미국인 84%가 이란 전쟁이 미국에 해롭다고 평가
Most Americans say the Iran war is bad for America - Brookings
공중의 여론이 단기적인 시장 흐름에 미치는 영향은 제한적입니다. 따라서 중립적인 입장을 취하는 것이 적절합니다.
핵심 요약
84%의 민주당원과 63%의 무소속이 이란 전쟁이 미국 이익에 부정적인 영향을 미쳤다고 평가했습니다.
핵심요약
- 84%의 민주당원과 63%의 무소속이 이란 전쟁이 미국 이익에 부정적인 영향을 미쳤다고 평가
- 33%의 공화당원도 전쟁의 영향이 부정적이라고 답함
- 38%의 응답자가 이란이나 미국이 전쟁에서 승리하지 못하고 있다고 답함
- 35세 미만(55%)과 35세 이상(57%) 모두 전쟁의 영향이 부정적이라고 평가
도입
이란 전쟁에 대한 미국의 공중 의견이 지속적으로 부정적인 이유는 투자자에게 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다. 전쟁의 지속적 불인기가 미국 정부의 정책 결정과 경제적 안정성에 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 이는 시장 변동성과 투자 전략에 직접적인 영향을 줄 수 있습니다. 특히, 주요 정당 간 의견 차이와 연령별 평가 차이가 투자자의 포트폴리오 구성에 고려해야 할 중요한 요인이 될 수 있습니다.
본문 1: 정당별 평가 차이의 시장 영향
2026년 5월 대학 메릴랜드 비상 문제 설문조사 결과, 민주당원 중 84%가 이란 전쟁이 미국 이익에 부정적인 영향을 미쳤다고 답한 것은 주목할 만한 수치입니다. 이는 민주당이 전통적으로 국제적 갈등에 대한 비판적인 입장을 취해왔음을 반영하는 것으로, 향후 민주당 정부가 이란 전쟁에 대한 정책을 조정할 가능성을 시사합니다. 공화당원 중에서도 33%가 전쟁의 영향이 부정적이라고 평가한 것은, 전쟁에 대한 공화당 내부의 의견 분열이 심화되고 있음을 보여주며, 이는 향후 미국 정부의 외교 정책에 대한 불확실성을 높일 수 있습니다.
본문 2: 연령별 평가 차이의 장기적 전망
설문조사 결과, 35세 미만(55%)과 35세 이상(57%) 모두 전쟁의 영향이 부정적이라고 평가한 것은, 연령을 불문하고 전쟁에 대한 부정적인 인식이 널리 퍼져있음을 보여줍니다. 이는 젊은 세대와 노년 세대 모두 전쟁에 대한 비판적인 시각을 가지고 있으며, 이는 향후 선거에서 전쟁 관련 정책이 주요 쟁점으로 부상할 가능성을 높입니다. 특히, 젊은 세대의 부정적인 평가는 향후 미국 정부의 외교 정책에 대한 압력을 증가시킬 수 있으며, 이는 시장 변동성의 주요 원인이 될 수 있습니다.
결론
이란 전쟁에 대한 미국의 공중 의견이 지속적으로 부정적인 이유는 투자자에게 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다. 전쟁의 지속적 불인기와 정당 간 의견 차이, 연령별 평가 차이가 투자자의 포트폴리오 구성에 고려해야 할 중요한 요인이 될 수 있습니다. 향후 미국 정부의 외교 정책과 전쟁의 진행 상황에 주목할 필요가 있으며, 이는 시장 변동성과 투자 전략에 직접적인 영향을 줄 수 있습니다.
Original Article
Most Americans say the Iran war is bad for America - Brookings
As the Iran war reaches a critical juncture, the Trump administration and Iran appear to prefer extending a precarious truce rather than resolving the issues that divide them. One reason may be the war’s persistent unpopularity. Public opinion polls have consistently shown public opposition to the war the United States and Israel initiated against Iran, making it unique among modern American wars, which often benefit from initial public support or at least a rally-around-the-flag effect.
However, opposition alone does not explain public skepticism. Critics on both the left and right argue that the war has not advanced American interests, while others contend that the United States is losing the war. How do Americans actually assess the war so far and its consequences for American interests?
In the latest round of the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll —fielded by Ipsos among 1,377 American adults, May 15-21, 2026—we found that a majority of Americans say the war has impacted American interests more negatively than positively, while a plurality of Americans say neither the United States nor Iran has won or is winning the war.
On matters related to American foreign policy in the Middle East, as on many other issues, polls have consistently shown not only significant differences of opinion along party lines, but also major differences by age, both among Democrats and Republicans. The results in this poll are no exception, but with some notable variation.
As usual, there are significant partisan differences. Eighty-four percent of Democrats and 63% of independents say the war’s effects have been more negative than positive. But even among Republicans, the assessment is more negative (33%) than positive (25%).
Notably, majorities of both under-35 Americans (55%) and those 35 years or older (57%) say that the impact of the Iran war has been more negative than positive.
Overall, 38% of respondents said neither Iran nor the United States has won or is winning the war, including 56% of Democrats, 24% of Republicans, and 42% of independents. At the same time, a plurality of Republicans, 39%, say the United States has won or is winning, compared to only 1% of Democrats and 12% of independents. About a quarter said they didn’t know, while 13% said it’s too early to tell.
Fewer younger Americans (11%) tended to say that the United States has won the war or is winning compared to those 35 years old or over (18%), while a larger segment of younger Americans (33%) say they don’t know compared to those 35 years old and over (21%).
Before the war commenced on February 28, 2026, another poll we conducted from February 5-9 found that 21% of respondents, including a minority of Republicans (40%), backed a potential war with Iran. At the same time, only 30% of all respondents said such a war would serve American interests, including 34% of Republicans. Nonetheless, I concluded at the time that American attitudes were malleable, especially among Republicans, since President Donald Trump had yet to make a case for the war and nearly one-third of Americans said that they didn’t know whether they favored or opposed the United States initiating an attack.
Indeed, once the war started, there was some shift among Trump’s Republican base, with an early poll showing a majority of Republicans (77%) expressed support, compared to only 40% support before the war. Yet, there was no major national shift in the opposition to war as Democrats and independents, as well as a significant minority of Republicans, seemed to double down in their opposition despite a rally ‘round the flag expectation.
Indeed, polls have since been consistent in finding continuing American public opposition to the war and its consequences. In many ways, the outcome was predictable and predicted. As noted in the findings of the Middle East Scholar Barometer, which I codirect with Marc Lynch and surveyed academic experts before and just after the war began, only 5% of respondents supported launching a war, and just 1% thought that it would produce a pro-American democratic regime in Iran. Many international relations experts similarly warned that Iran would emerge stronger and that the war might end in a strategic defeat for the United States, with their views being echoed by influential critics of the war on the Republican right, including Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelley , reaching parts of the president’s own political base.
Polls have not only shown robust public opposition to the war and lower approval of the president because of it, but also a rising assessment that the war has not gone well for the United States. An April Pew poll , for example, found that 51% of total respondents said American military action in Iran has gone “not too/not at all well.” This represented a six-percentage-point increase from responses to the same question in the previous poll in March.
Our latest poll brings home the rising public fear that, regardless of the war’s aims, the United States is not perceived to be winning. This view extends across all segments of the public, including Republicans over 35 years old, who have been generally more supportive of Trump. Moreover, Americans decidedly view the impact of the war to be detrimental to U.S. interests. It’s hard to imagine that extending the war further could reverse the tide of public attitudes.
The Brookings Institution is committed to quality, independence, and impact. We are supported by a diverse array of funders . In line with our values and policies , each Brookings publication represents the sole views of its author(s).