핵심요약

• 이란 대리 세력들은 이란의 설계 기반으로 자체 UAV를 구축하며, 부품을 중국 등 비이란 국가로부터 조달할 수 있습니다.
• 드론 기술의 확산은 이란과 대리 세력 간의 지휘통제 관계가 없다는 점을 시사합니다.
• 이들은 샤헤드-136 드론용 엔진을 중국 제조업체로부터 직접 조달하는 등 공급망을 다변화하고 있습니다.
• 이란의 대리 세력들은 중동 지역에서 드론 공격을 지속하며 미국 및 이스라엘의 목표 달성에도 불구하고 행동을 계속하고 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란과 중동 지역 대리 세력 간의 관계가 군사적 목표 달성을 넘어 기술 확산을 통해 어떻게 재편되고 있는지를 보여줍니다. 투자자들은 단순한 군사적 충돌을 넘어, 첨단 기술과 공급망의 변화가 지정학적 리스크와 경제적 연관성에 미치는 장기적인 영향을 분석해야 합니다. 드론과 같은 기술의 비국가 행위자(non-state actors)에 의한 활용 증가는 국제 안보 환경의 변동성을 심화시키고 있습니다.

본문 1: 기술 확산을 통한 자율성 확보

이란이 대리 세력들에게 드론 시스템과 훈련을 이전한 것은 단순한 군사 지원을 넘어선 기술 이전의 사례입니다. 이는 대리 세력들이 이란의 설계에 기반하여 자체적으로 무인 항공기를 개발할 수 있는 능력을 부여했습니다. 핵심은 이들이 이란을 전통적인 지휘통제 체계로 보지 않고, 기술 접근성을 통해 자율적인 행동을 수행할 수 있게 되었다는 점입니다. 예를 들어, 이들은 이란의 설계에 따라 드론을 제작하고, 필요한 부품을 이란 외 국가로부터 조달함으로써 기술적 종속성을 완화하고 독자적인 운영 능력을 확보했습니다. 이는 기술이 지정학적 힘의 새로운 원천이 될 수 있음을 의미합니다.

본문 2: 공급망 다변화와 지정학적 리스크

대리 세력들이 드론 부품을 중국 등 외부 국가로부터 직접 조달하는 행위는 기존의 전통적인 무역 경로와 공급망의 구조를 변화시키고 있습니다. 이는 이란 중심의 공급망에 대한 의존도를 낮추고, 특정 국가에 대한 경제적·기술적 통제력을 분산시키는 효과를 가져옵니다. 이러한 공급망 다변화는 이란의 제재 정책에 대한 회복탄력성을 높이는 동시에, 국제 무역 질서 내에서 새로운 기술 패권 경쟁이 발생하고 있음을 시사합니다. 특히, 중국과의 기술 협력은 이란의 대리 세력들이 특정 기술을 확보하는 데 있어 새로운 지정학적 동맹을 형성하게 만들며, 이는 국제 관계의 복잡성을 더욱 증가시킵니다.

본문 3: 장기적인 영향과 전망

드론 기술의 확산과 공급망의 분산은 중동 지역의 안보 환경에 장기적인 영향을 미칠 것으로 전망됩니다. 기술이 국경을 넘어 확산됨에 따라, 특정 국가의 군사적 행동이 다른 국가의 안보에 미치는 파급 효과가 더욱 복잡해집니다. 향후 국제 사회는 기술 통제와 공급망 안정성을 확보하기 위해 새로운 형태의 규범과 협력 메커니즘을 구축해야 할 필요성이 커질 것입니다. 이러한 기술적 변동성은 기존의 군사적 대립 구도를 넘어 경제적 상호의존성을 기반으로 한 새로운 경쟁 구도를 형성할 가능성이 높습니다.

결론

결론적으로, 드론 기술과 같은 이중 용도 기술의 확산은 전통적인 군사적 관계를 초월하여 대리 세력들의 행동 양식을 근본적으로 변화시키고 있습니다. 이는 기술적 자율성이 지정학적 영향력으로 전환되는 현상으로 읽힙니다. 향후 이 지역의 안정성은 기술 통제와 공급망의 안정성에 달려 있으며, 국제 사회는 이러한 기술적 변화를 관리하고 예측하는 데 집중해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.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?oc=5

How drones transformed Iran's relationships with its proxies - DW.com

When the United States and Israel launched the war on Iran in late February, they hoped to cripple both the Islamic Republic and its so-called "Axis of Resistance" in the Middle East. This comprises Iran's paramilitary proxy groups, including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq, all of whom are opposed to the US and Israel.

The assumption was that "by hitting the right leaders, weapons facilities and supply lines, an outside actor could induce catastrophic failure across the Iranian regime and its web of Middle Eastern allies," said Peter Salisbury, a fellow at US think tank Century International and lead author of the think tank's recently published report "Beyond the Axis."

Despite the US and Israel achieving many of those military objectives, Iranian forces were able to continue launching drone attacks on neighboring Gulf states and shipping in the Strait of Hormuz , while their allies in Lebanon and Yemen intensified attacks against Israel and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

For Wolf-Christian Paes, associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and one of the contributors to the "Beyond the Axis" report, the term "proxies" is actually misleading as it implies a command-and-control relationship between Tehran and the members of the axis.

"Unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV] proliferation is a good example," he told DW. A few years ago, Tehran transferred complete systems and the necessary training to its allies. "Today these militias can build their own UAVs, based on Iranian designs, with most of the parts coming from countries other than Iran," Paes said.

For example, according to the report, which was published after two years of research, these groups are able to source large quantities of engines for the Shahed-136 drone directly from Chinese manufacturers.

"Dual-use technology is difficult to control in the first place and without a traditional hub for smuggling, tracking the supply chain is like looking for a needle in a haystack," Paes told DW, adding that for example China , Russia but also Oman have so far made no real attempts to control the movement of these items.

According to the "Beyond the Axis" report, drone-related conflict incidents around the world rose from 140 in 2016 to more than 58,000 in 2025, a 41,000% increase.

"The growing ability of Iran's partners to manufacture and deploy drones independently is also changing the nature of their relationship with Tehran," Neil Quilliam, an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at the UK-based think tank Chatham House, told DW.

In his view, the Houthi militia in Yemen illustrates this trend. The group now possesses a level of operational autonomy that would have been difficult to imagine a decade ago. "Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah helped establish the foundations of the Houthis' drone and missile programs, while years of conflict and isolation compelled them to develop domestic production capabilities," he told DW.

During the two-year war in Gaza from 2023 to 2025, the Houthis attacked Israel as well as international shipping in the Red Sea with drones and missiles in what they said was a bid to show support for Palestinians in Gaza. During the war in Iran from February to April 2026, the Houthis resumed attacks.

The report also notes that, since at least 2022, a small group of senior Houthi officers in Sanaa have built relationships across the African coasts of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. "Houthi smuggling networks are now present in Somalia , Djibouti , Eritrea and Sudan ," the report said.

For many years, Lebanon's Hezbollah militia was Tehran's best equipped proxy largely because of its proximity to Israel. A day after Hamas attacked Israel on Oct.7, 2023, Hezbollah opened a second front in Israel's north which escalated into a war in Lebanon.

"Israeli efforts to degrade the organization's leadership and military infrastructure created a situation in which Iranian assistance became essential for recovery," Quilliam said.

A November 2024 ceasefire fell apart in early March 2026, after Hezbollah attacked Israel with drones and missiles following the Israeli killing of the Iran's leader Ali Khamenei, who Hezbollah also pledged allegiance to . In the peace talks between the US and Tehran, the front in Lebanon has since become a key issue.

"Hezbollah's participation alongside Iran during the recent conflict, coupled with Tehran's insistence that any ceasefire arrangement include Lebanon , demonstrated how closely the two remain linked," Quilliam said.

As a consequence of Israel's prolonged military campaign in Gaza , Tehran's access to Gaza and Hamas is reduced, Quilliam said. "That should not be mistaken for a permanent decline in Iranian relevance, as the relationships, training networks and technical expertise developed over decades have not disappeared," he told DW. In his view, Tehran's ties to Hamas illustrates how military cooperation can survive even when political influence temporarily recedes .

In Iraq , Tehran-linked armed groups need to balance local Iraqi interests against their ties with Iran, Quilliam observed. While greater drone self-sufficiency gives them more independent means of projecting power and expanding influence, "the challenge for Tehran increasingly lies in coordinating a growing number of capable actors whose interests only partially overlap," Quilliam said.

In his view, Iran retains influence through political relationships, training, intelligence sharing and strategic coordination across all of these groups. "But influence is not the same as control ," he told DW.

Salisbury, of Century International, agrees that Iran is still the militia groups' most powerful and consequential node but the relationship between Tehran and the proxies has turned into one of mutual interdependence. "Capabilities, data and strategic needs flow in multiple directions," he said.

Does all this make it harder for Iran's opponents to dismantle these networks, and to reduce the threat of drone warfare from them?

"Looking ahead, the most significant consequence of drone proliferation across the so-called 'Axis of Resistance' may be the emergence of multiple centers of expertise within what was once viewed primarily as an Iranian-led system," Quilliam told DW. "This makes the wider network more resilient, harder to disrupt and potentially more unpredictable."

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