핵심요약

• 이란의 공격은 호르무즈 해협에서 발생했으며, 이는 국제 유가 급등을 초래했습니다.
• 이란은 드론과 고속 보트를 이용해 상업 선박 통행을 어렵게 만들어 보험 불가능 상태로 만들었습니다.
• 미국의 군사력은 해협에서 이란을 제어하고 있으며, 이는 비대칭적 현실을 반영합니다.
• 분쟁은 6월 14일 협상 합의 이후에도 호르무즈 해협 통제권이 결정될 때까지 계속될 것입니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란-미국 간의 지정학적 갈등이 단순한 군사 충돌을 넘어 글로벌 에너지 시장과 국제 해상 무역에 미치는 영향을 분석하는 데 중요합니다. 특히 호르무즈 해협의 통제 여부가 전 세계 유가와 무역 흐름에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 것은 투자 전략 수립에 필수적입니다.

본문 1: 비대칭적 군사력과 해협 통제 (Asymmetric Warfare and Strait Control)

이란 혁명수비대(IRGC)는 드론과 '모기 함대'라 불리는 고속 보트를 이용하여 호르무즈 해협을 효과적으로 봉쇄하고 있습니다. 이들은 상업 선박이 통과하는 데 드는 비용을 극도로 높여 보험을 불가능하게 만들고 있습니다. 이는 이란이 군사적 우위를 확보하지 못했음에도 불구하고 해협 통제라는 실질적인 승리를 획득하고 있음을 보여줍니다. 미국의 군사력이 해협에서 이란을 제어하고 있다는 점은 현대전의 비대칭적 현실을 극명하게 보여줍니다. 즉, 물리적인 군사력의 우위가 반드시 지정학적 통제권을 보장하지 않는다는 점이 핵심입니다. 이처럼 비대칭적 환경에서 해협 통제권은 군사력의 양적 우위보다 더 큰 경제적 영향력을 가집니다.

본문 2: 경제적 파급 효과와 지정학적 리스크 (Economic Ripple Effects and Geopolitical Risk)

이란이 해협 통제권을 통해 세계 석유의 5분의 1이 통과하는 수로를 효과적으로 차단할 수 있다는 점은 글로벌 에너지 공급망에 직접적인 충격을 줍니다. 이러한 통제는 유가 급등과 글로벌 시장의 변동성을 증폭시키는 주요 원인이 됩니다. 선박들이 위험을 회피하면서 발생하는 물동량 감소는 경제적 손실을 야기하며, 이는 단순히 군사적 충돌을 넘어 국제 경제 시스템 전반에 걸친 리스크로 작용합니다. 따라서 호르무즈 해협의 안정성은 에너지 안보와 직결되는 핵심 지정학적 변수로 간주되어야 합니다. 이는 투자자들이 에너지 관련 자산뿐만 아니라 지정학적 리스크를 종합적으로 고려해야 함을 의미합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망 및 전략적 시사점 (Long-term Outlook and Strategic Implications)

현재의 교착 상태는 미국과 이스라엘의 군사적 대응이 이란의 해협 통제 시도를 완전히 저지하지 못하고 있음을 시사합니다. 장기적으로 볼 때, 이 지역의 안정은 미국의 전략적 목표와 이란의 내부 정치 상황 변화에 따라 달라질 것입니다. 향후 호르무즈 해협의 통제권이 어떻게 확정되느냐에 따라 국제 무역의 흐름과 에너지 가격의 장기적인 방향성이 결정될 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 단기적인 군사적 움직임뿐만 아니라, 이 지역의 정치적 합의 도출 과정과 장기적인 전략적 목표를 면밀히 관찰해야 할 것입니다.

결론

결론적으로, 이란 전쟁의 종결은 호르무즈 해협의 통제권 확립에 달려 있으며, 이는 단순한 군사적 승패를 넘어 글로벌 경제의 안정성에 직접적인 영향을 미칩니다. 향후 지정학적 상황의 변화에 따라 에너지 시장의 변동성이 커질 수 있으므로, 투자자들은 이 지역의 정치적 역학 관계와 군사적 균형 변화를 지속적으로 주시해야 할 것입니다. 구체적인 통제권 확정 시점과 그에 따른 경제적 파급 효과에 대한 예측은 지속적인 모니터링이 필요합니다.

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No End to Iran War until Hormuz’s Fate Is Settled - Geopolitical Monitor

The June 26th American strikes on Iranian military infrastructure come as no surprise. After the Iranians attacked a Singapore-flagged ship in the Strait of Hormuz a day earlier, US Central Command (CENTCOM) had little choice but to respond. The Iranian attack, in turn, was a response to Israeli strikes in Lebanon against Iran’s ally, Hezbollah. Of course, this all has occurred barely twenty-four hours after US President Donald Trump declared that the war had been ended via a negotiated settlement signed with Iran on June 14th. And on and on this cycle will continue until control of the uber-important Strait of Hormuz is definitively determined. At the moment, the Iranians control it – despite what Trump says, and despite a heavy US military presence. By launching attacks with drones, and their ‘mosquito fleet’ of pirate-like speedboats, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) can effectively close the strait by making it too costly for commercial shipping to transit. Even if they can’t stop every boat, the increased risk makes them virtually uninsurable , and shipping companies become reluctant to put their cargo, and people, in danger. This reduces traffic enough to spike oil prices and rattle global markets, and they have been able to do it with a vastly superior US force in the strait trying to stop them – a dramatic testament to the asymmetric reality of modern warfare. What Does Victory in Iran Look Like? The Americans would like to have control of the strait, of course – this would curtail Iranian power and give them a decisive victory to a war they started without, it seems, a clear ‘Plan B’ after the anticipated popular uprising did not materialize. The Iranians have proved as unable to effectively counter-attack US and Israeli forces as the Americans have been to safeguard Hormuz – hence the current stalemate. Yet, as long as they can effectively block the waterway through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes they are the de facto victors in this conflict. In order to break the Iranian stranglehold on shipping, and win the war, CENTCOM would almost certainly have to take the strait (if they could do it by other means, what are they waiting for?). Anything less would be a hopeful half measure. The formidable Fifth Fleet has been attempting to restore traffic to pre-war levels for the past four months, but remains unable to do so as long as the drones and speed boats are being launched from land sites. At a minimum, stopping this would mean taking Qeshm Island – the location of a major Iranian military base – and at least some of the Iranian coastline. Such an operation would involve mass US casualties, and so far Mr. Trump has demonstrated little appetite for such politically unpopular actions. Preferring to approach the situation with his signature ‘dealmaker’ hacks, Trump has negotiated for months, while all three parties to the conflict (the third being Israel) continue to exchange fire intermittently. The Israelis initiate these sequences by launching attacks in Lebanon or Gaza; the Iranians, who want to replace Israel and Saudi Arabia as the regional power, feel they must respond by attacking ships in the strait; the Americans, who don’t want the Iranians to control the strait, feel they must respond to the response. So why do the Israelis keep touching-off these triangular spats, preventing peace from taking hold? Because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, unlike Donald Trump, is not in search of a quick, bloodless settlement that can be presented to his population as a triumph of dealmaking. He is seeking to prevent Iran from establishing itself as a regional power rival. This is what the war has always been about: Who controls the middle east, and its precious oil? If the war concludes not because the Iranians were forced to open the strait, but because they agreed to open it, they remain in control – and firmly established as a regional player, with real power and influence. Tehran will, for example, be able to clamp off the oil every time the Israelis launch a major military operation in response to a Hamas or Hezbollah attack – something that happens about every ten years. This will in turn constrain Israeli policy in the West Bank, where it ever seeks to expand settlements. Netanyahu doubtless sees this as an attenuation both of his state’s ability to defend itself, and its ability to direct policy with respect to expansion. He is prolonging the war to prevent a resolution that would be a strategic defeat for him, even if Trump considers it a PR victory. The Dictates of Power Politics Netanyahu, along with most statesmen who have done battle in the global arena throughout history, thinks about international affairs in the way that Don Pietro Savastano thought about Mafia politics in the acclaimed HBO series Gomorrah. After eschewing more temperate options and sending his men on a highly dangerous assault to oust an upstart rival, he consoles Ciro Di Marzio (his lieutenant, and the main protagonist) about the heavy losses, which included Ciro’s best friend and mentor, Attilio. “I know he was like a father to you – but it had to be done, right?” the boss intones poignantly, “And it had to be done like that .” Don Pietro knew that, in order to remain in control of the criminal underworld, he had to be seen to crush his opposition – not weaken it, not bargain with it, not appease it: crush it with overwhelming force. Anything less would be the beginning of the end of his power, even if it were less costly, and brought temporary peace. This is what Netanyahu sees, and what Trump does not – the long game; the power game; the ‘Great Game’ as it is referred to in the parlance of international relations. He knows that global affairs are little different from a Mafia turf war: no justice, no morality, no higher authority enforcing the rules – only power, and the perception of power. This misalignment of goals and viewpoints is what is prolonging the conflict. If Trump gets peace with a negotiated deal, he looks good today (or at least he thinks he does). But in starting the war, and then not having the stomach to finish it forcefully, he will have shown the world that the US – and therefore Israel – is no longer in control of the Middle East. The Iranians have previously attacked Israel and US forces primarily through proxies, rarely daring to come into direct conflict and risk outright war. When the war finally came, Tehran found that, overmatched as it was militarily, it could close Hormuz with surprisingly modest resources, and start a clock ticking for Washington as world oil prices soared and markets tumbled. By bargaining with them to re-open the strait, instead of winning militarily, Trump will have handed the IRGC a power it didn’t know it had: the ability to hold the world economy hostage by closing Hormuz whenever it likes. That would be the beginning of the end of US dominance in the region – and perhaps globally. This is of course very bad for Israel, which gets its power through the ‘special relationship’ with the United States. Thus, Netanyahu will continue to scuttle ceasefire after ceasefire, provoking response and counter-response, with no end in sight. Looking Ahead So, will Trump bite the bullet, accept the casualties, and take Hormuz? No. It would be far too unpopular domestically. Will Netanyahu, or his eventual successor, stop breaking the ceasefires and re-starting the cycles of retaliation? No. Any Israeli prime minister will have the same incentive to stop Iranian power from rising. Will the Iranians stop attacking ships in response to Israeli strikes in Gaza and Lebanon? No. They have more power now than ever and aren’t going to stop using it. Will the world economy gradually start working around the strait, finding other ways to transport oil and other commodities? Yes, but Hormuz will never stop being a significant trade route, and crucial source of power and control in the ‘Great Game’ of international affairs. The stalemate can, and will, continue until something changes. What exactly that will be is very hard to predict. Underneath the surface of the weekly back and forth, global power balances are shifting, and we will not know what the board will look like until the pieces have stopped moving. Simon Capobianco is a former Senior Analyst at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, where he contributed to the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (CCR2P) and Syria Watch projects. He writes about international relations and foreign policy. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com

And on and on this cycle will continue until control of the uber-important Strait of Hormuz is definitively determined. At the moment, the Iranians control it – despite what Trump says, and despite a heavy US military presence. By launching attacks with drones, and their ‘mosquito fleet’ of pirate-like speedboats, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) can effectively close the strait by making it too costly for commercial shipping to transit. Even if they can’t stop every boat, the increased risk makes them virtually uninsurable , and shipping companies become reluctant to put their cargo, and people, in danger. This reduces traffic enough to spike oil prices and rattle global markets, and they have been able to do it with a vastly superior US force in the strait trying to stop them – a dramatic testament to the asymmetric reality of modern warfare.

The Americans would like to have control of the strait, of course – this would curtail Iranian power and give them a decisive victory to a war they started without, it seems, a clear ‘Plan B’ after the anticipated popular uprising did not materialize. The Iranians have proved as unable to effectively counter-attack US and Israeli forces as the Americans have been to safeguard Hormuz – hence the current stalemate. Yet, as long as they can effectively block the waterway through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes they are the de facto victors in this conflict.

In order to break the Iranian stranglehold on shipping, and win the war, CENTCOM would almost certainly have to take the strait (if they could do it by other means, what are they waiting for?). Anything less would be a hopeful half measure. The formidable Fifth Fleet has been attempting to restore traffic to pre-war levels for the past four months, but remains unable to do so as long as the drones and speed boats are being launched from land sites. At a minimum, stopping this would mean taking Qeshm Island – the location of a major Iranian military base – and at least some of the Iranian coastline. Such an operation would involve mass US casualties, and so far Mr. Trump has demonstrated little appetite for such politically unpopular actions.

Preferring to approach the situation with his signature ‘dealmaker’ hacks, Trump has negotiated for months, while all three parties to the conflict (the third being Israel) continue to exchange fire intermittently. The Israelis initiate these sequences by launching attacks in Lebanon or Gaza; the Iranians, who want to replace Israel and Saudi Arabia as the regional power, feel they must respond by attacking ships in the strait; the Americans, who don’t want the Iranians to control the strait, feel they must respond to the response.

So why do the Israelis keep touching-off these triangular spats, preventing peace from taking hold? Because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, unlike Donald Trump, is not in search of a quick, bloodless settlement that can be presented to his population as a triumph of dealmaking. He is seeking to prevent Iran from establishing itself as a regional power rival. This is what the war has always been about: Who controls the middle east, and its precious oil? If the war concludes not because the Iranians were forced to open the strait, but because they agreed to open it, they remain in control – and firmly established as a regional player, with real power and influence.

Tehran will, for example, be able to clamp off the oil every time the Israelis launch a major military operation in response to a Hamas or Hezbollah attack – something that happens about every ten years. This will in turn constrain Israeli policy in the West Bank, where it ever seeks to expand settlements. Netanyahu doubtless sees this as an attenuation both of his state’s ability to defend itself, and its ability to direct policy with respect to expansion. He is prolonging the war to prevent a resolution that would be a strategic defeat for him, even if Trump considers it a PR victory.

Netanyahu, along with most statesmen who have done battle in the global arena throughout history, thinks about international affairs in the way that Don Pietro Savastano thought about Mafia politics in the acclaimed HBO series Gomorrah. After eschewing more temperate options and sending his men on a highly dangerous assault to oust an upstart rival, he consoles Ciro Di Marzio (his lieutenant, and the main protagonist) about the heavy losses, which included Ciro’s best friend and mentor, Attilio. “I know he was like a father to you – but it had to be done, right?” the boss intones poignantly, “And it had to be done like that .”

Don Pietro knew that, in order to remain in control of the criminal underworld, he had to be seen to crush his opposition – not weaken it, not bargain with it, not appease it: crush it with overwhelming force. Anything less would be the beginning of the end of his power, even if it were less costly, and brought temporary peace. This is what Netanyahu sees, and what Trump does not – the long game; the power game; the ‘Great Game’ as it is referred to in the parlance of international relations. He knows that global affairs are little different from a Mafia turf war: no justice, no morality, no higher authority enforcing the rules – only power, and the perception of power.

This misalignment of goals and viewpoints is what is prolonging the conflict. If Trump gets peace with a negotiated deal, he looks good today (or at least he thinks he does). But in starting the war, and then not having the stomach to finish it forcefully, he will have shown the world that the US – and therefore Israel – is no longer in control of the Middle East. The Iranians have previously attacked Israel and US forces primarily through proxies, rarely daring to come into direct conflict and risk outright war. When the war finally came, Tehran found that, overmatched as it was militarily, it could close Hormuz with surprisingly modest resources, and start a clock ticking for Washington as world oil prices soared and markets tumbled.

By bargaining with them to re-open the strait, instead of winning militarily, Trump will have handed the IRGC a power it didn’t know it had: the ability to hold the world economy hostage by closing Hormuz whenever it likes. That would be the beginning of the end of US dominance in the region – and perhaps globally. This is of course very bad for Israel, which gets its power through the ‘special relationship’ with the United States. Thus, Netanyahu will continue to scuttle ceasefire after ceasefire, provoking response and counter-response, with no end in sight.

So, will Trump bite the bullet, accept the casualties, and take Hormuz? No. It would be far too unpopular domestically. Will Netanyahu, or his eventual successor, stop breaking the ceasefires and re-starting the cycles of retaliation? No. Any Israeli prime minister will have the same incentive to stop Iranian power from rising. Will the Iranians stop attacking ships in response to Israeli strikes in Gaza and Lebanon? No. They have more power now than ever and aren’t going to stop using it. Will the world economy gradually start working around the strait, finding other ways to transport oil and other commodities? Yes, but Hormuz will never stop being a significant trade route, and crucial source of power and control in the ‘Great Game’ of international affairs.

The stalemate can, and will, continue until something changes. What exactly that will be is very hard to predict. Underneath the surface of the weekly back and forth, global power balances are shifting, and we will not know what the board will look like until the pieces have stopped moving.

Simon Capobianco is a former Senior Analyst at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, where he contributed to the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (CCR2P) and Syria Watch projects. He writes about international relations and foreign policy.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMijgFBVV95cUxNajJqZkxsNnJtdHhuY2x2OXpCVmVHMEw0R2dZRXMyaGlKUjcySlM5OTlQQ3VHbXQtcW5jUk52X0JBZkdOYjhKNjlNWE5mTHJFVUhoUkVVLURHOEhKZ05yOTJRR2tobE5GdWlkcXhUbmlVQXByV3cxZ3ZGSUxRbFZxNFo2QkR3aUtOLWpQYmp3?oc=5