo1dURYVTcyMnAwcWc5cENSdk1UWV90SkEtc25yc29NamR1Y1NESnloT21lZnplYTNxZW5kX2h1d28tQ3lTWTZGMlR5NG5fYU5jbWtObThlY3F4QmJ6RThjN2VhQ1doeGJFZmpjMkw4S3JheXVweTVzVzlCZzJBbjVTQVlFTm1rRHEzY0JzUHNGRVk3VHNHYUNtbTFvRER3dDN2?oc=5