핵심요약

• 이라크 연방 정부는 9월 30일까지 이란 지원 민병대를 해체시키기 위한 군사적 고립 계획을 고려하고 있습니다.
• 이 계획은 미국 군사 교리의 고립 임무와 유사하게 민병대의 이동과 보급을 제한하는 것을 목표로 합니다.
• 이라크 정부는 이 계획을 통해 민병대의 자발적 해체를 유도하려는 의도를 가지고 있습니다.
• 이라크 안보군은 민병대가 협조하지 않을 경우 이 계획을 실행할 준비를 하고 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란-미국 전쟁 상황이 이라크 내 민병대 해체라는 구체적인 군사적 움직임으로 어떻게 연결되는지를 분석합니다. 투자자들은 지정학적 불안정성이 에너지 시장과 지역 안보에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 주시해야 합니다. 이라크 내 군사적 재편은 지역 전체의 물류 및 에너지 공급망에 잠재적인 변동성을 야기할 수 있으므로, 이러한 움직임의 파급 효과를 이해하는 것이 중요합니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 압박과 군사 전략의 연관성

이라크 연방 정부가 민병대를 고립시키려는 계획은 단순한 내부 통제가 아닌, 외부 세력과의 연계된 복합적인 지정학적 압박 전략으로 해석됩니다. 이라크 정부가 군대를 동원하여 민병대 활동 지역을 물리적, 심리적으로 차단하는 것은, 이란의 영향력으로부터 분리시키려는 외교적 목표와 결합될 때 그 효과가 극대화될 수 있습니다. 미국 군사 교리에서 언급된 '고립 임무'는 적의 지원 경로를 차단함으로써 적의 행동 능력을 약화시키는 데 초점을 맞춥니다. 따라서 이라크의 고립 전략은 이란의 군사적 영향력으로부터 이라크의 주권을 강화하고, 민병대들이 연방 정부에 복종하도록 강제하는 이중 목표를 가지고 있다고 분석됩니다. 이는 지역 내 안보 균형에 중대한 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.

본문 2: 안보 공백과 에너지 시장의 위험

민병대 해체 과정에서 발생하는 안보 공백은 지역 에너지 시장에 직접적인 위험을 초래할 수 있습니다. 이라크 지역은 주요 석유 생산국 중 하나이며, 민병대 활동은 종종 에너지 인프라 및 운송로에 영향을 미칩니다. 만약 군사적 고립 과정에서 무력 충돌이 발생하거나, 민병대 해체 과정에서 불안정성이 증폭된다면, 석유 및 가스 수출 경로의 안정성이 위협받을 수 있습니다. 이는 국제 에너지 가격의 변동성을 증가시키고, 특히 중동 지역의 지정학적 위험 프리미엄을 상승시키는 요인으로 작용할 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 이라크 지역의 정치적 안정성 지표와 에너지 관련 상품의 가격 움직임을 면밀히 모니터링해야 합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 정책 불확실성

이러한 군사적 고립 전략의 장기적인 결과는 이라크 내부의 정치적 통합 수준에 달려 있습니다. 단기적으로는 민병대 해체라는 목표 달성 여부가 중요하지만, 장기적으로는 이라크 연방 정부의 통제력이 지역 전역으로 확장될 수 있는지에 대한 불확실성이 존재합니다. 만약 고립 전략이 성공적으로 민병대의 자발적 해체를 이끌어내지 못하고 갈등을 심화시킨다면, 이는 지역 내 분쟁의 장기화로 이어질 수 있습니다. 따라서 이라크 정부의 정책이 군사적 목표뿐만 아니라 정치적 통합이라는 장기적인 목표를 달성하는 데 초점을 맞추는지가 향후 지역 안정성을 결정하는 핵심 변수가 될 것입니다.

결론

이라크 정부의 민병대 해체 계획은 군사적 고립을 통해 정치적 통제를 강화하려는 전략적 시도로 읽힙니다. 이러한 움직임은 단기적으로 지역 안보에 즉각적인 영향을 미치며, 궁극적으로는 에너지 공급망의 안정성과 장기적인 지역 정치 통합이라는 복합적인 변수를 고려해야 합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변동성이 지역 경제 및 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향을 종합적으로 평가하여 포트폴리오에 반영해야 할 것입니다. 향후 이라크 내 정치적 통합 과정에서의 군사적 개입 양상을 지속적으로 관찰하는 것이 중요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilwFBVV95cUxNRjFlY3pNaGNmVGVHYWp5NkVRUmd5aGc5ZHRpSDhlR0ljczl4RXRrdUQyeG9UcUtjMUVlZ29XSC1EYlh2dGktNkRrVXl0Uml1LXhpLUVkZ1lrY0lqVHZ6S0pjZWRiYTAwQzNoX3pnQmNvZDI1Tmw2bU5kT2EtcmdIeS1hVS1GNWZHUVRQUzN4U0Vob1psSExZ?oc=5

Iran Update Special Report, August 13, 2026 - understandingwar.org

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

Note : ISW-CTP has revised its update structure due to the resumption of war between the United States and Iran. Iran is currently engaged in an information effort to frame its attacks on US bases and regional states as retaliatory and defensive. Iran is not merely responding to US strikes on Iran, however, but is engaged in proactive military operations to achieve discrete objectives. The revised update structure reflects some of these key objectives.

There are additional indicators that the Iraqi federal government is considering using force to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if they fail to disarm by September 30. Iraqi sources told Saudi media on August 12 that the Iraqi federal government has a plan to deploy the Iraqi Army, Counter Terrorism Service, and other “elite” units around Iraqi militia operation centers to restrict the militias’ freedom of movement and supplies after the September 30 disarmament deadline.[1] This plan as rendered in Saudi media is consistent with how US military doctrine describes an isolation mission, in which “a unit seals off an enemy, physically and psychologically, from sources of support and denies it freedom of movement.”[2] It is unclear if and how efforts to isolate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would ultimately contribute to the militias’ full disarmament, however. Iraqi sources’ discussion of this plan to Saudi media may intend to encourage Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to acquiesce to the federal government and willingly disarm. This report also suggests that Iraqi security forces are preparing to enact such a plan if the militias do not oblige, however.

It is also unclear precisely which militias and areas of operation the Iraqi federal government would target under this plan, but this report comes after Saudi media previously reported on August 11 that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is considering two approaches to disarm the militias as part of the Iraqi government’s efforts to restrict arms to the state. One of the plans that Zaydi is reportedly considering would include deploying Iraqi security forces to take control of Jurf al Sakhr in Babil Province.[3] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah has refused to allow the Iraqi government to exercise sovereignty over Jurf al Sakhr for over a decade and has used the area to store weapons and launch attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region, including in March and April 2026.[4]

Iran and some Shia Coordination Framework members are concerned about Zaydi’s preparations to use force against the militias to directly disarm them or compel them to disarm. An Iraqi security source told Iraqi media on August 13 that the Iraqi federal government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are engaging in intensive talks about the disarmament process.[5] It is unclear which Iraqi government actors are participating in talks with the IRGC, but Iraqi and regional media have reported on an active IRGC presence in Iraq.[6] The Iraqi government spokesperson appeared to confirm that Iranian advisors work with the PMF on August 9, for example.[7] Iran continues to firmly oppose militia disarmament. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani swiftly traveled to Baghdad on August 10 in response to the Iraqi federal government’s reported plan to send security forces to Jurf al Sakhr, for example.[8]

Some members of the Shia Coordination Framework, which is a coalition of Iraqi Shia parties that includes some with close ties to Iran, also continue to oppose disarmament. Informed sources separately told Saudi media on August 12 that unspecified Shia Coordination Framework leaders are concerned that Zaydi risks provoking an armed confrontation with the militias following Zaydi’s merger of several security offices into the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.[9] The office, which is directly under Zaydi’s control, will now oversee the interior and defense ministries, the Counter Terrorism Service, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), border crossings, and military manufacturing.[10] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised of many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[11] Unspecified framework actors are reportedly working on a settlement between Zaydi and the Iraqi militias that will provide Zaydi a “symbolic victory” and “save face” for militia leaders who refuse disarmament, according to Saudi media.[12]

Zaydi is also weighing using legal measures to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[13] Iraqi media reported on August 11 that Zaydi reportedly directed the preparation of a draft law to restrict weapons to the state according to “constitutional procedures” during a meeting with Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee members.[14] The content of the draft law and how it would differ from the existing Iraqi constitutional prohibition on non-state armed groups is unclear.[15] It is also unclear if this potential law would successfully pass through Iraqi Parliament and if Iraqi authorities would implement it.

The Iraqi government is also considering disarming Iranian-backed Iraqi militias by requiring them to hand over their weapons to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on August 9 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will hand over their weapons to the PMF before the September 30 deadline.[16] The spokesperson for Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing claimed on August 12 that the militia handed over its medium and heavy weapons, including drones and missiles, to unspecified PMF brigades.[17] Asaib Ahl al Haq controls three PMF brigades.[18] It remains unclear if other Iraqi militias would willingly give their weapons to the PMF, given the continued rejection of the government’s calls to disarm by groups like Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[19]

Reports of militias potentially transferring their weapons to the PMF come as Zaydi is considering “sweeping” leadership changes to the PMF, which could include appointing Iraqi Army and Counter Terrorism Service officers to PMF leadership positions.[20] High-ranking Iraqi Army officers integrated into the PMF would reportedly assist with redistributing PMF fighters across brigades and provinces, according to Iraqi sources speaking to UK-based Qatari media on August 12.[21] The PMF has previously resisted Iraqi government attempts to reform the organization, particularly under the Haider al Abadi administration, and it is unclear if Iranian-backed actors in the PMF would accept these changes.[22] Any changes to the PMF that fail to curb Iranian influence within the organization or address the allegiance of many of its members to Iran and their willingness and ability to attack US interests in Iraq and the region will not support US interests in Iraq.[23]

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated media interpreted Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s guidance to new Basij Commander Hossein Taeb as an indicator that the regime plans to strengthen its ability to monitor and repress the Iranian population. Mojtaba appointed Taeb as Basij commander on August 10 and tasked Taeb with making “every Iranian a Basiji,” using the people to “confront enemy threats,” and protecting the Islamic Revolution.[24] AFGS-affiliated media outlet Defa Press Agency interpreted the decree as instructing Taeb to use the Iranian people as “the vigilant eyes of society” to collect information for the regime to combat internal security threats.[25] Defa said that mosques will be “local security command center(s)” and called Iranian neighborhoods the “smallest security unit in the country” where religious leaders and the people “form a local threat monitoring network.”[26] Defa also emphasized that Iranian security services can use technology to analyze “threat patterns” and that the regime can deploy a combination of “human alertness” and “machine precision” to defend Iran from enemy hybrid warfare. Iran defines “hybrid warfare” as “hostile actors using all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, to destabilize Iran.”[27] The security strategy that Defa outlined is not necessarily new. Iran has for years sought to develop a “neighborhood-based security” strategy to confront threats. The Defa report is nevertheless noteworthy given that it indicates that Taeb may seek to use regime loyalists at the local level to combat internal threats.[28]

Mojtaba’s appointment of Taeb reflects Taeb’s decades of experience in repressing counter-regime activities as a former Basij commander and the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization.[29] Taeb led the Basij’s brutal suppression of the 2009 Green Movement, for which the United States sanctioned him in 2010.[30] Taeb also served as the IRGC Intelligence Organization chief for 13 years, which strengthens his background and experience in Iran’s internal security apparatus. Taeb is notably the only Basij commander who has also served as the head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization. Taeb’s significant experience in suppressing protests and repressing anti-regime activity is notable given that the recent Winter 2025-2026 protest wave was the largest wave of protests in Iran in recent years. It is possible that Taeb’s appointment as Basij commander reflects a renewed focus by the regime on internal security issues, particularly during the current pause of kinetic conflict with the United States. Mojtaba may have appointed Taeb as Basij commander for other reasons beyond his experience, including the two men’s personal ties. Taeb and Mojtaba served together during the Iran-Iraq War in the Habib Ibn Mazahir Battalion under the IRGC 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Division.[31]

The Houthis deployed fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to attack the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces in Yemen for the first time on August 11.[32] Two Yemen analysts published footage on August 12 that showed a Houthi fiber-optic FPV drone that ROYG forces captured in Marib Governorate on August 11.[33] Both analysts noted that this marked the first recorded instance of the Houthis deploying fiber-optic FPV drones.[34] The recovered Houthi FPV drone appears to utilize commercially available fiber-optic cable that is sold on People’s Republic of China (PRC) e-commerce platforms.[35] The Houthi FPV drone does not appear to have an explosive payload, which indicates that the Houthis may have used the drone for reconnaissance.[36] ROYG forces may also have disarmed the drone’s payload before filming the video, however.[37] A Yemen-based think tank previously reported in 2025 that the ROYG-affiliated, Saudi-backed National Resistance Forces’ (NRF) seizure of commercially available FPV drones intended for the Houthis indicated that the Houthis intended to deploy FPV systems in combat in Yemen.[38]

The capture of the Houthi fiber-optic FPV drone on August 12 comes amid the recent proliferation of FPV drone technology, including fiber-optic systems, among Iran’s Axis of Resistance partners in the region. Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed fiber-optic FPV drones to attack Israeli and US targets in Lebanon and Iraq since March 2026, respectively.[39] Syrian security forces recently seized an Iranian shipment of FPV drones intended for Hezbollah on July 16. The shipment included fiber-optic cable similar to the cable sold on PRC e-commerce platforms.[40]

Nothing significant to report.

Newly appointed Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohsen Rezaei met with PRC Ambassador to Iran Cong Peiwu on August 11 to discuss regional affairs and the expansion of PRC-Iranian relations.[41] IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency reported on August 13 that Rezaei’s decision to meet a Chinese official in his first official meeting as SNSC secretary signals the Iranian regime’s intent to deepen strategic ties with the PRC, including deeper “security ties.”[42] Both the official Iranian and PRC readouts of Rezaei and Cong’s meeting include vague, boilerplate language that likely does not reflect what was discussed in the meeting, however.[43] Iran has directly benefitted from its military partnership with the PRC in this conflict. The PRC reportedly sold Iran an advanced reconnaissance satellite that Iran used to target US military bases across the region during the war, for example.[44] The PRC also supported Iran’s ballistic missile program by sending Iran missile fuel precursors during the conflict.[45] ISW-CTP noted in July 2026 that Iran is attempting to bolster its air defense capabilities with assistance from the PRC.[46]

The Houthis continued to attack Saudi oil infrastructure on August 13.[47] A Houthi military source told Houthi media on August 13 that two Houthi drones struck the Saudi Aramco refinery in Jizan, Saudi Arabia.[48] The source added that the strike was in response to Saudi “violations” of Houthi airspace in Yemen and recent Saudi attacks in Yemen’s Saada and Hajjah governorates.[49] Saudi officials and media have not confirmed the Houthi attack on Jizan at the time of this writing, however. This would mark the third attack targeting the Jizan refinery that the Houthis have conducted since July 24.[50] ISW-CTP continues to assess that the Houthis are attacking Saudi oil infrastructure in order to force Saudi Arabia to end its blockade of Houthi ports and airports and cease military operations in Yemen by imposing political and economic costs on Saudi Arabia.[51]

Saudi-backed NRF naval forces reportedly sank two Houthi vessels in the Red Sea over the past two days.[52] NRF-affiliated media reported that NRF naval forces engaged three Houthi vessels and sank one. NRF forces fired an anti-tank guided missile that sank a Houthi vessel that functioned as a one-way drone attack platform.[53] The reports did not specify the locations of the vessels. The NRF’s targeting of Houthi vessels may have been intended to destroy assets that the Houthis could use to support their blockade on Saudi vessels and ports in the Red Sea. The Houthis have attacked several vessels transiting the Red Sea since July 22 as part of their effort to enforce their blockade on Saudi ports, including an attack on an allegedly Saudi-linked cargo ship on August 11.[54]

[1] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5306201-بغداد-تتحرك-لتطويق-مواقع-فصائل-يديرها-الحرس-الثوري-دون-احتكاك

[2] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5306201-بغداد-تتحرك-لتطويق-مواقع-فصائل-يديرها-الحرس-الثوري-دون-احتكاك ; https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN38160-FM_3-90-000-WEB-1.pdf

[3] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/iraq/2026/08/11/العراق-الزيدي-يتمسك-بحصر-السلاح-ويبحث-السيطرة-على-جرف-الصخر

[4] https://alhurra dot com/en/14420 ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/standing-with-iran-the-integrated-combat-performance-of-iraqi-militias-during-operation-epic-fury/

[5] https://almadapaper dot net/448331

[6] https://alhurra dot com/en/32307 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-set-up-covert-iraqi-cells-attack-gulf-neighbors-2026-06-19/

[7] https://x.com/alssaanetwork/status/2086453446916337936

[8] https://alhurra dot com/32845

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