핵심요약

• 트럼프 대통령은 호르무즈 해협 유료 호위 서비스를 도입할 계획을 검토 중입니다.
• 이 제안은 미국 군사 전략의 전통적인 접근 방식에서 유료 서비스로의 전환을 의미합니다.
• 미군의 자원 고갈과 중동 지역 내 변화하는 동맹 관계로 인해 이 모델의 실현 가능성은 불확실합니다.

도입

이 기사는 미국 군사 전략의 근본적인 전환을 논의하고 있습니다. 트럼프 대통령의 제안은 미국 군사력의 역할에 대한 새로운 시각을 제시하며, 투자자들에게는 전략적 자산의 가치 재평가를 요구할 수 있습니다. 특히 중동 지역과 관련된 기업들의 리스크 프로파일 변화에 주목해야 합니다.

본문 1: 미국 군사 전략의 상업화

트럼프 대통령의 제안은 미국 군사력을 유료 서비스로 전환하는 것을 목표로 합니다. 호르무즈 해협을 통과하는 선박들에게 유료 호위 서비스를 제공함으로써 미국 군사 자원을 직접 수익화하려는 시도입니다. 이는 미국 군사 전략의 전통적인 접근 방식에서 벗어나, 경제적 수익을 중시하는 새로운 모델을 제시합니다. 이 접근 방식은 단기적으로는 미국 군사 예산의 일부를 보완할 수 있지만, 장기적으로는 동맹국들과의 신뢰 관계를 악화시킬 가능성도 있습니다.

본문 2: 중동 지역 내 변화하는 동맹 관계

트럼프 대통령의 제안은 중동 지역의 정치적 불안정을 반영합니다. 이란과의 휴전 합의 이후에도 호르무즈 해협의 안전성은 여전히 불안정하며, 이는 지역 내 다른 국가들의 동맹 전략을 변화시킬 수 있습니다. 특히 사우디아라비아와 아랍에미리트의 미국에 대한 의존도가 높아질 수 있으며, 이는 미국의 군사 전략에 새로운 기회를 제공할 수 있습니다. 그러나 이 제안이 성공적으로 실행되기 위해서는 지역 내 다양한 이해관계자들의 협력이 필수적입니다.

본문 3: 미국 군사 산업의 미래 전망

트럼프 대통령의 제안은 미국 군사 산업의 미래를 재구성할 수 있는 계기가 될 수 있습니다. 유료 군사 서비스의 도입은 새로운 수익 모델을 창출할 수 있으며, 이는 군사 산업의 성장 가능성을 높일 수 있습니다. 그러나 동시에 기존의 군사 계약 체계가 혼란에 빠질 수 있으며, 이는 산업 내의 불확실성을 증가시킬 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 이 제안이 군사 산업에 미칠 영향에 대해 신중하게 분석해야 합니다.

결론

트럼프 대통령의 제안은 미국 군사 전략의 새로운 방향성을 제시하며, 이는 투자자들에게 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다. 단기적으로는 유료 군사 서비스의 도입이 군사 예산의 일부를 보완할 수 있지만, 장기적으로는 동맹 관계의 변화와 군사 산업의 구조적 변화가 예상됩니다. 따라서 투자자들은 이 제안이 군사 산업과 관련 기업들의 가치에 미칠 영향을 지속적으로 모니터링해야 합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMifEFVX3lxTE9sWnhfWmk0cmVGQXoyLVZIUGh5N1NwSThUN3ZqUV8tMWdhSzhPX2w4bmd3VGlWcm92UF8wZE16SXB3WVdyWXJFT0dNMWJ6dUVzQUFCdlYxYWZleU9XcC02bGNWaWpxZGM1YWpaamFVV1ZrX0tGN3VJNjFnN0k?oc=5

Trump wants the US military to be rent-a-cops - vox.com

One of President Donald Trump’s core political positions has always been that US allies should pay more for the benefits they receive from US military power. This has included demanding that South Korea and Japan pay more for the presence of US troops on their soil, and suggesting that the US would only honor its mutual defense obligations under NATO for countries that are not “delinquent” in their defense spending.   Lately, however, he appears to be going even further — mulling the idea of turning the US military into a kind of force for hire.  --- Key takeaways * In his recent remarks, President Donald Trump has recast US military power as a paid service. Rather than treating America’s global security role as advancing US strategic interests, Trump increasingly frames military protection as something other countries should buy — whether through naval escorts in the Strait of Hormuz or a broader “guardian” role financed by Middle East oil revenues. * Washington has long justified its global military presence as serving America’s own economic and security interests. Trump’s approach replaces that logic with a far more transactional one, where military intervention is expected to generate direct financial returns. * In the wake of the disappointing results of the Iran war, America’s depleted military resources, and countries in the region looking to diversify their alliances, it’s not clear that there are still customers for what Trump is selling. --- Politico recently reported that Trump administration officials have been considering ideas to encourage still-reluctant shippers to return to the Strait of Hormuz, despite their concerns that it still isn’t safe after the US-Iran ceasefire deal. (This was before Iran announced on June 20 that it was reclosing the strait, throwing the entire arrangement into doubt.) The ideas reportedly included a “VIP pass” system where shippers would pay the US to receive a naval escort through the strait.  On an even more expansive note, Trump suggested in an interview with the New York Times’ David Sanger last week that if Iran does not abide by the terms of its deal with the US, one step he might consider would be making the United States “the guardian of the Middle East” in return for 20 percent of the region’s revenues — effectively a regional police force paid in oil money.  Over the weekend, Trump expanded on that idea in a Truth Social post, pushing back on reports that Iran would charge tolls for ships transiting the strait, writing, “There ​will be NO TOLLS in the ​Hormuz Strait for 60 days during the Cease Fire Period, and there ​will be NO TOLLS ​after the 60 day period has expired, ‌unless ⁠they are imposed by and for the United States of America, should the deal not ​be ​completed, for ⁠services rendered as the Guardian Angel to ​the countries of the ​Middle ⁠East for purposes of both past, present, and future reimbursement ⁠of ​costs.” This is, as Sanger noted, a departure for a president who long questioned both the need to maintain expensive large-scale military deployments in the region and the need to get the US military involved in foreign wars. But it’s also strange given that the need to keep oil flowing out of the Persian Gulf is one of the biggest, if not the biggest of reasons, why the US has such a large military presence in the region in the first place. From the 1980 “Carter Doctrine,” through the Reagan administration’s Persian Gulf tanker war, through Desert Storm and up through 9/11 and the War on Terrorism, US military power helped keep the oil flowing not because it was being paid by local emirs — but because doing so was seen as a vital national interest of the United States.  The new vision sounds less like a global guardian than a state-backed mercenary force.  Turning America’s military into a force for hire At one time, Trump appeared to view the ideal model for America’s global military primacy as a sort of protection racket, where countries would pay handsomely for being under the US security umbrella. He now seems to have something more fleeting and transactional in mind: A system where the US is a global troubleshooter for hire.  This “have gun will travel” model of American power feels like a natural evolution of Trump’s current approach to foreign policy. It’s transparently obvious at this point that the president isn’t any sort of isolationist; he’s a right-wing globalist who is comfortable intervening — including with military force — to deal with foreign crises, even when American interests aren’t obviously at stake. But unlike his liberal internationalist or neoconservative predecessors, he’s suspicious of alliances and binding security commitments. (The mutual-defense deal the US inked by executive order with Qatar last year feels less like a sign of how seriously this administration takes the security of Qatar than of how unseriously it takes deals like this.) Rather than the traditional network of alliances and security guarantees that have long undergirded America’s global military might, Trump’s ideal vision sometimes seems to more resemble the deals Russia inked in recent years to provide security services for various governments in Africa, first via the now-defunct military contractor Wagner Group, and now via more directly state-run paramilitaries. That’s a very different way of thinking about the role of American power in the world.  The “enshittification” of American power The evolution from the Carter Doctrine — which held that any attempt “to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America” — to Trump’s suggestions of turning the US military into what sounds on paper like a mercenary force for Gulf monarchies, can be seen as emblematic of what the political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman have called “the enshittification of American power.” The term is borrowed from science fiction writer Cory Doctorow’s description of how online products — particularly social media sites — decline in quality over time as they pivot from providing useful and enjoyable services to their users to extracting value from them. Likewise, the United States has spent decades selling its allies on a model that ties their security and stability to American military primacy. And now that they’re locked in, Washington is jacking up the user fees. In the Carter and Reagan eras, it was seen as self-evident that the US benefited from the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. In the Trump era, the president wants to make sure we get a cut of the action.  But as Trump seeks to monetize American military primacy, potential “customers” could be starting to wonder what they’re getting for the money. Countries in the Gulf were already reconsidering their traditional reliance on the US as an ally before Trump launched a war that led to missile attacks on their cities and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. It didn’t help that the war ultimately ended with the Iranian regime still in power, and much of its missile and nuclear programs still intact. (In recent days, Trump has gone as far as to say that it’s only fair for Iran to have ballistic missiles when so many of its regional rivals do.) It may be hard to market your services as a “guardian angel” when these are the results. Now, there are ongoing talks about developing a regional security framework that includes the Gulf countries and Iran, but not the United States.  It’s also far from clear whether the US has the firepower for a global troubleshooter role. The Iran war, a relatively short conflict with a far weaker adversary, taxed US stocks of missiles and interceptors to the point that the military had to divert resources from other global hot spots. On Wednesday, Trump gathered the heads of US defense contractors at the White House to pressure them into ramping up production. And in an age of AI-enabled warfare, the US military is increasingly locked in to the services of companies like SpaceX, which raised the price of internet connectivity for US kamikaze drones during the war with Iran, and Anthropic, which pushed back on how its products were being used on the eve of the conflict. In their 2025 Wired magazine article on the enshittification of American power, Farrell and Newman use Starlink as a prominent example of how countries become locked into US-dominated military platforms. The Ukrainian military’s dependence on Starlink for battlefield connectivity, for instance, became a liability when Musk cut service in 2022 at a time when Ukraine was rapidly retaking territory. (Musk reportedly feared nuclear retaliation by Russia.) But it’s becoming clear that the US is also vulnerable to this kind of leverage from its private contractors.  Moreover, even as counterterrorism has faded somewhat as a US security priority, it’s clear from this recent conflict that the US still has a hard time winning asymmetric wars against weaker adversaries that have the advantage of geography and more will to fight. The US can’t eliminate the security threat from adversaries like Iran, though it can punish and degrade them — hence Trump’s repeated threats to return to airstrikes if the country steps out of line again.  The notion that the US will need to play an ongoing “guardian” role to keep the Middle East stable is a long way from the “everlasting peace” Trump was promising a year ago after the signing of a ceasefire deal in Gaza. This moment is not a high point for the US-Israel relationship, just a few months after the two countries broke new ground by going into combat side-by-side for the first time. But still, Trump does appear to have somewhat embraced Israel’s logic of “mowing the grass” — the idea that rather than getting locked into long, drawn-out wars to defeat asymmetric adversaries, it’s better to simply launch periodic missions to degrade and knock them off balance.  The “guardian” role Trump seems to have in mind may be less a police force than a landscaping service — replacing the goal of long-term security for both the US itself and its allies, with short-term profit. 

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMifEFVX3lxTE9sWnhfWmk0cmVGQXoyLVZIUGh5N1NwSThUN3ZqUV8tMWdhSzhPX2w4bmd3VGlWcm92UF8wZE16SXB3WVdyWXJFT0dNMWJ6dUVzQUFCdlYxYWZleU9XcC02bGNWaWpxZGM1YWpaamFVV1ZrX0tGN3VJNjFnN0k?oc=5