미국과 이스라엘의 이란 전쟁, 전략적 재앙으로 판명
The war on Iran was a strategic disaster for America and Israel - Middle East Eye
미국과 이란의 갈등이 장기화될 경우, 중동 지역 안정성에 대한 우려가 증시에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 다만, 현재 시장은 이미 이러한 리스크를 일부 반영한 상태이므로 단기적인 변동성이 예상됩니다.
핵심 요약
미국은 아프가니스탄과 이라크에서 수조 달러를 지출했지만 목표를 달성하지 못하며 군사력의 한계를 보여주었습니다.
핵심요약
- 미국은 아프가니스탄과 이라크에서 수조 달러를 지출했지만 정치적 목표를 달성하지 못했습니다
- 이란은 군사 인프라가 타격받고 주요 지도자 및 과학자들이 암살당했으며 경제가 타격을 입었습니다
- 전쟁은 서아시아의 힘의 균형을 둘러싼 것이었습니다
- 군사력이 정치적 결과를 결정할 수 없음을 보여주었습니다
도입
이 기사는 투자자들에게 군사력과 정치적 결과 사이의 복잡한 관계를 이해하는 데 중요한 통찰을 제공합니다. 군사적 승리와 정치적 성공이 반드시 일치하지 않음을 보여주며, 이는 글로벌 시장과 지정학적 리스크 평가에 중요한 영향을 미칩니다.
본문 1: 군사력의 한계와 정치적 결과
기사는 미국이 아프가니스탄과 이라크에서 수조 달러를 지출했지만 정치적 목표를 달성하지 못했음을 강조합니다. 이는 군사력이 정치적 결과를 결정할 수 없음을 보여주며, 이는 글로벌 시장과 지정학적 리스크 평가에 중요한 영향을 미칩니다. 미국은 아프가니스탄과 이라크에서 수조 달러를 지출했지만 정치적 목표를 달성하지 못했으며, 이는 군사력이 정치적 결과를 결정할 수 없음을 보여주었습니다.
본문 2: 서아시아의 힘의 균형
이 전쟁은 서아시아의 힘의 균형을 둘러싼 것이었으며, 이는 지역 안정성과 글로벌 시장에 중요한 영향을 미칩니다. 이란은 군사 인프라가 타격받고 주요 지도자 및 과학자들이 암살당했으며 경제가 타격을 입었지만, 여전히 지역 내 영향력을 유지하고 있습니다. 이는 지역 안정성과 글로벌 시장에 중요한 영향을 미칩니다.
결론
이 기사는 군사력과 정치적 결과 사이의 복잡한 관계를 이해하는 데 중요한 통찰을 제공합니다. 군사적 승리와 정치적 성공이 반드시 일치하지 않으며, 이는 글로벌 시장과 지정학적 리스크 평가에 중요한 영향을 미칩니다. 미래에는 군사력과 정치적 결과 사이의 복잡한 관계를 지속적으로 모니터링하는 것이 중요합니다.
Original Article
The war on Iran was a strategic disaster for America and Israel - Middle East Eye
When neoconservative writer Robert Kagan, who spent decades as a cheerleader for America's forever wars, warned that the confrontation with Iran could become one of the greatest strategic defeats in modern American history, many dismissed his assessment as alarmist and exaggerated.
After all, the conventional wisdom in the West is that Iran had suffered extensive damage. Its military infrastructure was targeted, its foremost leaders, senior commanders and scientists were assassinated, its economy was battered, and the Axis of Resistance absorbed serious blows across multiple fronts.
How could anyone speak of Iranian victory under such circumstances?
The answer depends on a question that war experts and military historians have wrestled with for centuries: how should victory be measured?
If wars are judged by the amount of destruction inflicted, then the side possessing overwhelming military superiority will almost always appear victorious. Yet history repeatedly demonstrates that destruction and victory are not the same thing.
The United States destroyed vast portions of Vietnam and still failed to achieve its objectives, while the Soviet Union inflicted enormous damage in Afghanistan and still withdrew in defeat.
The US spent two decades in Afghanistan and trillions of dollars only to watch the government it had built collapse within days of its departure. In Iraq , it carried out regime change and attempted social engineering before having to withdraw in humiliation after facing fierce resistance and spending trillions of dollars.
In each case, military power has proven it can destroy but not necessarily dictate political outcomes. This distinction is essential for understanding the recent confrontation between Iran and the US-Israel axis.
The war was never fundamentally about nuclear enrichment , nor was it simply about missiles, sanctions or Iranian support for regional allies.
At its core, it was a fight over the future balance of power in West Asia. Washington and Tel Aviv sought to consolidate a regional order built on Israeli supremacy and American dominance, while forcing Iran to abandon the policies and alliances that had made it the principal obstacle to that project.
By that measure, the war ended not with an Iranian surrender but with a profound failure of the American-Zionist project.
To understand Iran's victory, one must begin before the first missile was launched.
On 22 September 2023, standing before the United Nations General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unveiled his vision of a "New Middle East".
The stereotypes and perceptions built through years about Iran being run by an irrational theocratic 'regime' proved not only overblown but also strategically costly
The map he displayed effectively erased Palestine , treating a question long considered the central issue of the region as a problem that had already been solved.
The future, according to this vision, belonged to normalisation agreements under the so-called Abraham Accords , economic corridors, technological integration and strategic partnerships linking Israel to the Persian or Arab Gulf and beyond.
The Abraham Accords were only the beginning.
Israel's integration into US Central Command, expanding relations with US-allied Gulf states, and the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), all pointed towards a regional order in which Israel would emerge as the dominant military, economic and technological power.
The Zionist regime would provide security, Iran would be isolated, Palestine would be marginalised and resistance movements would be weakened or eliminated. The region would finally be reorganised around Israeli supremacy backed by American power.
The events of 7 October 2023 shattered that vision.
What followed was more than a war on Gaza ; it was a regional struggle over the future political order of the Middle East. The subsequent campaigns against Gaza, Lebanon , Yemen , Syria , Iraq and eventually Iran, as well as the attempt to confiscate wide areas in the West Bank , were all connected to this larger objective.
The very outcome that Netanyahu and his Zionist and imperialist allies sought to prevent ultimately became the defining consequence of the war. Palestine returned to the centre of global politics, and Iran survived the assault designed to break it.
The assumptions underlying much of the American and Israeli strategy rested on the belief that sustained military pressure, economic warfare, an extensive sanctions regime, cyber operations, assassinations and internal unrest could eventually trigger political collapse or force strategic capitulation.
For years, discussions in Washington and Tel Aviv revolved around various forms of regime change or collapse, whether through maximum pressure, internal fragmentation, elite divisions, economic exhaustion or social upheaval.
None of these succeeded. The Islamic Republic suffered greatly, particularly economically, but its system remained intact. State institutions continued to function, command structures remained operational, leadership succession took place without systemic disruption, and government ministries continued their work.