핵심요약

• 이란은 석유 수출 및 탱커 통행료로 $50억 달러를 벌어들였습니다.
• 페르시아만에는 $10억 달러 이상의 비이란산 원유가 1,500만 배럴이 묶여 있습니다.
• 미국은 7월 7일 일반 라이선스 X를 철회하고 군사적 공세를 강화했습니다.
• 이란은 주요 원유 수출을 중단하여 수개월간 주요 수입원을 차단했습니다.

도입

본 기사는 미국과 이란 간의 에너지 정책 변화가 글로벌 에너지 흐름에 미치는 지정학적 영향을 분석합니다. MOU가 설정한 상업적 운송의 자유와 실제 이란의 해상 통제력 사이의 괴리를 조명함으로써, 국제 에너지 시장의 변동성과 리스크 프리미엄을 이해하는 데 중요합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 정책 변화가 유가와 공급망 안정성에 미치는 장기적인 영향을 면밀히 살펴볼 필요가 있습니다.

본문 1: 에너지 운송 통제력과 MOU의 한계

MOU는 호르무즈 해협을 모든 선박의 통행을 허용하는 것을 목표로 했으나, 이란은 여전히 해상 운송을 통제하는 독점적인 지위를 유지하고 있습니다. 이란은 MOU의 조건인 '무상 통행'을 위반하며 해상 무역을 차단함으로써, 미국이 설정한 제재와 무관하게 에너지 흐름을 통제하는 능력을 입증했습니다. 이는 양해각서가 단순한 정치적 합의에 불과하며, 실제적인 해상 통제권의 변화를 담보하지 못했음을 시사합니다. 이란이 에너지 운송을 통해 얻은 $50억 달러의 수익은 이러한 통제력을 활용한 경제적 이익을 보여주며, 이는 국제 해상 무역의 규범과 제재의 실효성에 대한 근본적인 질문을 던집니다.

본문 2: 미국의 정책 전환과 리스크 프리미엄

미국이 이란에 대한 제재를 해제하고 군사적 조치를 강화한 것은 이러한 불균형을 해소하려는 시도로 해석됩니다. 특히 미국이 7월 7일에 일반 라이선스 X를 철회하고 군사적 공세를 강화한 것은, 이란의 해상 통제에 대한 압력을 높이는 행위입니다. 이러한 미국의 행동은 시장에 새로운 불확실성을 야기하며, 이는 에너지 상품에 대한 리스크 프리미엄을 상승시키는 요인으로 작용합니다. 비록 미국이 제재를 완화하더라도, 이란의 군사적 행동과 해상 통제력은 여전히 글로벌 공급망에 심각한 변동성을 초래할 수 있습니다. 따라서 시장은 미국의 정책 변화뿐만 아니라 이란의 행동에 따른 지정학적 위험을 종합적으로 평가해야 합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 공급망과 지정학적 전망

페르시아만에 묶여 있는 $10억 달러 이상의 원유는 단기적인 해상 운송의 문제뿐만 아니라 장기적인 에너지 공급망의 취약성을 드러냅니다. 이란의 통제력은 향후 국제 에너지 가격의 안정성에 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 서방의 제재 정책과 이란의 행동 사이의 역동적인 관계를 이해해야 합니다. 장기적으로 볼 때, 이러한 지정학적 갈등은 에너지 자원의 흐름을 재편하고 새로운 공급망 구조를 형성할 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 단기적인 유가 변동성뿐만 아니라, 이란의 해상 통제력 변화에 따른 장기적인 에너지 안보 환경 변화에 주목해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiqAFBVV95cUxPUVpaMkhOeW5fXzNSY0VydHhpeWJjR3BMTmFYaEstRkROZnlwdFEzbnlscmZpOFYyYVdtVjRWOVRLaWhqc2czcU5LNjVyQ3NReWc0Q0w2a3ZpTjdsOEg2RFZlY1NndnNQekhXUFE3NXYtdTVPN1pDNEV5NXpPUmtSUzZqa0VhNlFuRGN1VnZ6SnpteVFMc3A3anpmTXhidldmbEpTRE1PMEU?oc=5

Oil For Tehran, Not Us: Removing Iran’s Strait Jacket on Global Energy Flows - JINSA

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Last month’s U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was supposed to open the Strait of Hormuz to any and all shipping. Yet Iran became the only regional country able to ship out its energy without threat of interference. The United States may now be putting an end to that untenable status quo, and it is more than justified in doing so.

The trade-for-trade model spelled out by the MOU has proven a dangerous falsehood. Iran’s energy shipments are moving at unprecedented rates, while, thanks to Iranian aggression, other nations’ crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas flows remain at a fraction of their pre-war volume.

Since the United States lifted its blockade on June 17 and waived U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil—via the Treasury Department’s General License X—on June 21, the Iranian regime has likely reaped $5 billion from oil exports and tanker tolls, per JINSA estimates. At the same time, Iran is still taxing , attacking , and generally choking off maritime energy trade through the Strait of Hormuz—a blatant violation of the MOU’s terms requiring Iran to permit “the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge.” Even now, nearly a month after the MOU was reached, over 15 million barrels of non-Iranian crude oil are stranded on tankers inside the Persian Gulf—collectively worth over $1 billion. All of it is being held hostage by the Iranian regime.

Fortunately, the United States is pivoting to an overdue course correction. In response to Iranian attacks on three energy tankers, and on Bahrain and Kuwait, in recent days, the U.S. government formally revoked General License X on July 7. It also has intensified military strikes on Iran, and informally suspended the MOU. Significantly, President Donald Trump has said he is considering reimposing the blockade that—as JINSA data shows and as Iranian leaders have now admitted —cut off Iran’s main revenue stream for months by stopping its crude oil shipments.

The Iranian regime is once again feeling the heat—at least for now. It is vital that the United States, rather than returning to the failed MOU, continue applying pressure to Iran until there are real and durable changes to its behavior.

The U.S. Sanctions Waiver: What It Was and Why It Mattered

On June 21, the U.S. Treasury Department issued General License X, authorizing Iran to sell crude oil and similar products. The license stated that, through August 21 of this year, “the production, sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil, petrochemical products, or petroleum products of Iranian origin” would be authorized. It also allowed Iran to repatriate revenue in U.S. dollars—reversing many years of Iran being isolated from the dollar and the American banking system. Doing so eliminated additional Iranian costs that it had previously incurred in its sanctions-evading oil trade—like expenditures on shadow tankers , money launderers , and networks of currency exchangers.

That U.S. concession, part of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), ended a decadeslong American policy to prevent Iran from being able to sell its oil and fund its range of dangerous behaviors. It also coincided with the U.S. decision three days prior, also made pursuant to the MOU, to lift the American blockade that had fully curtailed Iranian oil exports for two months. Neither had the desired result of pacifying Iran.

Iran rushed to export its oil at the first opportunity, and it made a fortune by doing so. It shipped out approximately 8 million barrels of crude oil on June 18, the day the MOU entered into effect—shipments with an estimated export value of, conservatively, over $565 million. The following day, Iran exported an estimated 20 million barrels of oil. Over the first two weeks after the U.S. blockade was lifted, the Iranian regime was able to export 50 million barrels of oil, according to TankerTrackers.com shipping data reviewed by JINSA. This tracks with Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohamed Ghalibaf’s June 30 comment that Iran, which he said was unable to export any oil during the naval blockade’s implementation, was able to sell 40 million barrels of oil after the blockade was lifted. Even slightly more conservative estimates place Iranian oil exports between June 14—when the MOU was announced—and July 6 at roughly 55 million barrels, valued at over $4.5 billion.

Please click the images above for higher-resolution versions. Compared to pre-war shipping flows, this export bonanza was a major boon for the cash-strapped Iranian regime. Prior to the war’s outbreak, Iran was able to export an estimated 47-50 million barrels of oil in a typical month—a roughly $3.05 billion value. That means that in the 22 days after the MOU was first announced, Iran generated, based on conservative estimates, 47 percent more revenue from its oil exports than it did in a full month before the war. It’s also worth noting that Iran, prior to the war, was forced to export its oil at a discount compared to energy market prices due to U.S. sanctions on its oil. Yet thanks to the U.S. waiver, Iran spent over two weeks selling crude oil at a relative premium—full market price—increasing the value of its oil exports.

There is good reason, though, to believe that Iran’s current revenue figure is even higher than the above estimates suggest.

Many ships laden with Iranian crude oil had already been in East Asian waters when the blockade entered effect, and in many cases, were unable to offload their oil to leery customers. With the U.S. sanctions waiver in effect for over two weeks, many such ships—including the infamous ghost fleet consisting of constantly-changing ship names, spoofed locations, and shadowy ownership—have apparently offloaded Iranian oil in recent days. At least seven such ships were tracked reaching the Eastern Outer Port Limits (EOPL) area near Malaysia in recent days. The EOPL is a vast maritime area where ship-to-ship oil transfers frequently take place, enabling Iranian oil to reach China without the unwanted visibility of a tanker entering Chinese waters.

Yet all this does not account for another primary source of Iranian funds: taxation. Although Iran is prohibited, under the MOU’s provisions , from charging any fees on shipping for a period of 60 days, Iran is nonetheless reportedly still demanding—and receiving—these extortionary payments in exchange for commercial ships’ safe passage.

According to July 8 reporting from Israel’s Globes outlet, “the Iranians are forbidding ships to pass without permission and without payment …. the Iranian government seeks to collect $2 million from each tanker.” Assuming that estimate is correct, even when discounting those tankers that did not take the “Iranian route” through the Strait, Iran may have generated an additional $300 million from its illicit tolls, according to JINSA’s review of Kpler shipping data.

It is safe to assume that, if the status quo remains in place until after the 60-day period expires, Iranian tolls—those Iran plans to “ coordinate ” with a far weaker and pliable Omani government—on tankers in nearby waters will go up even more.

In fact, Iran, if permitted to do so by the United States and the international community, will thereafter be able to charge exorbitant tolls so long as importing nations are willing to pay. There is good reason to believe they will be, as East Asian importers continue to feel the crunch from reduced oil supply, increased energy costs, and higher shipping costs due to constrained shipping flows through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran, in short, has reaped a financial windfall thanks to the MOU and its accompanying inducements to Tehran. It has almost certainly generated close to $5 billion in revenue in under a month—a significant increase over its pre-war revenue rate. Likely, much of it will go to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) activity and help fund the regime’s military, proxy, and internal oppression apparatuses.

…While Global Shipping Remains Constrained

While Iranian energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz have shot up, by contrast, for everyone else, energy flows through the maritime chokepoint are significantly down compared to pre-war levels. That scorecard is a bad omen for the future of maritime security in the Middle East—and U.S. deterrence of Iran, or lack thereof, writ large.

Iran’s active threats to shipping, not merely insurers or shipping firms’ abstract risk aversion, remain the cause of diminished energy flows. Iran has insisted that tankers through the Strait on the southern/western route near Oman turn around, and several have. It continues demanding that energy tankers travel near Iran’s shores on the northern/eastern route and reportedly is still extracting tolls from commercial ships.

Oil tankers rerouting away from Strait of Hormuz in recent days following Iranian threats. Source: Windward Intelligence

Put simply, Iran is continuing its extortion racket—backed up by force. Following Iran’s July 6 Iranian attacks, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, a leading global advisory firm, raised the threat level in the Strait to “severe,” its second-highest tier.

As a result, nearly a month after the MOU was concluded, energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz remain far below pre-war levels. Prior to the Iran war, an average of 15 million barrels of crude oil transited the Strait per day; yet in the entire first week after the MOU was reached, fewer than 35 million non-Iranian barrels of oil passed through the Strait, for an average of 4.8 million barrels of crude oil per day—less than a third of pre-war levels. In that same timespan, by contrast, Iran exported 5 million barrels of crude oil per day.

That overall picture has not improved since then. For example, on July 6, just 23 tankers traveled outbound through the Strait of Hormuz going in either direction. Yet pre-war shipping flows involved an average of 50-60 tankers traversing the Strait of Hormuz each day. That means, per JINSA estimates, there are at least 25 million fewer barrels of crude oil—cumulatively worth hundreds of millions of dollars—being sent through the Strait per day compared to pre-war activity. More concretely, around 23 million barrels of seaborne oil are still stranded inside the Strait.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiqAFBVV95cUxPUVpaMkhOeW5fXzNSY0VydHhpeWJjR3BMTmFYaEstRkROZnlwdFEzbnlscmZpOFYyYVdtVjRWOVRLaWhqc2czcU5LNjVyQ3NReWc0Q0w2a3ZpTjdsOEg2RFZlY1NndnNQekhXUFE3NXYtdTVPN1pDNEV5NXpPUmtSUzZqa0VhNlFuRGN1VnZ6SnpteVFMc3A3anpmTXhidldmbEpTRE1PMEU?oc=5