미국-이란 휴전협정의 위험 요소: 협상 테이블에서 제외된 부분
The danger of US-Iran ceasefire agreement is what it leaves out - The Conversation
미국-이란 협정의 혼합 신호로 인한 지opolitical 불확실성이 시장을 불안하게 유지하고 있습니다.
핵심 요약
미국-이란 협상은 다섯 주요 당사자를 포함하며, 협상 테이블에서 제외된 부분이 위험 요소로 작용할 수 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 최소 다섯 주요 당사자(워싱턴, 테헤란, 이스라엘, 의회, 유럽 연합)를 포함하는 다층적 협상 구조
- 이란 측은 레바논 긴장 완화가 협상의 일부라고 주장하지만, 이스라엘 측은 이를 부인
- 로버트 푸트남의 '두 수준의 게임' 이론을 확장해 '다층적 협상'으로 분석
도입
이번 미국-이란 휴전협정은 단순한 양자 협상이 아니라 다층적 이해관계가 얽힌 복잡한 구조를 가지고 있습니다. 투자자들에게는 협상 과정에서 제외된 요소들이 향후 변동성의 주요 원인이 될 수 있다는 점이 핵심입니다. 특히 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정성과 국제적 이해관계가 얽힌 상황에서, 협상의 지속 가능성에 대한 분석이 필요합니다.
본문 1: 다층적 협상 구조의 복잡성
로버트 푸트남의 '두 수준의 게임' 이론을 확장해 미국-이란 협상을 분석할 때, 최소 다섯 수준의 게임이 동시에 진행되고 있습니다. 워싱턴은 이란, 이스라엘, 의회, 아랍 파트너, 유럽 연합을 동시에 고려해야 하며, 테헤란은 최고지도자, 혁명수비대, 대중, 러시아와 중국과의 관계를 고려해야 합니다. 이러한 다층적 구조는 협상의 복잡성을 높이며, 각 당사자의 요구를 동시에 충족시키는 것이 어렵다는 점을 보여줍니다. 이는 향후 협상이 예상치 못한 방향으로 전개될 가능성을 의미합니다.
본문 2: 협상 과정에서 제외된 요소의 위험성
협상 테이블에서 제외된 요소들이 향후 변동성의 주요 원인이 될 수 있습니다. 예를 들어, 레바논의 긴장 완화에 대한 이란과 이스라엘의 갈등은 협상의 지속 가능성에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 또한, 각 당사자의 국내 정치적 요구를 고려하지 않은 부분이 협상의 실패로 이어질 수 있습니다. 특히 이란의 혁명수비대와 미국의 의회 간의 갈등이 협상의 안정성을 위협할 수 있습니다. 이러한 요소들을 고려할 때, 협상이 장기적으로 유지될 가능성은 낮아 보입니다.
본문 3: 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정성
미국-이란 협상의 배경에는 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정성이 있습니다. 이스라엘과 헤즈볼라 간의 갈등, 아랍 국가들의 정치적 변화, 러시아와 중국의 중동 정책 등이 협상의 결과를 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 특히 러시아의 우크라이나 전쟁과 중국의 중동 정책이 미국-이란 협상에 미치는 영향은 무시할 수 없습니다. 이러한 요소들을 고려할 때, 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정성이 협상의 지속 가능성에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 가능성 있습니다.
결론
미국-이란 협상은 다층적 이해관계가 얽힌 복잡한 구조를 가지고 있으며, 협상 과정에서 제외된 요소들이 향후 변동성의 주요 원인이 될 수 있습니다. 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정성도 협상의 지속 가능성에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 향후 협상의 진행 상황과 각 당사자의 반응을 주의 깊게 관찰해야 할 필요가 있습니다.
Original Article
The danger of US-Iran ceasefire agreement is what it leaves out - The Conversation
The latest U.S. military conflict with Iran appears to be over.
Washington declared success . Tehran claimed victory . Israel insisted it remains free to strike Hezbollah .
Some sticking points remain. For example, Iranian officials insist de-escalation in Lebanon was part of the deal; Israeli leaders deny it .
To most onlookers, the contradictions may seem like confusion, bad faith or evidence that the agreement is already unraveling.
But after more than two decades studying how wars end and whether the peace holds , I have learned that contradictions are often a sign the negotiations are working. The real danger lies elsewhere: in what the U.S.-Iran agreement leaves out.
It would be a mistake to assume the United States and Iran are bargaining only with each other.
The political scientist Robert Putnam called diplomacy a “ two-level game ” in which leaders negotiate abroad and at home at once. And no deal abroad survives unless it can be sold to the audience back home.
The U.S.-Iran agreement is closer to a five-level game. Washington must satisfy Iran, Israel, Congress , its Arab partners and its European allies . Tehran must satisfy Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard , Iran’s most powerful military institution . Iran must also contain a public whose anger over sanctions can spill into the streets , and it must keep Russia and China on its side.
Every gain at the negotiating table must be sold to people who are not at the table.
That is why the messaging contradicts itself. Each side is talking past its rival to its own people. Washington calls relief from sanctions a reversible decision . Tehran stresses its sovereignty . Israel advertises its freedom to strike .
And the price of caving differs from place to place. In Washington, it might be electoral. In Tehran, factions of hard-liners may exact a heavy political price from leaders who compromise with the West, a lesson learned by President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif after the 2015 nuclear deal .
Diplomacy has always worked this way. The first recorded peace treaty, struck by Egypt and the Hittites – an ancient civilization centered in modern-day Turkey – after the battle of Kadesh 3,000 years ago, survives in two versions, each written in its own language for an audience at home.
In October 2025, I saw the Egyptian text carved into the walls at the Karnak complex , a vast array of temples, pylons and chapels near Luxor in southern Egypt. A copper replica now hangs outside the U.N. Security Council , where agreements like these are still negotiated today.
Peace between Egypt and the Hittites held not because the parties told the same story but because each could tell one its own people would accept.
Generous with rewards, short on penalties
Contradictory messaging, then, is not the problem. The problem is that the same multilevel pressures that scramble public narratives also shape what negotiators are willing to put into an agreement.
Each side bargains hard for rewards it can display at home and resists penalties for noncompliance that it would have to defend later. The result is a U.S.-Iran deal generous with benefits and short on enforcement.
While conducting research for my 2009 book “ Securing the Peace ,” I found that negotiated settlements ending civil wars break down at roughly twice the rate of wars ending in outright military victory. Although my research focused on civil wars, the broader lesson applies to war settlements more generally. They fail not because of what is written on paper but because they lack credible enforcement once implementation begins.
This weakness is hidden at the moment of signing, when all parties are still collecting the benefits an agreement promises. It surfaces later, once those rewards are exhausted and nothing exists to deter or punish defection.
The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty makes the point. It endured not simply because Egypt regained the Sinai Peninsula and Israel won recognition, but because those gains were embedded in a broader enforcement structure: phased Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai tied to compliance and sustained U.S. economic and military assistance to both countries. The treaty also deployed the Multinational Force and Observers in 1982 to monitor Sinai’s demilitarization. More than four decades later, the treaty holds.
The lesson for any U.S. settlement with Iran is clear. Durable peace depends not only on what parties gain but on the institutions and incentives built to enforce it long after the signing ceremony ends.
By that standard, the U.S.-Iran agreement is built to wobble. It is generous with rewards and short on penalties . The United States lifts its blockade, issues oil waivers, releases frozen Iranian funds and promises more than US$300 billion in reconstruction.
Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz and dilutes its enriched uranium on its own soil, while keeping the machinery to enrich more. Nearly every step confers a benefit on someone; almost none imposes a cost on the party that walks away.
Enforcement is left to a U.N. Security Council resolution that has not been written. The hardest question, enrichment, is pushed into a final deal that may never be reached .
And there is a deeper problem. The actors most capable of destroying the agreement are precisely those least constrained by it . Israel, Hezbollah and the broader network of Iranian-backed militias across the region all sit outside the agreement. They gain little by complying and risk little by defecting because they never signed. A settlement that excludes powerful spoilers has no way to make breaking it hurt.
None of this means collapse is imminent. The history of peacemaking – from Kadesh to the Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian war , to the Belfast Agreement that halted the 30-year sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland – shows that public blowups and threats to walk out are normal stages, not proof of failure.
But surviving the turbulence is not the same as lasting. The question is not whether setbacks come. History shows they will. It is whether the parties build institutions capable of deterring defection before the rewards are spent and the incentives are gone.
That points to a clear task, and it is not the one most are watching. The task is not to reconcile competing narratives. It is to create automatic costs for anyone who returns to violence, including actors who never sat at the negotiating table.