반(反)이란 전쟁 목표 변경: 에너지 가격 인하가 최우선 과제
Vance Pitches a New Objective for the Iran War - Foreign Policy
전쟁 목표의 변화는 거시경제적 불확실성을 야기하여 단기적인 위험 자산의 방향성을 완화시킵니다.
핵심 요약
J.D. Vance는 미국의 에너지 가격을 낮추는 것을 최우선 목표로 설정했습니다.
핵심요약
- 미국은 이란 전쟁 목표를 에너지 가격 인하를 최우선 과제(Goal No. 1)로 설정했습니다.
- 미국은 이란이 핵무기를 갖지 않도록 하는 것을 두 번째 목표(Goal No. 2)로 유지하고 있습니다.
- 전쟁으로 인한 글로벌 에너지 시장의 혼란이 미국 소비자들의 에너지 가격 급등을 초래했습니다.
- 이란은 미국에 3,000억 달러의 배상금, 대(對)미국 봉쇄 종식, 제재 해제를 요구하고 있습니다.
도입
본 기사는 미국이 이란 전쟁에 대한 외교적 목표를 어떻게 재정립했는지 보여줍니다. 이는 단순히 중동 지역의 지정학적 갈등을 넘어, 국제 분쟁이 미국의 국내 경제 정책과 소비자 물가에 미치는 직접적인 영향을 분석하는 데 중요합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 외교적 목표의 변화가 글로벌 에너지 시장의 변동성 및 장기적인 인플레이션 전망에 어떤 영향을 미칠지 주목해야 합니다.
본문 1: 지정학적 목표의 경제적 재편
미국 정부가 이란과의 군사적 목표를 핵 프로그램 중단이나 지역 세력 무장 해제에서 에너지 가격 인하로 전환한 것은 지정학적 목표가 국내 경제적 목표와 결합되는 현상을 보여줍니다. 이는 전쟁의 궁극적인 목표가 군사적 승리뿐만 아니라 국내 경제 안정에 초점을 맞추고 있음을 의미합니다. 특히, 에너지 가격이 미국 소비자들에게 미치는 직접적인 영향은 외교적 압박의 새로운 동력이 될 수 있습니다. 이처럼 외교적 목표가 경제적 목표로 구체화됨으로써, 국제 분쟁은 더 이상 순수하게 군사적 영역에 머무르지 않고 거시 경제 변수에 직접적으로 영향을 미치는 현실을 반영합니다.
본문 2: 에너지 시장의 변동성과 리스크
에너지 가격 안정화가 최우선 목표가 됨에 따라, 국제 유가 및 천연가스 시장의 변동성은 더욱 커질 것으로 예상됩니다. 이란이 지역 에너지 인프라에 대한 추가적인 공격을 계획하고 있다는 보고는 이러한 변동성을 증폭시키는 요인입니다. 이는 에너지 공급망의 취약성과 지정학적 리스크가 어떻게 원자재 가격에 반영되는지를 보여줍니다. 또한, 미국이 에너지 가격 안정화를 위해 취하는 외교적 조치(예: 제재 완화 또는 강화)는 국제 에너지 시장의 흐름을 예측하기 어렵게 만들며, 이는 에너지 관련 자산의 위험 프리미엄을 상승시킬 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 에너지 시장의 단기적인 변동성뿐만 아니라, 장기적인 에너지 공급망의 안정성에 대한 분석을 병행해야 합니다.
본문 3: 이란의 반응과 장기적 전망
이란이 미국과의 협정(3,000억 달러 배상금, 대(對)미국 봉쇄 종식, 제재 해제) 이행을 요구하며 갈등을 고조시킬 가능성은 여전히 존재합니다. 이란이 에너지 인프라에 대한 추가적인 공격을 고려하는 것은, 외교적 협상보다는 군사적 압박을 통해 자신들의 요구를 관철하려는 전략적 선택으로 해석됩니다. 이러한 상황은 중동 지역의 에너지 안보가 장기적으로 미국의 외교 정책에 미치는 영향을 심층적으로 분석할 필요가 있음을 시사합니다. 궁극적으로 에너지 가격 안정화라는 목표가 달성되기 위해서는 군사적 해결과 경제적 압박이 동시에 작용해야 하는 복잡한 외교적 균형이 요구됩니다.
결론
미국의 전쟁 목표가 군사적 목표에서 국내 에너지 가격 안정화라는 경제적 목표로 전환된 것은 국제 분쟁이 국내 경제에 미치는 연쇄적 영향을 강조합니다. 향후 에너지 시장은 지정학적 긴장도와 미국의 외교적 압박 강도에 따라 높은 변동성을 보일 가능성이 높습니다. 투자자들은 에너지 자산에 투자할 때, 단기적인 시장 변동성뿐만 아니라, 이란의 군사적 행동과 미국의 외교적 전략이 결합된 복합적인 리스크 요인을 면밀히 평가해야 할 것입니다.
Original Article
Vance Pitches a New Objective for the Iran War - Foreign Policy
Simply lowering energy prices for U.S. consumers is “goal No. 1”
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In month six of what was meant to be a six-week war, the Trump administration is steadily dialing down its war aims. What began as a quest for regime change in Iran became an effort to contain Tehran’s (“ obliterated ”) nuclear program, then destroy its missile capability, or at least defang the country’s regional proxies, or at the very least reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before U.S. President Donald Trump started the war.
Now, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance has a new, even more minimalist war goal: lower energy prices for U.S. consumers, which have spiked due to months of disruptions to global energy markets as a consequence of the war.
“That’s goal No. 1—keep oil and gas cheap for Americans all over our country,” Vance said last week, adding that “obviously goal No. 2 is ensure that Iran never gets a nuclear weapon.”
Trump quickly reiterated on social media that ending Iran’s moribund nuclear program remains the top priority, even though Washington and Tehran have reportedly had no discussions on the nuclear portfolio in months. Iran seems to be in little mood for further talks and is reportedly planning to escalate the conflict, potentially by making more strikes against regional energy infrastructure. Iran wants the Trump administration to comply with the terms of the memorandum of understanding that Trump signed in June, including $300 billion in reparations, an end to the U.S. blockade, and an end to U.S. sanctions.
Reining in pump prices that have risen by almost $1 a gallon since last year is an understandable political objective just months before the U.S. midterm elections; the Biden administration allowed oil prices to dictate much of the pace of its pressure campaign against Russia in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But the quiet part is not meant to be said out loud.
“Vance committed a truth. Sometimes the priority is the economic situation, sometimes the nuclear task, and sometimes the military task,” said Kevin Book, a managing director at ClearView Energy Partners, a Washington energy consultancy.
But curbing gasoline (and diesel) prices will be an uphill task, even if it is now among the White House’s priorities.
The Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important energy chokepoint, remains sclerotic, with daily transits of ships remaining barely above single digits, down from more than 100 daily transits before the war. (And few of those ships, either inbound or outbound, are tankers.) It’s still a shooting zone: A vessel was attacked early Tuesday while attempting to leave the strait through the southern route. Continued attacks on shipping will do little to encourage shipowners to run the gauntlet, no matter how much Trump affirms that the United States has “ total control ” over the strait. Two big state-run Chinese shipping firms stopped sending tankers through the strait on Tuesday.
That means that at least 5 million to 6 million barrels of oil remain missing from global markets, as they have been every day since the war began. Meanwhile, oil inventories, both commercial stocks and strategic reserves, are dwindling , as they have for months. (Though U.S. commercial oil stocks showed an unexpected rebound last week.)
Global benchmark crude oil prices are back to more than $90 a barrel. Average U.S. gasoline prices are at $4.06 a gallon nationwide, up from $3.14 a gallon one year ago. The picture for diesel is even bleaker—$5.46 a gallon now versus $3.69 a year ago—which bodes ill just ahead of harvest season . The diesel “crack,” the spread between the price of crude feedstock and the refined product, broached $100 a barrel for the first time ever this week, a sign of how straitened refineries are.
There is a bottleneck, but it’s not just in the Strait of Hormuz. Global refinery capacity simply cannot cope with the requirements to process what crude oil is available to meet demand for gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. U.S. refineries are running at 96 percent utilization rate—a record—and yet gasoline and diesel prices keep creeping higher. Next month, many are scheduled to go offline for seasonal maintenance, which will exacerbate the refinery crunch.
Add to that the loss of much of the world’s refinery capacity, in part due to Ukraine’s campaign of “long-range sanctions,” which involve drone and missile strikes that have knocked out a huge chunk of Russia’s refineries, and the lingering damage to Middle Eastern refineries from the brief shooting war in the Persian Gulf earlier this year. (That may also be intensifying: Yemeni news agencies report that the Houthis claim to have again targeted Saudi Arabia’s big Jazan refinery on Tuesday, though there was no confirmation.)
“There’s not a U.S.-only answer. It’s global. The cracks are huge everywhere, and lots of refineries are out,” Book said. “Even adding more crude oil won’t solve the problem, which is that refineries in Russia have been damaged by drones at the same time that refineries in the Middle East have been damaged by combat.”
There may be one answer, though it’s not a good one: Curtail the roughly 3 million barrels per day of U.S. exports of refined products such as gasoline and diesel. That is an idea that keeps cropping up and has since the spring, and it’s one that the White House keeps saying is not on the table. Curtailing those exports would, in the very short term, keep more refined products in the United States, which could lower pump prices in some places.
The problem with that idea, and the reason that oil companies have argued so hard with the administration against even considering it , is that it would be disastrous .
Ending exports from U.S. refineries, most of which are on the U.S. Gulf Coast, would lead to a glut of gasoline and diesel in that region. But it would be very difficult to ship those surplus supplies to other regions of the country. And with a profitable export stream cut off and a glut building, refiners would automatically throttle back their output, which would lead to even fewer refined products and higher prices. It would also pass the burden of higher energy prices to U.S. allies who have come to rely on huge amounts of U.S. energy exports to weather the disruptions in the Middle East.
“It’s a terrible idea. But terrible ideas in April could become options in October,” Book said.
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage . Read more here .
Keith Johnson is a staff writer at Foreign Policy covering geoeconomics and energy. Bluesky: @kfj-fp.bsky.social X: @KFJ_FP
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