핵심요약

• 60일 협상 기간 동안 레바논이 주요 분쟁 지점으로 부상
• 이스라엘은 헤즈볼라와의 전투를 협상과 분리하려 함
• 이란은 두 전선을 연결해 그라니를 보호하려 함
• 미국 행정부는 협상의 성공을 원하며, 이는 이스라엘의 전략에 복잡성을 더함
• 이란은 협상 구현을 위해 이스라엘이 레바논에서 철수하도록 압박하려 함

도입

이 기사는 투자자에게 이스라엘과 미국의 전략적 이해관계가 어떻게 충돌하는지 보여주며, 중동 지역 안정성에 대한 잠재적 영향을 분석합니다. 특히 이스라엘이 헤즈볼라와의 전쟁과 미국-이란 협상을 동시에 관리해야 하는 복잡한 상황을 이해하는 것이 중요합니다.

본문 1: 이스라엘의 전략적 도전

이스라엘은 헤즈볼라와의 전투를 60일 협상과 분리하려 하지만, 이는 어려운 과제입니다. 미국 행정부는 협상의 성공을 원하며, 이는 이스라엘이 헤즈볼라에 대한 공격을 중단하도록 압박할 수 있습니다. 이스라엘은 전쟁에서 지위를 잃지 않으면서도 협상의 방해자가 되지는 않기 위해 노력하고 있습니다. 이란은 이스라엘이 성공하지 못하도록 두 전선을 연결하려 하고 있습니다. 이는 이스라엘이 헤즈볼라와의 전투를 계속하면서도 미국과의 관계를 유지하는 것이 얼마나 어려운지 보여줍니다.

본문 2: 이란의 전략적 목표

이란은 이스라엘이 헤즈볼라와의 전투에서 성공하지 못하도록 두 전선을 연결하려 합니다. 이는 이스라엘이 레바논에서 철수하도록 압박하여 협상 구현을 보장하기 위한 것입니다. 이란은 미국이 협상의 성공을 원하기 때문에, 이스라엘이 공격적인 행동을 중단하도록 압박할 수 있다고 믿습니다. 이는 이스라엘과 미국의 관계에 균열을 일으킬 수 있습니다. 이란의 전략은 헤즈볼라를 보호하고 동시에 미국과 이스라엘 사이의 분쟁을 확대하는 것입니다.

결론

이스라엘은 헤즈볼라와의 전투와 미국-이란 협상을 동시에 관리해야 하는 복잡한 상황을 직면하고 있습니다. 이란의 전략적 목표는 이스라엘이 헤즈볼라와의 전투에서 성공하지 못하도록 두 전선을 연결하는 것입니다. 이는 이스라엘과 미국의 관계에 균열을 일으킬 수 있으며, 중동 지역 안정성에 대한 잠재적 영향을 고려해야 합니다. 향후 이스라엘의 전략적 결정과 미국-이란 협상의 진행 상황을 주의 깊게 지켜볼 필요가 있습니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilgFBVV95cUxNWThzYzg1aGtTLUVfWGI1a3puQnlrMUJSR3dUYkNpaG5OWmJvc0dUQTVGZ09hOHZYdDNpYTRpaTBvZmcyN1E3SW5XenpKUU90U0ZVNFlaZ3VDdEVFZW5KZ0VwOHdXUmZ4WUR0US1ndkJTUG94MDFwakFxQXF0amVwLUhPTHVleUJEWThaNUZBQy1PZnRUVEE?oc=5

Can Israel Fend off Hezbollah Without Alienating America? - Middle East Forum

Israel Has Sought Throughout to Detach Its Battle with the Iranian Proxy Group Hezbollah in Lebanon from the Negotiations As the 60-day period of negotiations stipulated by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed between Iran and the US gets under way in Switzerland, the issue of Lebanon is fast emerging as a central bone of contention between them. It is also revealing significant differences in the stances of America and Israel. Iran hopes that U.S. commitment to the success of any agreement will lead it to pressure Israel to withdraw from Lebanon or otherwise stay its offensive against Hezbollah so as not to endanger the agreement’s implementation. Israel has sought throughout to detach its battle with the Iranian proxy group Hezbollah in Lebanon from the negotiations and from the larger effort to settle the conflict between the US and Iran. The logic to this is as follows: Hezbollah intends to continue its war against Israel. Jerusalem is aware that the US administration very much wants the current negotiations to succeed, so the Israeli government is currently engaged in the difficult task of seeking not to lose ground in an ongoing fight with an Iranian proxy while simultaneously not coming across as a spoiler to a US administration keen to conclude its own conflict with Iran. Iran, predictably, is keen that Israel should not succeed in this effort. As part of this, Tehran is determined to link the two fronts (i.e., Iran/Hormuz and Lebanon), insisting that failure in one means failure in both. Iran hopes by so doing to formalise a mechanism by which it can both protect its main Levantine proxy and create and widen divisions between Washington and Jerusalem. Regarding the former goal, Iran hopes that US commitment to the success of any agreement will lead it to pressure Israel to withdraw from Lebanon or otherwise stay its offensive against Hezbollah so as not to endanger the agreement’s implementation. Should Israel seek to defy US desires in this regard, this will serve the secondary goal of encouraging differences between Iran’s two enemies. After initial wrangling between the US and Iranian sides over the issue of Lebanon, they have now reached agreement on the establishment of a ‘deconfliction cell’ intended to ensure the cessation of military operations in the country, as required by the MoU. The mechanism includes the United States, Iran and the official government of Lebanon, along with the two countries who are mediating the negotiations, Pakistan and Qatar. Israel is excluded from the deconfliction cell, and it is not at all clear that the mechanism will succeed in its intended purpose. This is because a direct conflict is still under way between Israel and Hezbollah, the dynamics of which are in direct contradiction to the Geneva negotiations. Israel, having been attacked twice by Hezbollah in the last three years (on 8 October 2023 and 1 March this year) is, however, determined not to simply accept the status quo antebellum. Iran considers that it emerged victorious from the war which recommenced on 28 February. It is now interested in reaching an arrangement with the United States, which it sees as formalising this achievement – and which it intends will include new arrangements on the Strait of Hormuz and the unfreezing of financial resources currently out of its reach. At the same time, Tehran has no intention of ending the broader strategic contest with the US. It also has no interest in concluding the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Israel, having been attacked twice by Hezbollah in the last three years (on 8 October 2023 and 1 March this year) is, however, determined not to simply accept the status quo ante bellum. As Israeli Defence Minister Yisrael Katz bluntly expressed it this week: Even if there is an American demand – we will not withdraw from Lebanon. 200,000 residents will not return.Katz is referring here to residents of Israeli border communities who have quit their homes because of the danger of living close to the border fence with Lebanon thanks to Hezbollah’s liking for repurposing anti-armour missiles to target civilians and their homes. Israel is also concerned at the practical implications of a deconfliction cell involving Iran and Qatar which is intended to manage ongoing friction between Hezbollah and Israel. As an un-named Israeli intelligence source quoted in the newspaper Haaretz put it: Transferring intelligence information, coordination plans or warnings ahead of a possible IDF attack to a body that includes Iranian or Qatari representatives is preposterous… These representatives cannot be trusted, and any shred of information that reaches them will immediately leak to Hezbollah and endanger human lives.Israel has no capacity to destroy Hezbollah in its entirety in Lebanon, short of a ground invasion of the whole country—which is outside of the scope of possible options. At the same time, the current diplomatic process under way in Washington between the governments of Israel and Lebanon stands little chance of success, given the simple and stark fact that Hezbollah is stronger than any coercive force available to the Lebanese authorities. The Beirut government therefore simply has no capacity to force Hezbollah (which itself is represented in the government) to do anything it doesn’t want to. And neither Hezbollah nor its Iranian masters want it to stand down. Israel has no capacity to destroy Hezbollah in its entirety in Lebanon, short of a ground invasion of the whole country—which is outside of the scope of possible options. This means that further conflict in Lebanon is fairly clearly only a matter of time. At the same time, Israel has, under US pressure, currently ceased advancing in Lebanon and is in a defensive stance. Where is all this likely to be heading? In the short term, with US encouragement, a partial Israeli withdrawal from some of the areas of Lebanon captured since 28 February is likely. A complete withdrawal, by contrast, probably won’t happen. Israel’s strategy since 7 October has been characterised by a desire to place barriers between its own civilian communities and potentially dangerous areas. This is the upshot of the Gaza war; it has been implemented also in Syria. In Lebanon, the November 2024 ceasefire left the IDF in five outposts north of the border. The clear Israeli desire now is for the army to hold a zone around 6 miles from the border across its entire line—placing civilian communities out of range of anti-tank missiles—for as long as Hezbollah remains the de facto ruler of Lebanon. This is likely to happen but will also be accompanied by partial withdrawals from areas beyond this point. These will be handed over to the Lebanese Armed Forces, and one way or another will almost certainly then be reoccupied by Hezbollah. What all this goes to prove is that the three months of war between February and June changed little of the deeper dynamics. The long war conducted by Iran and its Islamist proxies, intended to result in Israel’s destruction, is still under way. What has changed, at least for now, is that Israel needs to conduct this fight with the additional complication of not upsetting a US administration that is trying to make its retreat look like a peaceful outcome.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilgFBVV95cUxNWThzYzg1aGtTLUVfWGI1a3puQnlrMUJSR3dUYkNpaG5OWmJvc0dUQTVGZ09hOHZYdDNpYTRpaTBvZmcyN1E3SW5XenpKUU90U0ZVNFlaZ3VDdEVFZW5KZ0VwOHdXUmZ4WUR0US1ndkJTUG94MDFwakFxQXF0amVwLUhPTHVleUJEWThaNUZBQy1PZnRUVEE?oc=5