핵심요약

• 북한의 미사일 프로그램은 1970년대 말 또는 1980년대 초에 시작되었습니다.
• 누동 미사일은 300에서 1,200킬로미터의 사정거리를 가지고 있습니다.
• KN-02 미사일은 약 120킬로미터의 사정거리를 가지고 있습니다.
• 북한은 아직 핵탄두 탑재 능력의 확증을 보여주지 않았습니다.

도입

북한의 핵무기와 미사일 프로그램은 국제 사회의 주요 관심사이며, 투자자에게는 지정학적 리스크를 평가하는 데 중요한 요소입니다. 특히 미국 대륙까지 도달할 수 있는 미사일 기술의 존재 여부는 regional stability와 directly related합니다.

본문 1: 북한의 미사일 기술 발전과 사정거리 분석

북한의 미사일 프로그램은 1970년대 말 또는 1980년대 초에 시작되었으며, 소련의 스쿠드 미사일 기술을 기반으로 발전했습니다. 누동 미사일은 300에서 1,200킬로미터의 사정거리를 가지고 있으며, 이는 동아시아 지역을 포함하는 넓은 범위를 커버할 수 있습니다. KN-02 미사일은 약 120킬로미터의 사정거리를 가지고 있으며, 이는 지역적인 방어나 공격에 사용될 수 있습니다. 이러한 기술 발전은 북한의 군사적 능력을 높였지만, 핵탄두 탑재 능력의 확증이 없기 때문에 아직 완전한 핵무기 체계라고 보기 어렵습니다.

본문 2: 핵탄두 탑재 능력의 불확실성과 국제 사회의 대응

북한이 핵탄두 탑재 능력을 보유하고 있는지 여부는 여전히 불확실합니다. 이는 국제 사회가 북한의 핵무기 프로그램에 대해 cautious approach를 취하는 이유 중 하나입니다. 미국을 포함한 여러 국가들은 북한의 미사일 기술에 대해 지속적인 감시를 하고 있으며, 이는 regional tension을 높이는 요인입니다. 또한, 북한의 핵무기 프로그램은 국제 사회의 제재와 외교적 압박을 받으며, 이는 북한의 경제적 안정성에도 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.

본문 3: 미래 전망과 투자자 고려사항

북한의 미사일 기술과 핵무기 프로그램은 계속적으로 발전할 가능성이 높습니다. 이는 동아시아 지역의 안정성에 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 투자자들에게는 지정학적 리스크를 고려해야 하는 이유입니다. 특히, 미국과 북한 간의 고위급 협상이 지속될 것으로 예상되며, 이는 국제 사회의 대응 전략에 변화를 줄 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 동향을 closely monitor하며, 포트폴리오의 diversification과 risk management를 강화해야 합니다.

결론

북한의 미사일 기술과 핵무기 프로그램은 international security와 closely related합니다. 특히, 핵탄두 탑재 능력의 불확실성은 regional stability에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 미래에는 북한의 기술 발전과 국제 사회의 대응 전략이 중요한 관측 포인트가 될 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMieEFVX3lxTE45TXpQYmpFaDN3cTc5Zk5hbUlXMkNrbnEtVE5wUEJxdWpmRnRDWWhScEptQlJaX2p1U0dLa2dXbjVXb0wtcVhLcC1VVGkyVTU2cXROeWc3Q2xDZnFONE4ydGdTdDZKTHBVVmNhZjMxUnF2dmF6OHVYbw?oc=5

North Korea’s missile program and nuclear weapons: What we know (and don’t) - Popular Science

On June 30, President Trump met North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un on the hermit country’s soil—a first for a sitting American president. The moment also appeared to signal a resumption of high-level negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program.

North Korea is widely considered to have both nuclear warheads (the explosive head of a weapon) and missiles (which deliver the warheads) that can likely reach most corners of the continental U.S. Whether the country can put the two together into a viable nuclear weapon is a bit of an open question—they have yet to show definitely that their missiles can carry a nuclear payload—but it remains a serious international issue.

Using satellite imagery, photos, videos and other intelligence, experts have long tried to keep as close tabs as possible on North Korea’s often-secretive nuclear program. And, as talks over its fate seem poised to continue, here’s a primer on what to know about the country’s capabilities.

Short- to medium-range: meet the Nudong

Presumably, North Korea won’t be dropping nuclear bombs out of an aircraft. So, to know what North Korea is capable of, you need to know what their missiles can do.

The North Korean missile program is generally considered to have begun in the late 1970s or early 80s . At the time, the Soviet Union gave Egypt a stockpile of scud missiles, but not as many as Egypt wanted. So Egypt turned to North Korea to help them decode the technology and make their own scuds— giving both countries access to a supply of reliable missiles.

North Korea has since developed a series of successors that have a range of between 300 and 1,200 kilometers (186 – 746 miles). Also during the Soviet era, North Korea developed an even shorter-range missile known as the KN-02, which can fly about 120 kilometers (75 miles). It’s important to remember that North Korea hasn’t yet shown that any of its weapons can carry a nuclear payload, a fact that is particularly relevant to the KN-02, since its small size requires miniaturized warheads that North Korea may not have the capability to produce.

Once they had scud missiles, North Korea made them bigger and fatter until they arrived at a creation called the “Nodong” — one of its most commonly launched missiles, which can travel up to 1,300 kilometers (808 miles).

More recently, North Korea added a submarine-launched missile to its array. Called the KN-11, it has a Korean name that translates to “Polaris”, which is not-so-coincidentally what the Americans calls its equivalent. One hitch is that North Korea is only known to have one, largely experimental, submarine (and possibly another one underdevelopment).

The country also has what is thought to be a land-based version, the KN-15, though, again, they have never launched a missile and a warhead together.

North Korea’s latest launch came in April. President Trump dismissed it, saying “we don’t consider that a missile test.” Semantics aside, experts believe the country set off a new short-range missile, called the KN-23. Demonstrated only once before, it’s designed for short, low trajectories, can also fly medium-range arcs, and is similar to the Russian Iskander missile, which has a range of between 50 and 450 kilometers (31 and 280 miles)

“This puts US allies like South Korea and Japan in a very difficult position,” Matt Korda , a research associate specializing in North Korea with the Federation of American Scientists, writes via email. “Shorter-range missiles are specifically designed to target those countries.”

The intermediate range: the Musudan and Hwasong-12

North Korea’s early approach to missile development was relatively systematic. “They find something that works, stretch it as far as they can and then stack it,” explains David Schmerler , a senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies.

Building on the Nodong, North Korea arrived at the Musudan, which has a range of around 3,200 kilometers (1,988 miles). But that program, which began in the early 2000s, has been shaky at best. It’s only been successfully tested once, says Schmerler.

North Korea’s missile testing accelerated around 2014 and peaked in 2017, a period in which they debuted an array of new technology. During this era, the Musudan’s function was largely replaced with the Hwasong-12 (that translates to “Mars” in Korean). The aim, says Korda, “appears to be intended to attack U.S. staging areas like Guam.”

Perhaps more importantly, the Hwasong-12 was the country’s first indigenously engineered missile — a major step for the North Korea’s nuclear program, and one that helped lead to even longer-range weapons.

The big ones: the Hwasong-14 and 15

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have always included being able to reach the continental U.S.

Starting in the early 2000s, the Western media speculated that the “Unha” (“galaxy”) series of space launch vehicles could be a round-about way of achieving that goal. But many experts thought that was more hype than function.

“The Unha was more like the boogeyman missile,” says Schmerler. “I never looked at the Unha as a really reliable weapons system.”

In a sense, the Unha was a stop-gap measure until Kim Jong-Un could develop a land based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). That happened in 2017 with the Hwasong-14, which has a range of more than 10,000 kilometers (6,214 miles). This was quickly followed up by the more powerful Hwasong-15.

“The HS-14 could likely target the west coast of the US (including Los Angeles and possibly Denver),” says Korda, “while the HS-15 could potentially target the entirety of the continental United States.”

While no one is sure exactly how many ICBMs North Korea has, seven appeared in a military parade in Pyongyang in early 2018. There are, however, a few caveats to their effectiveness.

One important consideration is how many launch vehicles (called Transport Erector Launchers, or TELs) North Korea has. In 2011, China sold at least six “logging” trucks to the country, in a half-hearted attempt to disguise the transfer of TELs. The latest ICMBs, however, require bigger TELs, so North Korea may have repurposed or cannibalized some of their original Chinese equipment for that task. That makes it difficult to know exactly how many operational TELs are left, which the country must have in order to launch an ICBM.

Another major unknown is whether North Korea’s ICMBs can survive re-entry into the atmosphere during a strike; an ability that’s not yet been proven. But, Korda says, “just because the North Koreans have yet to publicly demonstrate re-entry, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the ICBMs wouldn’t work as designed.”

Schmerler has a similar take, noting that the U.S. would be taking a big risk by assuming it’s not possible.

“In general, most people are on board with the idea that [North Korea] could hit most of the continental US,” he says. “Are you going to hedge on [them] not being able to make re-entry?”

Still, there’s much we don’t know about the opaque program. For example, the exact number of nuclear weapons North Korea has is also unclear (estimates put the arsenal between about 20 and 60 warheads).

Where they’re located is an unknown as well. “The missiles and launchers are largely hidden in the vast network of underground tunnels and caves that flow throughout North Korea,” says Korda. ”It’s basically impossible to tell where North Korean missiles are at any given time.”

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMieEFVX3lxTE45TXpQYmpFaDN3cTc5Zk5hbUlXMkNrbnEtVE5wUEJxdWpmRnRDWWhScEptQlJaX2p1U0dLa2dXbjVXb0wtcVhLcC1VVGkyVTU2cXROeWc3Q2xDZnFONE4ydGdTdDZKTHBVVmNhZjMxUnF2dmF6OHVYbw?oc=5