핵심요약

• 미국과 이란 간의 직접적인 군사 대결은 6개월째 진행 중입니다.
• 갈등의 종결에 대한 전략적 경로를 찾는 것이 주요 분석의 초점입니다.
• 미국의 군사 개입 동기(트럼프 대통령의 선호 vs. 외교 정책 프레임워크)에 대한 질문이 제기됩니다.
• 미국은 이란의 핵 프로그램 및 지역 군사 역량을 억제하기 위해 제재를 확대해 왔습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란-미국 간의 군사적 대립이 단순한 전술적 충돌을 넘어, 미국 외교 정책의 근본적인 목표와 연관되어 있음을 시사합니다. 투자자들은 이 분쟁이 장기적인 에너지 시장, 제재의 지속성, 그리고 미-중 경쟁 구도에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 분석해야 합니다. 갈등의 종결 여부는 향후 글로벌 지정학적 위험 평가에 결정적인 변수가 될 것입니다.

본문 1: 미국의 전략적 동기 분석

미국이 이란과의 군사적 대결을 시작한 근본적인 동기에 대한 질문은 이 분석의 핵심입니다. 일부 비평가들은 이 결정이 도널드 트럼프 대통령의 개인적 선호에 의해 주도되었을 가능성을 제기하며, 이는 명확하게 정의된 전략 없이 진행되었다는 비판을 받습니다. 그러나 다른 관점에서는 이 행동이 미국 외교 정책의 더 넓은 틀 안에서 이해되어야 하며, 수십 년간 지속된 미국의 전략적 우선순위와 연결되어 있다고 분석합니다. 이는 미국이 이란을 지역 질서를 위협하는 대리 세력 네트워크를 통해 서아시아 전역으로 영향력을 확장하려는 시도에 대응하는 과정으로 해석됩니다. 따라서 미국이 이란 문제에 대한 헌신 정도를 파악하는 것은 향후 미국의 정책 연속성과 비용 부담 능력을 예측하는 데 필수적입니다.

본문 2: 제재와 경쟁 구도의 상호작용

미국이 이란에 대해 추구해 온 전략적 우선순위는 주로 제재 확대와 핵 프로그램, 미사일 능력, 지역 군사 역량에 대한 제약 추구로 나타났습니다. 이러한 제재 정책은 이란의 지역적 영향력 확대를 견제하려는 목적을 가집니다. 이와 동시에, 이 문제는 미국이 중국과의 장기적인 경쟁이라는 더 큰 맥락에서 고려될 때 그 중요성이 더욱 명확해집니다. 미국이 이란에 대한 개입을 통해 지역 질서를 재편하려는 시도는 중국의 영향력 확대와 맞물려 더욱 복잡한 지정학적 역학 관계를 형성합니다. 이는 미국이 단일 지역의 안보를 넘어 글로벌 경쟁 구도 속에서 자신의 전략적 이익을 확보하려는 다차원적인 접근을 취하고 있음을 의미합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 리스크

현재의 교착 상태는 단기적인 군사적 해결보다는 장기적인 외교적 해법 모색이 필요함을 시사합니다. 갈등이 장기화될 경우, 에너지 시장의 변동성 확대와 제재 체제의 지속 가능성이 주요 리스크로 부상합니다. 특히, 미국과 중국 간의 경쟁 심화 속에서 이 지역 분쟁은 양국 모두에게 전략적 자원의 배분과 외교적 입지 확보라는 측면에서 중요한 시험대가 될 것입니다. 따라서 향후의 결과는 단순한 군사적 승패를 넘어, 글로벌 경제 시스템과 국제 안보 구조에 미치는 파급 효과를 중심으로 평가되어야 합니다.

결론

결론적으로, 이란-미국 분쟁의 종결은 단기적인 군사적 결과보다는 미국의 전략적 일관성과 글로벌 경쟁 환경 속에서의 외교적 목표 달성 여부에 달려 있습니다. 향후의 전개는 제재의 지속성과 미-중 경쟁의 영향을 반영하며, 이는 에너지 시장과 글로벌 안보 환경에 예측하기 어려운 변동성을 가져올 가능성이 높습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변수들을 고려하여 장기적인 포트폴리오 전략을 수립해야 할 것입니다.

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Six Months Into the Iran War: The Search for an Endgame - Al Jazeera Centre for Studies

As the direct military confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States enters its sixth month, questions are mounting over how the conflict might ultimately end. With neither side appearing willing to retreat and both moving toward a complete deadlock, several broad strategic trajectories can be identified that may shape the conflict’s course. The precise contours of what lies ahead, however, remain uncertain.

Much of the analysis of the current situation hinges on a fundamental question: why did the United States decide to enter into direct military confrontation with Iran? Was the decision, as some critics have argued, primarily driven by the personal preferences of US President Donald Trump and pursued without a clearly defined strategy, (1) or should it instead be understood within the broader framework of U.S. foreign policy? (2) And how should the apparent contradiction between Trump’s electoral promises to reject “endless wars” and his current conduct be understood? Answering these questions is important because they shed light on the extent to which Washington is committed to the conflict and prepared to bear its political, economic, and military costs.

For a significant segment of the US foreign policy establishment, containing Iran has been a strategic priority for Washington for several decades, demonstrating considerable continuity across changes in power between Republicans and Democrats. (3) As Iran expanded its regional influence across West Asia through a network of proxy forces challenging the regional order favoured by the United States, this priority assumed increasing importance. Washington pursued it through political and economic pressure, particularly by expanding sanctions and seeking to constrain Iran’s nuclear programme, missile capabilities and regional military capacity. (4)

The significance of this issue becomes even clearer when considered in the context of the United States’ long-term competition with China, which Washington regards as the most important strategic challenge of the 21st century. (5) From the perspective of US defence strategy, while China is identified as the principal long-term challenge, Iran remains one of the regional challenges that Washington must manage. (6)

Accordingly, containing Iran is an important consideration in US regional security policy, both because Iran represents an asymmetric military power capable of striking US interests beyond the immediate front lines and because Washington seeks to prevent long-term disruptions to critical energy transit routes. (7)

It can therefore be argued that the United States viewed the post-7 October 2023 environment as a particularly favourable opportunity to strike Iran. During this period, Iran’s network of regional allies was severely weakened, initially through the degradation of much of the military capabilities of Palestinian armed groups, including Hamas, (8) followed by the fall of the Assad regime in Syria (9) and significant blows to Hezbollah in Lebanon. (10) These developments substantially weakened Iran’s regional network of allies. (11)

At the same time, Tehran was confronted with a series of domestic challenges, including internal protests, economic difficulties and declining social capital. (12) (13) (14) In some cases, these challenges were accompanied by efforts by external actors to exert informational or political influence. (15) Political infighting was also increasingly visible, particularly following the suspicious death of former President Ebrahim Raisi. (16)

Against this backdrop, and with encouragement from Israel, Trump pursued bolder measures, (17) perhaps in the hope of securing a political legacy for himself while finally resolving one of the longstanding challenges facing US foreign policy—before Iran had an opportunity to rebuild its capabilities. As US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has repeatedly argued, “If we had not attacked Iran, they would have built such a conventional arsenal that attacking Iran would no longer have been possible.” (18)

Taken together, these developments ultimately culminated in the outbreak of war on 28 February 2026. The US government stated that its primary objectives were to degrade and destroy Iran’s military and missile capabilities, eliminate its weapons-production infrastructure, and prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. (19) At the same time, Trump and some political currents in the United States also raised the possibility of political change in Iran. (20)

Six months later, however, the situation is markedly different. Although neither side can be considered the victor, Iran has, at a minimum, managed to withstand the conflict despite suffering heavy losses. (21) The United States has achieved some of its tactical objectives, but it has yet to secure the strategic gains necessary to disengage from the conflict, particularly given the continued resilience of Iran’s nuclear programme, the uncertain fate of its stockpile of enriched uranium, and restrictions on maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. (22)

The question, therefore, is how the conflict’s future trajectory can now be mapped out.

Beyond the long and contentious history of relations between Iran and the United States, a significant degree of mistrust currently exists between Tehran and the administration in Washington. This mistrust is reflected in the official positions and statements of Iranian officials, who view the prospects for meaningful negotiations with the current US administration as highly limited. (22)

One example of this position can be found in recent remarks by Majid Shakeri, an adviser close to Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament and head of Iran’s negotiating delegation. In an interview, Shakeri was asked why Iran was taking actions that provoked the United States to such an extent, while countries such as Turkey, Pakistan and Oman had engaged in dialogue with Washington. The interviewer also pointed to Pakistan’s ability to maintain relatively stable relations with the United States despite possessing nuclear weapons.

In response, Shakeri framed the situation around three factors: “First, Iran’s domestic considerations and circumstances; second, the country’s specific circumstances and strategic imperatives; and third, the characteristics of the US administration. The situation in Washington is such that it is impossible to conduct effective negotiations with the Donald Trump administration. During Trump’s two presidential terms, the political team in the White House has failed to reach a lasting agreement with any country. The only example that can be cited is the trade negotiations with Canada and Mexico during Trump’s first term, and even that agreement was subsequently altered and violated during his second term. The United States has failed to reach lasting agreements with China, the United Kingdom, the European Union or Japan, and it will not reach an agreement with Iran either. As a result, many countries prefer to defer serious negotiations until the end of Trump’s presidency.” (23)

A similar position is expressed explicitly in the statements of Ghalibaf himself. On 17 June 2026, following the Islamabad negotiations, he stated in a televised interview: “I am the person who has the least trust in the United States.” (24) Ghalibaf reiterated this position on 21 June 2026, following the talks in Switzerland, stating: “We did not trust the Americans, we do not trust them now, and it is only rational to remain distrustful of them in the future as well.” (25) He repeated the same position on 10 July 2026, during a meeting with the Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament, stating: “Only those who are prepared for war can negotiate with the United States.” (26)

Taken together, these statements indicate that, within the discourse of a significant segment of Iranian policymakers, distrust of the United States has become a fundamental assumption underlying any negotiations with the current US administration. The roots of this distrust can be traced to the unilateral withdrawal of the Trump administration from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. The subsequent activation of the snapback mechanism by the European troika with US support, followed by the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran in late September 2025, (27) further reinforced this perception in Tehran. Similarly, Israel’s attacks on Iran on 13 June 2025, and US participation in strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, (28) at a time when the sixth round of negotiations between the two sides was scheduled for 15 June 2025, (29) were interpreted as evidence that Washington was not genuinely committed to negotiations.

This perception has persisted throughout the current crisis. From the perspective of Iranian officials, repeated violations of the ceasefire in April 2026, (30) US attacks on Iran’s coastal areas and military facilities, (31) and, ultimately, the collapse of the Islamabad memorandum of understanding (32) have collectively provided a series of practical examples that feature prominently in the Islamic Republic’s official narrative as evidence of the unreliability of US commitments and the difficulty of reaching a durable agreement with Washington.

In the author’s assessment, the United States currently has no intention of ending hostilities. Its present and previous actions can instead be interpreted as efforts to buy time while constraining Iran’s economic and political leverage. (33)

Iran’s approach to the ongoing tensions, however, differs significantly from that of the United States. At the heart of this divergence is the two sides’ differing perceptions of the role of “time”. (34) While Washington appears to operate under pressure to achieve tangible operational results within a medium-term timeframe, Tehran does not necessarily view the passage of time as detrimental to its interests. (35)

Iran appears to perceive four key sources of leverage. The first is the potential for an increase in global energy prices, which will be discussed in greater detail below. The second is the rising cost of sustaining the US military presence in the region, coupled with the gradual depletion of precision-guided munitions held by the US military and its allies. The third is the war’s indirect economic cost, which has placed additional pressure on America’s East Asian allies while ultimately shifting much of the burden onto Washington. Finally, if the conflict expands further, the ability to impose economic pressure on the Arab states would constitute Iran’s fourth major source of leverage.

Iran's use of ballistic and cruise missiles in "Nasr-2" operations. [IRGC]

The Oil and Petroleum Products Challenge: Perhaps one of Iran’s sources of leverage that has so far underperformed expectations is the energy market, particularly oil. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, restrictions on shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and limited attacks on oil infrastructure are all factors that directly affect global oil prices.

Despite the fact that shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has never returned to pre-war levels, global oil prices have nevertheless remained below $100 per barrel. According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) monthly Oil Market Report, global oil supply fell to 98.8 million barrels per day in June 2026, approximately 9.4 million barrels per day below the February 2026 level, representing a disruption equivalent to roughly 9 percent of global supply. (36) The most important factor preventing a sharper price spike was China’s reduction in oil imports and use of strategic reserves, which compensated for a significant portion of the supply shortfall. At the same time, Western countries also released strategic reserves to mitigate the impact of reduced supply. (37) From Iran’s perspective, however, the continuation of the war will gradually deplete these reserves, leaving the global oil market increasingly vulnerable to subsequent shocks.

By contrast, one of the United States’ principal priorities has been to maintain the flow of oil exports from the Gulf. Although tanker traffic through the southern approaches to the Strait of Hormuz and the waters of Oman has declined significantly compared with pre-war levels, approximately 3–5 million barrels of oil per day—equivalent to nearly 25 percent of the previous volume—continue to pass through the route. This has been made possible primarily by US military operations against Iranian military facilities on the islands and along the coastline, as well as the use of alternative pipeline routes through the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. These routes have offset more than 35 percent of the Strait of Hormuz’s previous oil-transit capacity. (38) (39)

Alongside these measures, lower Chinese import demand, releases from strategic reserves and increased exports by some producers—particularly the United States, in both the oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets—have helped prevent a severe price shock. (40) As a result, market reactions to supply disruptions have become increasingly muted following each round of hostilities, with oil prices gradually moving closer to pre-war levels. This trend has reduced the economic cost to Washington of sustaining its strategy of containing Iran.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiggFBVV95cUxPZ09Udl95RmRENGtBSENXZGJJU202VU1BOFo5X2JHaVRrZW1VS1VTbjlSYU5RUFUzZmlLd01WMHhHeEI2Mm80VDFXalZYcDEwRWlhZ19QTFJqSkhCVzFQMGcxN0JwNW9JVHNCZy1NMUJHNk12UUdaejZUbE1faWRKbXBn?oc=5