핵심요약

• 4월 1일 중국이 대만을 상대로 2일간의 군사 연습을 실시했습니다.
• 동부전구사령부가 중국 해안경비대(CCG)와 함께 인민해방군(플라) 군대를 운영하는 것이 관찰되었습니다.
• 2월 2024년 CCG가 법집행 활동이라는 이름으로 대만을 상대로 전쟁 수행 기능을 실행한 사건 이후입니다.
• 플라의 CCG 운영 통제는 중국이 법집행 활동이라는 이름으로 군사적 우위를 확보하는 것을 가능하게 합니다.

도입

이 기사는 중국이 해안경비대를 군사화하여 대만 지역에서의 군사적 우위를 확보하고 있음을 보여주며, 투자자에게는 지역 안정성과 군사적 리스크를 고려한 포트폴리오 조정의 필요성을 시사합니다. 중국이 CCG를 법집행 활동이라는 이름으로 군사적으로 활용하는 전략은 기존의 군사적 위협을 넘어 회색 지대(Gray Zone) 전략으로 확장하고 있어, 투자자에게는 새로운 리스크 관리 접근이 요구됩니다.

본문 1: 중국 해안경비대의 군사화 전략

중국이 CCG를 군사적으로 활용하는 전략은 2024년 2월의 사건에서 이미 그 실체를 드러냈습니다. 당시 CCG가 법집행 활동이라는 이름으로 대만을 상대로 전쟁 수행 기능을 실행한 것은 단순한 실험적 배열이 아니라 체계적인 군사 전략의 일환으로 보입니다. 동부전구사령부가 CCG와 함께 플라 군대를 운영하는 것이 관찰된 것은 중국이 CCG를 군사적 목적으로 활용하는 전략이 체계적으로 구축되고 있음을 보여줍니다. 이는 중국이 법집행 활동이라는 이름으로 군사적 우위를 확보하는 것을 가능하게 하며, 지역 안정성에 대한 새로운 리스크 요인으로 작용할 수 있습니다.

본문 2: 대만과 미국동맹의 대응 전략

중국의 CCG 군사화 전략에 대응하기 위해서는 대만과 미국동맹의 협력이 필수적입니다. 대만은 CCG의 회색 지대 활동에 대한 명확한 대응 전략을 수립해야 하며, 이를 위해 미국 해안경비대와 워싱턴의 동맹국들과의 협력이 필요합니다. 특히, CCG의 법집행 활동이 군사적 목적으로 활용되고 있음을 공개적으로 알리고, 이에 대한 국제적 압박을 강화하는 것이 중요합니다. 이는 중국이 CCG를 군사적으로 활용하는 전략을 억제하는 데 도움이 될 수 있습니다.

본문 3: 지역 안정성과 군사적 리스크

중국의 CCG 군사화 전략은 지역 안정성에 대한 새로운 리스크 요인으로 작용할 수 있습니다. 특히, 대만 해협에서의 군사적 긴장도가 높아질 수 있으며, 이는 지역 경제와 투자 환경에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 투자자는 중국이 CCG를 군사적으로 활용하는 전략이 지역 안정성에 미치는 영향을 고려하여 포트폴리오를 조정해야 합니다. 또한, 미국과 동맹국들의 대응 전략이 지역 안정성에 미치는 영향을 주시해야 합니다.

결론

중국의 CCG 군사화 전략은 지역 안정성에 대한 새로운 리스크 요인으로 작용할 수 있으며, 대만과 미국동맹의 협력이 필수적입니다. 투자자는 중국이 CCG를 군사적으로 활용하는 전략이 지역 안정성에 미치는 영향을 고려하여 포트폴리오를 조정해야 합니다. 또한, 미국과 동맹국들의 대응 전략이 지역 안정성에 미치는 영향을 주시해야 합니다. 향후 중국이 CCG를 군사적으로 활용하는 전략이 확대될 가능성에 대비한 리스크 관리 전략이 필요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMi5gFBVV95cUxPT3JyN1pLSmdtY2RjNG1uZUt1bFRnR3Y5dklpQmlBQWw1bUlMaTlBVmRFN1BoUW9xekhFcVVOV1dEVmNtczFLbmNaR0dXVmc0NE54RUg4MnhVT19PYzNxMFpDbTBUa2ZTWUJrMWxMeU5mUDdFMDVRZVBlYm1HZDlEOTBWckJrNFAwVE1IVWxaYVRrTFJQNHZ4NHd0TGpVX2I0VUlVVnNwdVpiTFVqcEUzU25IQmE3SWhRTEpkUDZCSjBPYW5WVkdkc0E4V05mOEFlV1RDbUYtc1JTLXBGaVR4Q0FJZlloUQ?oc=5

China is militarizing its coast guard against Taiwan. Here’s how Taipei and its allies can respond. - Atlantic Council

On April 1, China launched a two-day military exercise against Taiwan. Taiwanese national security officials suggested it was timed to coincide with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s first trip to the Indo-Pacific since taking office. While the exercise was accompanied by the usual inflammatory and sometimes crude public messaging against Taiwan, it yielded a critical insight about China’s military operations. In describing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) movements they observed, Taiwan’s Coast Guard disclosed that the Eastern Theater Command exercised operational control over the China Coast Guard (CCG) along with PLA military forces in theater.

This is a ground-breaking revelation. Beijing generally aims to portray the CCG as a nonmilitary actor despite its legally mandated dual role as both law enforcement and a component of China’s armed forces. This is also significant considering a previous incident in February 2024 in which Taiwan confronted the CCG when the latter was caught executing war-fighting functions against Taiwan under the guise of law enforcement activities. At the time, it was unclear whether this was merely a one-off experimental arrangement or the act of an overzealous CCG officer. It is now clear that the PLA exercises operational control over the CCG and uses the cover of law enforcement to gain military advantage over the United States, Taiwan, and their allies and partners without drawing much public attention.

China’s use of its coast guard for military purposes under the guise of law enforcement poses a threat to Taiwan that requires a strong response from Taipei, as well as the United States and its allies and partners in the region. Countering the CCG’s gray zone activities will require an active response from Taiwan and public messaging that makes clear that certain CCG law enforcement activity is a cover for military activities. It will also require a coordinated response from the US Coast Guard and Washington’s allies to provide deterrence and impose costs on China for using the CCG’s law enforcement cover to threaten Taiwan’s security.

Taiwanese media reported in February 2024 that CCG vessels were identifying Taiwanese vessels and targets and providing real-time precise locations to the PLA for subsequent missile strikes while acting in a law enforcement capacity. Three CCG cutters entered the Western Pacific through the southern tip of the Miyako Strait and turned south until parallel to Taiwan’s east coast before speeding at eighteen to twenty knots eastward directly toward Taiwan. The cutters maintained radio silence, turned off their automatic identification system, and exercised emission control, an unusual precaution generally taken by military vessels, civilian vessels going through conflict zones, or vessels conducting illegal activities. The CCG cutters entered Taiwan’s twenty-four-nautical-mile contiguous zone, a buffer area internationally recognized for identification and interception of unknown vessels, and streaked past Taiwanese military and coast guard vessels sent to intercept them.

Intelligence provided to Taiwan by an undisclosed allied country indicated that these CCG vessels were validating functionalities of China’s Guo Wang, or “state network,” satellite constellation. Guo Wang designates targets for DF-21/DF-26 ballistic missiles supporting future PLA rocket force strikes against both Taiwan and US allied forces operating in the Western Pacific. The vessels only activated their automatic identification system and identified as belonging to the China Coast Guard after they passed the Taiwan Coast Guard’s TCG Nantou and came perilously close to Taiwan’s territorial waters.

Most countries’ coast guards, including those of the United States, China, and the Philippines, identify as both law enforcement and military, thus sailing in gray waters under international law. However, there is still a widely accepted norm that “white hull” vessels conducting law enforcement activities and promoting stability at sea are treated differently than “gray hull” warships safeguarding individual countries’ national interests. White hull activities near another country’s territorial waters are generally received with more goodwill and elicit less provocative reactions. China understands this and has been actively exploiting this divide since at least 2016.

The type-818 CCG vessels in the 2024 incident were 3,800-ton cutters built on People’s Liberation Army Navy ( PLAN) 054A-class frigate hulls , equipped with 76 mm guns and the standard PLAN communication suite—essentially a “gray hull” in all but name. Through operational control over CCG, the PLA can use the cover of a “white hull” law enforcement facade to conduct exclusively “gray hull” military activities that would otherwise receive much stronger pushback.

Beijing reorganized the CCG in 2018, moving it from China’s State Oceanic Administration to the People’s Armed Police. The People’s Armed Police is a paramilitary that reports directly to the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military authority. The CCG’s placement under the Central Military Commission’s authority is an unusual arrangement. In the United States, for example, although the US Coast Guard is a branch of the armed forces, its chain of command runs through the Department of Homeland Security, not the Department of Defense, unless it is otherwise directed by the president or Congress during wartime. Taiwan’s Coast Guard administration also follows a similar logic.

Since the 2018 reorganization, the CCG has used its law enforcement facade to great effect in gray zone operations against Taiwan, the Philippines, and other US regional allies and partners. In the South China Sea, the CCG has been using its vessels, which include the largest coast guard cutters in the world , to “shoulder,” or attempt to ram, other countries’ coast guard vessels and force them to divert course. All the while, these vessels use their white hull cover to justify these incidents as law enforcement actions.

To protect this useful subterfuge, Beijing has been careful to disaggregate exercises conducted by the PLA and those conducted by the CCG against Taiwan since the Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that came in response to then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in 2022. This means careful messaging from the official Weibo accounts of both the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command and the CCG. While exercises from the two entities seemed to take place within similar and sometimes overlapping timeframes, the Eastern Theater Command and CCG have different names for their respective exercises and take care to deconflict areas of operation.

Observers have long suspected operational coordination between the PLA and the CCG, but to date, only circumstantial evidence has linked the organizations. It is known that the PLA coordinates some of China’s gray zone operations through the Eastern Theater Command’s Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC). Previous concurrent CCG exercises with PLA in the Taiwan Strait have not provided sufficient direct evidence of operational coordination by observing PLAN and CCG movements alone , though international reporting sometimes characterizes the two entities’ actions as a combined exercise.

The revelation came from Taiwan’s Coast Guard administration , which stated on April 1 that the CCG, while ostensibly law enforcement, operates under the control of military theater commands. In the case of exercises against Taiwan, this would mean the Eastern Theater Command’s JOCC. Additionally, for the first time since the exercises in response to Pelosi’s visit in 2022, the CCG conducted joint operations with the PLA east of Taiwan , confirming its role in exercises for a potential joint quarantine/blockade against Taiwan.

Consequently, the April exercise indicates that the CCG is operationally controlled by PLA. And the 2024 incident provided an example of China unilaterally escalating cross-strait tension by conducting military operations with ostensibly law enforcement white hull vessels against Taiwan during peacetime, without even the facade of declaring a military exercise. These developments have far-reaching implications beyond garden-variety gray zone operations. These practices are highly provocative and require strong but measured responses from the United States and Taiwan, as well as their partners and allies in the region.

To stop Beijing from gaining additional military advantage under the guise of law enforcement activities, Taiwan must combine a proper active response with strong public messaging. Taipei’s active responses must be commensurate with the nature of each incident—dispatching military assets to intercept and guard against the CCG’s military activities against Taiwan while leaving law enforcement issues for Taiwan’s Coast Guard. This will create significant challenges for the Taiwan Navy and Coast Guard’s existing command-and-control, but it is essential to counter China’s use of the CCG as cover to gain military advantage over Taiwan. Taiwan’s public messaging must adequately establish this. Taiwan should present the public with credible evidence, including intercepted signals intelligence, electro-optical recordings, and the exact courses and speeds of offending CCG vessels.

Meanwhile, the United States and its allies and partners must impose additional costs for the CCG’s clandestine activity. Joint patrols led by the US Coast Guard and the coast guards of other allied nations can form a credible deterrent against China’s militarization of law enforcement activities. The US Coast Guard already extensively collaborates with the Taiwan Coast Guard. A joint patrol within Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone or even within the twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone, modeled after the US Coast Guard’s agreement with Taiwan’s diplomatic ally Palau , can impose significant costs for the CCG should it decide to engage in provocative behaviors like the February 2024 missile targeting incident. Additional support from Japan or even the Philippine Coast Guard, such as joint patrols, could lend further legitimacy to counter the militarization of the CCG. Taken together, these measures can send a strong message to Beijing and mark clear redlines against the CCG’s participation in the PLA’s gray zone activities.

Kitsch Liao is an associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Previously, he worked in the US Congress, in diplomatic postings, and as a cyber intelligence analyst for the private sector.

New Atlanticist By Kitsch Liao

The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review offers a window into the Taiwanese military’s issues with prioritization, operational readiness, and manpower retention.

The incoming administration will have significant decision-making power over how the United States would respond to a Taiwan crisis.

New Atlanticist By Elizabeth Freund Larus and James Rice

Washington, Manila, and their Indo-Pacific allies must work together to counter China’s maritime aggression in Philippine waters.

Image: SANSHA, CHINA - OCTOBER 14: China Coast Guard vessel conducts patrol operations on October 14, 2024 in Sansha, Hainan Province of China. Photo by Wang Jian/VCG.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMi5gFBVV95cUxPT3JyN1pLSmdtY2RjNG1uZUt1bFRnR3Y5dklpQmlBQWw1bUlMaTlBVmRFN1BoUW9xekhFcVVOV1dEVmNtczFLbmNaR0dXVmc0NE54RUg4MnhVT19PYzNxMFpDbTBUa2ZTWUJrMWxMeU5mUDdFMDVRZVBlYm1HZDlEOTBWckJrNFAwVE1IVWxaYVRrTFJQNHZ4NHd0TGpVX2I0VUlVVnNwdVpiTFVqcEUzU25IQmE3SWhRTEpkUDZCSjBPYW5WVkdkc0E4V05mOEFlV1RDbUYtc1JTLXBGaVR4Q0FJZlloUQ?oc=5