핵심요약

• 이란 최고지도자 알리 하메네이 암살로 전쟁 시작
• 호르무즈 해협 폐쇄로 에너지 시장 즉시 혼란
• 전 세계 정부들의 긴장 완화 요구
• 이란 정권은 군사적 피해에도 불구하고 정치적으로 강화
• 미국과 이스라엘의 전략적 위치는 약화

도입

이 기사는 투자자에게 이란, 미국, 이스라엘 간의 전쟁의 결과가 글로벌 에너지 시장과 지정학적 균형에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 데 중요합니다. 특히 호르무즈 해협의 폐쇄가 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향과 그로 인한 정치적 변화는 투자 결정에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.

본문 1: 에너지 시장 혼란과 호르무즈 해협의 전략적 중요성

호르무즈 해협의 폐쇄는 에너지 시장에 즉각적인 혼란을 일으켰습니다. 이 해협은 글로벌 에너지 수송의 핵심 경로이며, 그 폐쇄는 석유 공급망에 심각한 영향을 미칩니다. 에너지 시장의 불안정성은 석유 가격 급등으로 이어질 수 있으며, 이는 전 세계 경제에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 에너지 섹터의 변동성에 대비해야 합니다.

본문 2: 이란 정권의 정치적 강화와 미국-이스라엘 동맹의 약화

이란 정권은 군사적 피해에도 불구하고 정치적으로 강화되었습니다. 이는 미국과 이스라엘의 전략적 실패를 보여주며, 두 나라의 동맹 관계에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 이스라엘의 전략적 상황과 가장 중요한 동맹인 미국의 위상이 약화되었습니다. 이는 향후 중동 지역에서의 군사적 및 외교적 전략에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.

본문 3: 글로벌 긴장 완화 요구와 그 영향

전 세계 정부들은 호르무즈 해협 폐쇄로 인한 긴장 완화를 요구하고 있습니다. 이는 국제 사회가 군사적 충돌보다 외교적 해결책을 선호한다는 것을 보여줍니다. 그러나 이란의 정치적 강화와 미국-이스라엘 동맹의 약화는 향후 중동 지역의 안정성에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이 지역에서의 지정학적 리스크를 고려해야 합니다.

결론

이 전쟁의 결과는 이란의 정치적 강화와 미국-이스라엘 동맹의 약화를 보여주며, 글로벌 에너지 시장과 지정학적 균형에 미치는 영향을 강조합니다. 향후 투자자들은 중동 지역의 지정학적 리스크와 에너지 시장의 변동성에 주목해야 합니다. 이란과 미국, 이스라엘 간의 관계 발전과 호르무즈 해협의 안정화 여부가 주요 관측 포인트입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiakFVX3lxTE1pekFUX3BQWkxvbE1HWk1xazVieERqM2JIR0pqZVhNZHhOdnJ1YmV5cEdac1hpY21BQXVGX09ZUTBRZm9SSmV4YVBhVmFxeFlEY3VidHVYR3B6al9FSHNXLUJNazh4YkQxT1E?oc=5

The Iran war ended terribly for the US, and even worse for Israel - The Forward

The Iranian regime is the only party leaving this conflict in a strong position

President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Mar-a-Lago on Dec. 29, 2025. Photo by Joe Raedle/Getty Images

Columnist Dan Perry June 15, 2026

A war that began with immense ambition has ended with profound setbacks for both the United States and Israel.

With an emerging U.S.-Iran peace agreement , what initially appeared to be a historic demonstration of military dominance evolved into a vivid illustration of the limits of both Israeli and American power. The conflict also exposed profound failures in strategic competence within that alliance. Washington and Jerusalem planned effectively for the initial decapitation strikes, but were unprepared for the economic and geopolitical consequences that followed.

The result is a war that may ultimately strengthen the Iranian regime politically, despite the damage it suffered militarily; has weakened international perceptions of American military might; and has diminished both Israel’s own strategic circumstances and its most important alliance.

The opening phase of the war appeared spectacularly successful. Israeli intelligence and airpower decapitated large portions of Iran’s military and security leadership with astonishing speed, including by assassinating Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei . Key military infrastructure suffered major damage, and for a brief moment, it seemed plausible that the Iranian regime might genuinely face collapse or surrender on terms dictated by Washington and Jerusalem.

That perception proved short-lived.

Iran shifted the battlefield away from conventional military confrontation and toward economic coercion. Its closure of the Strait of Hormuz exposed the extraordinary vulnerability of the global economy to relatively inexpensive forms of pressure. Energy markets panicked almost immediately. Governments across Europe, Asia, and the Gulf pushed urgently for de-escalation.

The central strategic reality became impossible to ignore: the U.S.could not tolerate sustained economic disruption, and the Iranian regime has a strong stomach for suffering. The overwhelming military superiority of the U.S. and Israel effectively ceased to matter.

That asymmetry changed the balance of the conflict. And the resulting agreement appears to preserve much of Iran’s architecture of mischief, which the regime’s many critics had hoped to see dismantled.

Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities have been harmed but can be rebuilt; long-term reductions to that firepower are reportedly not on the table in a planned 60-day negotiation. The regime’s regional proxy network — including Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad — survives, even though Hezbollah and Hamas have been battered.

And as Israel is not a party to the ceasefire, it cannot advocate for more stringent terms on this front.

The regime itself remains firmly in power and may receive enormous sanctions relief and renewed economic access. Demands for democratic reforms seem to have been set aside, as has any kind of punishment for the regime’s massacre of thousands — and by some reports tens of thousands — of domestic protestors in January.

The latter aspect is especially galling given that President Donald Trump was driven to intervene because of the January massacre, after he promised Iranians that “help is on its way.” Upon launching the war, he declared that it would enable Iranians to “take your country back.”

Ironically, Trump in his first term pulled out of former President Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal over objections that it provided funds for the regime while allowing it to run riot. Now, he is settling for an effective reconstitution of that deal — except one with substantially less American leverage.

The implications extend far beyond Iran itself. The war demonstrated that Tehran can generate immediate global economic panic through relatively cheap tools and can leverage that panic into diplomatic concessions. Before the war, fears about Iran’s ability to blackmail the world economy remained somewhat theoretical. After the war, those fears became a demonstrated geopolitical reality.

There is little evidence that either the American or Israeli governments understood in advance the degree to which the global economy had become vulnerable to this form of coercion. This, even though the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz was completely predictable and indeed expected by every strategist I’ve spoken to for decades.

This outcome may be most devastating for the Iranian people themselves. Many Iranians who despise the regime interpreted the opening phase of the conflict as evidence that the dictatorship might finally face genuine collapse. Instead, the regime not only survived but also regained leverage. The machinery of repression remains intact.

But this result is damaging for every party to this war aside from the Iranian regime.

The war has transformed perceptions of American power. For decades, the U.S. has anchored a global system built on the assumption that Washington could manage regional crises with some strategy in mind. That strategy wasn’t always brilliant, but it was rarely clueless. With the Hormuz confrontation, the world watched the U.S. confront a regional adversary with vastly inferior capabilities and fail to control events.

For Israel, the alliance Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has spent years cultivating with the American right and with Trump personally has become dangerously fragile. As pressure mounted to stabilize energy markets and prevent wider regional escalation, Trump increasingly presented himself not as a partner coordinating with Israel but as a superior authority managing Israeli actions. He repeatedly framed Israeli military action as dependent on his approval. He cursed Netanyahu in public. He presented Israel as a vassal doing his bidding — something no U.S. president has previously done.

This will destabilize Israel, where much of the governing right previously viewed Trump as a uniquely reliable ally who would support Israeli military objectives without hesitation or conditions.

Previous American presidents pressured Israel privately while still preserving the outward presentation of a relationship between sovereign allies. Trump discarded much of that convention. The new perception weakens Israel’s deterrence dramatically. Plus, with bipartisan support for Israel in Washington even more completely collapsed than after the deleterious war in Gaza, and relations with much of Europe — Israel’s top trading partner — similarly deteriorated, Israel finds itself at a new peak of dangerous international isolation.

This strategic shipwreck bears no resemblance to the sweeping regional transformation that supporters of the war — myself included — initially envisioned. I assumed, partly because of the first days’ successes, that Trump and Netanyahu had a plan. This is not a mistake serious people are likely to make again.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Forward . Discover more perspectives in Opinion . To contact Opinion authors, email [email protected] .

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Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiakFVX3lxTE1pekFUX3BQWkxvbE1HWk1xazVieERqM2JIR0pqZVhNZHhOdnJ1YmV5cEdac1hpY21BQXVGX09ZUTBRZm9SSmV4YVBhVmFxeFlEY3VidHVYR3B6al9FSHNXLUJNazh4YkQxT1E?oc=5