미국, 대만 관계법 준수 미흡: 아시아 타임즈
America no longer abiding by its own Taiwan Relations Act - Asia Times
미국과 대만의 관계 악화가 지opolitical한 변수이지만, 정책 변화가 명확하지 않아 단기 시장에 미치는 영향은 미미합니다.
핵심 요약
미국이 대만 관계법 준수 실패: 무기와 전투력만으로는 중국에 대한 억제력 부족.
핵심요약
- TRA는 1979년에 작성되어 대만에게 자위력 확보를 위한 무기 제공을 요구
- 미국은 대만에게 무기를 판매하지만, 이는 법을 충족하지 못함
- TRA 작성 당시 중국은 해상 힘 투사, 합동 작전의 조정, 병력과 장비의 이동 능력을 갖지 못함
- 현재 미국은 중국에 대한 억제력을 유지하는 데 어려움을 겪음
도입
이 기사는 미국이 대만 관계법(TRA)을 준수하지 못하고 있다는 점을 지적하며, 이는 아시아 태평양 지역의 안보 환경에 중요한 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 미국과 대만 간의 군사적 관계 변화가 지역 안정성에 미치는 영향을 고려해야 합니다.
본문 1: 미국, 대만에게 자위력 확보를 위한 무기 제공 의무 불이행
TRA는 미국이 대만에게 자위력 확보를 위한 무기를 제공해야 한다는 의무를 부과합니다. 그러나 기자는 미국이 이 의무를 충족하지 못하고 있다고 지적합니다. TRA 작성 당시 중국은 해상 힘 투사, 합동 작전의 조정, 병력과 장비의 이동 능력을 갖지 못했지만, 현재 중국은 이러한 능력을 갖게 되었습니다. 이는 미국이 대만에게 제공하는 무기가 중국에 대한 억제력으로 작용하지 않을 수 있음을 의미합니다.
본문 2: 미국, 중국에 대한 억제력 유지의 어려움
기자는 미국이 중국에 대한 억제력을 유지하는 데 어려움을 겪고 있다고 지적합니다. 이는 미국이 대만 관계를 관리하는 데 있어 전략적 유연성을 잃을 수 있음을 의미합니다. 투자자들은 미국과 중국 간의 군사적 긴장 상승이 지역 안보 환경에 미치는 영향을 고려해야 합니다.
본문 3: 지역 안보 환경의 변화
미국이 TRA를 준수하지 못하는 것은 아시아 태평양 지역의 안보 환경에 중요한 변화를 가져올 수 있습니다. 이는 대만과 주변 국가들의 군사 전략을 재검토하게 만들며, 투자자들은 이러한 변화가 지역 경제에 미치는 영향을 고려해야 합니다.
결론
이 기사는 미국이 대만 관계법(TRA)을 준수하지 못하고 있다는 점을 지적하며, 이는 아시아 태평양 지역의 안보 환경에 중요한 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 미국과 대만 간의 군사적 관계 변화가 지역 안정성에 미치는 영향을 고려해야 하며, 미국과 중국 간의 군사적 긴장 상승이 지역 안보 환경에 미치는 영향을 주시해야 합니다.
Original Article
America no longer abiding by its own Taiwan Relations Act - Asia Times
America is arguably failing to comply with its own Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), enacted by Congress in 1979.
Many know that the TRA established a framework for unofficial US relations with Taiwan after the US ended its defense treaty with the Republic of China and switched formal diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Many also (incorrectly) believe the TRA requires the US military to defend Taiwan if China attacks.
Perhaps less well-known are two other actual requirements. First, the TRA obligates the US to provide arms “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”
Second, the TRA requires “maintain[ing] the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
Superficially, the US checks both boxes. Washington sells arms to Taiwan and maintains significant combat power in the Asia-Pacific region. These actions by themselves, however, do not satisfy the law.
In fact, Washington is clearly not fulfilling the first requirement, and compliance with the second is increasingly in doubt.
At the time the TRA was written, ensuring that both Taiwan and the US could defeat a Chinese attack were reasonable goals. Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, China’s abilities to project power over the sea, coordinate joint operations by its different armed services and transport sufficient numbers of troops, equipment and supplies across the Taiwan Strait were minimal.
US forces could sink Chinese ships before the Chinese had a chance to target American platforms. Taiwan’s navy and air force had qualitative, if not numerical, advantages over their Chinese counterparts.
At the time of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996, when then-President Jiang Zemin asked his military advisors what options China had for responding, they reportedly told him China was incapable of effectively invading or blockading Taiwan or driving off nearby US Navy warships.
To maintain Taiwan’s security, the Republic of China armed forces needed only periodic top-ups with occasional shipments of US weapons systems, and the Americans needed only to maintain their ample margin of superiority.
The situation is much different today. China not only has quantitative advantages in major weapons systems, but its capabilities in military technology in many important areas are comparable or close to those of the US.
China’s military forces can strike US bases in Asia and the Pacific and target moving US warships far beyond the horizon with anti-ship missiles. With its world-leading defense industrial base, China can out-produce the US in ships, aircraft and missiles, giving Beijing a decisive advantage in any protracted conflict.
In the TRA’s requirement that America ensure Taiwan’s ability to defend itself, the key word is “sufficient,” as in “sufficient self-defense capability.” Different interpretations are possible, but any assertion that the US still fulfills this TRA requirement no longer passes the smell test.
Many experts estimate Taiwan could not hold out against a determined Chinese invasion attempt for more than a couple of months without US military intervention. Taiwan would also likely eventually succumb to a Chinese blockade without robust and sustained external military assistance. Taiwan is almost totally dependent on imports for its energy supply.
Chinese warships outnumber Taiwan’s opposite numbers by a factor of four, and Beijing has six times Taipei’s inventory of combat aircraft. Both gaps continue to widen. The US has provided no ships to Taiwan since two frigates in 2017-2018.
Since 2000, America has supplied Taiwan with 12 maritime patrol aircraft and is working to deliver 66 new F-16 fighters, but these have scarcely affected the massive imbalance.
A major threat to Taiwan’s security is China’s missile arsenal. There is no US plan to help Taiwan build a Golden Dome missile defense system. Against a possible onslaught of thousands of Chinese missiles of different types, the US has supplied a few hundred Patriot interceptors.
The US Department of Defense’s annual reports on Chinese military power began noting as early as 2004 that with “steady improvement in the PLA’s military capabilities, the cross-Strait balance of power is steadily shifting in China’s favor.” That steady shift has continued during the intervening 22 years.
While the US is helping to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses, there clearly is no serious effort by Washington to ensure that Taiwan has a sufficient capacity to defend itself against a Chinese attempt to seize control of the self-governing island.
US arms sales, already far from adequate, now face two additional obstacles. First, the US is struggling to deliver promised weapons systems because other conflicts are diverting already limited US stockpiles.
Acting US Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao announced on May 22 that weapons sales to Taiwan are on “pause in order to make sure we have the munitions we need for Epic Fury,” the ongoing US war against Iran.
Second, Trump said after his meeting with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping earlier this month that he sees arms sales to Taiwan as a “very good negotiation chip” with China.
For weeks, observers have expected Trump to give the final okay for a relatively large US$14 billion US arms package for Taiwan already approved by Congress. Now Trump says , “I may do it. I may not do it.”
The TRA would allow the US to delay or cancel an arms sale if doing so would improve Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. This could be the case if Beijing agreed to take a less aggressive posture toward Taiwan as part of a bargain — for example, renouncing the use of force to compel unification.
If, however, the bargain was for the US to cancel an arms sale in exchange for a Chinese concession that benefitted the US (such as China buying a large amount of US products) but did not proportionately enhance Taiwan’s security, this would violate the TRA.
It is true that determining what Taiwan needs for its defense is not just a simple matter of comparing the order of battle on both sides of the Strait. The amount and quality of armaments the US provides for Taiwan are adjustable based on China’s intentions as well as its capabilities.
This principle is clear from the circumstances surrounding the US-China Joint Communique of 1982 . In that statement, the US government said it “does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan” and “intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.”
Focusing on those passages, the Chinese government has complained that every subsequent US arms sale to Taiwan is a violation of the 1982 Communique. But this misses the underlying principle.
In a memo commenting on the communique, US President Ronald Reagan said “any reduction of such arms sales depends upon peace in the Taiwan Strait. . . . US willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences.”
In theory, the TRA could countenance Taiwan having military forces too small and weak to repel an attack by the larger and stronger PLA if there were no grounds for believing that China harbored any intent to attack.