대만해협, 억지력 넘어 충돌 방지 장치 필요성 제기
The Taiwan Strait needs circuit breakers, not just deterrence - ThinkChina
지정학적 불안정성은 지역 주식 시장에 구조적 불확실성을 도입하며 위험 회피 심리를 유발합니다.
핵심 요약
군사적 충돌 확대 위험을 관리하기 위해 지역에 충돌 방지 장치(circuit breakers)가 필요하다는 주장이 제기되고 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 군사 및 해안경비대 접촉이 증가하며 지역 분쟁 확대 위험이 발생하고 있습니다.
- 억지력(Deterrence)만으로는 충분하지 않으며, 충돌을 종료할 수 있는 안전장치(circuit breakers)가 필요합니다.
- 우크라이나와 이란 사례는 전쟁 종식(war termination)의 중요성을 시사합니다.
- 지역 정책 입안자들은 드론, 미사일 등 전술적 교훈을 넘어 분쟁을 통제하고 종식시키는 능력에 집중해야 합니다.
도입
본 기사는 서태평양 지역의 지정학적 긴장이 단순한 군사적 억지력만으로는 관리될 수 없으며, 충돌의 확산을 막고 종식시키는 안전장치(circuit breakers)의 필요성을 역설합니다. 이는 현재의 국제 안보 환경이 기존의 억지 전략만으로는 더 이상 충분하지 않다는 점을 시사하며, 투자자들은 지정학적 위험이 어떻게 실제 군사적 충돌로 이어질 수 있는지에 대한 구조적 이해가 필요함을 의미합니다.
본문 1: 억지력의 한계와 전략적 분산
연구자들은 현재의 억지력만으로는 지역의 불안정성을 효과적으로 관리할 수 없다고 지적합니다. 예를 들어, 미국 항공모함의 중동 이동과 중국-인도네시아의 해상 상호작용 사례는 다른 지역의 갈등이 서태평양의 자원과 주의를 분산시킬 수 있다는 우려를 제기합니다. 이는 한 지역의 긴장이 다른 지역의 안보 환경에 연쇄적인 영향을 미칠 수 있음을 보여줍니다. 억지력은 잠재적 충돌을 억제하는 초기 방어선일 수는 있으나, 실제 전쟁이 발생했을 때의 에스컬레이션 관리 및 종식에는 한계가 있습니다. 즉, 억지력은 '시작'을 막을 수는 있으나 '종료'를 보장하지 못한다는 점이 핵심입니다.
본문 2: 충돌 관리의 패러다임 전환
기존의 안보 논의는 드론, 미사일, 방공, 분산 물류 등 즉각적인 전장 교훈에 초점을 맞추어 왔습니다. 그러나 기사는 더 중대한 질문, 즉 '억지력이 실패했을 때 지역이 충돌을 통제하고 종식시킬 수 있는지'에 대한 질문으로 논의의 패러다임을 전환할 것을 요구합니다. 이는 군사 기술적 측면에서 다루는 것을 넘어, 정치적, 외교적 차원에서 갈등 관리 메커니즘을 구축해야 함을 의미합니다. 이는 단순한 군사적 대치 구도를 넘어, 상호 연관된 동맹과 핵 억제 환경 속에서 갈등이 어떻게 확장되는지를 분석해야 함을 의미합니다.
본문 3: 장기적 위험과 구조적 대응
갈등이 장기화될 경우, 초기 제한된 캠페인조차도 보복, 공세, 일시적인 휴전의 순환으로 이어져 자원을 소모하고 지역 안보를 장기적으로 재편하게 될 위험이 있습니다. 따라서 서태평양 정책 입안자들은 단기적인 전술적 대응에 머물지 않고, 상호 연관된 동맹 체제와 핵 억제 환경을 고려하여 갈등의 장기적 결과를 예측하고 통제할 수 있는 구조적 시스템을 구축하는 데 집중해야 합니다. 이는 단기적인 군사적 우위를 넘어, 지역의 안정성을 담보하는 제도적 장치를 마련하는 것이 중요함을 강조합니다.
결론
결론적으로, 서태평양 지역의 안보는 억지력에만 의존해서는 안 되며, 충돌을 효과적으로 통제하고 종식시킬 수 있는 다층적인 안전장치 마련이 필수적입니다. 투자 관점에서 볼 때, 지정학적 위험이 고조될수록 이러한 구조적 안정성을 제공하는 정책적, 외교적 노력이 실제 경제적 불확실성으로 전환될 가능성을 면밀히 주시해야 합니다. 향후 지역 안보 환경에서 '충돌 통제 메커니즘'의 구축 여부가 장기적인 시장 안정성에 중요한 변수로 작용할 전망입니다.
Original Article
The Taiwan Strait needs circuit breakers, not just deterrence - ThinkChina
Military and coast guard encounters are becoming more frequent in the Western Pacific and around Taiwan, raising the risk that a limited incident could spiral into wider conflict. Deterrence alone is not enough; the region needs safeguards to contain escalation and create off-ramps, says researcher Hao Nan.
In mid-August, the redeployment of the USS George Washington from the Western Pacific towards the Middle East, alongside a Chinese-Indonesian naval interaction east of Taiwan , revived a familiar debate: are wars elsewhere diverting American assets and attention from the Western Pacific?
The carrier’s departure temporarily leaves the region without a US carrier presence. Beijing presented the interaction with Indonesia as a navigation exercise, while Jakarta described it as a routine passing exercise with no war-fighting purpose. There is no evidence that the two decisions were connected, but their concurrence captured the pressure of managing strategic competition across several theatres.
The debate is often framed around whether regional countries might accidentally fall into conflicts while the US is distracted elsewhere. Competition for military resources matters, but Ukraine and Iran point to a deeper problem: war termination.
Political leaders may decide when to use force, but resistance, external intervention and incompatible security demands soon narrow their control. Campaigns conceived as limited can become prolonged wars or recurring cycles of strikes, retaliation and temporary truces, absorbing resources and reshaping regional security long after their original assumptions have failed.
Western Pacific policymakers should therefore look beyond the immediate battlefield lessons on drones, missiles, air defence, distributed logistics and infrastructure resilience. The more consequential question is whether the region can contain and terminate a conflict once deterrence fails. Persistent grey-zone encounters, interconnected alliances, nuclear-conventional entanglement and concentrated supply chains could turn a limited incident into an open-ended regional confrontation. Stronger deterrence must be matched by mechanisms for escalation control and war termination.
Russia appears to have expected military shock to produce political submission at manageable cost. Ukrainian mobilisation and Western support instead produced attritional war. Territorial control matters, but the hardest question is Ukraine’s future security: guarantees sufficient for Kyiv look threatening to Moscow, while arrangements acceptable to Moscow leave Ukraine exposed. The anti-ballistic missile programme announced by Ukraine and nine European partners reflects an expectation that the threat will outlast negotiation. Wartime measures are entering Europe’s long-term security architecture.
Iran presents another form of protraction. US and Israeli strikes can damage targets but cannot cheaply impose a stable order. Iran can retaliate through missiles, drones, armed groups and pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, yet cannot defeat the US in a conventional war. Washington seeks to prevent a nuclear weapon state without occupation; Israel seeks to stop Iran from regenerating nuclear, missile and proxy capabilities; Gulf states want protection without indefinite war or collapse. Tehran treats these as insurance. With the June settlement in tatters and Washington prepared to maintain its blockade indefinitely, the pattern is cyclical: strike, retaliate, mediate, rearm and strike again.
Beijing has reasons to study both cases. Any resort to the “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” envisaged in Article 8 of China’s Anti-Secession Law would entail amphibious logistics, possible US and Japanese intervention, sanctions, disrupted shipping, resistance and postwar governance. China’s trade and energy exposure would magnify the shock. Ukraine shows how mobilisation and external support can frustrate rapid victory; Iran shows the limits of long-range strikes as instruments of political compellence. Whatever Beijing’s view of developments around Taiwan, these lessons favour caution about major war.
Such caution can coexist with efforts to reinforce jurisdictional claims below the threshold of armed conflict. China uses coast guard patrols, military exercises and administrative measures. Since June, Chinese coast guard ships have operated repeatedly east of Taiwan ; Beijing describes the missions as law enforcement, while Taipei rejects any Chinese jurisdiction there. The subsequent exercise with Indonesia added an international dimension, although Jakarta qualified Beijing’s presentation. They can establish presence and shape expectations while limiting immediate escalation risks.
Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines respond through defence preparation, public attribution and stronger partnerships. Taipei expands civil resilience and rehearses responses to blockade. Tokyo connects the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea while strengthening its southwestern islands. Manila releases footage, invokes the 2016 arbitral ruling and deepens defence ties with Washington, Tokyo and Canberra. July encounters at Second Thomas and Scarborough shoals produced competing allegations, an injury and repeated water cannon use. Defence or transparency measures can still be read in Beijing as coordinated pressure.
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Beijing calculates that Washington is unlikely to risk war over one patrol; Japan will seek to contain an encounter; Manila will hesitate before turning a coast guard collision into an alliance crisis; and Taipei will calibrate its response below a blockade. The pattern gives every actor incentives to test limits without triggering wider conflict. Yet accommodation remains possible. Manila and Beijing have resumed maritime talks, and President Marcos sees a “distinct possibility” of joint oil and gas exploration . Competition, deterrence and transactional cooperation coexist — the conditions of a stability-instability paradox.
A breakdown could transmit shocks quickly. The Western Pacific concentrates Chinese manufacturing, Japanese and South Korean industry, Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem, Southeast Asian production networks and vital shipping routes. It also lies under the nuclear shadow of China, the US, Russia and North Korea. A crisis could connect Taiwan, the East and South China seas, the Korean peninsula and US bases in Japan and the Philippines. The George Washington redeployment adds another dimension: open-ended conflict in one theatre can draw finite forces and attention from deterrence elsewhere. American power in the Pacific remains substantial, but the redeployment raises the risk of misreading US priorities.
Conflict could begin ambiguously. A coast guard patrol might be followed by an inspection regime; resistance could lead to quarantine or blockade; military escorts could produce warning shots and limited strikes. Governments would disagree over when law enforcement ended and conflict began. Fatalities would engage alliance commitments and domestic politics, narrowing room for compromise. Taiwan presents the hardest termination problem because Beijing, Taipei and Washington lack a mutually acceptable end state. A ceasefire could halt operations without resolving the dispute driving them.
The region therefore needs operational circuit breakers alongside deterrence. Principles underlying the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea should be adapted for coast guards, government-directed civilian vessels, maritime militia and unmanned systems. Arrangements should address collisions, dangerous interceptions, fire-control radar illumination, cockpit lasers and boarding procedures. Major exercises and missile tests need advance notice, defined operating areas and clear end times. Command-level hotlines should remain staffed during political disputes, backed by deadlines for incident reporting and technical investigation.
The region’s functional multilateral institutions offer a practical approach. The ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus can develop norms on exercise notification, search and rescue, and protection of civilian infrastructure. US-China, China-Japan and China-Philippines channels must handle bilateral risks. Taiwan’s absence requires parallel technical, unofficial or third-party cross-strait channels. Nuclear-conventional entanglement belongs in a dedicated US-China strategic stability dialogue. Each arrangement should leave sovereignty and jurisdictional claims untouched, allowing governments to step back without appearing to concede them.
Ukraine’s missile programme shows how protracted war reshapes institutions. Iran shows how failed termination absorbs resources across theatres. The Western Pacific is investing heavily in arsenals, alliances and resilient infrastructure; its investment in crisis management and political off-ramps remains thinner. Its most dangerous war may begin when each government assumes the others want to avoid it and can absorb one more patrol, interception or exercise. Deterrence can suppress deliberate aggression. Workable circuit-breakers are needed to prevent mutual restraint from becoming a licence for cumulative risk.
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