핵심요약

• 코로나19 당시 인도 정부는 고위험군에 대한 검사를 우선시하며 의료 자원 배분을 관리했습니다.
• 인도 에너지 파이프라인은 중동의 지정학적 사건으로 인해 중단되어 에너지 안보가 위협받았습니다.
• 팬데믹 상황에서 백신 및 의료 자원의 적시 배송(just-in-time delivery)이 핵심 성공 요인이었습니다.
• 인도 경제는 팬데믹과 지정학적 충격이라는 상이한 위기 속에서 공급망 및 에너지 의존도의 취약성을 드러냈습니다.

도입

본 기사는 코로나19 팬데믹과 중동 에너지 충격이라는 두 가지 상이한 위기 속에서 인도가 어떻게 대응했는지 분석합니다. 이는 투자자들이 단순히 거시 경제 지표를 넘어, 팬데믹과 지정학적 위험이 국가의 핵심 공급망과 에너지 안보에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 데 중요합니다. 인도의 경험은 글로벌 공급망의 취약성과 지정학적 변동성이 경제 안정성에 미치는 영향을 시사합니다.

본문 1: 팬데믹 상황에서의 자원 관리와 물류의 중요성

코로나19 팬데믹 초기, 인도는 의료 자원과 PPE(개인 보호 장비)의 부족이라는 도전에 직면했습니다. 정부는 자원을 분산하여 고위험군에 집중하는 방식으로 대응했으며, 이는 의료 시스템의 효율성을 유지하는 데 필수적이었습니다. 특히 백신 배포 과정에서 'just-in-time delivery'라는 전략은 자원 부족 상황에서 효율적인 대응을 가능하게 했습니다. 이 경험은 팬데믹과 같은 전례 없는 위기 상황에서 물류 및 자원 배분의 효율성이 국가 대응 능력에 얼마나 결정적인지를 보여줍니다. 자원의 적시 배송 능력은 공중 보건 위기 대응의 성공에 직접적인 영향을 미쳤습니다.

본문 2: 지정학적 충격과 에너지 공급망의 취약성

팬데믹 경험 이후 약 6년이 지난 시점에서, 인도는 중동의 에너지 공급망이 미국과 이스라엘의 이란 공격으로 인해 중단되는 지정학적 위기에 직면했습니다. 이 사건은 인도의 에너지 안보가 외부 지정학적 사건에 의해 얼마나 취약한지를 명확히 보여줍니다. 중동 지역의 불안정성은 국제 에너지 시장의 변동성을 증폭시켰고, 이는 인도의 경제에 직접적인 물가 상승 압력과 에너지 수입 불안정성을 야기했습니다. 이는 인도 경제가 글로벌 에너지 시장의 변동성에 매우 민감하게 반응하며, 지정학적 리스크가 경제적 결과로 즉각적으로 전이됨을 의미합니다.

본문 3: 장기적인 리스크와 향후 전망

인도는 팬데믹과 지정학적 충격이라는 두 가지 거대한 위기를 겪으면서, 단기적인 위기 대응 능력뿐만 아니라 장기적인 공급망 다각화와 에너지 자원의 전략적 확보의 필요성을 절감했습니다. 향후 인도의 경제 성장은 글로벌 공급망의 안정성과 에너지 자원의 다각화에 달려있습니다. 지정학적 긴장이 지속되는 한, 인도 경제는 에너지 수입 비용 상승과 공급망 병목 현상에 지속적으로 노출될 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 장기적인 관점에서 에너지 자원의 안정적인 확보와 공급망의 회복탄력성을 높이는 노력이 필수적입니다.

결론

인도의 사례는 위기 상황에서 자원 관리의 효율성과 지정학적 위험에 대한 민감도를 동시에 고려해야 함을 강조합니다. 향후 인도의 경제적 안정성은 글로벌 공급망의 회복탄력성과 에너지 자원의 전략적 다각화에 달려있습니다. 투자자들은 지정학적 변동성과 공급망 병목 현상이 인도 경제에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 모니터링해야 할 것입니다. 특히 에너지 및 핵심 광물 공급망의 안정성을 점검하는 것이 중요합니다

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Steady In the Storm: India navigates oil shock and an uncertain Middle East - Open Magazine

IN FEBRUARY 2020, AS Covid cases began to be detected in increasing numbers, the central hall of Parliament was gripped with a sudden scare. News spread that an MP, who had just the other day mingled with several people, was down with Covid. The cavernous hall in the old Parliament building, usually a hub of political talk, saw MPs and mediapersons urgently recalling whether they had met the MP who contracted the virus. Attendance in Parliament thinned rapidly, and a few days later, the prime minister announced a nationwide lockdown. The decision to bring normal activity to a grinding halt was tough but necessary. The overall number of infected persons was small but growing at an alarming pace, and India lacked the testing kits and PPE (personal protective equipment) suits needed by medical personnel to attend to highly infectious patients. Aware that the virus was being transmitted mostly through international travellers, the government focused testing on high-risk groups rather than opting for widespread sampling that would have spread resources thin. Despite criticism, the government stood its ground, even as hos­pital capacity and production of PPE suits were ramped up at warp speed. When the anti-Covid vaccine was ready for use, a similar decision was taken to begin vaccinating the most vulnerable, such as the elderly and those with compromised immunity. The entire exercise hinged on just-in-time delivery of vaccine and medical resources as Covid cases spiked and patients crowded hospitals. The learnings from the Covid pandemic proved useful when a very different—but equally demanding—crisis blew up almost exactly six years later. The American and Israeli attacks on Iran and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz abruptly choked off India’s energy pipeline from the Middle East. AGAIN, AS DURING Covid, the challenge was deciding which section of the population needed more protection. Aware that shortages of cooking gas for home use could trigger mass panic, the government decided that com­mercial and catering establishments could wait but households could not. The strategy was aimed at easing fears that the domes­tic “chulha” or stove would shut down and there would be no food on the table. Already, videos of lines outside cooking gas retailers were doing the rounds, and there was concern over social media telegraphing the “bad” news. The decision to ramp up domestic production of cooking gas and prevent any disruption in the retail chain was crucial as the public panic subsided in a week or so. The government initiated a multi-ministry daily media brief­ing—as was the case during Covid—to address public anxieties. Sujata Sharma, joint secretary in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, repeatedly assured that the delivery cycle for a cook­ing gas cylinder remained two-and-a-half days. To encourage judi­cious use of cooking gas and ensure better supply management, a replacement booking could not be made before 25 days, a marginal increase from the earlier 21 days. There was no hike in pump rates for petrol and diesel, and the first revision happened only on May 15. The crisis in the Middle East coincided with intense electoral battles in Assam, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal and Puducherry, and the government was accused of delaying price hikes for political considerations. The expectation that an office party would wilfully damage its own prospects during an election was always unrealistic, but the government did take a few steps to protect the finances of oil com­panies. An excise duty cut of ₹10 per litre for petrol and diesel on March 27 added to a revenue hit of more than ₹1 lakh crore. The government’s effort was directed at protecting consumers from savage increases in fuel and cooking gas costs, which would cause distress and impact consumption. Oil marketing companies did their version of just-in-time deliveries, carefully mapping sale volumes and geographical distribution of population almost on a pump-to-pump basis. The decisions were complemented by an urgent diversification of oil and gas purchases, while the suspen­sion of sanctions on Russian oil was an unanticipated bonus. Addressing a public meeting on July 4 at the inauguration of a HPCL Rajasthan Refinery Limited (HRRL) plant, Prime Minis­ter Narendra Modi said, “India took potent decisions, made cor­rect evaluations, charted effective strategies, used its domestic resources effectively and constructively leveraged its diplomatic power to successfully weather the challenges.” As the fragile truce—despite the continuing hiccups—between the US and Iran held out hopes of oil and gas flowing through the Hormuz, Modi understood the need to explain how India managed the crisis. He thanked people for responding to his call to reduce dis­cretionary foreign travel and economise on fuel expenses that cost dollars and said: “New India does not step back from its resolve or slow down its pace of development irrespective of the immensity of the challenge.” Precise assessments of the war in the Middle East were backed by hard-nosed diplomacy. With India relying on imports to meet 60 per cent of its LPG needs, domestic refiner­ies were reconfigured within seven days to divert gas meant for industrial use to domestic cooking gas. The price of cooking gas cylinders could have rocketed to ₹2,000 but remained ₹950 for regular customers and ₹650 for Ujjwala beneficiaries. Modi attacked the opposition for seeking to spread panic and pointed out that the previous Congress government in Rajasthan refused to cooperate in setting up the refinery he was inaugurating. There was a standstill from 2018 to 2023, and things changed only when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) returned to office in the state. He pointed to the impressive rise in India’s refinery capacity, cur­rently the fourth largest in the world, which saved additional costs. Modi detailed how India strategically leveraged its diplomacy to expand its fuel import base from just 25-26 countries to over 40 na­tions. “India delivered a crystal clear message to the entire world that for us, the national interest and the welfare of our citizens remain completely paramount,” he said. Severe fertiliser shortages due to the Ukraine war drove global urea prices above ₹3,000 per bag, but the government absorbed the burden of higher subsidies and asked embassies to secure alternatives while promoting natural farming at home. The Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme (ECLGS) to provide working capital to MSMEs—another Covid-time initia­tive—facilitated an additional 20 per cent loan from banks backed by a 100 per cent government guarantee. “It is the direct result of such financial interventions that our small and large industries are feeling completely secure,” Modi said. The prime minister’s references to In­dia’s diplomacy are relevant in the context of criticism of India’s cautious reaction to the death of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei in the US-Israeli attack on February 28. While hindsight can offer clearer vision, the out­come of the conflict—that Iran would hold down the US to a draw—was hardly evident. An evolving situation requires tactical ad­justments, and while Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri signed the condolence reg­ister at the Iranian embassy in New Delhi only on March 5, both sides understood the compulsions at work. The Iranians let the matter slide, recognising that India had not offered any assistance to its attackers and had its interests in the Gulf region. At a time when Iran was at war with the US, picking more fights did not make sense either. As for India, a watch and wait policy was more prudent than offering homilies on a conflict it was in no position to influence. “We had no role in the war and no role in ending it. Our task was to manage the fallout of the war as best we could,” said a senior BJP leader. India’s approach did not fundamentally alter the big goals and markers of its foreign policy, even if there were course corrections along the way. Though the bickering and sporadic exchange of fire between the US and Iran continue, the possibility of a more durable rapprochement, as unlikely as it may seem, between the two sworn enemies cannot be ruled out. As it is, the lifting of sanctions on Iran’s oil on August 21 during the war was hardly an anticipated outcome. “The point is that while India has interests in all regions, they are not equal. What happens in the Gulf influences India the most. This is also a region which does not compete with India. The Gulf can buy Indian products and use our manpower and has surplus resources that can be invested in India,” Syed Akbaruddin, former diplomat and currently the dean of Kautilya School of Public Policy, told Open. There are, of course, reasons to pursue relations with Iran, which is important for India’s access to Central Asia. Also, despite Islamabad’s role in peace talks, Iran and Pakistan have had their share of differences. Yet, Iran’s attacks on Gulf nations hurt Indian interests directly in a region best described as India’s “near West.” While the impor­tance of the immediate neighbourhood cannot be discounted, India competes with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and even Pakistan in the export of manpower, cotton, textiles and leather goods. The scope for economic cooperation with the Gulf region is vast. India has free trade agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Oman, and there is a strong case for concluding one with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as a whole. The case for linkages has gained traction with America’s ac­tions making it evident that the US-led security order, on which Arab states and even Egypt depended, is no longer a given. The US is very likely to pursue great power policies that do not factor in the impact—let alone concurrence—of allies and partners. The prevail­ing situation opens the doors for powers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to explore a role for themselves, and the same goes for India. The war has shown that holding the US to a stale­mate, as Iran did by attacking the Gulf states and blockading the Strait of Hormuz, is as good as a win. Despite the seemingly clumsy American diplomacy, US President Donald Trump did realise that things were not getting better and found a way to end the war. With possible access to Iranian oil, In­dia’s options may have improved despite Pakistan exploiting a tactical opening to present itself as a “mediator” and enhance its status. Banking on Trump’s “goodwill” is a dicey proposition, and on the other hand, the power differential between India and Pakistan continues to grow.

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