예멘 분쟁, 홍해 안보, 그리고 미국의 정책 분석
Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, And U.S. Policy – Analysis - Eurasia Review
지정학적 해상 위험은 즉각적인 방향성 변화 없이 시장에 불확실성을 추가할 뿐입니다.
핵심 요약
2023년 10월부터 2024년 12월까지 후티의 해상 공격으로 인해 바브 알 만답 해협을 통과하는 글로벌 물류 흐름에 심각한 차질이 발생했습니다.
핵심요약
- 2023년 10월부터 2024년 12월까지 후티는 국제 선박에 공격을 감행했습니다.
- 2025년 3월부터 5월까지 미국은 후티를 겨냥한 공습을 확대했습니다.
- 2025년 7월에 후티는 일부 비미국 선박에 대한 공격을 재개했습니다.
- 사우디아라비아와 UAE는 후티에 대한 공동 대응에서 경쟁 관계를 보였습니다.
도입
본 기사는 예멘 내의 분쟁과 홍해 지역의 해상 안보가 글로벌 공급망에 미치는 영향을 분석합니다. 이는 지정학적 갈등이 에너지 및 무역 경로를 어떻게 위협하며, 국제 사회의 개입이 지역 안보에 어떤 복잡한 결과를 초래하는지를 투자자들에게 이해시키는 데 중요합니다.
본문 1: 해상 운송로의 지정학적 취약성
바브 알 만답 해협은 세계에서 가장 활발한 해상 운송로 중 하나이며, 이 지역의 불안정성은 에너지와 상품의 흐름에 결정적인 영향을 미칩니다. 후티 운동이 이 해협을 통제하거나 위협하면서 발생한 해상 공격은 단순한 지역 분쟁을 넘어 글로벌 물류의 병목 현상을 심화시킵니다. 2026년 지역 분쟁이 예상됨에 따라 이 해협의 안전성은 더욱 취약해질 것으로 보이며, 이는 유가 변동성과 글로벌 무역 비용 상승으로 이어질 수 있습니다. 해상 무역로의 안전 보장은 국제 무역의 안정성과 직결되므로, 이 지역의 군사적 상황 변화는 국제 금융 시장의 변동성에 직접적인 영향을 미칩니다.
본문 2: 지역 강대국 간의 경쟁과 외교적 역학 관계
예멘 분쟁과 홍해 안보 문제는 단순히 현지 갈등에 국한되지 않고, 이란의 지원과 지역 강대국들(사우디아라비아, UAE) 간의 경쟁 구도를 반영합니다. 과거에는 이 두 국가가 후티 위협에 공동으로 대응했으나, 최근에는 상호 경쟁 관계가 부각되었습니다. 이러한 경쟁은 지역 안보 협력의 효율성을 저해하고, 각국이 자국의 이익을 극대화하는 방향으로 외교적 노선을 설정하게 만듭니다. 특히 이란의 영향력이 복잡하게 얽혀 있는 상황에서, 각국은 자국의 전략적 목표 달성을 위해 독자적인 안보 전략을 추구하며 잠재적인 갈등 요소를 내포하고 있습니다. 이는 장기적인 지역 안정성을 확보하는 데 있어 외교적 균형이 얼마나 중요한지를 보여줍니다.
본문 3: 장기적 위험과 전략적 전망
후티의 공격이 특정 시점에 중단되더라도, 바브 알 만답 해협을 통한 물류의 잠재적 위험은 지속될 수 있습니다. 2026년 미국-이스라엘-이란 간의 분쟁과 같은 더 광범위한 지정학적 충돌은 해상 안보 환경을 더욱 예측 불가능하게 만들고, 해협 통행료 및 보험료에 구조적인 인플레이션을 유발할 수 있습니다. 따라서 단기적인 휴전보다는 장기적인 다자간 해상 안보 프레임워크 구축이 필수적입니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 위험이 에너지 시장과 해운 산업의 장기적인 구조적 비용 상승으로 이어질 가능성을 지속적으로 주시해야 합니다.
결론
결론적으로, 예멘 분쟁과 홍해 지역의 안보는 단기적인 군사적 상황을 넘어 글로벌 공급망의 안정성과 지역 강대국 간의 외교적 역학 관계를 이해해야 합니다. 향후 해상 안보 환경은 지정학적 갈등의 연쇄 반응에 따라 더욱 복잡해질 가능성이 높으므로, 글로벌 투자자들은 이러한 다층적인 위험 요소를 종합적으로 평가하여 장기적인 전략을 수립해야 할 것입니다.
Original Article
Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, And U.S. Policy – Analysis - Eurasia Review
Yemen is a conflict-afflicted nation along the strategic Bab al Mandab Strait, one of the world’s most active shipping lanes. The Strait has become a more important conduit for energy and goods as regional conflict has disrupted flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2026. Since 2015, a civil war has pitted the Iran-backed Houthi movement against Yemen’s internationally recognized government (IRG), the IRG’s foreign backers, and other anti-Houthi forces. The Houthis control most of northwestern Yemen, including the capital, Sana’a ( Figure 1). Foreign intervention complicates the conflict, which has contributed to a long-standing and ongoing humanitarian crisis. An uneasy truce has frozen conflict lines since 2022, but regional conflict in 2026 has contributed to rising tensions in Yemen.
The Iran-backed Houthis launched numerous attacks on international shipping from October 2023 (after Hamas-led attacks on Israel sparked the war in Gaza) to December 2024, before pausing these attacks in early 2025. From March to May 2025, U.S. forces expanded strikes against the Houthis seeking to compel a lasting end to Houthi maritime attacks. The U.S. campaign ended under an agreement brokered by neighboring Oman in which the Houthis agreed to cease targeting U.S. vessels and the United States agreed to halt strikes. The Houthis renewed attacks on some non-U.S. ships in July 2025 and launched strikes against targets in Israel, ostensibly to compel Israel to end its war with Hamas. The Houthis suspended their attacks on Israel after the October 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire, but restarted them during the 2026 U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict. In June 2026, the Houthis threatened to attack Israel-linked ships.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) once collaborated in Yemen to counter the Houthis and other threats, but have more recently competed there, despite shared concerns about Iranian support to the Houthis. In December 2025, Saudi Arabia accused the UAE of providing military support to the Yemeni separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) in the STC’s bid to seize Yemen’s eastern governorates and Aden, the IRG’s seat. Saudi Arabia military intervention against the STC was followed by the departure of UAE forces, but STC activists have resisted IRG and Saudi initiatives.
Iranian and Houthi leaders have threatened to target commerce in the Red Sea corridor, potentially expanding regional conflict involving Iran. In July 2026, flights from Iran to Houthi-controlled Sana’a were followed by strikes (attributed by the Houthis to Saudi Arabia) on the Sana’a airport. The Houthis then announced they would target Saudi Arabia-linked ships. Conflict and threats raised the prospect of disruption of shipments of Saudi oil and Gulf imports rerouted to the Red Sea from the Strait of Hormuz because of the U.S.-Iran conflict.
Background and Key Stakeholders
Long-running Yemeni disputes over governance and energy resources have deepened since 2015 amid foreign influence and intervention. The Republic of Yemen was formed by a 1990 merger of the Sana’a-led Yemen Arab Republic (a former Ottoman province, then Zaydi Shia-ruled kingdom, “North Yemen”) and the Aden-led People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (a former British colony and Marxist regime, “South Yemen”). North-south tensions and conflict have recurred since the 1960s, and the STC leveraged some southerners’ continuing demands for independence. The IRG, STC, and the Houthis maintain influence through complex ties with tribal networks and local actors—the most powerful forces in many areas.
In 2012, Arab Spring-era protests and unrest prompted the president of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG /IRG ) to resign. A UN-mediated transition and national dialogue sought to broker new governing arrangements. The Houthi movement (alt. Ansar Allah or Partisans of God), a north Yemen-based Zaydi Shia network, opposed UN-backed outcomes and resumed an insurgency. In 2014, the Houthis seized the capital, Sana’a, and later advanced on Aden. ROYG leaders fled and sought international intervention.
In 2015, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia began a military campaign against the Houthis. Houthi attacks across Yemen’s borders grew in complexity and scope with deepening support over time from Iran . The United States provided logistical, intelligence, and advisory support to the coalition, but ended aerial refueling in 2018 and curtailed some arms sales to Saudi Arabia in response to civilian casualties and action in Congress .
Power-sharing agreements in 2020 and 2022 brought anti-Houthi Yemenis together under a coalition. An STC offensive on IRG-aligned forces in December 2025 and Saudi military intervention resulted in the STC’s dissolution and changes in the makeup of the IRG’s eight-person Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and the IRG cabinet. Saudi Arabia is now the IRG’s principal sponsor and security partner.
Conflict Status and U.S. Diplomacy
Since 2015, conflict has caused widespread humanitarian suffering and significant infrastructure damage in Yemen, long the Arab world’s poorest country. Prior to the ceasefire, foreign observers attributed human rights violations to all parties. Since 2022, violence has not returned to pre-truce levels , but intermittent cross-line fighting occurs. The STC’s dissolution is prompting a reorganization of anti-Houthi forces. The Houthis have reasserted control in the north and can threaten Israel, other regional states, and shipping, including energy supplies.
The Trump Administration has taken military action against the Houthis and in March 2025 redesignated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The Administration supported the UN Security Council’s decision to end the UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), a 2018 ceasefire agreement that halted fighting over Houthi-held Red Sea ports.
Since February 2015, the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen and a Yemen Affairs Unit (YAU) have been based at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Jonathan Peccia serves as U.S. Chargé d’Affaires. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg engages Yemeni and regional actors in efforts aimed at “insulating Yemen from wider regional escalation” and pursuing talks “to end the conflict comprehensively.”
The UN reports that 22.3 million Yemenis (more than half the population) need humanitarian assistance and protection, including 18.3 million people who are acutely food insecure, of whom more than 2 million are acutely malnourished children. UN agencies reported that a “severe gap” in humanitarian funding during 2025 forced providers “to scale back critical services despite escalating needs.” The annual UN humanitarian needs and response plan for Yemen seeks $2.16 billion to reach 12 million people. As of July 21, 2026, it was 19% funded . Limits on movement constrain humanitarian access and affect aid delivery, largely in Houthi-controlled areas, where the Houthis have detained UN and aid workers. The World Food Programme (WFP) has terminated its operations in Houthi-controlled northern Yemen given security risks and funding cuts. Economic side effects of regional conflict since February 2026 have raised costs of imported food and fuel, on which Yemenis depend.
Insecurity in Yemen creates opportunities for an estimated 2-3,000 Yemen-based Al Qaeda members, who UN monitors report have a “covert pragmatic relationship” with the Houthis and an alliance with the Somalia-based Al Shabaab. UN monitors report the Houthis also have “limited collaboration” with Al Shabaab. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and Lebanon’s Hezbollah also have operated in Yemen.
Houthi Attacks and U.S. Responses
Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks on Israel, and Israel’s military operations in Gaza, the Houthis began targeting Israeli territory as well as commercial ships transiting the Bab al Mandab Strait. Through 2024, U.S. forces intercepted Houthi-launched projectiles, prevented some attempted Houthi vessel seizures, led coalition patrols, and struck Houthi targets. On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign the Administration intended to compel the Houthis to end their attacks and eliminate their capability to threaten maritime transit. The Houthis resisted, attacked U.S. Navy ships, and shot down U.S. unmanned aircraft . A U.S.-Houthi truce has held since May 2025, but Houthi attacks on Israel did not end until October 2025 and resumed during the 2026 U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict. In June 2026, the Houthis announced they would target Israel-linked vessels, and in July 2026 they similarly threatened Saudi-linked vessels. UN Security Council Resolution 2722 (2024) demands the Houthis cease attacks, and notes the right of member states to defend their vessels from attack. In June 2025, U.S. CENTCOM stated that “only through a whole of government approach, of which military operations are a key component, will a sustained return of freedom of navigation be guaranteed.”
Foreign support and Houthi experience may allow the group to pose enduring regional security risks. U.S. sanctions target the group’s far-reaching networks . U.S. officials have reported that Iran has supplied the Houthis with weaponry, targeting information, and military advice. In 2025, Yemeni forces seized tons of Houthi-bound arms, and in July 2026, U.S. and IRG officials said Iranian air links to Sana’a pose security risks.
The 119 th Congress may consider whether or how to respond to developments in Yemen, including through legislation that would address Houthi human rights violations ( H.R. 1848 / S. 3451 ). Members also may conduct oversight of Yemen-related diplomacy or military and intelligence operations. The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 119-60 ) authorized the U.S. military to treat as U.S. stocks any weapon or materiel intended for the Houthis obtained by the United States in transit or otherwise and to use them for drawdown purposes, including transfer. In 2025 , some Members questioned President Trump’s assertions of authority to direct military operations in Yemen.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.