미국과 이스라엘의 이란 전쟁 관심사 차이 확대
From a gap to a chasm: Diverging US and Israeli interests in the war with Iran - Atlantic Council
미들 이스트 지역에서의 지정학적 긴장이 시장을 혼란스럽게 만들고 있어, 투자자들은 보유 자산을 유지하는 중입니다.
핵심 요약
이란이 호르무즈 해협을 폐쇄하며 미국은 significant spike in gasoline prices를 경험했습니다.
핵심요약
- 이란 전쟁 초기에는 미국과 이스라엘의 군사 협력이 close coordination이었습니다.
- 도널드 트럼프 대통령은 이란 정권의 significant military blows 견디는 능력을 깨닫고 off-ramp를 모색했습니다.
- 벤야민 네타냐후 총리는 continued military pressure를 주장하며, threats to Israel을 proactively deal with 해야 한다고 강조했습니다.
- 이란의 호르무즈 해협 폐쇄로 미국은 significant spike in gasoline prices를 경험했습니다.
- 협상에서는 해협 재개통이 nuclear issues보다 우선순위가 되었습니다.
도입
이번 기사는 이란 전쟁에서 미국과 이스라엘의 increasingly diverging interests를 분석한 것으로, 투자자들에게 지정학적 리스크를 평가하는 데 중요한 통찰을 제공합니다. 특히 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향을 고려할 때, 이란과의 갈등이 글로벌 공급망에 미치는 영향과 경제적 파장을 예측하는 데 필수적입니다.
본문 1: 미국과 이스라엘의 전략적 목표 차이
기사에서는 미국과 이스라엘의 전략적 목표가 increasingly diverging하고 있음을 강조합니다. 도널드 트럼프 대통령은 이란 정권이 significant military blows를 견딜 수 있다는 점을 깨닫고, 전쟁의 끝을 모색하기 시작했습니다. 이는 미국이 경제적 파장, 특히 significant spike in gasoline prices을 고려해 전략을 전환한 것으로 해석됩니다. 이는 에너지 시장과 관련된 투자자들에게 중요한 신호입니다.
본문 2: 호르무즈 해협 폐쇄의 경제적 영향
이란의 호르무즈 해협 폐쇄는 글로벌 에너지 시장에 massive leverage를 제공했습니다. 미국은 significant spike in gasoline prices을 경험하며 경제적 혼란을 겪었습니다. 이는 미국이 협상 테이블에서 호르무즈 해협 재개통을 우선시하게 만든 주요 요인입니다. 이란의 전략적 선택이 글로벌 공급망에 미치는 영향은 에너지 관련 주식과 원유 가격에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.
본문 3: 협상 테이블에서의 우선순위 변화
협상에서는 호르무즈 해협 재개통이 nuclear issues보다 우선순위가 되었습니다. 이는 이란이 에너지 공급망을 통제하는 능력을 강조하며, 미국과 이스라엘의 협상 전략에 변화를 가져왔습니다. 이는 장기적으로 에너지 시장의 안정성과 관련 주식의 변동성에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.
결론
이번 기사는 미국과 이스라엘의 increasingly diverging interests와 이란 전쟁의 경제적 파장을 분석했습니다. 투자자들은 지정학적 리스크를 고려해 에너지 시장과 관련된 포트폴리오를 재검토하는 것이 중요합니다. 향후 호르무즈 해협의 재개통과 핵 협상의 진행 상황은 지속적으로 모니터링해야 할 핵심 포인트입니다.
Original Article
From a gap to a chasm: Diverging US and Israeli interests in the war with Iran - Atlantic Council
WASHINGTON—Despite close coordination between US and Israeli leaders and their militaries from the earliest days of the Iran war, the two countries’ interests and objectives, and their leaders’ political priorities and constraints, have increasingly diverged. The once-modest gap between them has opened into a chasm that will not be easily bridged.
Moreover, the chasm is widening along several different fissures:
When the war began, each side undoubtedly harbored hope that the Iranian regime would collapse. But when it became clear that the regime could endure significant military blows and inflict painful retaliation against US military and Gulf state infrastructure targets, US President Donald Trump understood that enough was enough and has been searching for an off-ramp ever since. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, operates according to the post-October 7 Israeli ethos: threats to Israel must be dealt with proactively and cannot be allowed to fester. He continues to believe that additional military pressure on Iran could cause the regime to fall. And even short of that, continued military pressure will further degrade its nuclear and ballistic missile capability.
When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, it gained massive leverage in the conflict. By disrupting global energy and other supply chains, it has caused economic havoc, including a significant spike in gasoline prices in the United States. Trump responded to the closure by imposing a blockade on Iranian ports, but that simply balanced the scale. In the negotiations that have followed, the strait has taken pride of place. As a result, nuclear issues are being punted to a second stage of negotiations, and many other important issues have been dropped altogether. What is widening this fissure is clear enough: Israel experiences the economic disruption of the strait’s closure far less than the United States does, and Israelis have a high tolerance for the disruption they do feel given the severity of the Iran threat. As Trump is increasingly consumed by the economic dimension of the conflict, and as Netanyahu remains overwhelmingly focused on security issues, US and Israeli priorities in these negotiations (in which Israel plays no role) are at odds.
Reopening the strait is a low priority for Israel. A much higher priority is a deal that permanently dismantles Iran’s nuclear program by exporting all enriched uranium, permanently banning further enrichment, dismantling all nuclear facilities, and allowing constant, intrusive inspections. (Israel also wants limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program, but that issue is absent from the negotiations.) Trump is prepared to accept much less. The likely deal includes an Iranian pledge never to develop nuclear weapons (such a commitment has been made many times before), an agreement to negotiate on the terms of exporting or downblending highly enriched uranium, and a time-limited suspension of enrichment, with details to be determined. In return, Iran is demanding some measure of sanctions relief or release of frozen assets, which Trump is resisting providing up front but is open to in later stages. For Trump, the ability to claim success in negotiations is significantly contingent on whether he can describe it as tougher than the nuclear agreement reached by President Barack Obama in 2015. It may not clear that bar, and even if it can for an American audience, the entire structure of the deal will fall far short of Netanyahu’s expectations and demands. Such an agreement will essentially leave Iran capable of reconstituting its nuclear program if it cheats on the deal or when the deal expires, and it will ensure that Tehran has revenue to fund its military capabilities and terrorist proxies.
Hezbollah has attacked Israel since October 8, 2023, and there is a near consensus among Jewish Israelis that Israel must respond to eliminate the Hezbollah threat and restore security to northern communities, regardless of the impact on US negotiations with Iran. Trump, meanwhile, has essentially adopted the Iranian position that the two theaters cannot be decoupled and that a deal to end the broader war must include quiet in Lebanon. Recently, he urged Netanyahu not to strike against Hezbollah in Beirut, and when Israel did so anyway and Iran responded by firing missiles at northern Israel, Trump tried to restrain the Israeli response and demanded that the exchanges cease. The idea that Israel’s ability to defend itself against Hezbollah strikes would be limited so as not to upset the US-Iran negotiations, especially when the US priority in those negotiations increasingly deprioritizes Israeli security objectives, is extremely difficult for Israelis to swallow.
The US midterms are now less than five months away. Even a prompt opening of the strait is unlikely to markedly reduce gas prices before the election, which even before the war was already poised to hinge on affordability issues. The war is now opposed by some 60 percent of the public, as Americans recognize the direct hit it has landed on their pocketbooks. Trump and his Republican colleagues would like to be free of this albatross with time to recover before voters cast their ballots. Naturally, these concerns are of little relevance to Netanyahu.
Domestic fallout for Netanyahu
Netanyahu has long marketed himself to Israelis as the sole leader who can ensure their security and, drawing on Trump’s popularity in Israel, as Trump’s best friend and partner in reshaping the Middle East in Israel’s favor. But the prime minister heads into a difficult fall election campaign with both of those contentions in doubt, perhaps even in tension. Netanyahu’s opponents and supporters alike criticize him for accepting a reality in which Israel cannot make sovereign decisions to act in its own defense and must accept constraints imposed by a foreign leader (even a friendly one) who belittles Israel’s concerns. That makes his perilous path to political survival more challenging still. Trump has previously staunchly defended the prime minister, calling for Israeli President Isaac Herzog to issue Netanyahu a pardon to curtail his corruption trial. At one time, Netanyahu planned to invite Trump to Israel to present him with the Israel Prize and highlight their partnership. That move may no longer be possible, or even politically valuable to Netanyahu.
Trump and Netanyahu share a commitment to ensuring that Iran can never possess a nuclear weapon, but the war has revealed many misaligned intervening objectives and priorities. That misalignment does not preclude future cooperation, whether during or after the current war, on the leaders’ common pledge to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Negotiations over a new US-Israeli security cooperation agreement are already underway. And one could imagine Trump trying to boost Netanyahu’s electoral chances in other ways. But the divergences in their national and political interests have narrowed both the space for them to make common cause and the persuasiveness of their attempts to do so.