핵심요약

• 이란은 중선거까지 트럼프를 전쟁에 얽매이게 하려는 장기적인 협상 일정을 설정했습니다.
• 이란 측은 보복을 정당한 전쟁 목표로 간주하며, 이는 트럼프 행정부에 대한 적대감을 반영합니다.
• 핵 프로그램 협상에 대한 다음 단계는 해상 운송로 합의 후 2개월에서 4개월이 소요될 것으로 예측됩니다.
• 이란은 트럼프의 지지율 하락을 전쟁의 비인기성과 높은 유가에 기인한다고 분석합니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란이 중선거를 목표로 트럼프 대통령에게 정치적 타격을 주기 위해 분쟁을 장기화하려는 외교 전략을 다룹니다. 이는 단순한 외교적 협상을 넘어, 지정학적 갈등이 미국 국내 정치에 미치는 영향을 활용하려는 전략적 움직임으로 해석됩니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 불확실성이 에너지 시장과 미국 정치 리스크에 미치는 연쇄 효과를 면밀히 살펴볼 필요가 있습니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 보복의 논리

이란이 트럼프 행정부에 대해 보복을 추구하는 배경은 과거의 역사적 사건과 현재의 관계에서 비롯됩니다. 이란 측은 트럼프가 2018년 핵 협정을 파기하고, 카셈 술레이마니 사살 및 이란 핵 프로그램 협상에 관여했던 행위에 대해 책임을 묻고 있습니다. 이러한 역사적 적대감은 현재의 외교적 협상에 대한 이란의 태도에 깊은 영향을 미치고 있습니다. 이는 단순히 현 상황을 넘어, 미국이 이란에 대해 취하는 정책에 대한 근본적인 불신에서 비롯되며, 이란이 협상 시간을 지연시켜 미국의 정치적 불안정성을 야기하려는 의도로 읽힙니다. 즉, 보복 심리가 외교적 목표를 구체화하는 동력으로 작용하고 있습니다.

본문 2: 협상 일정과 정치적 연계성

협상 과정의 구체적인 일정은 이란의 전략이 단기적 정치 목표와 장기적 외교 목표를 어떻게 결합하는지를 보여줍니다. 이란은 해상 운송로 합의 후 핵 프로그램 2단계 협상에 2개월에서 4개월이 소요될 것이라는 예측을 제시했습니다. 이러한 시간표는 이란이 단기적인 정치적 압박(중선거)을 활용하여 장기적인 외교적 목표(핵 프로그램)를 달성하려는 이중 전략을 구사하고 있음을 시사합니다. 이는 협상의 속도를 조절함으로써 미국 내 정치적 동요를 유발하고, 궁극적으로 이란의 입지를 강화하려는 시도로 분석됩니다. 따라서 이 일정은 단순한 기술적 시간이 아니라, 정치적 영향력을 극대화하기 위한 계산된 시간 관리 전략으로 평가됩니다.

본문 3: 리스크와 장기적 전망

이란의 이러한 전략이 가져올 장기적인 리스크는 미국과 이란 양측의 관계 악화 심화로 볼 수 있습니다. 만약 협상이 지연되거나 파국으로 치달을 경우, 이는 중동 지역의 불안정성을 더욱 증대시키고 에너지 시장의 변동성을 확대시킬 수 있습니다. 또한, 이란의 보복 심리가 확대될수록 핵 문제 해결에 대한 미국의 입장은 더욱 경직될 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 이란의 전략은 단기적인 정치적 이득을 취하려 하지만, 장기적으로는 지역 안보 환경에 더 큰 불안정성을 초래할 수 있는 양면성을 내포하고 있습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변동성에 대한 민감도를 고려해야 합니다.

결론

이란의 외교 전략은 중선거라는 단기적 정치적 목표를 달성하기 위해 분쟁을 장기화하는 것을 핵심으로 합니다. 이 전략은 과거의 적대감을 바탕으로 미국의 정치적 부담을 가중시키려는 의도를 담고 있습니다. 향후 이란과 미국 간의 관계 변화와 핵 협상의 진행 속도는 중동 지역의 안정성과 글로벌 에너지 시장의 변동성에 결정적인 영향을 미칠 것으로 전망됩니다. 따라서 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 맥락을 고려하여 포트폴리오를 관리해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMigAFBVV95cUxNMllaRG1YaWRad3lYVXJ0TkQtSGg1dDBXQk1HaUFiRV9kOWZzRi1mcEdEREVaZmlESEU2LXJ6MVh0VVl5MUJyNjY4aUFYbVA0Z2VGQTlJU0otT2NLX1VHY1h3NmtNQ2JqcXFnZC10bjlGRENiUUJpZ2VSaGltZzA5bA?oc=5

Iran hopes to deal Trump a blow at midterms by keeping him entangled in war - The Guardian

By dragging out talks, Tehran aims to damage the US president politically, but some fear a bruised and weakened Trump could only prolong the conflict

Tehran has set out a protracted negotiating timetable designed to keep Donald Trump embroiled in the Iran conflict until the midterm elections, in the hope of inflicting the same ruinous blow on his presidency as Jimmy Carter suffered over the 1979-81 US embassy hostage crisis.

For many inside Iran, inflicting meaningful revenge on Trump is a legitimate and self-standing war aim, reflected in the mood of those attending the funeral of the late supreme leader Ali Khamenei where demands for retribution were ubiquitous.

While Iranian officials since the 1979 Islamic revolution have never trusted the US, that animus is now also directed personally towards Trump. He not only tore up the painfully negotiated nuclear deal in 2018, but he also sanctioned the assassination of the military leader Qassem Suleimani and twice involved Iran in negotiations on its nuclear programme only to launch wars against it. He shows no remorse for the killing of the country’s supreme leader, or for the attempt on the life of Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian.

As the countdown to November’s midterm US elections begins, what could be the political demise of Trump has become a subject of obsessive speculation in Tehran. Iranian media track Trump’s waning ratings, attributing the decline to the war’s unpopularity and high oil prices . The changing politics of the Democrats is minutely examined.

But the focus on the midterms became more obvious this week when the deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, told the official IRNA news agency that after agreeing a route for commercial shipping through the strait of Hormuz, it would take two to four months to reach the second phase of negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. The original plan – to commence the nuclear phase of the talks within 30 days of signing June’s memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the US – had been jettisoned by the Trump administration, Gharibabadi said.

To get to that second stage, he laid out an obstacle course including the lifting of sanctions, the end of the US blockade of Iranian ports, the unfreezing of Iranian assets and new commitments on non-belligerence in a process that could last well beyond the midterms.

If Tehran gets its way on this timetable, Trump will be going to the polls with no Iranian commitment on nuclear weapons, only a hefty economic bill for a failed war. “This raises the very likely scenario of continued cycles of conflict between the US and Tehran over the strait,” said Jason Brodsky from United against a Nuclear Iran, an advocate of the war. “There won’t be any true quiet before the midterm elections – Tehran has no interest in giving this to the Trump administration […] It will continue to play games.”

Mehr News, an agency close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, published a piece saying Iran had given Trump a major dilemma. “Continuing the war could increase political and economic pressure on the government and exacerbate the decline in his popularity. On the other hand, backing down, or moving towards reducing tensions, could also be interpreted by some of Trump’s supporters as a retreat from his campaign slogans,” it said.

From this perspective, the outcome of this war will not be played out on the battlefield, but at the ballot box . The agency suggested the outcome could affect the course of American domestic and foreign policy for years to come.

Few in Iran take Trump’s statements at face value. But his denials that the midterms affect his Iran strategy are treated with special scepticism. Iranian media point to comments from Marc Zell, chair of Republicans Overseas Israel, who has said: “It’s all about the midterms […] the American public simply is tired of war and the administration is navigating the pre-election waters adroitly in order to avoid a Democratic takeover of Congress.”

Such remarks fuel the debate inside Iran about how much the midterms should be part of Iran’s calculus. Some believe the loss of Congress will inhibit him or lead to his impeachment, at the very least, it might mark the end of the war’s funding. Mostafa Zahrani, a former Iranian diplomat, argued electoral defeat “will make it inevitable that Trump will not be able to go back to war and will take the negotiations seriously”.

Others such as Nasser Hadian, a professor of international relations at Tehran University, disagree. An advocate of cashing in on Iran’s victories now rather than waiting for Trump to become weaker. “If he loses, he’ll have less incentive to reach an agreement with Iran, because in that case he’ll be weakened, and Israel and others will find it much easier to attack him – something they don’t dare do now,” he said. “Those who say we should wait for the midterm elections have no understanding of politics in America”.

The pleasure for Iran in seeing Trump defeated would indeed be reduced if feeling he has nothing left to lose, but its diplomats overall believe Trump’s freedom to act will indeed be constrained by the unpopularity of more conflict and by Republican presidential candidates anxious to wrap this up. Trump would also be at risk of seeing his whole second term consumed by a disastrous war.

The bigger question is what Iran itself wants to achieve. Agreeing to keep the dispute simmering until November is not an answer to that question – one that Iranians are better at debating than resolving.

Pezeshkian, working in alliance with Mohammad Ghalibaf, the chief negotiator, repeatedly says he does not want endless war, and insists that the vast majority of the supreme national security council concur. He still has faith in the MoU, saying it should be the cornerstone of Iran’s foreign policy.

But conservative newspaper Kayhan describes the memorandum as worthless since the US always breaks its commitments. “Accordingly, officials should know that the strait of Hormuz is not a bargaining chip and should not be opened as a passage for America,” it said.

Both hardliners and moderates envision the war leading to a new regional security architecture. But the hardliners put the emphasis on America’s expulsion and see this as something less to be negotiated and more to be enforced using control of the strait of Hormuz’s entry points as a lever to close US bases.

Pezeshkian says he sees a place for legitimate US investment in Iran while the former foreign minister Javad Zarif, in an essay this week, argued Iran in “a post-polar era would benefit from not depending solely on Russia and China in future”.

If Iran developed “a balanced and multifaceted foreign policy”, Tehran would not be forced into relationships based on necessity, he wrote. “Continuing uncontrolled tensions with the United States not only imposes direct costs on Iran, but also makes it more difficult for other countries, even close partners such as China and Russia, to cooperate with Iran”.

Just as Trump cannot resolve from one sentence to the next what he thinks of Iran, nor can Iran agree what it thinks it can get from America.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMigAFBVV95cUxNMllaRG1YaWRad3lYVXJ0TkQtSGg1dDBXQk1HaUFiRV9kOWZzRi1mcEdEREVaZmlESEU2LXJ6MVh0VVl5MUJyNjY4aUFYbVA0Z2VGQTlJU0otT2NLX1VHY1h3NmtNQ2JqcXFnZC10bjlGRENiUUJpZ2VSaGltZzA5bA?oc=5