핵심요약

• 이라크 정부의 대응은 지역 전쟁으로의 확산 위험을 내포하고 있습니다.
• 이라크 국가의 구조적 취약성과 의사결정 권한의 파편화가 주요 위험 요인입니다.
• 무장 단체들이 공식 보안 기관 밖에서 활동하며 '중립' 구호를 무시하고 있습니다.
• 이라크의 불안정성은 지역의 정치, 경제, 안보 이익에 직접적인 영향을 미칩니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란-미국 간의 군사적 긴장 상황이 이라크 정부의 미온적인 대응이 지역 전쟁으로 확대될 위험을 어떻게 증폭시키는지 분석합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 불안정성이 이라크의 경제 안정성과 에너지 시장에 미칠 잠재적 충격을 이해해야 합니다. 정부의 구조적 취약성이 외부 충격에 얼마나 취약한지를 파악하는 것이 핵심입니다.

본문 1: 국가 구조의 취약성과 위험 증폭

이라크 국가의 가장 큰 위험은 정부의 구조적 취약성과 의사결정 권한의 파편화에서 비롯됩니다. 공식적인 보안 체계 밖에서 활동하는 무장 단체들이 존재하며, 이들은 '중립'이라는 수사만 무시하고 있습니다. 이는 이라크 정부가 통제할 수 없는 비공식적 권력이 국가 안보와 경제 정책에 개입할 수 있음을 의미합니다. 이러한 구조적 결함은 외부의 군사적 압력에 대한 이라크 정부의 효과적인 대응 능력을 심각하게 저해하며, 잠재적인 지역 충돌 발생 시 국가 붕괴 위험을 가속화합니다. 따라서 이라크의 경제적, 안보적 이익은 이러한 내부 분열로 인해 심각한 위협에 직면해 있습니다.

본문 2: 무장 단체의 행동과 외교적 공백

무장 단체들은 외세의 철수 시한(9월)을 이용하여 무기 포기를 거부하거나 모호한 신호를 보내는 등 적극적인 행동을 보이고 있습니다. 이는 이라크 정부의 통제 밖에 있는 군사적 실체가 존재하며, 이는 국제적 외교적 노력이나 공식적인 협상 메커니즘이 무력화될 수 있음을 시사합니다. 이러한 무장 세력의 행동은 이라크 정부가 주도하는 평화적 해결책이 아닌, 강제적인 군사적 충돌로 이어질 가능성을 높입니다. 결과적으로, 지역 국가들은 이라크의 내부 불안정성이 지역 안보에 미치는 영향을 심각하게 고려해야 합니다.

본문 3: 지역 경제 및 에너지 시장에 미치는 파급 효과

이라크의 불안정성은 단순히 국내 정치 문제에 국한되지 않고, 광범위한 지역 경제 및 에너지 시장에 파급 효과를 미칩니다. 이라크는 주요 에너지 수출국으로서, 내부 분쟁이 심화될 경우 석유 및 가스 공급망에 직접적인 차질을 초래할 수 있습니다. 이러한 공급 불안정성은 국제 에너지 가격의 변동성을 키우고, 이는 전 세계적인 인플레이션 압력으로 작용할 수 있습니다. 또한, 이라크의 정치적 불안정성은 외국인 투자자들에게 높은 위험 프리미엄을 요구하게 만들며, 이는 이라크 관련 자산 시장의 불안정성을 증대시킵니다. 따라서 지역 투자자들은 지정학적 리스크를 반영하여 이라크 관련 포트폴리오에 대한 신중한 접근이 필요합니다.

결론

결론적으로, 이라크 정부의 느슨한 대응은 지역 분쟁으로의 확산 위험을 높이는 핵심 요인입니다. 이라크의 구조적 취약성과 비공식적 무장 세력의 존재는 향후 지역 정세에서 예측 불가능한 변동성을 야기할 가능성이 높습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 리스크가 에너지 가격과 지역 경제에 미치는 장기적인 영향을 면밀히 관찰하고 포트폴리오를 조정해야 할 것입니다. 향후 이라크의 정치적 안정화 노력이 지역 안보와 경제에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠지에 대한 지속적인 모니터링이 필요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMipwFBVV95cUxNUkYzeGpJbzhzenBldVZpYlZheXVHTWNuMlMxQkRxMEJia1Z2UlpHZmdWbW5ldi1PdFNZdEdGTTg1VmdlY2J0TFM0ZXl3VkdTWkpKbHVUbzhfTmNWdWdOS1Vua3FIdVZzT3FRaDlYNGx3SmQ4Y3liLUFBTWlnaW5HR1JrTVZJWktRSS1MU2h4bUh4TjNtZVBxWFZvMkZCTlZwZ2dyLWI4TQ?oc=5

As Iran War Spreads, Baghdad’s Slow Response Risks Unwanted Entanglement - mecouncil.org

The tepid response of Ali al-Zaidi's new Iraqi government to outlaw militias' involvement in the fighting could drag the country into a disastrous regional war.

The ongoing military escalation between Washington and Tehran could be a prelude to an open-ended confrontation with even more dangerous regional consequences. Such a prospect should compel regional states to raise their level of preparedness to protect their political, economic, and security interests. Yet Baghdad—the capital most exposed to the repercussions of these developments—remains governed by a political system mired in peripheral disputes and superficial measures that fail to address the root causes of the grave, multifaceted crises looming ahead. Baghdad’s lack of preparedness stems from several factors, including the war’s effects on the government’s financial resources. Most notably, however, the structural fragility of the Iraqi state and the fragmentation of its decision-making authority are a stark reminder of the dangers that could materialize should a full-scale regional confrontation erupt. Some armed groups remain capable of operating outside the mechanisms established by Iraq’s official security institutions, and they pay little heed to the rhetoric of “neutrality,” treating it as a slogan that can be disregarded without consequence. Outlaw armed militias have recently rejected calls to surrender their weapons outright, while some have issued cryptic signals in an apparent attempt to exploit the anticipated September deadline—the date agreed upon for the “complete withdrawal” of foreign forces. Baghdad now appears headed for an increasingly difficult confrontation with an emboldened militia establishment whose power extends across the military, political, parliamentary, and economic spheres. Yet no plan exists to contain a departure from the established course—whether under a scenario of open confrontation, a refusal by the militias to disarm, or a decision by the U.S. administration not to withdraw its troops, justified by the need to protect companies and uphold agreements, some of them signed during Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s recent visit to Washington. Iraq’s “domestic resilience” suffers from an underlying weakness, particularly in the aftermath of what became known as the “Dawn Offensive,” a sweeping anti-corruption campaign launched by al-Zaidi that has led to the arrest of dozens of individuals, including current and former lawmakers. The campaign created deep fissures within the ruling political establishment, leading some forces to believe that they alone were being targeted while others feared that they would be next. The result has been a crisis of confidence within Iraq’s political blocs—one that could translate into institutional disarray and an inability to manage state bodies or maintain control over critical decisions. Against this backdrop, Baghdad has plunged into a profound and alarming economic crisis. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the sharp decline in Iraqi oil exports, which account for roughly 90 percent of the state’s budget, have left the government unable to devise swift solutions to avert public anger that could erupt at any moment—particularly if the crisis begins to affect the salaries of public-sector employees and pensioners, as well as the vast numbers of Iraqis dependent on social welfare. Externally, tensions in Iraq’s relations with the international community and neighboring countries—particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—are increasingly apparent, as reflected in recent Saudi and American responses. These strains coincide with recurring allegations that attacks against those countries have been launched from Iraqi territory. Taken together, these crises present a dangerous outlook: should the region slide into another war, Baghdad could find itself virtually isolated abroad and bereft of leverage at home. Meanwhile, the United States is intensifying its military build-up in the Middle East, with dozens of strikes concentrated around the Iranian city of Ahvaz, near the Iraqi border and close to the Gulf states. Israel has also raised its level of military readiness, potentially laying the groundwork for a return to direct participation in the war. Another development—whose dangers to the region have received comparatively little attention—is the formal launch of Israel’s election campaign following the dissolution of the Knesset. Israel has now entered a decisive 90-day period leading up to the vote. With Benjamin Netanyahu facing mounting and multifaceted domestic pressure over his political future, he could resort to major escalatory measures as a means of escaping his predicament at home. An Israeli return to the fight would deepen the conflict’s complexity and could prompt Iran to mobilize affiliated groups across the region, particularly in Iraq—among the countries most exposed to the fallout of further escalation. This risk is compounded by the presence of U.S. interests on Iraqi soil and by outlaw militias’ continued possession of missiles and drones that could be used against American assets or Gulf states. During the initial 40-day phase of the war, Baghdad failed to prevent the outlaw militias from joining the escalation, raising the prospect that they could repeat the scenario in any future confrontation. Al-Zaidi—who held lengthy talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and made numerous commitments to rein in the militias and bring all weapons under state control—would face a serious predicament: all his assurances to Washington could unravel the moment the first drone is launched from Iraqi territory. Trump, who is seeking swift results, may then conclude that the Iraqi government is being evasive and merely buying time, without asserting effective control or taking tangible action on the ground. These developments, for which Baghdad appears wholly unprepared, could plunge the country into a sovereignty crisis no less dangerous than those it has faced in the past. Should drones or missiles be launched from Iraqi territory, the United States and Israel would have a pretext to strike inside Iraqi cities, as occurred previously when the headquarters, weapons depots, and commanders of armed militias were targeted. The Iraqi government would also face diplomatic and economic pressure, and potentially U.S. sanctions against individuals and institutions believed to support militia activities. The danger is no longer hypothetical. The attacks on Kuwait’s Abdali area—particularly amid allegations that Iraqi groups were responsible—along with other attacks that Saudi Arabia and Jordan allege were launched from Iraqi territory, place Baghdad on a direct collision course with its Gulf neighbors. Baghdad’s tendency to respond to such complaints by merely forming investigative committees exposes the official establishment’s inability to exercise control on the ground. It also sends an unmistakable signal that decisions of war and peace lie beyond the authority of state institutions—particularly if the escalation reaches a level at which Iran considers every option to be on the table. The problem is not confined to the official authorities; it extends to political forces as well, particularly the Coordination Framework, a council of major Shia parties that has so far demonstrated its inability to rein in the outlaw militias refusing to surrender their weapons. The bloc’s already strained relationship with the government, amid the latter’s anti-corruption campaign, could become a further liability if Washington concludes that Iraq’s assurances are not matched by concrete action on the ground. The Iraqi government’s reliance on limited, reciprocal strikes against these groups is a potentially disastrous gamble that could unravel rapidly. Baghdad must recognize that the current moment no longer allows for verbal assurances to external parties and cautious observation. It requires an immediate shift toward strategic planning and urgent action, free from the miscalculations that have consistently left Iraq reacting to events rather than anticipating them and protecting its national interests. An “open confrontation” scenario requires Baghdad to establish a high-level crisis center immediately and raise its readiness to protect critical infrastructure such as airports, oil installations, and diplomatic missions. It must also tighten surveillance along the borders and at suspected missile- and drone-launch sites; conduct a transparent investigation into the Abdali incident in coordination with Kuwait; activate direct channels of communication with Washington, Tehran, and the Gulf capitals to reaffirm that Iraqi territory may not be used to launch attacks; and mobilize a unified domestic political position that confronts those internal forces unilaterally dragging the country into war. The coming hours and days will be a genuine test of the new government’s ability to defend Iraq’s sovereignty, prevent the country from becoming an arena for settling regional scores, and retain control over decisions of war and peace. Rapid developments on the ground demand that the government move beyond merely monitoring events, by developing emergency plans and building the resilience needed to withstand the storms ahead. The turbulent history of this region—and Iraq’s own experience—has taught us that regional crises do not permit cost-free neutrality. A state that cannot deny the use of its airspace and territory, that fails to strengthen its “domestic resilience,” and that is deemed incapable of exercising effective authority will inevitably share the cost of the conflict and become one of its victims. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

Baghdad’s lack of preparedness stems from several factors, including the war’s effects on the government’s financial resources. Most notably, however, the structural fragility of the Iraqi state and the fragmentation of its decision-making authority are a stark reminder of the dangers that could materialize should a full-scale regional confrontation erupt. Some armed groups remain capable of operating outside the mechanisms established by Iraq’s official security institutions, and they pay little heed to the rhetoric of “neutrality,” treating it as a slogan that can be disregarded without consequence.

Outlaw armed militias have recently rejected calls to surrender their weapons outright, while some have issued cryptic signals in an apparent attempt to exploit the anticipated September deadline—the date agreed upon for the “complete withdrawal” of foreign forces. Baghdad now appears headed for an increasingly difficult confrontation with an emboldened militia establishment whose power extends across the military, political, parliamentary, and economic spheres. Yet no plan exists to contain a departure from the established course—whether under a scenario of open confrontation, a refusal by the militias to disarm, or a decision by the U.S. administration not to withdraw its troops, justified by the need to protect companies and uphold agreements, some of them signed during Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s recent visit to Washington.

Iraq’s “domestic resilience” suffers from an underlying weakness, particularly in the aftermath of what became known as the “Dawn Offensive,” a sweeping anti-corruption campaign launched by al-Zaidi that has led to the arrest of dozens of individuals, including current and former lawmakers. The campaign created deep fissures within the ruling political establishment, leading some forces to believe that they alone were being targeted while others feared that they would be next. The result has been a crisis of confidence within Iraq’s political blocs—one that could translate into institutional disarray and an inability to manage state bodies or maintain control over critical decisions.

Against this backdrop, Baghdad has plunged into a profound and alarming economic crisis. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the sharp decline in Iraqi oil exports, which account for roughly 90 percent of the state’s budget, have left the government unable to devise swift solutions to avert public anger that could erupt at any moment—particularly if the crisis begins to affect the salaries of public-sector employees and pensioners, as well as the vast numbers of Iraqis dependent on social welfare.

Externally, tensions in Iraq’s relations with the international community and neighboring countries—particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—are increasingly apparent, as reflected in recent Saudi and American responses. These strains coincide with recurring allegations that attacks against those countries have been launched from Iraqi territory. Taken together, these crises present a dangerous outlook: should the region slide into another war, Baghdad could find itself virtually isolated abroad and bereft of leverage at home.

Meanwhile, the United States is intensifying its military build-up in the Middle East, with dozens of strikes concentrated around the Iranian city of Ahvaz, near the Iraqi border and close to the Gulf states. Israel has also raised its level of military readiness, potentially laying the groundwork for a return to direct participation in the war.

Another development—whose dangers to the region have received comparatively little attention—is the formal launch of Israel’s election campaign following the dissolution of the Knesset. Israel has now entered a decisive 90-day period leading up to the vote. With Benjamin Netanyahu facing mounting and multifaceted domestic pressure over his political future, he could resort to major escalatory measures as a means of escaping his predicament at home.

An Israeli return to the fight would deepen the conflict’s complexity and could prompt Iran to mobilize affiliated groups across the region, particularly in Iraq—among the countries most exposed to the fallout of further escalation. This risk is compounded by the presence of U.S. interests on Iraqi soil and by outlaw militias’ continued possession of missiles and drones that could be used against American assets or Gulf states.

During the initial 40-day phase of the war, Baghdad failed to prevent the outlaw militias from joining the escalation, raising the prospect that they could repeat the scenario in any future confrontation. Al-Zaidi—who held lengthy talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and made numerous commitments to rein in the militias and bring all weapons under state control—would face a serious predicament: all his assurances to Washington could unravel the moment the first drone is launched from Iraqi territory.

Trump, who is seeking swift results, may then conclude that the Iraqi government is being evasive and merely buying time, without asserting effective control or taking tangible action on the ground.

These developments, for which Baghdad appears wholly unprepared, could plunge the country into a sovereignty crisis no less dangerous than those it has faced in the past. Should drones or missiles be launched from Iraqi territory, the United States and Israel would have a pretext to strike inside Iraqi cities, as occurred previously when the headquarters, weapons depots, and commanders of armed militias were targeted. The Iraqi government would also face diplomatic and economic pressure, and potentially U.S. sanctions against individuals and institutions believed to support militia activities.

The danger is no longer hypothetical. The attacks on Kuwait’s Abdali area—particularly amid allegations that Iraqi groups were responsible—along with other attacks that Saudi Arabia and Jordan allege were launched from Iraqi territory, place Baghdad on a direct collision course with its Gulf neighbors. Baghdad’s tendency to respond to such complaints by merely forming investigative committees exposes the official establishment’s inability to exercise control on the ground. It also sends an unmistakable signal that decisions of war and peace lie beyond the authority of state institutions—particularly if the escalation reaches a level at which Iran considers every option to be on the table.

The problem is not confined to the official authorities; it extends to political forces as well, particularly the Coordination Framework, a council of major Shia parties that has so far demonstrated its inability to rein in the outlaw militias refusing to surrender their weapons. The bloc’s already strained relationship with the government, amid the latter’s anti-corruption campaign, could become a further liability if Washington concludes that Iraq’s assurances are not matched by concrete action on the ground.

The Iraqi government’s reliance on limited, reciprocal strikes against these groups is a potentially disastrous gamble that could unravel rapidly. Baghdad must recognize that the current moment no longer allows for verbal assurances to external parties and cautious observation. It requires an immediate shift toward strategic planning and urgent action, free from the miscalculations that have consistently left Iraq reacting to events rather than anticipating them and protecting its national interests.

An “open confrontation” scenario requires Baghdad to establish a high-level crisis center immediately and raise its readiness to protect critical infrastructure such as airports, oil installations, and diplomatic missions. It must also tighten surveillance along the borders and at suspected missile- and drone-launch sites; conduct a transparent investigation into the Abdali incident in coordination with Kuwait; activate direct channels of communication with Washington, Tehran, and the Gulf capitals to reaffirm that Iraqi territory may not be used to launch attacks; and mobilize a unified domestic political position that confronts those internal forces unilaterally dragging the country into war.

The coming hours and days will be a genuine test of the new government’s ability to defend Iraq’s sovereignty, prevent the country from becoming an arena for settling regional scores, and retain control over decisions of war and peace. Rapid developments on the ground demand that the government move beyond merely monitoring events, by developing emergency plans and building the resilience needed to withstand the storms ahead.

The turbulent history of this region—and Iraq’s own experience—has taught us that regional crises do not permit cost-free neutrality. A state that cannot deny the use of its airspace and territory, that fails to strengthen its “domestic resilience,” and that is deemed incapable of exercising effective authority will inevitably share the cost of the conflict and become one of its victims.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMipwFBVV95cUxNUkYzeGpJbzhzenBldVZpYlZheXVHTWNuMlMxQkRxMEJia1Z2UlpHZmdWbW5ldi1PdFNZdEdGTTg1VmdlY2J0TFM0ZXl3VkdTWkpKbHVUbzhfTmNWdWdOS1Vua3FIdVZzT3FRaDlYNGx3SmQ4Y3liLUFBTWlnaW5HR1JrTVZJWktRSS1MU2h4bUh4TjNtZVBxWFZvMkZCTlZwZ2dyLWI4TQ?oc=5