핵심요약

• 헤즈볼라는 3월 이후 소모전 전략으로 전환하여 공격에 드론을 45% (레바논) 및 32% (이스라엘) 활용
• 헤즈볼라는 3월 이후 월평균 199건 이상의 공격을 통해 이스라엘에 지속적인 압박을 가하고 있음
• 이스라엘의 2024년 작전으로 인해 헤즈볼라의 군사 역량과 억지력이 약화되었으나, 이란에게는 여전히 전쟁 비용을 높이는 역할을 수행
• 이란-이스라엘 갈등 재개나 이스라엘의 레바논 확장 시, 더 큰 규모의 캠페인으로 확대될 위험이 존재

도입

본 기사는 헤즈볼라가 채택한 소모전 전략의 변화가 중동 지역의 지정학적 역학 관계에 미치는 영향을 분석합니다. 이 전략의 변화는 단순한 전술적 움직임을 넘어, 이란과 이스라엘 간의 갈등에서 중재자이자 압박 수단으로서 헤즈볼라가 수행하는 역할의 변화를 의미하며, 이는 궁극적으로 지역 안보의 변동성을 예측하는 데 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다.

본문 1: 전술적 변화와 비용 효율성

헤즈볼라가 채택한 소모전 전략은 비용 효율성을 극대화하는 데 중점을 둡니다. 이들은 대규모 부대나 중화기 사용 대신 소규모 셀, 분산된 발사 지점, 드론, 유도 미사일과 같은 저비용 전술을 사용하고 있습니다. 특히 드론은 헤즈볼라 공격의 핵심 요소로 자리 잡았으며, 이는 공격의 효율성과 범위 확대를 가능하게 합니다. 구체적으로, 드론은 레바논 공격의 45%와 이스라엘 공격의 32%에서 사용되었습니다. 이러한 전술적 전환은 이스라엘 방어 체계를 약화시키고, 군사적 압박을 유지하면서도 직접적인 대규모 충돌의 위험을 관리하려는 전략적 선택으로 해석됩니다. 이는 제한된 자원으로 최대의 군사적 효과를 창출하려는 현실주의적 접근 방식을 반영합니다.

본문 2: 억지력 약화와 이란의 이익

이스라엘의 2024년 작전은 헤즈볼라의 군사적 역량과 억지력에 영향을 미쳤습니다. 이스라엘군이 주요 정치 및 군사 지도자들을 제거하고 지휘 통제 시스템을 방해했으며 미사일 및 드론 보급 기지를 손상시킨 것은 헤즈볼라의 군사적 가치를 감소시켰습니다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 헤즈볼라는 이란에게 여전히 중요한 군사적 가치를 제공합니다. 이는 이란 정권이 이스라엘과 미국의 위협에 직면했을 때 전쟁 비용을 지속적으로 상승시킬 수 있음을 입증했기 때문입니다. 즉, 헤즈볼라는 직접적인 군사적 승리보다는 간접적인 압박 수단으로서의 기능을 유지하고 있습니다. 이는 이란이 지역에서 영향력을 행사하는 데 있어 헤즈볼라를 활용하는 전략적 이점을 확보하고 있음을 의미합니다.

본문 3: 잠재적 위험과 장기적 전망

현재 상황에서 헤즈볼라가 남부 레바논 지역이나 북부 이스라엘 지역에 대규모 공격을 감행할 가능성은 낮습니다. 그러나 이스라엘-이란 갈등이 재개되거나 이스라엘이 레바논에서 작전을 확대하거나 헤즈볼라가 더 높은 수준의 공격을 지속할 수 있는 역량을 재건할 경우, 분쟁이 더 광범위하게 확대될 위험이 증가합니다. 이러한 위험은 헤즈볼라가 소모전 전략을 넘어 대규모 충돌로 전환할 수 있는 임계점을 설정합니다. 장기적으로 볼 때, 이 지역의 불안정성은 이란, 이스라엘, 미국 세 주체의 복잡한 상호작용에 의해 좌우될 것이며, 헤즈볼라의 행동은 이러한 지정학적 변동성의 주요 지표가 될 것입니다.

결론

헤즈볼라의 소모전 전략은 단기적인 충돌 강도를 관리하면서도 이란-이스라엘 갈등에 대한 군사적 압박을 유지하는 실용적인 수단으로 기능하고 있습니다. 향후 상황은 이스라엘의 군사적 대응과 이란의 지정학적 목표에 따라 달라질 것입니다. 투자 관점에서 볼 때, 이 지역의 긴장 고조는 중동 지역의 에너지 및 지정학적 리스크를 반영하므로, 관련 지역의 변동성을 지속적으로 주시할 필요가 있습니다. 구체적으로, 헤즈볼라의 역량 재건 가능성과 이란-이스라엘 관계의 변화에 주목해야 합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMipgFBVV95cUxOYkZlZ0ZESHJzZG0yU2JzSHVGWU1wYmVVTlpsVVY4VkhOWE1PYkdPcnN6X3ZXZlZ0aV9fdkRnMWpMd3JhV2xoX0ZmVFpublI1aHpQcGstaEhERFNLLTZjdzM5SDIyOEZwYTRRREF5clYtUFZUZDlRLVhnclVrTGVNZkhndWdiSGQ5RE1CTS1WMHVnTEY1eHZLTHhXQ1BDM1FJbkp6dUZ3?oc=5

Hezbollah’s shift to attrition offers Iran a lasting tool to pressure Israel and the US - acleddata.com

Middle East Assistant Research Manager

✓ ACLED is the world’s most trusted source of conflict information >

Since March, Hezbollah has shifted toward an attritional strategy and guerrilla tactics in combatting Israel forces in Lebanon. Rather than relying mainly on large formations and heavy rocket fire, the group has used small cells, dispersed launch sites, drones, guided missiles, and selective rocket attacks. Drones have become central to Hezbollah’s operations and were used in 45% of Hezbollah attacks in Lebanon and 32% of its attacks in Israel. Hezbollah has used rockets to disrupt life in northern Israel, stretch Israeli defenses, and signal its ability to widen the conflict.

Hezbollah is unlikely to carry out large-scale attacks against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and communities in northern Israel under current conditions. However, sporadic and limited clashes near the buffer zone are likely to continue in the short term. The risk of a wider campaign will rise if the Iran-Israel conflict resumes, Israel expands its operations in Lebanon, or Hezbollah rebuilds enough capacity to sustain a higher level of attacks.

Since joining the US-Israel war with Iran on 2 March, Hezbollah has adopted an attritional strategy aimed at keeping military and political pressure on Israel, while using lower-cost military tactics. The group’s military capabilities and deterrent role were significantly weakened by Israel’s operations in 2024, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed key political and military leaders , disrupted the group’s command and control system, and damaged its missile and drone arsenal and production sites. Nevertheless Hezbollah has maintained military value for Iran: It has shown that it can continue to raise the cost of war on Israel if the Iranian regime faces a serious threat from Israel and the United States. This is reflected in the greater intensity of its attacks on IDF operations in Lebanon, with more than 199 per month since March 2026, compared with nearly 163 during Israel’s October-November 2024 ground invasion.

The group has come to rely on small cells, dispersed launch sites, remote operators, and targeted attacks, rather than visible formations and direct engagement with Israeli forces. Hezbollah has reduced its reliance on direct confrontation with the IDF — armed clashes fell from 34% of total interactions in Lebanon during the ground invasion in October-November 2024 to 11% between March and July 2026 — and increasingly turned to lower-intensity remote attacks on Israeli forces operating in Lebanon. Rockets still account for the largest share of Hezbollah weapon use, but drone use has increased sharply: Hezbollah used suicide drones in 24% of attacks between March and July, up from 6% in October and November 2024. Fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones, which the group did not report using until March 2026, were deployed in 21% of attacks in the last five months.

The reliance on FPV drones marks a shift from Hezbollah’s military operations during the 2024 ground invasion, which focused on missile attacks. With this shift, Hezbollah presents a drastically changed risk profile to the IDF. Rocket attacks are often detected, intercepted, or fall in open areas, while anti-tank guided missiles are more precise but have a limited range. FPV drones, on the other hand, are small, mobile, low-flying, and require limited logistical support. Fiber-optic guidance has also made them less vulnerable to Israeli jamming, while night-vision and thermal-imaging systems allow them to operate in poor visibility.

Israel established a buffer zone in southern Lebanon partly to reduce Hezbollah’s anti-tank missile threat by pushing launch teams farther from northern Israeli communities. While anti-tank guided missiles are most effective within about 6 kilometers, FPV drones have targeted soldiers, vehicles, tanks, bulldozers, fixed positions, and military equipment from distances of up to 20 km. Their range and precision have allowed Hezbollah to threaten Israeli forces inside and around the buffer zone. Israel reported that at least 33 of Hezbollah’s remote attacks since March killed or injured Israelis in Lebanon, while Hezbollah claimed a direct hit in at least 240 other incidents. Hezbollah used FPV drones in more than half of the 33 events that resulted in reported casualties or fatalities. These attacks have not had a decisive military impact, but they show that Hezbollah can still impose deadly costs despite Israeli efforts to weaken its arsenal and push it away from the border.

At the same time, Hezbollah has maintained an emphasis on rocket attacks on northern Israeli border towns and the Galilee since March ( see map below ). Since March the group has launched at least 821 rocket attacks on Israel.

Though the number of these rocket attacks remains below those recorded in October and November 2024, such rocket fire allows Hezbollah to disrupt life in northern Israel and signal its ability to widen the conflict in case of Israeli escalation. The limitations of rockets — their detectability, vulnerability to interception, and tendency to fall in open areas — matter less when the goal is to create fear and disruption rather than directly engage with a military force. These attacks have often coincided with Israel’s expansion north of the Litani River, strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, or sensitive stages of US-Iran negotiations.

Despite losing much of its deterrent leverage over Israel, Hezbollah remains valuable to Iran as an attritional force that can raise the cost of war. It can be expected to continue rebuilding its military capability with Iran’s support. Under sustained Israeli military pressure and growing domestic pressure linked to the trilateral framework between Lebanon, Israel, and the US, however, the group is likely to focus on smaller, low-cost weapons that are easier to obtain, assemble, move, and store. FPV drones, guided missiles, and other precision weapons are likely to remain a priority.

Hezbollah is unlikely to resume a large-scale military campaign without close coordination with Iran. However, its use of FPV drones will likely remain central to attacks on Israeli troops near the buffer zone, alongside suicide drones and short-range rocket fire, including small-scale barrages against northern Israel. Limited clashes with Israeli forces are likely to continue near the buffer zone. Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces in the Ali al-Taher Ridge on 1 August and in al-Mansouri village on 5 August show that Israel’s continued deployment in southern Lebanon remains a source of friction.

Renewed Israel-Iran escalation: Renewed fighting between Iran and Israel would be the clearest trigger for a wider Hezbollah campaign. Iran will expect Hezbollah to join the conflict because the group’s proximity to Israel allows it to stretch the IDF and pressure its air-defense systems by firing rocket barrages at northern Israel and resuming attacks on Israeli forces deployed in the security zone. Hezbollah also relies heavily on Iranian weapon supplies, financial support, and operational assistance, and it is unlikely to remain on the sidelines if Tehran faces another major Israeli attack. Israel, in turn, could use a wider confrontation to intensify its campaign against Hezbollah and further degrade its capabilities.

Expansion or withdrawal of Israeli forces in Lebanon: Israeli deployment and military operations in Lebanon will maintain heightened friction with Hezbollah. Expanding Israeli operations will likely increase clashes with Hezbollah, especially north of the Litani River and around Ali al-Taher and al-Nabatieh, where Hezbollah has significant military infrastructure. Israel has shown little willingness to withdraw and has limited confidence in the Lebanese army’s ability to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah is also unlikely to disarm while Israeli troops remain in Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s remaining military capacity: Hezbollah’s military capabilities and weapons stockpiles have been heavily degraded. The timing and scale of any operation in the short term will depend on how much the group can rebuild its arsenal. Hezbollah is unlikely to escalate significantly while it still needs to replenish its weapons, especially given the growing challenges of smuggling weapons through Syria and limited access to commercially available dual use technology.

Table 1: Hezbollah attacks in Lebanon: Comparing March-July 2026 with October-November 2024

Table 2: Hezbollah attacks in Israel: Comparing March-July 2026 with October-November 2024

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMipgFBVV95cUxOYkZlZ0ZESHJzZG0yU2JzSHVGWU1wYmVVTlpsVVY4VkhOWE1PYkdPcnN6X3ZXZlZ0aV9fdkRnMWpMd3JhV2xoX0ZmVFpublI1aHpQcGstaEhERFNLLTZjdzM5SDIyOEZwYTRRREF5clYtUFZUZDlRLVhnclVrTGVNZkhndWdiSGQ5RE1CTS1WMHVnTEY1eHZLTHhXQ1BDM1FJbkp6dUZ3?oc=5