핵심요약

• 양해각서(MOU)의 14개 조항 중 거의 전부가 파기됨
• 미국은 이란에 대한 군사 작전 중단 의무를 위반하고 150개 이상의 표적을 타격함
• 미국은 30일 이내에 해협 봉쇄를 해제하고 군대를 철수해야 하는 의무를 이행하지 않음
• 협상 기간(60일)은 실질적으로 무의미해짐

도입

본 기사는 미국과 이란 간의 양해각서(MOU)가 어떻게 파기되었는지에 초점을 맞춥니다. 이는 국제 협정의 형식적 합의가 실제 지정학적 현실과 군사적 행동 앞에서 얼마나 취약한지를 보여줍니다. 투자자 관점에서 이 사건은 국제 정세의 예측 불가능성과 계약의 구속력에 대한 근본적인 질문을 던지며, 중동 지역의 에너지 및 무역 경로에 대한 변동성 위험을 재평가해야 함을 시사합니다.

본문 1: 협정 이행의 실패와 계약의 유연성

미국이 이란과의 협상을 위해 양해각서를 체결했음에도 불구하고, 양측은 즉각적인 군사적 대립을 재개했습니다. 양해각서의 14개 조항 중 대부분이 위반되었으며, 이는 협정 체결 시점의 정치적 의지가 장기적인 합의보다 단기적인 군사적 이익에 의해 압도되었음을 의미합니다. 특히, 군사 작전의 즉각적인 중단 요구(제1조)와 해협 봉쇄 해제(제4조)와 같은 핵심 조항들이 이행되지 않은 것은, 협정 자체가 정치적 의지에 따라 언제든지 무효화될 수 있는 유연한 틀에 불과했음을 입증합니다. 미국이 30일 내에 군대를 철수하고 봉쇄를 해제해야 하는 의무를 이행하지 않고 오히려 재차 군사 행동을 감행한 것은, 국제법적 구속력보다 국가 이익이 우선한다는 현실을 명확히 보여줍니다.

본문 2: 지정학적 리스크의 현실화

협정 파기는 단순히 문서상의 위반을 넘어, 중동 지역의 지정학적 리스크가 어떻게 실제 군사적 행동으로 전환되는지를 보여주는 사례입니다. 이 사건은 국제 협약이나 양자 합의가 실제 강대국의 이해관계와 현장 상황에 의해 얼마나 쉽게 무력화될 수 있는지에 대한 우려를 증폭시킵니다. 특히 호르무즈 해협과 같은 주요 해상 통로의 안정성은 이러한 협정의 실패로 인해 더욱 불안정해졌습니다. 이는 에너지 공급망에 직접적인 영향을 미치므로, 해당 지역의 원유 및 가스 가격에 대한 변동성을 키우는 주요 요인으로 작용합니다. 따라서 투자자들은 공식적인 외교 채널보다는 현장 군사적 행동과 실질적인 통제력을 기준으로 위험을 평가해야 합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 시장 영향

이러한 협정의 파기는 향후 국제 관계에서 외교적 합의보다는 군사적 역량과 실질적인 통제권이 더 중요한 요소로 작용할 것임을 시사합니다. 장기적인 관점에서 볼 때, 이러한 불안정성은 중동 지역의 정치적 불확실성을 지속시키며, 이는 장기적인 투자 결정에 있어 프리미엄 리스크 요인으로 작용합니다. 향후 국제 사회는 공식적인 합의보다는 상호 견제와 군사적 균형을 통해 안정성을 확보하려는 경향을 보일 것으로 전망됩니다. 따라서 에너지 및 관련 무역 상품 시장에서는 이러한 지정학적 변동성이 지속적으로 반영될 가능성이 높습니다.

결론

미국과 이란 간의 양해각서가 파기된 사건은 국제 외교 협정의 한계와 지정학적 리스크의 현실적 힘을 명확히 보여줍니다. 향후 국제 관계는 공식적인 합의보다는 군사적 역량과 실질적인 통제권에 의해 좌우될 가능성이 높습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 불안정성이 에너지 시장과 글로벌 공급망에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 주시하며 리스크 관리 전략을 수립해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilAFBVV95cUxOeTRzelZBOVYtejVQUl82UVExaUFabTJQY1ZERHhSYmRKQjRMYVNrU3hfNVJNS0ZTSC00bWpvTTlXVFhOdGx5eFozMEFMMnRYR1hZbFlES1Q3UnVNY1lOOU5VWWRsbUlQRFRTWm1uY2hNeFIwV3ZqVERxQ25lQUlBNDBFY3doUm5kMWhaTWVSZE5uTmkx?oc=5

An Iran Agreement Honored Only in the Breach - The Atlantic

T he U.S.-Iran war was supposed to be over when President Trump signed a memorandum of understanding last month at a dinner table in the Lower Gallery of Versailles. But Trump has a famously flexible definition of what constitutes a binding contract, Iran feels that it has little to lose from further hostilities, and the two nations have essentially remained at war ever since.

The agreement was designed to make permanent a cease-fire and to usher in a negotiating period of up to 60 days to settle the many disputes at the root of the conflict. About halfway through the 60-day window, the memorandum’s 14 terms have been honored almost entirely in the breach. The only clause that took immediate effect that has not been violated is the one that says the two sides will keep talking. (Even that requires an asterisk: The talks remain on, but recent belligerence has prompted a time-out, U.S. officials told me.)

The MOU’s other short-term obligations have already been broken by actions each side has taken in the Strait of Hormuz, by the intermittent resumption of conflict, or by different interpretations of ambiguous clauses. Clause one, for instance, requires “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts.” Since the signing, the United States and Iran have engaged in at least three tit-for-tat exchanges, with the U.S. striking more than 150 targets over the weekend. The U.S. was obligated to lift its blockade of the strait and to withdraw its forces from “proximity” to Iran within 30 days, according to clause four. Instead, Trump notified Congress that hostilities with Iran had resumed, and earlier this week, he reestablished the blockade as well. A huge U.S. force remains in the Gulf. U.S. strikes continued yesterday afternoon.

Based on the record so far, Trump’s gambit of bringing Iran to the table, to achieve goals the U.S. military alone could not, appears to be in serious jeopardy. Many of the European and Middle Eastern officials I spoke with are skeptical. (Before his death over the weekend, Senator Lindsey Graham , a staunch Trump ally, bluntly predicted that talks, although worth a shot, would likely fail.) So by the time Trump declared last week that the cease-fire between the U.S. and Iran was “over,” he may have thought he was making news; he was really just stating aloud what had already been self-evident.

That’s a problem for Trump, because he is in a hurry to move on from the war. Talks could yet miraculously deliver on the lofty goal of ending Iran’s nuclear program by August 21, the initial deadline, or they could deliver something less ambitious that Trump is willing to accept. The two countries share the common goal of wanting the Strait of Hormuz to reopen (albeit with a disagreement over how) and for the fighting to stop. But the United States and Iran may instead be left in a resource-sapping limbo of intermittent conflict for the foreseeable future, with the global economy suffering the consequences.

“The more you show you are in a rush, the more the Iranians will use time as a weapon,” Jon Alterman, the chair in global security and geostrategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told me. “Neither side wants to be fighting, but neither side can figure out a way to avoid fighting.”

T he MOU, in its first and fourth clauses , requires the fighting to stop and U.S. forces to withdraw from “the proximity of” Iran as the first step toward establishing trust. Neither has happened.

As the body of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, killed on the opening day of the war, lay in state for mourners across Iran and Iraq last week, Tehran launched drone and missile attacks on U.S. military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as on three commercial tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. Central Command responded with strikes on approximately 80 Iranian targets.

The escalation prompted Trump to declare, from the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara, that the cease-fire was effectively “over,” even as U.S. officials assured me that the diplomatic track remained alive. Things got only hotter from there. Strikes escalated over the weekend, and on Saturday, Iran said that the Strait of Hormuz was closed. Trump then said that the U.S. blockade of the strait would be restored, targeting only “Iran’s ships or customers from entering or leaving.” The episode raised the likelihood of a prolonged and simmering conflict and dimmed the prospects of a nuclear deal.

Trump “has always been clear that if Iran shoots, we will shoot back,” Anna Kelly, White House spokesperson, told me in a statement. “Iran wants to make a deal, but they should get serious or risk the consequences.” She described the memorandum as “performance-based.”

Safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, which the memorandum also promised in clause five, is closely linked to the fighting. But what safe passage looks like has become hostage to different interpretations. The language of the memorandum was deliberately vague in parts, to secure a preliminary agreement, but those vagaries have complicated everything since. Depending on the day, the strait has been either unsafe or unpassable, rendering the agreement’s guarantee of “safe passage of commercial vessels” moot.

A senior U.S. official, reading the MOU’s text to reporters, stressed that the clause meant that traffic through the strait would remain “fundamentally toll-free” through the 60 days of talks and beyond. After Iran said that it had the right to impose a toll, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said , “No country is allowed to charge tolls or fees on an international waterway.”

Despite that, Trump decided that a toll isn’t such a bad idea. “The U.S.A. will be, from this point forward, known as ‘THE GUARDIAN OF THE HORMUZ STRAIT,’” he wrote on Truth Social on Monday, adding that the U.S. would charge a 20 percent fee on all cargo. Experts told me that no country would be willing to pay. Sure enough, yesterday morning, Trump backtracked and said that the U.S. would recoup costs through investment from Gulf states, not through a toll.

The poorly written fifth clause also says that Oman and Iran—the two nations that flank the strait—will work together to “define the future administration and maritime services.” That ambiguity has proved far more consequential than U.S. negotiators anticipated. Tehran and Muscat have confirmed that they are in discussions to jointly manage commercial shipping through the strait in the future, adding that services provided to transiting vessels would carry associated costs. Clearly, Iran and Oman—and, at least temporarily, Trump—disagree with Rubio.

The answer to the question at the center of the dispute—Who will decide the rules for commercial shipping in the strait?—remains elusive. Yet it may not prove fatal. “Both sides in their own way want traffic to resume,” Michael Singh, the managing director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told me. “Neither side has a desire, or even a strategy, for a wider war. So this is really about talking-and-fighting their way through who gets to control the strait, on whose terms, who is going to benefit, and so forth.”

“The core transaction was: Iran opens the Strait of Hormuz, and we give them economic incentives to do it,” Singh added. “It’s clear that has not happened.”

T he biggest carrot the U.S. dangled to lure Iran to the table was a package of incentives to help Tehran repair its devastated economy. Different parts of that relief are contained in different clauses of the agreement, with the ultimate goal of removing all U.S. sanctions. But the provisions are already under severe stress.

The Treasury Department issued waivers on sanctions targeting Iran’s oil sector, as called for immediately in clause 10, the first tangible economic concession to Iran. But after the attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the department revoked those waivers. Companies were given until July 17 to wrap up existing transactions before U.S. sanctions snap back into force.

The reversal was significant not simply because the waivers disappeared but also because they had been intended to demonstrate that diplomacy could produce immediate economic rewards for the regime. Instead, the agreement’s most immediate relief proved to be one of its shortest-lived provisions.

The complete lifting of sanctions, envisaged in clause seven, was designed to coax Iran into abandoning its nuclear program and disposing of its enriched uranium, spelled out in clause eight, although the details were kicked to the longer negotiations. When the text of the memorandum was read to reporters, the U.S. official said: “We are saying the sanctions relief and the nuclear issues are connected, and to the extent that you perform on the nuclear questions, you will get the sanctions relief.” The two were supposed to happen in tandem. But given that the preliminary step of issuing waivers has already been revoked, any further progress remains uncertain.

Trump “has always been clear that if Iran shoots, we will shoot back,” Anna Kelly, White House spokesperson, told me. “Iran wants to make a deal, but they should get serious or risk the consequences.” She described the memorandum as “performance-based.”

Even a separate promise to maintain the status quo has been challenged. Clause nine calls for Iran to maintain its nuclear program and the U.S. to hold off any new sanctions, until they reach further agreement. But on July 10, the U.S. announced “action to cut off the financial lifelines sustaining Iran’s ruling elite” by imposing fresh sanctions.

The memorandum also commits the U.S. and its regional partners to developing a plan for Iran worth at least $300 billion within 60 days. It is one of the agreement’s boldest proposals. It was also news to many of those expected to provide the funds. When the text of clause six was revealed, I started receiving messages from senior regional officials who were hearing for the first time about their own governments’ supposed contributions. They were asking me what, exactly, had been promised.

U.S. officials insist that the provision has been widely misunderstood by the public and the media. They say that the U.S. does not envision Gulf governments depositing hundreds of billions of dollars into Iranian state coffers. Rather, the goal is to create a framework that encourages long-term foreign investment in a post-sanctions Iran, particularly in sectors such as energy and infrastructure. Whether or not that plan survives, it faces at least one big problem: Iran has spent the past several weeks attacking some of the very countries now being asked to help it rebuild.

Despite the memorandum being replete with violations, vagaries, and tough-to-fulfill ambitions, one provision has so far proved resilient. Clause three calls for both sides to talk for 60 days. That period can be extended if both sides agree. So in the absence of a major breakthrough, the president who objected to forever wars may have landed himself in a forever negotiation—if that’s what he decides he wants to do.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilAFBVV95cUxOeTRzelZBOVYtejVQUl82UVExaUFabTJQY1ZERHhSYmRKQjRMYVNrU3hfNVJNS0ZTSC00bWpvTTlXVFhOdGx5eFozMEFMMnRYR1hZbFlES1Q3UnVNY1lOOU5VWWRsbUlQRFRTWm1uY2hNeFIwV3ZqVERxQ25lQUlBNDBFY3doUm5kMWhaTWVSZE5uTmkx?oc=5