이스라엘, 인공지능 기반 인지전 참전: 신뢰 기반의 안보 전략 필요성
Mazal tov: Israel finally joined the cognitive war - opinion - The Jerusalem Post
해당 뉴스는 의견 기반의 지정학적 논평으로, 방향성을 설정할 수 있는 직접적인 재무 데이터가 부족하여 중립적인 관점을 유지합니다.
핵심 요약
이스라엘은 5천만 달러를 인공지능 기반 영향력 캠페인에 투자하고 있으며, 이는 국가 안보를 단기적 마케팅 문제로 취급하는 실패를 보여줍니다.
핵심요약
- 이스라엘은 미국 내 영향력 캠페인에 약 5천만 달러를 지출하고 있습니다.
- 이 캠페인은 인공지능 생성 텍스트 메시지, 보수 미디어, 온라인 인플루언서, 브래드 파스칼과 같은 요소를 활용합니다.
- 기사는 국가 안보 책임을 마케팅 과제로 처리하는 실패를 지적합니다.
- 캠페인의 실패 원인은 단기적인 신뢰를 구매할 수 없다는 점입니다.
도입
본 기사는 이스라엘이 안보 문제를 인지전의 영역으로 확장하고 있으며, 이 과정에서 발생하는 신뢰와 정당성의 위협을 분석합니다. 투자자들은 지정학적 위험이 단순한 군사적 충돌을 넘어 정보 환경과 대중의 인식을 조작하는 '인지적 전장'으로 이동하고 있음을 인식해야 합니다. 이러한 인지적 전쟁은 국가의 정당성(legitimacy)에 직접적인 위협을 가하며, 이는 장기적인 안보 및 경제적 안정성에 중대한 영향을 미칩니다.
본문 1: 인지적 전쟁의 비용과 실패
이스라엘이 지출한 5천만 달러는 단순한 광고비가 아니라, 국가의 정당성에 대한 신뢰를 구축하려는 시도였습니다. 그러나 기사는 이러한 투자가 실패한 이유가 자금의 크기가 아니라, 국가 안보 책임을 광고 대행사나 알고리즘에 아웃소싱하려는 접근 방식에 있다고 지적합니다. 이는 안보라는 본질적인 가치를 단기적인 마케팅 도전으로 격하시키는 행위입니다. 결과적으로, 이 캠페인은 미국 내에서 이스라엘에 대한 신뢰를 얻는 데 실패했으며, 이는 안보의 근간을 흔드는 역효과를 낳았습니다. 즉, 돈으로 메시지를 살 수는 있으나, 진정한 신뢰를 구매할 수는 없다는 점이 핵심입니다.
본문 2: 정보의 흐름과 구조적 위험
이러한 인지적 전쟁의 이면에는 지정학적 행위자들이 정보의 파이프라인을 통제하고 있다는 구조적 위험이 존재합니다. 기사는 미국 대중에게 전달되는 정보가 카타르, 이란, 중국, 러시아와 같은 적대 세력에 의해 조작된 '정보 파이프라인'을 통해 공급된다고 암시합니다. 이는 대중이 접하는 정보의 흐름이 객관적인 현실이 아닌, 적대 세력의 의도를 반영하도록 설계되어 있음을 의미합니다. 따라서 투자자들은 표면적인 데이터나 미디어 노출량에만 집중할 것이 아니라, 정보의 출처와 흐름을 분석하여 잠재적인 지정학적 변동성을 예측해야 합니다. 이는 단순한 시장 예측을 넘어, 정보의 무결성(integrity)에 대한 위험 프리미엄을 평가해야 함을 시사합니다.
본문 3: 장기적 전망과 신뢰의 가치
궁극적으로, 국가 안보와 관련된 모든 활동은 단기적인 캠페인 성공 여부가 아니라, 장기적인 대중의 신뢰에 달려 있습니다. 인지적 전쟁의 성공은 일시적인 인상에 기반할 뿐이며, 근본적인 신뢰가 결여될 경우, 이는 이스라엘의 정당성에 대한 추가적인 공격으로 이어질 수 있습니다. 따라서 장기적인 안보 전략은 마케팅이나 알고리즘에 의존하는 것이 아니라, 국제적 협력과 객관적인 사실에 기반한 투명성을 확보하는 데 중점을 두어야 합니다. 향후 투자 환경에서는 정보의 진실성(truthfulness)과 투명성이 지정학적 리스크 프리미엄을 결정하는 핵심 요소가 될 것입니다.
결론
결론적으로, 이스라엘의 인지전 투자는 단기적인 영향력 확보에 초점을 맞추었으나, 근본적인 신뢰의 부재라는 구조적 한계를 드러냈습니다. 투자 관점에서 볼 때, 지정학적 리스크는 이제 군사적 충돌뿐만 아니라 정보 환경과 대중 심리를 조작하는 인지적 차원에서 평가되어야 합니다. 향후 시장은 정보의 흐름과 정당성에 대한 투명성 확보 노력을 중심으로 움직일 것으로 전망됩니다. 이러한 정보의 불확실성이 장기적인 투자 결정에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 관찰할 필요가 있습니다.
Original Article
Mazal tov: Israel finally joined the cognitive war - opinion - The Jerusalem Post
The Wall Street Journal recently revealed that Israel is spending roughly $50 million on an American influence campaign involving artificial-intelligence-generated text messages, conservative media, online influencers, and former Trump campaign manager Brad Parscale. According to the report, millions of Americans have received messages from seemingly friendly senders named “Emma” or “Sarah,” asking for their opinions about Israel, Iran, and global security. This story was published only a matter of days after Vice President JD Vance accused some Israeli officials of attempting to manipulate American opinion in order to keep the Iran conflict going and frustrate US diplomacy via influence campaigns in America. Israel is right to spend serious money defending itself on the cognitive battlefield. The failure is not the size of the investment. The failure is both that we didn't expose those detractors running campaigns in America twisting the truth against Israel and that we treated an existential national-security responsibility as a marketing challenge that can be outsourced to advertising agencies, political consultants, and algorithms.Fifty million dollars can buy messages, impressions, consultants, and data. As the famous Beatles song suggests, “money can't buy you love.” What our government forgot is that it also cannot buy you trust in a short-term campaign. Without trust, the campaign risks becoming another missile fired at Israel's own legitimacy.The accompanying cartoon captures the problem. In an American town square, people happily drink apparently pure water while polished robots assure them, “We just want to explain Israel to you.” But beneath the ground, the information pipes have been fed by Qatar, Iran, China, and Russia for decades. Nearby, hostile operatives pour accusations of “genocide,” “war crimes,” and “death to the IDF” into the public reservoir.The drinkers see the sparkling fountain. They do not see who is influencing the content of the pipes.This is how cognitive warfare operates. The objective is not simply to persuade someone to accept one false allegation. It is to influence the entire information environment through which that person interprets every subsequent event. Once the water supply is contaminated, offering the public an explanation is not a winning strategy.Israel's enemies understood this long ago. Qatar did not merely purchase advertisements promoting its agenda. It invested for decades in media, universities, research institutions, political relationships, and cultural influence. Iran, China, and Russia do not separate intelligence, diplomacy, information operations, cyber activity, and national strategy into unrelated assignments. They construct ecosystems intended to shape what societies see, whom they trust, and which political choices become acceptable.Israel, by contrast, repeatedly behaves as if its problem is insufficient explanation (i.e. hasbara – public diplomacy). When hostility rises, we produce another video, hire another spokesperson, launch another campaign, and count another million impressions. We measure how many people saw our content, not whether legislation changed, a university acted, a false legal allegation was defeated, or an ally maintained political support.That is a communications activity. It is not strategic influence.From hasbara to strategic influenceThe new campaign does contain important innovations. Israel has correctly identified younger Americans – including younger conservatives – as a critical audience.It recognizes that artificial intelligence and search engines are becoming gateways through which people understand history and current affairs. It is collecting audience data, producing content at scale, and attempting to compete in environments Israel neglected for too long.Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar is also correct that public diplomacy must be funded as seriously as jets, bombs, and missile interceptors. The latest Pew data explain why: 60% of American adults view Israel unfavorably, as do 57% of Republicans between 18 and 49. This is no longer only a problem on the progressive Left. It has reached the emerging generation of the Republican Right and is weakening what was once a broadly bipartisan alliance.But responding to an existential threat through a collection of commercial contracts creates a dangerous contradiction. If the cognitive war is truly a war, where is the war cabinet? Where is the national intelligence assessment? Where is the chain of command integrating the Prime Minister's Office, Foreign Ministry, intelligence community, IDF, Diaspora Affairs Ministry, and Israel's diplomatic missions? Who defines the strategic objectives, tests the messages, examines unintended consequences, and measures policy outcomes?Most importantly, who is accountable if the strategy fails?The IDF would never outsource the defense of Israel's airspace to mercenaries and then evaluate them by counting how many interceptor videos received views. Yet Israel has placed significant elements of its defense against cognitive missiles in the hands of advertising firms, foreign consultants, and politically connected intermediaries.These contractors may be talented. Parscale understands political data and digital targeting. Media firms understand distribution. Influencers understand their audiences. But none of them is responsible for the national security of Israel or the safety of Jewish communities worldwide. Ultimately there are four major failures with the campaign that need addressing: anonymity instead of authenticity; impressions instead of policy impact; contractors instead of an integrated national command; persuasion without policy feedback.The reported use of AI personas presents an additional danger. A recipient who believes she is communicating with a person named Emma, only to discover an automated system connected to a foreign government campaign, is unlikely to feel better about Israel. She will feel manipulated. The tactic can validate the very allegation Israel's adversaries promote: that support for Israel is manufactured through concealed influence rather than earned through truth and shared values.In cognitive warfare, credibility is ammunition. Once expended, it is extremely difficult to replace. Israel needs a permanent cognitive-security directorate operating under a national-security authority. It must research the networks contaminating the information supply, expose their funding and methods, communicate through credible and properly disclosed messengers, receive continuous feedback, and connect that feedback to policy decisions. Its measurements must move beyond clicks and impressions to consequences: votes, regulations, diplomatic decisions, prosecutions, university policies, media corrections, and durable changes in public attitudes.This command must also be capable of telling Israel's political and military leaders when the problem is not merely how a policy is explained but how it is understood and experienced. Public diplomacy cannot succeed if it functions only as the final packaging department for decisions already made. Strategic influence requires communication to be considered before, during, and after policy formation.Israel is not facing an eighth “front” that can be addressed with occasional public relations. It is fighting an all-out war – one that affects its freedom of military action, diplomatic alliances, legal legitimacy, economic relationships, and the physical security of Jews around the world.The government deserves credit for finally putting serious resources into this battle. But purchasing reach is not the same as building influence, and neither is it the same as earning trust.Israel does not need more robots to build trust and legitimacy. It needs to defend the reservoir, expose those poisoning it, and take responsibility for the entire system – from the source of the information to its ultimate effect on policy.The national security of Israel and the Jewish people is too important to outsource.